DBWI: Italian campaign gums up in WW2 and 'Overlord' forced on W. Allies?

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Original Timeline we know that following the landings in southern Italy, in September 1943, the Western Allies proceeded up the Italian peninsula until they ran into the German 'winter line'. Here they stopped whilst Monty reorganized and prepared, and then in early December, 1943, with a 'lot of luck' and some brilliant deception operations (and some classic directives from Hitler), the Western Allies under Monty forced the lines, 'bagged' most of the German army which had been opposing them, and were in Rome by Christmas. The Germans threw more troops into Northern Italy, to garrison the 'Gothic Line', but Allied deception operations convinced them that landings in northern France/the Low Countries/Norway were the major threat, and they didn't have enough to stop the Western Allies from breaking the Gothic Line at the end of April/start of May, and cleaning out most of what was left of Italy. Then, in June 1944, the Western Allies moved along the coast with a series of amphibious hooks into southern France, soon had Marseilles, and were ready to drive up the Rhone Valley.

What if the Italian campaign comes to a halt though, maybe running up against the Winter Line and sticking there for half a year or more? Maybe the Germans get lucky and drop a stray bomb on Monty, or Hitler doesn't tell his generals exactly where the W. Allies will attack and how, and get it so spectacularly wrong. And without ongoing success in Italy, and with the presidential elections looming, Roosevelt issues an ultimatum to Churchill of no more troops for Italy, and instead (to keep their promises to Stalin of a front in France by mid-1944) they have to go cross-Channel (i.e. carry out 'Operation Overlord' for real)? How would a W. Allied attempt to land in Northern France or the Low Countries go in mid-1944? Besides all the concrete and steel he had Rommel pouring into building the 'Atlantic Wall', Hitler had all the ports garrisoned like crazy and the disastrous Dieppe raid in 1942 showed just how bloody any attempt to take a port by direct assault from the sea could get. :( And without a port, could the W. Allies have landed in anything like enough strength to achieve very much of meaning, without the capacity to keep a serious sized army in supply or to get to it heavy equipment in any volume? (Good luck putting ashore a Pershing tank in 1944 without a port!)
Of course, part of the OTL timeline deception operations which convinced Hitler to pour more and more troops into the area along the Channel coast in early 1944 were stories relayed to him via double-agents that the W. Allies were going to take 'floating harbours' with them, when they invaded; could such things have actually been built and have worked (and survived in the Channel environment - the weather in the early summer in 1944 had some pretty brutal storms, after all)?
And how much arm-twisting would it have taken on Roosevelt's part to get Churchill to actually green-light a cross-Channel operation? In his post-war memoirs Churchill wrote fairly frankly that he was adverse to the idea of such an 'adventure', and that he wanted the focus to stay on the front (in the Mediterranean) where the W. Allies were already 'ashore' in mainland Europe, because he feared a 'Gallipoli, on a vastly larger scale', should the Allies try to cross the Channel to force a landing on the coast of Northern France.

Edit:
I suppose what it comes down to is that if the Italian offensive 'gums up' to the point that the W. Allies can't support/make a move across the border/along the coast into Southern France, in mid-1944, then:
1) Could the W. Allies actually breech the lines of bunkers, walls, naval mines, and various beach-obstacles in Northern France and put ashore a force in the face of German resistance?
2) Assuming a force could be got ashore and German immediate counter-attacks suppressed with a combination of naval gunfire and (if close enough) airpower flying from southern England could it be kept in sufficiently good supply (with equipment, ammunition, food, fuel, and other stuff) to do anything other than sit there on the beaches without a 'real' port (such as Cherbourg, Calais, Le Havre, etc)?
3) Could/would Churchill be persuaded to go along with such a scheme in the first place, in despite of the first two problems, outlined above, that any such operation would stumble (and perhaps fail) against?

NB
For the confused, see the wiki on 'DBWI': http://wiki.alternatehistory.com/doku.php/alternate_history/double_blind_what_if?s
 
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Chill, you gave it scarcely six hours to develop.

Just bump it, I imagine wiking or someone like that is preparing a deep and highly-detailed response to your OP as we speak.
 
IF such an invasion had worked out (which is highly improbable) - perhaps the Allies meet the Soviets somewhere in the middle of Germany instead of the Rhine? It took a surprisingly long time to drive up the Rhone...

Also, post-war Soviet and Allied relations would have likely been a lot better. Stalin always complained that Italy was not a "real" 2nd front despite the fact that the Allies made huge progress in the theater.
 
When looking at the map, German fortifications were concentrated in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, and grew ever thinner as you got further from Calais, with the exception of the main port of the French Navy, Brest. This leaves the Cotentin peninsula and Cherbourg vulnerable. If Overlord is enforced, I see it trying to debark there and establish a beachhead, instead of the 1942 failure in Pas-de-Calais.
 
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could the W. Allies have landed in anything like enough strength to achieve very much of meaning, without the capacity to keep a serious sized army in supply or to get to it heavy equipment in any volume? (Good luck putting ashore a Pershing tank in 1944 without a port!)

The Sicilian campaign was run for four weeks primarily with cross beach supply. The Army that captured Marsailles operated for six weeks with cross beach supply until the port was opened. The railways & automotive roads to Italy were so badly damaged & took so long to open they were unusable for over 120 days after capture. Similarly a army was supplied cross beach on Luzon for a couple months until enough small ports were opened. On Okinawa not only was a army supplied cross beach, but a massive depot for the invasin of Japan was built up mostly cross beach. The small port of Naha could only handle a portion of the total, even after it had been rebuilt & upgraded after the island was cleared.

There is also the question how long it takes to capture a port from the landward side - the correct solution since at least Roman & probablly Sumerian times. Marsailles lasted only a few days & the French attacking it lacked heavy artillery, confounding the critics. When the fortified Atlantic ports were surrounded and besieged the time to take them varied widely froma few days to two months. the variable seems to have been the relative skill of the defenders. Brest which resisted some major assaults held out over six weeks. It was in part because a elite paratroop division was there, and in part because the commander was willing to take severe casualties in the defence. Most German generals were unwilling to sacrafice that many men for a near pointless seige.

In the Pacifc the massively fortified islands like Pelieu or Iwo Jima seldom held out to eight weeks, despite that their design forced frontal assault, and their defenders wee enitely unwilling to surender.

Of course, part of the OTL timeline deception operations which convinced Hitler to pour more and more troops into the area along the Channel coast in early 1944 were stories relayed to him via double-agents that the W. Allies were going to take 'floating harbours' with them, when they invaded; could such things have actually been built and have worked (and survived in the Channel environment - the weather in the early summer in 1944 had some pretty brutal storms, after all)?

Specifically floating docks and breakwaters were tested on the Scottish coast January 1943 & to the spring. They survived the winter storms there. Most of the other cross beach offloading techniques were used in other amphib operations. Conspricy theorists claim Churchill or Brooke witheld knowledge of the prefab harbors from the Yanks, but since most of the techniques used to operate the proposed 'floating' harbors were already known and used by the Americans this seems a bit of reaching.

And how much arm-twisting would it have taken on Roosevelt's part to get Churchill to actually green-light a cross-Channel operation? In his post-war memoirs Churchill wrote fairly frankly that he was adverse to the idea of such an 'adventure', and that he wanted the focus to stay on the front (in the Mediterranean) where the W. Allies were already 'ashore' in mainland Europe, because he feared a 'Gallipoli, on a vastly larger scale', should the Allies try to cross the Channel to force a landing on the coast of Northern France.

Of course the word Gallipoli or such a phobia was never connected by Churchill to his numerous proposals for amphib invasions in the Med, or anywhere else for that matter. His Cassadra act only emerged when a attack was connected to French soil. He was also opposed to the offensive in the direction of southern France & the Riviera invasion. So much so that it turned into a US/French campaign with only a couple of brigades of Commandos & Paras being the Commonwealth contribution.

Edit:
I suppose what it comes down to is that if the Italian offensive 'gums up' to the point that the W. Allies can't support/make a move across the border/along the coast into Southern France, in mid-1944, then:
1) Could the W. Allies actually breech the lines of bunkers, walls, naval mines, and various beach-obstacles in Northern France and put ashore a force in the face of German resistance?

The Japanese repeatedly put out heavily fortified positions, which were always defeated. Some by manuver & clever strategems, but mostly through massive firepower and higly developed assault units.

2) Assuming a force could be got ashore and German immediate counter-attacks suppressed with a combination of naval gunfire and (if close enough) airpower flying from southern England could it be kept in sufficiently good supply (with equipment, ammunition, food, fuel, and other stuff) to do anything other than sit there on the beaches without a 'real' port (such as Cherbourg, Calais, Le Havre, etc)?

As before; the Allies did repeatedly force entier armies ashore without a imeadiately avaulalbe port. ie: the US 5th Army was supplied pricipally across the Salerno beaches & a couple small fishing ports for two months until enough repairs were made to the Naples harbor.

3) Could/would Churchill be persuaded to go along with such a scheme in the first place, in despite of the first two problems, outlined above, that any such operation would stumble (and perhaps fail) against?

Churchill opposed the south France operation to the point where only two British brigades were included. Since most field formations of the Brits were sent to the Med its tough to see how they could have participated.

However the decision needs to be made by the US before the end of 1943. While Op bolero had built some infrastructure for US ground forces in the UK that was incomplete in Jan 1944. A invasion along the lines of the 1943 COSSAC 'Overlord' plans would require some six months of preparation, not the six weeks average of the Mediterranean invasions. The Scicillian invasion - Op Husky might be a guide as that attack of two armies had been under preparation since the Symbol confrence in late January 1943. About six months.
 
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