A obscure bit of forgotten diplomacy was the Iraqi threat to invade Kuwait in the summer of 1990. A 'clarification of the US position on that from the US Ambassador seems to have squelched that, but WI?
Backstory. Post Iraqi Iranian war Iraqs finances were thin. Oil sales revenues were stagnant & Iraqs creditor nations were not a flexible as hoped for. Kuwait was a major creditor, and vulnerable so the Iraqi government, which was pretty much in the hands of the president & Baaith party leader Saddam Hussein, place extreme pressure on Kuwait, reviving claims of oil poaching from border fields, raising the old argument Kuwait was a Iraqi province illegally detached by the colonial policies of the British Empire. When the Iraqis inquired about the US position on the use of "military pressure" the US Ambassador threw a little diplomatic fit and made it clear that would not be tolerated & the US fully supported the Kuwait/Saudi policies vis Iraqi loans.
However this was not clearly US policy at the moment. The Bush administration had been playing a complex game against all parties, seeking to both keep Iraq passive, and yet force greater flexibility on its creditors. The ambassador took considerable heat for her message & there were further efforts to keep the situation balanced. However the damage was done, at least to the Baathist government. While the creditor governments took greater flexibility in the longer run, Iraq was financially troubled the next few years. Hussein was ousted in a coup, along with his supporters. There was a brief tho divisive civil war of Shia vs Sunni, & Iraq became subject to a series on eneffectual and occasionally dangerous governments that were changed by coup.
So, WI the ambassador had followed the policy and forwarded the ambigious policy statement the State Dept had drafted with the White House. Judging from the previous messages and the proposed 'damage control' message, those eventually sent the iraqis could have misinterpreted US attitude on this and actually invaded Kuwait. Either to ransom away a portion of its debt, or annex the nation entirely.
Can the Baath goverment still survive past 1993?
What is the actual US reaction?
What are the reactions of other concerned nations?
Could or would the Iraqi Army eventually pressure the Saudis the same way?
What else?
Backstory. Post Iraqi Iranian war Iraqs finances were thin. Oil sales revenues were stagnant & Iraqs creditor nations were not a flexible as hoped for. Kuwait was a major creditor, and vulnerable so the Iraqi government, which was pretty much in the hands of the president & Baaith party leader Saddam Hussein, place extreme pressure on Kuwait, reviving claims of oil poaching from border fields, raising the old argument Kuwait was a Iraqi province illegally detached by the colonial policies of the British Empire. When the Iraqis inquired about the US position on the use of "military pressure" the US Ambassador threw a little diplomatic fit and made it clear that would not be tolerated & the US fully supported the Kuwait/Saudi policies vis Iraqi loans.
However this was not clearly US policy at the moment. The Bush administration had been playing a complex game against all parties, seeking to both keep Iraq passive, and yet force greater flexibility on its creditors. The ambassador took considerable heat for her message & there were further efforts to keep the situation balanced. However the damage was done, at least to the Baathist government. While the creditor governments took greater flexibility in the longer run, Iraq was financially troubled the next few years. Hussein was ousted in a coup, along with his supporters. There was a brief tho divisive civil war of Shia vs Sunni, & Iraq became subject to a series on eneffectual and occasionally dangerous governments that were changed by coup.
So, WI the ambassador had followed the policy and forwarded the ambigious policy statement the State Dept had drafted with the White House. Judging from the previous messages and the proposed 'damage control' message, those eventually sent the iraqis could have misinterpreted US attitude on this and actually invaded Kuwait. Either to ransom away a portion of its debt, or annex the nation entirely.
Can the Baath goverment still survive past 1993?
What is the actual US reaction?
What are the reactions of other concerned nations?
Could or would the Iraqi Army eventually pressure the Saudis the same way?
What else?