Kaiser Wilhelm
Banned
Truth be told 30% of the Roman male populace was dead, who could blame for giving up at the very end.
Yup
Truth be told 30% of the Roman male populace was dead, who could blame for giving up at the very end.
If Hasdrubal lost at Metaurus, there's no way Mago would ever get to Italy, not with Roman dominance over the seas; his capture of Genua, allowing Mago to enter the harbor unopposed, was at least as much a strategic coup as Cannae. Once all three 'Thunderbolts' were in Italy, each with a major army, all the blood and treasure spilled in Spain and Sicily was for naught. Scipio Hispenienses would have never been recalled, nor would he have felt the need to finally offer the decisive battle under the walls of Rome Hannibal had been seeking the whole time.
I mean, it’s perfectly understandable that he did so. Hell, he almost won, even in those awful conditions
It's really a credit to Scipio Hispaniensus that he was able to counsel peace to the hotheads who wanted to try raising another army after his army had been scattered just north of the city; none of his brilliant victories in Spain compare to his statesmanship, bringing peace and prosperity to Rome after decades of war, reforming the senate to be more responsible to the people, and stewarding the economy to quickly pay down the indemnity.Truth be told 30% of the Roman male populace was dead, who could blame for giving up at the very end.
Certainly; by that point, Hannibal's army was the smallest one in Italy, and it reflects well on Hannibal's confidence in his army that he was willing to accept Scipio's offer of battle, camping only a few miles away, before Mago had even reached him. His battle plan, sending in Spanish, Gallic cavalry to exploit the gaps opened by the elephants pulled from Hasdrubal's army was inspired, and would have worked whether or not Scipio had a plan for dealing with the elephants.I mean, it’s perfectly understandable that he did so. Hell, he almost won, even in those awful conditions
It's really a credit to Scipio Hispaniensus that he was able to counsel peace to the hotheads who wanted to try raising another army after his army had been scattered just north of the city; none of his brilliant victories in Spain compare to his statesmanship, bringing peace and prosperity to Rome after decades of war, reforming the senate to be more responsible to the people, and stewarding the economy to quickly pay down the indemnity.
Certainly; by that point, Hannibal's army was the smallest one in Italy, and it reflects well on Hannibal's confidence in his army that he was willing to accept Scipio's offer of battle, camping only a few miles away, before Mago had even reached him. His battle plan, sending in Spanish, Gallic cavalry to exploit the gaps opened by the elephants pulled from Hasdrubal's army was inspired, and would have worked whether or not Scipio had a plan for dealing with the elephants.
And then what? You can't feed a city of a quarter million on stores forever, and the vengeance would be all the more terrible for having been so long delayed. Scipio could hardly be expected to know which army would invest Rome and which would defend their communications once they joined. He had to take his chance of beating Hannibal on the field, and had reason to be confident, outnumbering him two to one the night before the battle, not to mention faith in his won abilities. Unfortunately, Mago was able to join his brother before he could be made aware.Not really. If the feasting that occured in the following weeks in the Gaulic camps was any indication the city had taken the precaution of loading up its graineries with food, and had access to plenty of fresh water. Assuming they had the will, Rome could have withstood quite the effective siege considering none of the Carthaginian forces were particularly well experienced or equip for attacking major fortifications. People tend to forget that all the big victories were, ultimately, ambushes and field battles.
It's really a credit to Scipio Hispaniensus that he was able to counsel peace to the hotheads who wanted to try raising another army after his army had been scattered just north of the city; none of his brilliant victories in Spain compare to his statesmanship, bringing peace and prosperity to Rome after decades of war, reforming the senate to be more responsible to the people, and stewarding the economy to quickly pay down the indemnity.
Certainly; by that point, Hannibal's army was the smallest one in Italy, and it reflects well on Hannibal's confidence in his army that he was willing to accept Scipio's offer of battle, camping only a few miles away, before Mago had even reached him. His battle plan, sending in Spanish, Gallic cavalry to exploit the gaps opened by the elephants pulled from Hasdrubal's army was inspired, and would have worked whether or not Scipio had a plan for dealing with the elephants.
After fleeing to Massilia, yes, but that's only because Carthage threatened war on the city if he wasn't handed over.Wasn’t he eventually assassinated though?
That's just silly; Carthage ruled the breadbasket of the Mediterranean, and this is a time when all economies are based on agriculture.Any way, if Carthage lost, they would have most certainly tumbled into a steep decline. Carthage was a city built on money and if it wasn't for Rome's ludicrous concessions, their economy wouldn't have stayed afloat
Any way, if Carthage lost, they would have most certainly tumbled into a steep decline. Carthage was a city built on money and if it wasn't for Rome's ludicrous concessions, their economy wouldn't have stayed afloat
After fleeing to Massilia, yes, but that's only because Carthage threatened war on the city if he wasn't handed over.
That's just silly; Carthage ruled the breadbasket of the Mediterranean, and this is a time when all economies are based on agriculture.
And then what? You can't feed a city of a quarter million on stores forever, and the vengeance would be all the more terrible for having been so long delayed. Scipio could hardly be expected to know which army would invest Rome and which would defend their communications once they joined. He had to take his chance of beating Hannibal on the field, and had reason to be confident, outnumbering him two to one the night before the battle, not to mention faith in his won abilities. Unfortunately, Mago was able to join his brother before he could be made aware.
While Carthage was a bread basket it was in 2 biggest wars of the century and had lost the first one, Rome's concessions were a cushion to pay their armies for their good service.That's just silly; Carthage ruled the breadbasket of the Mediterranean, and this is a time when all economies are based on agriculture.
Well, mistake for who in Carthage? Hannibal's kingship ushered in a golden age of Punic empire and culture, as cities and tribes impressed by his honorable conduct flocked to their banner.That was a mistake. Carthage’s decision, I mean. It led to pissing off Hannibal and led him to lead a coup of the Republic.
Hannibal would be able to maintain the siege indefinitely, as with his brothers' armies in Italy, he would have a secure line of communications to his operational base; sieges are not supplied from the coutnryside period. I'd also have to argue against any idea they were psychologically defeated; after all, it took the rare agreement of Fabius and Scipio to counsel peace against the people's Phokian fixations. Scipio was also an inventive tactician, and fought extremely well in his last land battle, too; had it not been for Hannibal's excellent coordinated use of heavy cavalry and elephants, he almost certainly would have won. The idea of expelling the women and children of the city -the very people their husbands, sons, brothers, fathers are supposed to die to protect- to uselessly extend a siege is so outlandish it doesn't warrant dismissal.Hannibal also woulden't have been able to sustain a siege in the already picked-clean countryside forever either. Cities in the ancient world have conducted extended siege many, many times throughout history: granted, it would have involved the kicking out of a large number of women and children, but they already were broken psychologically anyways: resistance by "useless mouths" would have likely been minimal if Scipio had had same attitude as so many leaders of antiquity for the nessecities of warfare. When push came to shove, though, he managed to talk himself into his own delusions that maybe if we try the same tactic of just marching the heavy infantry into the enemy's center AGAIN, this time it will work.
Hannibal would be able to maintain the siege indefinitely, as with his brothers' armies in Italy, he would have a secure line of communications to his operational base; sieges are not supplied from the coutnryside period. I'd also have to argue against any idea they were psychologically defeated; after all, it took the rare agreement of Fabius and Scipio to counsel peace against the people's Phokian fixations. Scipio was also an inventive tactician, and fought extremely well in his last land battle, too; had it not been for Hannibal's excellent coordinated use of heavy cavalry and elephants, he almost certainly would have won. The idea of expelling the women and children of the city -the very people their husbands, sons, brothers, fathers are supposed to die to protect- to uselessly extend a siege is so outlandish it doesn't warrant dismissal.
Well, mistake for who in Carthage? Hannibal's kingship ushered in a golden age of Punic empire and culture, as cities and tribes impressed by his honorable conduct flocked to their banner.
Hannibal would be able to maintain the siege indefinitely, as with his brothers' armies in Italy, he would have a secure line of communications to his operational base; sieges are not supplied from the coutnryside period. I'd also have to argue against any idea they were psychologically defeated; after all, it took the rare agreement of Fabius and Scipio to counsel peace against the people's Phokian fixations. Scipio was also an inventive tactician, and fought extremely well in his last land battle, too; had it not been for Hannibal's excellent coordinated use of heavy cavalry and elephants, he almost certainly would have won. The idea of expelling the women and children of the city -the very people their husbands, sons, brothers, fathers are supposed to die to protect- to uselessly extend a siege is so outlandish it doesn't warrant dismissal.
[OOC: it was established earlier that Scipio had to dissuade them from raising another army and having another go]Um... have you read any accounts of sieges in antiquity? Expelling large chunks of the civilian population (Or at least those who can't actively contribute to the war effort) was par for the course at the time. Armies in ancient warfare also did live largely off looting the land they lived on: this is an era in which your most advanced form of transport is the horse with a cart, before refridgeration or basically any form of preservation beyond salting, which prevented large scale, long distance transport of basic foodstuffs. I'm not discounting that Scipio was a fairly inventive tactician... but he could also make really stupid mistakes be underestimating his opponents, both in politics and on the field. Playing to your enemy's greatest strength (His maneuverability and speed) while completely abandoning the use of yours (The prepared fortifications of the city walls and advantages close quarters, slow moving fighting give to heavy infantry, Rome's forte) was one of the later.
And yes, Roman morale was teetering on the edge of absolute breakdown. (OCC: This was established earlier in the thread...)
[OOC: it was established earlier that Scipio had to dissuade them from raising another army and having another go]
Plundering the countryside can sustain an army on the march, but not a siege; there's no way the Spanish countryside could have supported Hannibal for the eight months he spent besieging Saguntum. Moreover, Latinum proper had not been the seat of war for long up to this point; aside from Hannibal's approach in 211 BC and the final campaign, it was relatively untouched. With secure communications, Hannibal or one of his brothers could sustain a siege at length, making the city's fall a matter of time. Additionally, Hannibal's tactics in the last battle with Scipio were distinctly off-brand for him; a direct, frontal attack in the center of his enemy's line is about the last thing you'd expect from him, but he pulled it off flawlessly, with great credit owed to Mago for swiftly joining him undetected under cover of darkness. Scipio's deployment with his Spanish allies holding the center and Romans on the wings was by no means inferior to Hannibal's deployment at Cannae, and against a less daring enemy could have crushed him.
[OOC: it was established earlier that Scipio had to dissuade them from raising another army and having another go]
Plundering the countryside can sustain an army on the march, but not a siege; there's no way the Spanish countryside could have supported Hannibal for the eight months he spent besieging Saguntum. Moreover, Latinum proper had not been the seat of war for long up to this point; aside from Hannibal's approach in 211 BC and the final campaign, it was relatively untouched. With secure communications, Hannibal or one of his brothers could sustain a siege at length, making the city's fall a matter of time. Additionally, Hannibal's tactics in the last battle with Scipio were distinctly off-brand for him; a direct, frontal attack in the center of his enemy's line is about the last thing you'd expect from him, but he pulled it off flawlessly, with great credit owed to Mago for swiftly joining him undetected under cover of darkness. Scipio's deployment with his Spanish allies holding the center and Romans on the wings was by no means inferior to Hannibal's deployment at Cannae, and against a less daring enemy could have crushed him.