Wilderness? He turned Grant, although not decisively.(1)
Gettysburg? He attacked en echelon, which is a variant of a turning movement against a flank secure position.(2)
The Overland Campaign? Lee continually outgeneralled Grant to the point Grant conceded defeat and settled down for a siege.(3)
Anyone with sense enough to look at a map knows Malvern Hill is not a tenable position. If he'd have stood on Malvern Hill Longstreet would have enveloped him and the Army of the Potomac would have been destroyed.(4)
OOC:
(1) Grant's only concern in the Wilderness was passing through it. Grand maneuvers in the Wilderness involving turning of flanks (that could be exploited) were impossible. The very same natural barriers that prevented Grant and Meade from exploiting their artillery advantage barred Lee from keeping Grant from advancing. With 40,000 less men, there was only so much Lee could do to Grant. And Grant very well knew that. Lee's problem was he didn't.
(2)Gettysburg was a three day battle. The First Day was not under the control of Meade or Lee.
You are describing the Second Day only. And there was fighting in other sectors besides Hood's and McLaws'. Lee's plans for attack that day made no allowance for his ignorance of the ground on the flanks, and that every move his troops made on his right flank (First Corps) would be seen by the enemy. He seemed to be counting on sheer inertia by Meade. The en echelon attack was unworkable from the start, even if Sickles hadn't moved III Corps forward.
The Third Day was precisely the type of frontal assault for which Lee is so well known. Right down the enemy's center gunline that led to the massacre that was Pickett's Charge.
(3)The Overland Campaign? The Wilderness I have already addressed. Spotsylvania? The only reason that happened was because a mediocre general, Anderson, had the day of his life and just managed to beat the AotP to the site of the battle. The Battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse was a bloodbath for both sides, with most of the tactical results in the ANV's favor, save for the overrunning of the Stonewall Brigade.
As he had going from the Wilderness, Grant moved to the southeast of Spotsylvania to North Anna, which gave Lee an opportunity for success, if only the second-string of generals he had left were capable of executing his plans. The abortive results there led to Grant again maneuvering to the southeast to Cold Harbor. If you want to rip Grant for Cold Harbor, well, I'm with you there. So, for that matter, is Grant himself.
But the disaster at Cold Harbor led to Grant's decision to have the army disengage and head for the James River, and Petersburg,
all the while successfully deceiving Lee into believing he was going to make a direct try for Richmond by closing in on the city from the northeast. Superior numbers let you do these things.

Using the small force under Butler in Bermuda Hundred to screen his movements, in a magnificent feat of speed, logistics, and engineering, he got his army across a 1200 foot pontoon bridge and raced for Petersburg.
Petersburg was defended by Beauregard, who was blasting Lee with cables telling him that a huge army was closing in on Richmond's lifeline and he only had a few thousand troops to stop them. Only by having the greatest days of his life as a commander (and Baldy Smith and Hancock having their worst) allowed the city to be saved, if under a narrowed defense line that made Meade's life easier during the siege to come.
It took Lee SIX days to realize that Grant had outgeneraled him, and seven before the very first of his units started to reach Petersburg. Of course, by this time, his troops wouldn't have far to go.
(4)"The Army of the Potomac (or name whatever other Union Army applicable to discussion) would have been destroyed."-67th Tigers.
That statement is pretty much to be seen in every thread on the ACW in AH.com (except ASB) where you put in a post.
"The Army of Northern Virginia would have been destroyed."-?
I have no recollection of you ever posting that. I'm not saying you haven't. But assuming the ANV is under Lee's command for any length of time,
and he's not facing George B. McClellan
HAVE YOU EVER WRITTEN THAT?
Destroying an well-organized, well-supplied, well-trained, veteran army in the ACW, in the field, NEVER HAPPENED! The Battle of Nashville resulted in the destruction of a badly bled out, starving, half-frozen, and immobilized force (snow four feet deep, covered in ice, in Tennessee!

).
You speak so blithely, again and again, about destroying whole armies in battles of maneuver in a time when the advantages of defense were four times what they were in the Napoleonic Wars. Smoothbore muskets and smoothbore guns vs. the effects of rifles and rifled cannon. In the ACW two armies would bash each other until one side had had enough and retreated. The other side would be too bloodied to pursue. At least effectively. And things only got worse with the introduction of machine guns. Not to be altered again until armor arrived.
67th Tigers. You certainly know your numbers. I won't argue that for a second. Nor your archival depth of researchable resources. But you really don't seem to understand the larger effects of
firepower on armies, as a whole, as the subject relates to the ACW.