DBWI: Allies don't bolster Vercors uprising of 1944.

Curiousone

Banned
[OOC: Based off http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maquis_du_Vercors

After De Gaulles call for uprising by the Marquis to aid the D-Day landings - specifically mentioning the French Alps in his address, a force of 4000 French resistance members rose up taking the Vercours Plateau. Fighting against superior German forces, the Marqius pleaded for reinforcements and heavy weapons.

What if the Allies had never given air support, never made their airdrops? Without the paratroopers and the re-supply what would have become of their stand? Would Jean Claude Van Damme have still gotten his start in action films without his star role in the post war film depicting the battle? How would the battle of France, the later landings under Operation Dragoon have gone?
 
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I'm embarrassed to say that I don't know much about these events. Could someone clue me in on what happened historically?
 

Curiousone

Banned
I'm embarrassed to say that I don't know much about these events. Could someone clue me in on what happened historically?

OTL when D-Day happened the French resistance rose up in the French Alps. They called for the Cavalry (U.S/U.K) but they didn't come, so they got wiped up by the Germans. Managed to bog down about 10,000 German troops while the Normandy campaign was on at least.
 
Until the Allies pulled Dragoon, chances of the WAllies relieving the maquisards in Vercors were next to zero. Air power can only do so much.

The maquisards were fighting with light arms and limited ammo against much better-armed elite airborne and alpine regiments striking them from every direction.
Also, a big number of the German forces were Russian and Ukrainian Hiwis who were dedicated antipartisan forces that weren't taking prisoners.

Result: maquisards got crushed.

If the maquisards hadn't risen up, Dragoon probably wouldn't have been affected much. The maquis were best used as recon and harassment assets, and damned effective at it but screwed in a stand-up fight with regular troops.
Glancing at the wiki, the where the Allies were hurting was not properly planning and supplying for breakout thus having trouble cutting off the German retreat.

More maquisards mucking up their rear would've wrought havoc on the Germans. However, IMO De Gaulle and the maquis had to make their grand gesture.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
If the Vercors FFI had held off until the 6th AG was

about to come ashore August 15, they could have acted as a blocking/harassment force, requiring the Germans to conduct operations to the north and south, as the US 7th and French 1st armies drove north from the Mediterranean.

de Lettre de Tassigny doesn't mention Vercors in his history of the campaign, but an extra 4,000 highly-motivated FFI certainly would not have hurt the campaign...

The other element in all this are the Allied airborne forces in the theater; if the French had held off until August, it is possible that elements of the 7th Army's airborne force(s) could have been dropped into the Vercors.

Given the need for the airborne forces to be committed to DRAGOON, the obvious response would have been to withdraw a US unit from the task force once the 1st Special Service Force had joined (Aug. 22), and leave the British 2nd Parachute Brigade under Frederick's command; the obvious candidate would have been the 509th PIB, or the 1st/551st; combined with one battalion of the French 1st RCP, the FFI on the Vercors could have been reinforced by ~1,000 well-equipped Allied paratroopers, and 6th AG's spearhead could have faced (presumably) one less German division in the drive north.

Best,
 

Curiousone

Banned
Until the Allies pulled Dragoon, chances of the WAllies relieving the maquisards in Vercors were next to zero. Air power can only do so much.

The maquisards were fighting with light arms and limited ammo against much better-armed elite airborne and alpine regiments striking them from every direction.
Also, a big number of the German forces were Russian and Ukrainian Hiwis who were dedicated antipartisan forces that weren't taking prisoners.

Result: maquisards got crushed.

If the maquisards hadn't risen up, Dragoon probably wouldn't have been affected much. The maquis were best used as recon and harassment assets, and damned effective at it but screwed in a stand-up fight with regular troops.
Glancing at the wiki, the where the Allies were hurting was not properly planning and supplying for breakout thus having trouble cutting off the German retreat.

More maquisards mucking up their rear would've wrought havoc on the Germans. However, IMO De Gaulle and the maquis had to make their grand gesture.

I'm thinking De Gaulle might have pulled a '91/'98 US-Kurds deal on the Marquis. There were different factions, many of them Communist. He might have suckered them out into open battle only to be rid of them.

Given the number of troops the Marquis were pinning down while the race in Normandy was on, it would seem to have made sense for the Brits & Americans to provide minor aid. Sure they won't hold out - but they'll hold on for longer & the longer they do the longer they tie down German forces, even anti-partisan forces.

Even flying over & parachuting crates of Mortars, Piats/Bazookas would help.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
The Vercors maquisards were generally

mountaineers/farmers/townsmen - probably not a lot of communists in the Massif Central. From what I have read, it was more the issues inherent in supporting resistance/irregular forces in a coalition that was focused on conventional operations.

The problem, I think, is that the SOE/OSS/Jedburgh forces available in the UK were entirely committed to Normandy, Brittany, and northern France, while the much more limited equivalents available in the Mediterrenean Theater were needed for DRAGOON and the south. There just wasn't that much, in terms of transport aircraft and special operations forces, for southwestern and central France.

Best,
 
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Curiousone, you've clearly studied history!

IDK if DeGaulle was cannily getting rid of Communists or just trying to redeem France's martial honor.

As TFSmith pointed out, the SOE/OSS was stretched pretty thin as were the air transport assets to make the paratroop landings work.
The big problem with logistics is everything you drop needs to be supplied with ammo, spares, etc.
SOE had to rein folks from dropping too much stuff that needed extensive training for partisans to use.
Most airdrops dropped Sten guns, pineapple grenades, and radios to partisans, but got more elaborate as time went on.

Another bit is that anti-tank rockets are nice against tanks or AFV's but useless blowing up a bridge or RR track.
Mortars are nice, they give you a means of harassing and occasionally blasting an enemy position.
Problem is, they take a bit of training to be useful.

Satchel charges aren't exactly s/t I'd trust to folks w/o some demo training, either. Once they have, they're damned useful. Same with mines.

LSS, trying to keep those 4K partisans going wasn't as elaborate as trying to do an airborne assault, but still damned difficult when they've got other tasks higher on the priority list.
 

Curiousone

Banned
mountaineers/farmers/townsmen - probably not a lot of communists in the Massif Central. From what I have read, it was more the issues inherent in supporting resistance/irregular forces in a coalition that was focused on conventional operations.

The problem, I think, is that the SOE/OSS/Jedburgh forces available in the UK were entirely committed to Normandy, Brittany, and northern France, while the much more limited equivalents available in the Mediterrenean Theater were needed for DRAGOON and the south. There just wasn't that much, in terms of transport aircraft and special operations forces, for southwestern and central France.

Best,

Curiousone, you've clearly studied history!

Ok, maybe I should have studied more. Just found this, apparently there were Jedburgs & an airdrop. The German bombardment started 30 minutes after the airdrop.. :-/

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/70-42/70-423.htm

"
While most OG missions were successful, the operational groups and the resistance received a bitter lesson in the Vercours of the dangers of a partisan stand against conventional forces. Located in the Alpine foothills southwest of Grenoble, the Vercours region, a plateau surrounded by sheer cliffs and approachable by only a few roads, seemed a natural fortress. In early June the area's Maquis, responding to SHAEF's call to
Page 56
Photo: Colonel Obolensky and his OGs in a dressing area before departure for France (National Archives)
arms, attacked German communications all along the Rhone Valley. Allied headquarters sent an operational group and two Jedburgh teams with instructions to train the Maquis but discourage a large-scale uprising. The advice came too late. Confident of their ability to defend the plateau, the partisans, with ranks swelled by recruits to almost 3,200 men, proclaimed a Republic of Vercours. On Bastille Day the Allies carried out a massive supply drop to the insurgents, who appeared eager to face the regular German troops in a standup battle.
The German response to this clear challenge was swift. Within thirty minutes of the airlift, the German Air Force began round-the-clock bombing of the plateau. Having surrounded the region with 6,500 men, the Germans attacked in converging columns on 18 July and later landed airborne troops on the plateau. Under heavy pressure from within and without, the partisans and OSS men split into small groups and fled to the forests. After eleven days of hiding from German patrols, the OSS elements managed to escape the"
 
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