Dagger held at the throat of England

[Riain]

General Helmuth von Moltke had been working on von Schlieffen’s memorandum War Against France for over a year when he was summoned by the Kaiser, Wilhelm II to a War Council on December 8th 1912. Also in attendance were Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (the Naval State Secretary), Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller (the Chief of the German Imperial Naval Cabinet), and Admiral August von Heeringen (the Chief of the Naval General Staff).While no binding decision came from this War Council several action were undertaken, including expansion Bills for the Army and Navy although the Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg was opposed to the Navy expansion Bill. Within ten days he had written and asked the Kaiser to end the Press campaign to drum up support for the Navy Bill, however he did support the Bill for the largest peacetime expansion of the German Army.

The Army expansion made v. Moltke’s task of planning for war considerably easier, however it was only a partial answer to his (and Germany’s) problems. Using on von Schlieffen’s memorandum War Against France as the basis for one of the four deployment plans required an extra 300,000 troops but the Army expansion was for an extra 135,000 troops, capped to maintain the aristocratic dominance of the Officer Corps. Von Motlke economised on troops for this Aufmarsch I West plan, he avoided Dutch terrority to save troops containing the Dutch Army and reduced the number of Corps allocated to masking Antwerp from five to two. These economies made the task of supplying the Armies of the right wing, if not easy, at least less difficult. However given the demand for troops to defend against the Russians and on the common border with France whose army was also expanding due to the new three year conscription term meant that the right wing was periously close to minimum requirements of troops.

 

[La Rouge Beret]

New tl?

 

[Riain]

The requirement to find extra troops lead v. Moltke to the other arm of the Kaiser’s forces, the Kaiserliche Marine, with it’s three Seebataillon Marine Infanftry regiments and the capacity to put together Matrosen Regiments from the Seewehr. Von Moltke discreetly organsied an informal meeting with the powerful head of the ReichsMarine Amt Admiral Von Tirpitz to discuss if it was possible for the Kaiserliche Marine to provide troops to assist with the Army’s Aufmarsch I West plan. Von Tirpitz was enthusiatic about the idea[1] in borad terms, seeing an opportunity to alter the naval balance against Britain with new bases on the French and Belgian coastlines as well as broadening the roles of the Kaiserliche Marine which could win a greater share of resources from the Reichstag. The men agreed to reconvene to work out the details concerning the force and its role at a later date.

Admiral V. Tirpitz took stock of the resources of the Kaiserliche Marinethat might be used to create a division for use in the Aufmarsch I West plan. Using regular and reserve Seebataillons and Matrosen regiments, padded out with some Landwehr artillerty and naval artillery a 15,000 strong MarineDivision could be formed upon mobilisation. [2] When he met with v. Moltke he advised that a MarineDivision of some 15,000 men could be formed upon mobilisation but that they would not be the equal of regular, or even reserve Army divisions due to a lack of training for most of their members and a lack of artillery compared to an equivalent Army division. As such they could only be used as a secon line force, to which v. Moltke proposed they would be added to the forces that would mask Antwerp while the rest of the right wing swept south, around the flanks of the French armies. Once Antwerp was taken the MarineDivision would be tasked with capturing the Belgian and French coastlines, a particulrly naval task. The subject of Army control over the MarineDivision was discussed and it was agreed that the MarineDivision would be under Army command until Antwerp was secured and would revert to Navy control.[3] As the creation of a Division would require an order from the Kaiser and most likely draw the objections of the Commanders to the Naval Sations where the men were to be drawn from it was agreed to develop the plans prior to presenting them to the Kaiser. However Tirpitz did exert his influence for Generalmajor von Wiechmann to conduct Brigade level exercises with Seebataillon I and II to familiarise themselves with larger level operations.

[1] IOTL the MarineDivision was Tirpitz idea on 23 Aug 14 once it bacame obvious what the Army’s plan was.
[2] IOTL the MarineDivision was 14,000 navy troops plus extras to bring it up to almost 17,000 men.
[3] IOTL these discussions and negotiations took place 24-28 August 1914 and the MarineDivision was stood up on 29 August.

 

[Riain]

New tl?

Yeah, dunno how this one will go, harder to get info and a much bigger subject than the last one.

 

[NoMommsen]

N I C E

Will follow with anticip ..... pation.

So, just to get it right :
- the novell of the Navy Bill 1912 goes through the Reichstag as OTL
- the new Army Bill goes ALSO as OTL through the Reichstag in spring 1913

The PoD here : having a fully trained and equipped Marine Division ready for deployment right at the outbreak of war

Have I got it ?

 

[Riain]

For Tirpitz the MarineDivision was only the tip of the iceberg. Now he was privy to the Army’s plan and had placed the Navy in it he could plan to bring other resources to bear to increase the chances of success and maximise the benefits for the Navy. He comissioned a study of the ports on the Belgian and French coast that were likley to fall into Germans hands in the Aufmarsch I Westplan which reported:

• Antwerp: major port and shipbuilding facilities, Scheldt pass through (neutral?) Dutch waters, linked by inland canal to Bruges:
  
  
• Zebrugge: shallow approaches and drifting sand requiring dredging, undefended apart from sea mole requiring major defensive gun emplacement, canal big enough for small cruisers inland to Bruges, minimal repair facilities: in general not considered a desirable base
  
  
• Bruges: linked by canal to Antwerp, Zeebrugge and Ostend, no repair facilities: useful as safe harbour and supply station
  
  
• Ostend: defenceless without guns, linked by small canal to Bruges, some repair facilities including 2 small drydocks
  
  
• Dunkirk: shallow and navigational hazards on approach meant bad for Uboats but easily defended, good repair facilities: Good base for Torpedo boats
  
  
• Calais: Deep approaches mean uboats could dive as soon as leaving port, well equipped with repair facilities, very vulnerable to attack and would need major defensive gun emplacements: useable by uboats but overall worse than Dunkirk.
  
  
• Boulogne: approaches and defensibility similar to Calais but with added disadvantage that the supporting rail line ran along the coast and was vulnerable to naval gunfire leaving the port isolated, limited repair facilities: barely passable for Uboats and Torpedo boats
  
  
• Le Havre: navigation hazards so bad as to require French pilots, excellent defensive works with artillery, exceptional repair facilities, canal access from port to inland, Seine navigable deep inland for shelter against naval gunfire: very promising.
  
  
• Cherbourg: deep approaches, excellent defences, very well equipped repair facilities, very well placed for a commerce war against Britain: First class, more promising that Le Havre.[1]
  
  

[1] IOTL this report was compiled in October 1914 as the Siege of Antwerp ended and the Race to the Sea was in progress.

 

[Riain]

N I C E

Will follow with anticip ..... pation.

So, just to get it right :
- the novell of the Navy Bill 1912 goes through the Reichstag as OTL
- the new Army Bill goes ALSO as OTL through the Reichstag in spring 1913

The PoD here : having a fully trained and equipped Marine Division ready for deployment right at the outbreak of war

Have I got it ?

If the 1912 Navy Bill was before the Dec 8 War Council than yes it is the same as OTL, as is the expansion of the Army.

Given the command structure of internal politics of the Imperial Navy the Marine Division won't be fully trained and equipped by the outbreak of war, but the Marine Brigade will be better trained and the Division will be formed before the war. The biggest ting will be much of the thinking that took place after the war began will take place in the 18 months before the war, the plans might not be perfect but they will be a good base to get tings done.

 

[General Ripper]

But, are the Belgian railways up to the task of supplying of such higher number of soldiers?

 

[matzeskatze]

The biggest ting will be much of the thinking that took place after the war began will take place in the 18 months before the war, the plans might not be perfect but they will be a good base to get tings done.

And that could potentially win Germany the war early on. AFAIK the RN was set up nearly as bad at the start of WWI. So some DN class shipa were in Penny Packets in reach for the Germans. But the lack of forplanning let them get away with it.

 

[NoMommsen]

The belgian railway system was one of the most developed worlwide at that time, as thightly knit as the german system at the industrial Ruhr-region.

 

[Riain]

For Tirpitz the siege of Antwerp was only a precursor to the main aim of getting bases to take the war to Britain using a strategy of kleinkrieg as a grosskrieg strategy was unattainable with the rejection of the 1913 Navy Bill by the Chancellor and Riechstag. He directed the ReichsMarine Amt to locate guns suitable for emplacement to defend the French and Belgian ports once captured and using the administrative means at the RMA disposal ensure that a pool of suitable guns was not allocated to the North Sea and Baltic naval stations and thus available to be moved at short notice. Similarly the RMA began using administrative means to acquire field artillery and place it in a pool rather than allocate it to a Naval Station, Tirptiz believing that in the event of war manpower would quickly be made available but prying resources from the Army and Navy commands would be difficult. Equipped with an appreciation of Belgian and French ports and with a slowly growing pool of unallocated guns to work with the RMA also undertook a study of the manpower requirements and work priorities to turn these ports into naval bases; fortification being the highest priority followed by adaptation of repair and supply facilities to naval requirements and finally adaptation of supporting infrastructure such as inland canals.[1] As 1913 rolled into 1914 the informal agreement between v. Tirpitz and v. Moltke was forming into a coherent plan that could be presented to the Kaiser for approval.

The second area that v. Tirpitz bought his influence to bear was on the deployment of ships. Knowing as he did that the Army intended to strike west and that the proposed MarineDivision was to be tasked with capturing Antwerp and the Belgian and French coast and aware from the December 1912 War Council that the Kaiser considered the British would intervene v. Tirpitz began looking at ways to ensure the British did not ruin the plan. The British were presumed to be planning to operate with the French Army but it was well within their capabilities to land large bodies of troops to assist the Belgians and this capability must be guarded against. Knowing that the distances involved ruled out a penetration of the English Channel by surface forces, they would be cut off from their bases and likely lost when attempting to return after a mission, v. Tirpitz began looking at the deployment of the Uboat force. As embryonic as this force was both in terms of number of boats and the concept of operations v. Tirpitz saw inherent qualities of mission endurance and the ability to operate in waters dominated by the RN as the only option to support the sea flank of the MarineDivision, and of course the Army, and prepared his proposals and arguments for when the time came.

[1] IOTL these are the priorities laid out in the late October 1914 report on French and Belgian ports.

 

[Riain]

24 June 1914 became the day nominated by v. Tirpitz back in December 1912 that the German Navy was ready for war, the day the widened Kaiser Wilhelm Canal opened for passage of the new battleships. The next international crisis could lead to war and v. Tirpitz had his proposals and plans ready for presentation to the Kaiser as soon as the moment presented itself, backed by the support of his colluder v. Moltke. Such an event was not long in coming, a mere four days later Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo precipitating a crisis, the following day v. Tirpitz presented the Kaiser with a proposal to form a division using Seebataillon and Matrosen Regiment personnel to use to achieve naval objectives should any way break out. General v. Moltke was informed of this proposal and quickly supported it, saying such a unit would be put to good use in the planed capture of Antwerp and securing the sea flank of the Army's advance through Belgium into Northern France. The Kaiser was impressed with v. Tirpitz' proposal and v. Moltke's plan to utilise it added it it's lustre, the one-two punch leaving the rest of the KM command with no effective response. Their cries that they needed all of the resources to discharge their tasks fell flat when they could not provide detailed plans of action to compare with v. Moltke's plan to use these troops in the momentous events looming on the horizon. After a fortnight of argument[1] the Kaiser approved v. Tirpitz' plan to create a MarineDivision upon mobilisation for use under Army command to capture Antwerp as part of the war plan that was approved in April.

Not content to rest on his laurels after this success v. Tirpitz began exerting pressure on the KM leadership for the deployment of U boat patrols off the Belgian coast to protect the flanks of the MarineDivision. He argued that a U boat patrol could detect and possibly disrupt any British attempts to intervene in the investment of Antwerp and in a somewhat conspiratorial tone suggested a reluctance to rely on Army intelligence and resources. The KM leadership was lukewarm about the idea but reluctantly agreed to set up a U boat patrol area off the southern Dutch coastline upon mobilisation.[2]

[1] IOTL these arguments occurred after the 29 August decision to create the MarineDivision
[2] IOTL the Army detected an increase in cross Channel shipping in mid September and asked the KM to interdict it, the KM was lukewarm and sent a single U boat, U9 to the 'broad fourteens' where she sunk 3 armoured cruisers within an hour on 22 Sept.

 

[Riain]

The MarineDivision mobilised in the Schleswig area, Admiral Ludwig von Schroder was recalled from retirement to command the division which was allocated to the North Army alongside the IX Reserve Corps and some 24 Landwehr battalions under a Higher Landwehr Commander with detachments on North Sea islands. Von Schroder was chosen as the commander of the MarineDivision due to his varied experience with the naval infantry, coastal artillery and torpedo departments, as commander of the Baltic naval station and not least because of his close personal relationship with v. Tirpitz. He spent the first two weeks that the MarineDivision was assembled on training in an attempt to weld this gathering of disparate and undertrained men into something approaching a standard required by the task.[1] While this training was underway v. Tirpitz was able to inform v. Schroder that the RMA had a stock of some 50 coastal guns ranging from 88mm up to small numbers 210-280mm pieces that were not allocated to the North Sea or Baltic naval station he might request for coastal protection once his force arrived at the coast. Von Schroder was also informed of the advantages and drawbacks of the ports, the defensive requirements, civilian manpower requirements to emplace coastal guns to defend them and the suitability for naval vessels so that he could request them once his force occupied these ports. The requirement for a rapid emplacement of coastal guns was bought into focus when reports reached v. Schroder that German cavalry approaching Ostend had taken fire from British warships in 21 August.

The period of training came to an end on 23 August when the MarineDivision was ordered to entrain for positions south of Antwerp [2] as part of the 'observation' force that was to contain the Belgians, whose Army had withdrawn into the 'National Redoubt' after the fall of fortresses closer to the frontier. The MarineDivision, along with the IX Reserve Corps from the North Army, was to remain near Antwerp until the Army siege train could be bought up from other sieges to reduce the fortresses. This move was accompanied by a Uboat under the command of the High Sea Fleet being ordered to a patrol area off the mouth of the Scheldt to observe and interdict any British shipping that attempted to assist the Belgians. The MarineDivision reached Belgium on 24 August and took up position midway between Brussels and Antwerp just as the Belgian Army undertook its first sortie from the National Redoubt to assist the French and British Armies fighting further south.[3]

[1] IOTL after forming in late August the MarineDivision was supposed to undertake training near Brussels, but this never eventuated.
[2] IOTL 23 Aug was when Tirpitz first raised the subject of a Marine Division
[3] IOTL the MarineDivision did not move out to the Siege of Antwerp until 31 August and relieved Army troops already in position.

 

[Riain]

The MarineDivision acquitted itself suitably during the Belgian sortie from Antwerp given its use of landing guns rather than the field guns and howitzers of Army division. As soon as it withdrew the Uboat on patrol off the Belgian coast reported strongly escorted troop convoys bound for Zeebrugge. By 27 August a Brigade of Royal Marines was in control of Zeebrugge constituting a dire threat to the forces engaged observing Antwerp, which lead v. Schroder to request reinforcements of two Marine battalions and four batteries of 105mm or 150mm artillery.[1] Using the cover provided by the RM Brigade holding Ostend the Belgian 4th Division, which escaped from Namur and withdrew to Le Harve was shipped to Ostend and joined the Belgian Army in Antwerp.

However v. Schroder's dismay was destined to be short lived. The retreat of the BEF to positions much further south had lead to British supply lines through the Channel Ports of Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne to become unduly long and exposed to enemy action, so it was decided on 30 August that the BEF would be supplied through ports further south. This left the RM Brigade exposed and without a supply line so it too withdrew on 31 August, leaving Zeebrugge and Ostend unoccupied, indeed the only troops between Antwerp and the coast are some French Territorial battalions around Lille. This withdrawal is monitored by the U boat on patrol but the well guarded convoys defy any attempt to attack them, difficulties which when added to the loss of thee cruisers and a destroyer in the Battle of Heligoland Bight lead to an attitude of extreme caution bordering on defeatism within Kaiserliche Marine senior officer ranks.

[1] IOTL v. Schroder requested this reinforcement for the Marine Division on 12 Sept, 3 days after it first saw action.

 

[NoMommsen]

... just checked the wiki-articles about the siege of Antwerp .

Wouldn't this move to Zeebrugge and Ostend mean, that the (remnants) of the belgian Army are cut off their line of withdraw ? and can't partake at the battle(s) of Ypres ?

Could even the belgian King be captured ?


Eager to see further developments ITTL

 

[Riain]

... just checked the wiki-articles about the siege of Antwerp .

Wouldn't this move to Zeebrugge and Ostend mean, that the (remnants) of the belgian Army are cut off their line of withdraw ? and can't partake at the battle(s) of Ypres ?

Could even the belgian King be captured ?


Eager to see further developments ITTL

The Belgian army did 2 more sorties before surrendering so one of those could be a breakout.

I am very reluctant to do fancy things like capturing entire national armies and Kings. I know it does happen but it feels lazy and like a wank.

 

[NoMommsen]

@Riain
fair enough not to want to have it too 'wanky' (apprerciate it).

However, I would agree with @Caoster , that there should/will be some ... interesting changes compared to OTL.
Will it be perhaps only one other sortie ?
Will/has it to be then an 'all-out' sortie already aiming at breaking the german line to get as much as possible out of the trap ?

 

[Not Henry G.]

Interesting TL, subscribed

 

[naraic]

Ive been gathering data on the British channel fleet recently

Ive plans for a naval timeline where a German channel based naval strategy could see victories against squadronss of PDN which was the channel fleet which could result in either the grand fleet being moved the channel (with poorer harbours under threat from uboats or the grand fleet being split between Scapa and the channel.

This sort of naval strategy would be helped by the type of land battles focused on the ports you are aiming for.

If you decide to follow this sort of fleet strategy to compliment your land strategy feel free to bounce ideas off me.

 

[Karelian]

Just wanted to drop by to compliment this TL. Well-researched minor PODs starting butterflies that gradually take wing are always nice to read. Please do keep it up.