D-Day without Zitadelle

The thread D-Day at Calais and the book I am reading the Devils Virtuosos brought up the question for me of what the defenses in the West might have been like without the attack on Kursk. One of the main arguments made by the generals opposing Zitadelle other then it would be a failure according to the book was that it would 'considerably' effect defensive preparations in the West.

g11.png


g3.png


Lets say Hitler delays until Operation Husky and then decides against the attack on Kursk so Guderian and Rommel defacto win the argument and Germany goes defensive in the East. Lets even expand it so that Von Rundstedt is sent to Italy while Rommel given a few months head start in defenses of the so called Atlantic Wall.

It brings up questions such as if the WAllies even try for northern France first or go for southern France first. There is a lot the Western Allies still do, but I am not quite sure what exactly they would do or how prepared Germany would be come mid 1944 in the West.
 
Those forces which get pulled from the Eastern Front are going to have too be sent right back once the Soviets go on the offensive.
 
Those forces which get pulled from the Eastern Front are going to have too be sent right back once the Soviets go on the offensive.

Indeed, and deciding to surrender the strategic initiative in the East benefits the Soviets. IOTL, knowing that Germany would go on the offensive in summer of 1943, STAVKA willingly surrendered the initiative despite being far stronger so that it could force Germany to commit it's reserves prematurely. German forces took the heaviest losses not on the offensive, but on the defensive around Orel and Belgorod-Kharkov. The STAVKA, if it knew the Germans would not take the offensive in summer 1943, would begin offensive operations against Orel and Kharkov immediately, and by August launch a front-wide offensive which German forces, as IOTL, simply wouldn't be able to withstand. This will force Germany to, as IOTL, split it's reserves between the East and the West.
 
Those forces which get pulled from the Eastern Front are going to have too be sent right back once the Soviets go on the offensive.

This basically, the Germans feared the Soviets far more than they did the Western Allies. Namely to do with the fact that the Soviets are a tad closer and a tad more pissed off. Forces will be diverted accordingly.
 
Those forces which get pulled from the Eastern Front are going to have too be sent right back once the Soviets go on the offensive.

That is certainly potentally true, but the core of a defensive strategy in the East as argued by those who supported it would have been putting a heavy emphasis on German industry on mass producing defensive weapons. Which would mean more mines and anti tank weapons in the West and East.

Though getting Hitler to approve that may be a fair bit more difficult then then just getting him to stop the attack on Kursk.
 
That is certainly potentally true, but the core of a defensive strategy in the East as argued by those who supported it would have been putting a heavy emphasis on German industry on mass producing defensive weapons. Which would mean more mines and anti tank weapons in the West and East.

That strategy represented an inherent misunderstanding of the situation in the East. Germany lacked the industrial and manpower strength to establish a serious static defense along the entire front, or man it with high quality infantry divisions. Much of the front was defended by under strength infantry divisions backed up by dwindling reserves.

It also ignores Soviet strength in the East. Most notable of this was the ability to concentrate large formations, from corps to armies, unnoticed, along with artillery and support units. Thus Soviet forces in tactical breakthrough sectors could achieve ratios of 5:1 in manpower, and 10-15:1 in artillery. Operationally the gap narrowed somewhat, but was still large when Soviet deception operations worked. Thus no matter how many AT guns and mines they have, the Red Army will inevitably be strong enough to smash German tactical defenses in certain sectors and then commit mobile forces.

The 1943 Battles of Smolensk and Briansk are good example of how Soviet forces, composed of rifle armies with a small mobile group, were able to defeat German forces manning multiple deep and well manned defense belts backed up by infantry and mobile reserves. It took several months, but by the end of the battle Soviet forces were able to refit and launch further offensives in October, and later in winter, while German forces were exhausted.
 
Top