D-Day in 1943: The Effect on the Pacific Theater and Postwar Consequences

[Eric C Johnson]

I am indebted to the sources of information previously credited in the mother https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...-the-war-and-immediate-postwar-period.512778/ , and grandmother threads https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...nd-dragoon-happen.512121/page-3#post-22055849. In addition, I must clearly give credit to H P Willmott’s “Grave of a Dozen Schemes for insight on Allied Strategy in Southeast Asia.


Setting the Table – the Pacific Theater as a Backwater: The decision by President Roosevelt and PM Churchill in June 1942 to invade Normandy in 1943 initially had no effect of the course of the war in the Pacific. Substantial reinforcements had been sent in the first seven months of the war – for convenience they are treated in an arc from Alaska to Australia as constituted in June 1942. In Alaska are seven and one-third U.S. Infantry Regiments (IR), the 4th, 37th, 53rd, 58th, 138th, 153rd, 201st and 297th; the latter having only 1st Battalion due to the small size of the Alaska Territorial Guard. Air Power theorists in the U.S. Army Air Force had argued since the early 1930s that troops could be flown from Japan via Alaskan airfields to the west coasts of Canada or the United States; circumventing any naval vessels. These units were therefore dispersed to distant airfields and small ports to prevent any such aerial invasion. To counter the loss of Kiska, 2/197th U.S. IR was sent from Ft Lewis in January 1943 to reinforce the garrison of Adak; and 1/198th U.S. IR to help garrison Cold Bay in February.

In Hawaii, the prewar 24th and 25th U.S. Infantry Divisions lost their two Hawaii Territorial Guard Regiments (the 298th and 299th) when the 34th and 161st U.S. IR en-route to the Philippines were diverted to Hawaii immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The 299th U.S. IR folded into the 298th in July 1942, and most of the Nisei troops were sent to the 442nd U.S. IR in California. The 298th U.S. IR remains an independent unit. The New York National Guard 27th U.S. Infantry Division, the last four regiment “Square” Division was sent to Hawaii in March 1942, the second division sent overseas (after the 34th U.S. Infantry Division in January 1942). When the 27th U.S. Infantry Division converted to a “Triangular” structure, the 108th U.S. IR became independent in September 1942.

The AMERICAL Division arrived in New Caledonia between March and May 1942; the 37th U.S. Infantry Division in Fiji in June; although the division’s 147th U.S. IR had already been sent to Tonga in April. Two battalions of the 129th U.S. IR arrived in Fiji in September 1942 to bring the 37th U.S. Infantry Division back up to strength, but the need to create a third battalion meant the regiment was not fully combat ready until mid-1943. Independent units had also been sent, the 102nd U.S. IR from Connecticut National Guardsmen to Bora Bora in February; the 24th U.S. IR (Colored) to New Hebrides in May; and the Texas Guard’s 112th U.S. Cavalry Regt to New Caledonia in July 1942 to take over installation defense and allow the AMERICAL to train for combat. The horses did not do well in the island climate, and supplying fodder consumed too much shipping space. The 112th Cavalry was converted to infantry in May 1943. The 24th U.S. IR (Colored) was in poor shape, having sent its most experienced officers and NCOs to activate the 366th U.S. IR (February 1941), 367th U.S. IR and 368th U.S. IR (both in March 1941); the regiment was barely back up to full strength with newly minted ROTC and OCS Second Lieutenants filling most company grade positions. Training absorbed the unit’s time for the remainder of 1942.

The USMC also concentrated on defending the lifeline from Hawaii to Australia. As early as January 1942, the 2nd U.S. Marine Division (MARDIV) sent the 2nd U.S. Marine Brigade (MARBDE) to American Samoa with 8th U.S. Marine Regiment (MARREGT) initially as its core. 2nd MARBDE would become the finest jungle warfare training unit in the Second World War; with 7th, 3rd, 22nd and 4th MARREGT passing through by April 1944.

The 41st U.S. (162nd, 164th and 186th U.S. IR) and 32nd U.S. (126th, 127th and 128th U.S. IR) Infantry Divisions reached Australia between April and June 1942; and I U.S. Corps HQ and Corps units in September 1942 to command them. In January 1943, GEN MacArthur activated Sixth U.S. Army to command Allied Forces, but this was strongly opposed by GEN Thomas Blamey, the Australian Chief of Military Forces. Blamey desired to send Australian troops into battle under the command of First Australian Army, with II Australian Corps formed from Militia divisions and I Australian Corps after its return from the Middle East. Despite the amity always presented to the public, Mac Arthur bombarded Roosevelt with complaints about the Australian Government and its senior military leaders; while his subordinates were alternately astounded and outraged at high levels of theft of equipment (especially gasoline) at Australian ports, depots and rail terminals. To a lesser degree, similar problems were encountered in New Zealand, where the U.S. Marines invading Guadalcanal had to load their own equipment aboard transports due to a strike by dockworkers in Wellington. The Australians viewed Americans as “Johnnie Come Lately” to the war, and were unimpressed by American soldiers’ martial prowess. They also bitterly resented Australia being the “Economy of Force” mission to permit a concentration of resources on Roundup. Several riots between American and Australian troops broke out, primarily because of Americans enjoyed higher pay and more elaborate amenities in their post exchanges. In contrast, the RAAF and RNZAF got along well with USAAF commanders and personnel, as did the RAN and RNZN with their USN counterparts.

The Australian Army was geared primarily for defense of their island continent during the first half of 1942. The 2 Australian Armoured, 1 Australian Motor, plus 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 Australian Divisions were mobilized from Militia status in December 1941, but few of their units ever saw combat. 8 Australian Division and its 22, 23 and 27 Australian Bde were lost in Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies with the exception of 2/40 Australian Infantry Battalion (AIB), successfully evacuated from Timor in September 1942. 10 Australian Division was activated in December 1941 but never achieved full strength and disbanded again in August 1942. 11 Australian Division was created to command various units in New Guinea in Oct 1942. The best Australian units fielded were those which served in the Middle East, and returned in early March 1942 (7 Australian Division), between March and July 1942 (6 Australian Division) and in January 1943 (9 Australian Division).

The New Zealand Army was in similar condition. Its best, 2 New Zealand Division would remain in Europe. 1 New Zealand Division was the training and administrative structure for the rest of the Army, and not a combat asset. 4 and 5 New Zealand Divisions were only holding headquarters for militia cavalry and artillery units ill-suited for combat; training cadre; and coast defense units. 3 New Zealand Division had been scheduled for creation in mid-1941, but 8 New Zealand Bde was sent to garrison Fiji in November 1940; and heavy casualties in Crete six months later resulted in another postponement. In October 1942 it was finally created in Fiji with 8 and 14 New Zealand Bde, and the Fiji Bde with four locally recruited infantry battalions. Its artillery and engineer components were never brought to full strength, and while jungle conditions mitigated the former, they vastly exacerbated the latter.

Modified Events June 1942-May 1943. The most notable changes as a result of a combined Roosevelt-Churchill decision to execute Roundup have been mentioned previously. In the Alaskan Theater, Attu Island is not seized. In New Guinea, MacArthur assumes a defensive posture after the capture of Buna and Gona. Although the Fifth U.S. Air Force has not been reinforced with additional units, but has received replacement personnel and aircraft to bring its components up to authorized strength. Therefore, I believe the Japanese will send a reinforcement convoy at some time and a Battle of Bismarck Sea will ensue. In the Solomon Islands, the only change is the substitution of 24th U.S. IR (Colored) for the elements of the 43rd U.S. ID used in landings on the Russel Islands in February 1943. Little resistance was encountered. The use of a black regiment was made only with the greatest of reluctance given the racial attitudes of the time.

In India, the Arakan offensives were not commenced in order to conserve resources. As in New Guinea, small scale probing of enemy positions continues on both sides, but the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) still considers the brutal terrain and lack of infrastructure in western Burma to be a natural limit to further advance. Brigadier Orde Wingate is forming his Chindits, but without British battalions from 70 Division, leaving him with the 3/2 King Edward VII Own Gurkhas Rifles and the understrength 2/Burma Rifles.

Trident Conference; 12-25 May 1943. Churchill’s arrival at Trident in Washington DC will be delayed a few days as he remains in London until the outcome of Roundup’s initial landings is known. In the OTL, Trident discussed future strategy in the Mediterranean, and the first planning for recapturing Burma. Trident resulted in few points of agreement for several reasons. The Americans wanted both British offensive to capture Central and Northern Burma and amphibious landings to reoccupy Rangoon and reopen the supply line to China. The American interest in China was much stronger than the British. The British did not have the amphibious lift, and the Americans would not release it until after an invasion of France. Roundup cuts the Gordian knots.
Having won on their top priority, Roundup, the Americans do make concessions to the British. The Americans will retain enough amphibious lift in Europe to meet British requirements in the Mediterranean. In addition, a firm commitment is made for an offensive in Burma in 1944. The Americans will provide troops for Central and Northern Burma; the British will conduct the amphibious landings necessary. Attention is also paid to the long-suffering, and quite angry Australians. MacArthur is ordered to execute the “Middle Strategy” of returning to the Philippines via the Netherlands East Indies (discussed at Trident) instead of via the northern spine of New Guinea. This will not only remove the Japanese threat to Australia and fulfill MacArthur’s promise to return to the Philippines, but will also threaten Japan’s main source of natural resources. The Americans will also continue their Central Pacific operations.
These are concessions the Americans did not want to make. Roosevelt, his Democratic Party, and considerable numbers of influential citizens were strongly anti-imperialist in sentiments. The Americans did not want to appear in the Pacific to be fighting to restore colonial empires. But in political currency, this is the bill that must be paid for Roundup, and the defeat of Nazi Germany significantly sooner than the estimated date of October 1944 that Roosevelt and Churchill speculated as probable in the OTL Trident Conference.
The decision in favour of Roundup in June 1942 has one tremendous, but intangible benefit. It focused Western Allied strategy in Europe. Trident now has the same effect in focusing efforts on the defeat of Japan.

More as I have time.

 

[Bougnas]

@Eric C Johnson I have modified the title of the mother thread to ensure that the discussions are tackled in the appropriate threads, now that you made one for the Pacific and postwar consequences.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

The Trident Conference was enough to set early movements in motion. The United States Army already began post-Roundup planning by cancelling training at the Desert Training Center in the Mojave Desert of California and Arizona in late March 1943. While the training there was useful for the internal preparation of each division for combat, the desert offered little in the way of realistic combat conditions expected in either Europe or the Pacific. The arrival of the 77th US Infantry Division (ID) on 7 April 1943 is cancelled, followed by the 85th US ID (23 June 1943), 81st US ID (17 July 1943), 79th US ID (17 August 1943), 95th US ID (18 October 1943), 104th US ID (10 November 1943) and 80th US ID (9 December 1943). All except the 104th US ID, sent to Europe are allocated to the Pacific Theater.

Although available for earlier shipment overseas, the six infantry divisions cited join other divisions not sent to the Desert Training Center in the queue for overseas shipment, but are not immediately available for combat. Depending on operational planning, US Army divisions undergo jungle warfare training in Hawaii, on Guadalcanal, in Australia, or India. Some will receive amphibious training in addition. A total of 40 US Army divisions will first see combat service in the Pacific instead of only 21 in the OTL. The Trident Conference will also set in motion advance preparations, most notably in engineers. The departure dates for U.S. Divisions is as follows:

85th US ID – 9 September 1943; 77th US ID – 10 October; 79th US ID – 19 December; 81st US ID, 2nd US Cavalry Division (modified as 1st US Cavalry Division into an eight battalion modified infantry organization) – 28 February 1944; 83rd US ID – 6 April; 95th US ID – 9 April; 91st US ID – 14 April; 80th US ID – 19 April; 11th Airborne Division – 8 May 1944; 15th US ID (activated in July 1943 in the place of 71st US ID, in Panama instead of Ft Carson, CO. By mid-1943 it made no sense to transfer 5th and 14th IR from Panama to Ft Carson and retrain them as mountain infantry for deployment to Europe. Instead these two regiments, plus the 33rd IR; all Regular US Army – hence the designation with a number in the RA divisional series; retain their jungle expertise, with artillery and support units activated from RA units in Panama.) – 10 May 1944; 96th US ID – 23 July; 94th US ID – 6 August; 17th Airborne Division – 20 August; 102nd US ID – 12 September; 98th US ID – 13 September; 84th US ID – 20 September; 92nd US ID – 22 September; 99th US ID – 30 September; 100th US ID – 6 October 1944; 103rd ID – 12 October; 14th Armored Division (AD) and 78th US ID – 14 October; 106th US ID – 10 November 1944; 87th US ID – 12 November; 75th US ID – 14 November; 66th US ID and 69th US ID – 1 December 1944; 76th US ID – 10 December; 63rd US ID – 5 January 1945; 10th Mountain Division and 42nd US ID – 6 January; 70th US ID – 8 January; 65th US ID and 89th US ID – 10 January; 13th US AD – 17 January; 13th Airborne Division – 26 January; 86th US ID and 97th US ID – 19 February 1945.

In addition, the surrender of Germany in May 1944 allowed a redeployment of US Army and US Army Air Force (USAAF) units from Europe. First to depart around 20 June 1944 was XII US Corps, with the 90th, 93rd and 104th US ID. Most of these troops arrived in February, and their last stateside kisses were not yet considered dry, hence no stopover in the United States. 38th US ID was given similar leave before transfer to XXIV US Corps in Burma. The 101st Airborne Division, having spent considerable time in Great Britain between each operation, left at the same time and was given three weeks leave. III US Corps, departed Europe the first week of July, and the 8th, 33rd and 44th US ID were given a month’s leave before reassembling for departure for the Pacific. V US Corps left two weeks later, and 7th, 35th and 40th US ID spent six months rehabilitation before departure for Pacific service in January 1945. IV US Corps – 1st US Cavalry Division, 28th and 88th US ID left Germany at the beginning of August, and underwent considerable turnover of long-serving troops as well as leave before released for transfer to the Pacific at the end of October 1944. VI US Corps’ 4th, 36th and 45th US ID left in early September, and underwent transformation similar to IV Corps before achieving readiness in early January 1945. Similarly, IX US Corps’ 6th, 30th and 31st US ID passed about two weeks behind VI US Corps. VII US Corps, with the longest period of time in Europe reconstituted its 2nd, 26th and 43rd US ID from early October 1944 until April 1945.

Four armored divisions were converted to infantry formations, 12th US AD to 108th US ID in Panama beginning in June 1944; 10th US AD to 105th US ID in July. The 11th US ID inactivated to supply additional manpower to these two units. 9th US ID converted to 72nd US ID in August 1944, and 7th US AD to 64th US ID in September. 6th US AD inactivated to provide additional troops. The retraining took nine to 12 months. The Eighth US Air Force began transfer to the Pacific on 16 July 1944, which took several months due to personnel rotation and re-equipment of units. Twelvth US Air Force began its movements on 31 August 1944, and Ninth US Air Force on 2 December 1944. Fifteenth US Air Force remained in Europe. It should be noted that the availability of departure for the Pacific Theater did not imply combat readiness – additional training in Panama, Hawaii, Guadalcanal, Australia or India was expected. Nevertheless, the weight of American manpower and material devoted to the Pacific Theater is greatly increased.

For simplicity, the Pacific Theater is divided into the Southeast Asia, Southwest Pacific, Central Pacific, Northern Pacific and China Campaigns.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Some detail about ground combat forces here, but little to nothing about cargo shipping, or air forces. Which are where the money is.

 

[Garrison]

I think the biggest question is what's the Allied strategy for the Home Islands with no A-Bomb?

 

[kmmontandon]

So you've got Germany surrendering in May '44 ... how?

 

[Gillan1220]

Probably an earlier end to the war? The butterflies would be there. The same ships and aircraft of OTL must be present for the U.S. to conduct invasions of the Philippines, Formosa, and the Ryukyu Islands.

The atomic bombs weren't ready yet in 1943 so depending on how fast the war ends, there might be no use of it until the alternate Cold War.

 

[gallen95]

If you are doing an Invasion of Europe in 43 you need to address landing craft (caused planning problems between the Mediterranean and Western Europe amphibious operations) and will delay some Pacific Landings.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

If you are doing an Invasion of Europe in 43 you need to address landing craft (caused planning problems between the Mediterranean and Western Europe amphibious operations) and will delay some Pacific Landings.

That question turns up in most of these 1943 Invasion analysis. Its not just the amphibious fleet, but the cargo ships as well. To build up for a 1943 invasion of NW Europe & sustain it the cargo fleet needs to be better concentrated from mid 1942. & remain focused until ship building catches up in late 1943. Less tons cargo to Africa, the USSR, China, ect... and the Pacific.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

So you've got Germany surrendering in May '44 ... how?

Bad decisions by Hitler? My view is German collapse comes in late 44. Have tested this a few times on the game boards & a successful 1943 invasion in the NW, or South France, breaks the German military over the next 18 months. Stupid decisions by the defense can make this happen sooner, but I tend to avoid those paths.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I think the biggest question is what's the Allied strategy for the Home Islands with no A-Bomb?

Smart strategy is blockade, while picking off isolated Japanese garrisons elsewhere. But given the pace of preparing for the Pacific offensives, construction of the fleet train and accumulating a cargo fleet large enough, plus new Carriers and other warships the Pacifc offensives cant be accelerated all that much. Neither does this accelerate the destruction of the Japanese cargo fleet, or cause the 1943 & 1944 rice harvests to fail. The failure of the 1945 rice harvest was the third leg in the argument for surrender in August 1945. In 43 & 44 Japan was not yet facing famine in the home islands, & would not be until the cargo fleet was destroyed.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

Some detail about ground combat forces here, but little to nothing about cargo shipping, or air forces. Which are where the money is.

Point well taken. Please note that in all but six cases the movement from US Points of Embarkation to the Pacific are the identical dates to when the units actually shipped. Five exceptions are the divisions whose movement is accelerated by not completing desert training. In those cases, plus the 15th US ID I made a close match - but not exact to the departures in 1943-44 of divisions allocated by GEN Marshall in the OTL after the Casablanca Conference. The rates of return of troops from Europe is loosely based on the OTL rate of return, which I both reduced and delayed to take into consideration two factors - first the uncertain state of relations with the USSR, and second the much further advance into eastern Europe. Cargo capacity follows suit.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

So you've got Germany surrendering in May '44 ... how?

This is covered in the header to this thread -

https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...-the-war-and-immediate-postwar-period.512778/ ,

I do consider it patently unfair to expect the reader to digest all 1500+ postings in the mother thread, but the "how" is extensively debated.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

If you are doing an Invasion of Europe in 43 you need to address landing craft (caused planning problems between the Mediterranean and Western Europe amphibious operations) and will delay some Pacific Landings.

As in the post above, these issues were extensively covered in the mother thread.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

As a general note: the following posts are supporting arguments for my main thesis - that earlier end to the war in Europe results in a better outcome for the British Empire. This is found in the following thread. https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...sh-empire-and-the-postwar-world.520743/page-2

 

[Eric C Johnson]

For simplicity, the Pacific Theater is divided into the Southeast Asia, Southwest Pacific, Central Pacific, Northern Pacific and China Campaigns.

Southwest Pacific Campaign. No sooner was initial guidance received from the Trident Conference than the staff of GEN Douglas MacArthur began planning and preparations to initiate offensive operations into the Netherlands East Indies. The risks were balanced – the direct route to the Philippines was easily discerned by the Japanese – it was the same route they had taken southwards in early 1942. However, the Japanese also had to guard against any shift in the axis of advance to the west, which meant guarding the Lessor Sundas, Java and Celebes, thus dissipating IJA and IJAAF assets. The Japanese position was complicated by the lack of cooperation between the IJA and IJN. The latter was conserving and rebuilding its strength after the Solomons Campaign until a “decisive” battle with the USN in the Central Pacific. The IJN therefore dumped responsibility on the IJA and IJAAF, which saw diminished rates of losses after the curtailment of the Allied offensive in New Guinea. This left the same name gap in naval capability the Allies suffered from in their defeat in 1942 – it conceded freedom of seaborne movement to MacArthur. Most IJAAF units were poorly trained in anti-ship attacks. With no need to reinforce New Guinea due to suspension of Allied efforts there to meet requirements for Roundup, the 17th, 36th and 46th IJA Divisions transfer from China to Amboina, Flores/Soemba and Kendari, Celebes respectively, in November 1943-March 1944. (Historical note: in the OTL, the first two IJA divisions were sent to New Guinea/New Britain.)

MacArthur’s major problem was logistical. Although the Australian Government made detailed planning to link Darwin with the heart of Australia by rail, little had been done. The first primary route was some 600 miles northwestward from Mount Isa in Queensland, but no work was commenced. The second was to complete the route from Adelaide across the Great Australian Outback, but although some improvements were made to facilitate mining of essential minerals, the route from Alice Springs to Larrimah stretched 800 miles. Neither was feasible in time to be of use before the end of the war. This meant Darwin had to be supplied by sea, with key choke point in the Torrens Strait, especially near Prince of Wales Island. Major troop embarkations are still made in Brisbane or Sydney. Darwin Harbour itself was capacious, and several airfields built since 1942 gave it significant protection.

The U.S. Seventh Fleet provided the muscle for planned amphibious landings and was built around the obsolescent battleships USS Colorado, Maryland, Tennessee, New Mexico, Mississippi, Idaho and Pennsylvania, minus time spent in refits and when withdrawn to support Central Pacific operations. Initially, their air cover was provided by escort carriers, USS Sangamon, Suwannee and Nassau, but the paucity of aircraft carried meant that advances had to remain under cover of land-based aircraft. This was compensated for by the hundreds of islands in the archipelago on which airfields could rapidly be built. These airfields need not be co-located with resource-rich islands, to which the Japanese had to give priority in military assets. USN Cruiser and destroyer escorts varied, and lighter RAN and RNZN vessels were often attached.

MacArthur’s first move on 3 September 1943 was the amphibious landing by 158th US Regimental Combat Team (RCT) at Koembe on the southern coast of Dutch New Guinea. The easternmost IJA outpost, the garrison battalion was difficult to supply, and disease had taken nearly half of its number since arriving in July 1942. The survivors were counted on only to provide early warning of an Allied Advance. Resistance was quickly crushed. A Dutch mining company had built a small airfield in 1936, but the harbor was inhibited by a large sandbar. Koembe’s usefulness was as a fighter base to cover the Torres Strait and advances further west. Seven weeks later, a second assault against a relatively undefended objective was executed. The 32nd US ID landed on the Saumlakki on the Jamdena Islands and nearby Selaroe, just over 200 miles north of Darwin. Engineers followed to begin airfield and quay construction for future arrival of air units from the United States. A lull ensued as the USN moved to support the invasions of Tarawa and Kwajalein. In the air, a steady campaign of attrition began between IJAAF units on Amboina and Timor and the USAAF.

Ambon Island was the next target in this modified ‘island-hopping” campaign once USN heavy units and escort carriers returned from the Marshall Islands. In addition, the 2 March 1944 landings occurred just after USN fast carrier task forces conducted heavy raids on the Japanese naval base at Truk. I Australian Corps was given the bulk of the assignment built around 9 Australian Division, which reorganized and trained after its return from North Africa 13 months before; and 6 Australian Division, minus 17 Australian Bde which had not yet recovered from employment in New Guinea. Also attached were 1 Australian Tank Battalion (Royal NSW Lancers), with various “Frog” modifications to Matilda tanks to render them suitable for infantry support in jungle warfare, and 2/9 Australian Armoured Regiment with a mix of M-3 Lee and Frog tanks; and additional engineer and medical support. 2/21 Australian Infantry Battalion fought on Ambon in December 1941-January 1942, and the Australian Army had excellent intelligence on the topography and terrain as well as a number of personnel who served there. 6 Australian Division was assigned landing beaches on the north side of Ambon Bay, while 9 Australian Division landed on the opposite shore just south west of Amboina proper and near the airfield. 158th US RCT was assigned to capture Namrole Airfield on the nearby island of Boeroe.

The 17th IJA Division was split on its arrival, about one-third of the division built around the 81st IJA Regt was assigned to defend key positions are the larger island of Ceram to the north. About 10% of the remaining force was lost when its transport was sunk by the USS Grayback, and II/53rd IJA Regt, unreinforced by artillery was sent to Namrole. The remainder was positioned on Ambon, the other two battalions of 53rd IJA Regt on the south side of Ambon Bay and in Amboina proper, while the three battalions of 54th IJA Regt were positioned on the north side of Ambon Bay, in general reserve roughly centered, and Baguala Bay just to the east. The IJA had correctly identified the two Australian landing sites, but lacked sufficient troop strength, time and materials to construct major defensive positions in order to defeat the landings. In addition, Ambon was large enough for the Australians to employ maneuver and firepower over frontal assaults. Nevertheless, Ambon required three weeks to subdue, as the Japanese troops were well-trained and well-led. By contrast, Boeroe was secured in five days.

The Dutch East Indies Army (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger – LNIL) transferred its sole surviving battalion from Australia to Boeroe and Ambon. In addition to taking civil control, they began the reconstruction of the KNIL, whose prewar recruits were disproportionately drawn from the Malaccan Islands where Christianity had made its strongest inroads into the colony. Shortly afterwards a battalion of 500 Surinamese troops arrived from the Dutch West Indies.

The next move by MacArthur was to the west, an invasion of Timor in early May 1944, which would eliminate air attacks on the shipping lanes north towards the Philippines, and hopefully, cause the Japanese to move significant forces to Java and to the Lessor Sundas. MacArthur intended only to secure Portuguese Timor, sufficient for his purposes, but Timor brought a considerable surprise to American strategic planners. The island was defended by the 48th IJA Division, which assigned the defense of landing sites and airfield sites at Dili, Manatuto and Salazar to the 2nd Formosan Regt. The Formosan troops were of excellent quality, having proven that by spearheading the invasion of the Philippines in December 1941 and the capture of eastern Java in March 1942. However, they lacked the near-religious fanaticism of Bushido, nor did they view surrender as utterly shameful. Once they gave the 41st and 85th US ID a viciously stout battle, once ammunition ran out, or they were trapped and unable to resist further, the Formosans were willing to surrender. Over 2400 did, a sharp contrast to the Americans previous experience with the IJA. Korean labour troops also lacked the death before dishonor attitudes typical of the Japanese soldier.

Once captured, US intelligence began to discern the discontent Formosan conscripts had towards their Japanese colonial masters. This caused a reappraisal in Washington regarding Formosa that took a couple months to sort itself out. Without a Cairo Conference, the United States had not made a commitment to restore Formosa to Chinese rule, and indecision resulted. Secondly, MacArthur received a clear intelligence picture of the remainder of the Japanese forces on Timor, and resolved to take the entire island. This did not commence until late July 1944, after 41st US ID advanced south and west along the island’s only all-weather road to the Dutch border and 85th US ID cleared the eastern and southern portions of Portuguese Timor.

IJA reinforcements were limited – the nearby Lessor Sundras were lightly garrisoned until 46th IJA Division began arriving in November 1943. The division was formed six months earlier, and part of its artillery component did not begin arriving until April. The last echelon from Japan, the reinforced 145th IJA Regt had reached the southern Philippines in February 1944, when it was recalled and sent to the previously ungarrisoned island of Iwo Jima after the Marshall Islands barrier was breached by the Americans. (These are OTL movements.) The Japanese therefore concentrated on resupply, which the Americans could not completely interdict. IJN attempts to use submarines against the USN fizzled after USS England sank six in short order. The effect was to delay the American capture of Koepang until early September. The unblooded 100th US ID then arrived to take over the elimination of final resistance. Although the 1st Formosan Regt began to capitulate after the loss of Koepang, the 47th IJA Regt resisted until late November 1944.

Even while Timor was still very much the scene of active combat, MacArthur bypassed a number of other possible landing sites to strike at Menado on the northeast tip of Celebes. The employment of 32nd, 83rd US ID and 158th US RCT proved to be the proverbial sledgehammer cracking a nut – the Japanese fully expected Kendari, Dutch-built airfields capable of easily accommodating B-17s and nearby naval anchorages making it a prime target. Menado was unreinforced, its garrison and airfield woefully outnumbered. MacArthur only wanted an enclave, a support base for a move to Mindanao, and the US troops only advanced inland far enough to achieve that. There would be no reconquest of the Dutch empire. The quick loss of Menado caused landings at Morotai to be advanced by a month, by 83rd US ID. Mac Arthur was now in position to return to the Philippines.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

Southeast Asia Campaign Phase I. After June of 1942, with the Japanese conquest of Burma complete but her carrier strike force mutilated at Coral Sea and Midway; both the Japanese and British seemed content to leave the Bay of Bengal and the Chindwin Hills as unofficial armistice lines. India was kept safe for Britain and Japanese resources could be concentrated against the Americans. The 45th US General Service Engineer Regiment (GSER) (Colored) was rushed to India in July 1942 to improve port and rail facilities and build roads and airfields to support an airlift into China (known as “Flying the Hump”). This initial flood of American men and materiel peters out in June 1942 when Normandy became an unassailable strategic priority. Although American troops and planes were not allowed to diminish in numbers, northeast India became a distinct backwater of the war.

(Historical Note: This is not that different than the OTL – because the Japanese controlled the air and sea lanes in the Bay of Bengal, the US logistical system originated in Karachi, and crossed the subcontinent by rail. The 45th US GSER was used to build the Ledo Road from December 1942 on until decimated by disease and replaced by the 330th US GSER, transferred from North Africa in October 1943. The USAAF activated the 402nd and 476th Fighter Groups [FG] in China in May 1943, but deactivated both in July 1943 because aircraft and personnel simply could not be supplied.)

As noted in the Mother Thread, LTG William Slim, the Commander of XV British Corps was ordered not to initiate Operation Cannibal, an offensive into the Arakan in September 1942. It was already obvious the state of training of British and Indian troops was too far below that of their Japanese adversaries. In addition, replacement troops were being conserved for Operation Roundup. Instead lessons of the Burma battles were absorbed over the next year – 14 Indian Division became a training formation for that purpose. From late 1942 until the spring of 1944, realistic training brought the British formations (2 and 70 Divisions, 29 Bde – now part of 36 Indian Division, and no longer independent), most Indian Army units (7, 17, 19, 20, 23, 25, 26 and 36 Indian Divisions, 251, 254 Indian Armoured, 50 Indian Tank, 268 Indian Lorried, 50 Indian Airborne Brigades), and hand-picked Colonial forces (11 East African, 81 and 82 West African Divisions, 22 and 28 East African Brigades) to superb levels of combat readiness. Staff elements, senior and junior combat leaders, NCOs and common soldiers were drilled with little fear of turbulence within the ranks. One by one, retrained brigades were rotated to the terrain constricted Arakan front, and the first pair were manhandled by the veteran 213th IJA Regt and reinforcing IJA mountain artillery. Over 1943, the Japanese perceived the quality of the British (and primarily) Indian troops was greatly improving. As training was completed, the units rotated into the eastern border regions where they assumed defensive positions that brought reinforced patrols into sharp skirmishes with Japanese reconnaissance troops.

This also partially aborted the first “Chindit” raid by MG Orde Wingate’s 77 Indian Bde, cut back to battalion size by the additional diversion of transport aircraft crews to training duties in preparation for Operation Roundup; and the lack of time for local labour to expand airfields. The best personnel from 13/King’s (Liverpool) Regiment, 3/2 Gurkhas and 142 Commando Company were absorbed into 2/Burma Rifles. 2/Burma Rifles was in turn organized into three columns (instead of eight) and its mission scope reduced to a raid on the main north-south line of the Burma Railways.

During this time, India was hit by a series of cyclones in the summer of 1943. Part of the damage could not be mitigated – it was the result of decades of land mismanagement. These events exposed the population not only to direct danger, but also the degree to which the war absorbed the attention of the Raj Civil Service. There was plenty of food in India, but the overworked bureaucracy could not coordinate relief efforts at first. With Slim’s cancellation of Operation Cannibal, there was time to recover before famine engulfed the Bengal region.

Although the Viceroys, Sir Leo Amery and later FM Archibald Wavell was a humane leader, and Wavell’s wife quite active in relief efforts, they were initially stymied by the provincial governments which were empowered by British political reforms in 1935. Several of them were controlled by the Congress Party, which was engaged in a “Quit India” campaign in favor of immediate independence from Great Britain. Others, primarily in the Punjab had instituted strict food distribution protocols to guard against local food shortages. Photos published by the Life Magazine also hurt British prestige. However, with no ongoing offensive into Burma to take priority on internal transport; Wavell used his military authority to impose relief efforts. Churchill approved, but in a fit of pique ordered strongholds of the Congress Party not supplied until they begged for aid. In some areas, the ability of the Congress Party to supply and protect a population which supported it against British rule therefore came into doubt. Millions of the peasantry knew that famine relief finally came only under the British flag. In other areas, these British efforts were no match for the skilled propaganda arm of the Congress Party. This deepening split helped lead to severe postwar consequences.

Food relief was the first mission for a couple of RAF Dakota squadrons arriving in India. In April 1942 there was only one (No 31 Sqn) to cover the entire the entire subcontinent; but in May 1943 with Roundup’s immediate needs met in the previous year, a second unit (No 194 Sqn) was formed. Two existing squadrons with obsolete Blenheim bombers were converted to Dakotas (No 117 and 62 Sqn) in June and July 1943; but with needs in Europe rising again with the occupation of the Balkans a third and fourth Blenheim squadron did not convert until February and July 1944 (No 48 and 52 Sqn). These six squadrons were adequate only for the highest priority needs.

What made the difference was the Quadrant Conference in Quebec, Canada from 11-24 August 1943. Quadrant was not bogged down by disputes over strategy in Europe – these were already settled by the success of Roundup. Just after the Conference began, the Italian Government initiated armistice negotiations, and despite Churchill’s intense desire to extract a pound of flesh from the Italians, he realized that could wait until conclusion of a formal peace treaty. Therefore, the armistice would be pursued to a successful conclusion despite any temporary concessions. The arrival of a vast amount of material aid from the Americans, made possible primarily by the Italian Armistice which released considerable resources held in North Africa and not required in France, was decisive in the Southeast Asia Theater. In addition, the previous interim actions taken at Trident were reconfirmed. After the Conference, Roosevelt and Churchill met with French and Dutch representatives, the former to convey that US operations would be aimed solely at the destruction of Japanese power, and not to aid in the re-conquest of colonial empires. Churchill sought to know how much the French and Dutch would be able to contribute to the defeat of Japan.

These decisions rescued India from being a backwater of the war, but could not fully compensate for the lack of British naval infrastructure. The British and American planners took note the closest naval bases able to support fleet operations in the Indian Ocean were at Malta, and Durban, South Africa; a round trip of over 4,000 miles to either. The forest of warehouses built in Egypt and Palestine to support the Desert War were almost as far away. Offensive operations in Southeast Asia would be dependent on idle merchant ships acting as floating warehouses close to the scene of combat operations. The repair and supply capacity at Colombo and Trincomalee in Ceylon; Calcutta, Cochin, Bombay and Karachi in India; Massawa on the Red Sea; Aden, and Mombasa, Kenya all combined, was less than what Portsmouth alone devoted to the Normandy invasion. (British intuition on this point was underscored when the ammunition ship SS Fort Sitkane exploded in Bombay Harbour on 14 April 1944; destroying two docks, sinking or reducing to scrap 20 other ships, plus 50 godowns and barges. Hundreds of skilled workers were killed or wounded.) The Royal Navy had not yet perfected the food and ammunition replenishment at sea techniques that allowed the U.S. Navy to roam at will all over the Central Pacific; largely due to a dearth of pre-war merchant ship designs adaptable for replenishment duties. This reinforced the separation of American and British operations in Theater anticipated at Trident.

The planned amphibious portion of Operation Anakim against Rangoon was looming almost as large Operation Torch due to the long train of supply vessels reaching back to Alexandria, Malta and Durban to sustain the invasion force once ashore. The absence of nearby airfields would require a constant presence of aircraft carriers until Rangoon, some 50 miles from the Andaman Sea, could be captured. To support this large naval presence, the Allies could either build a first class naval base (which would take too long) or capture one. This conveniently dovetailed into British desires to avenge the sting of defeat at Singapore, a wound in the British political and military psyche that was far deeper than the loss of Burma, where blame was shared with Chinese troops and an American General, Joseph Stilwell. If the operation were as large as Torch, the objective might as well be Malaya, designated Operation Culverin.

The British thus quietly, and unilaterally abandoned further planning for Operation Anakim (a drive into Northern Burma combined with amphibious landings at Akyab and Rangoon); Operation Bullfrog (a more limited amphibious effort to seize Akyab only); Operation Cudgel (a proposed renewal of Operation Cannibal); Operation Pigstick ( a combination of Bullfrog and Cudgel); and Operation Capital (an attempt to open a land route to the Burma Road) – all of which were initiated to please American strategists focused on China. In the first half of 1944, the British would only execute Operation Buccaneer, a limited naval and amphibious plan to capture the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The Andamans were unsuitable for major naval or air bases, but their possession would strip the Japanese of their capability to reconnoiter and interdict shipping in the Bay of Bengal and the eastern coast of India; as well as reception of any early warning of a thrust towards the Burmese, Thai, Malayan or the Sumatran coastline.

Although Port Blair, the largest town in the Andaman Islands could not support a naval base and repair facilities, its protected anchorage was large and deep enough for supply ships to anchor alongside warships to refuel/resupply them. (This is the same effort expended at Trincomalee, Ceylon during the same time period.) Using Port Blair as a staging point, the Penang and the western Malay coast will be invaded preparatory to the recapture and restoration of Singapore Naval Base. Burma could then be invaded with the Bay of Bengal as a secure-Allied controlled lake. Operation Buccaneer would be executed by 79 Armoured Division, withdrawn from combat in Europe once it was realized it was not needed for the Rhine River to be successfully breached. VI British Corps is formed in India as its higher HQ under the control of British Twelfth Army (LTG Richard O’Conner); 36 Indian Division was also assigned.

Operation Buccaneer began on 15 March 1944. With the surrender of the Italian Fleet, the RN managed to concentrate a substantial naval presence in the Indian Ocean. This RN Eastern Fleet was further reinforced when the Kriegsmarine was bottled up in the Baltic after the sinking of KMS Scharnhorst. More than 28 submarines provided a distant reconnaissance screen. Aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious, battleships HMS Anson, Renown; light cruisers HMS Ceylon, Spartan, Black Prince, Jamaica, Kenya, Nigeria; and 33 destroyers (including four RCN) provided a vanguard for the invasion force – however quite frankly, if the IJN did respond in force the RN was prepared to withdraw the vulnerable troop transports and risk a fleet engagement only. The U.S. Navy, anxious to disrupt the flow of oil from Sumatra, sent the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga to the Indian Ocean in February 1944. She carried twice as many attack aircraft as the HMS Illustrious, but VA James Somerville was reluctant to be so dependent on a foreign navy.

Close to the invasion force itself were escort carriers HMS Atheling, Begum, Stalker (each equipped with 30 fighter aircraft only); Nabob (RCN-manned), Shah, Striker (all three equipped with 12 fighter and 18 strike aircraft trained primarily against enemy shipping); Ameer, Khedieve and Attacker each with 12 fighter and 18 strike aircraft specially trained to support the landings ashore. The latter aircraft were equipped with radios to communicate with forward controllers with the ground forces. Providing close escort and shore bombardment are battleships HMS Rodney, Queen Elizabeth and Valiant; heavy cruisers HMS London, Sussex, Cumberland, Suffolk; light cruisers HMS Royalist, Phoebe, Newcastle, HMNLS Tromp and Jan van Heemskirk, eight fleet (six RAN, two RNLN) and 11 escort destroyers; seven sloops (five RIN); and five frigates. It was this close escort force that engaged in the only surface combat – escort destroyer HMS Southdown sank a large patrol boat off Port Blair, and in turn was damaged sufficiently to force her return to Trincomalee and then Durban for repairs. The Japanese Fleet did not sortie at all, saving its strength to contest control of the Philippine Sea and Mariana Islands with the USN three months later.

The logistics for Operation Buccaneer came largely from the shores of Normandy. By early October 1943 the weather had deteriorated to the point than over-the-beach delivery of supplies had to cease, and a few weeks later the exposed artificial Mulberry harbor ceased operations. The amphibious ships employed in these duties spent five to eight weeks refitting for tropical waters and then loaded with cargo left British ports by the end of November. They arrived in Ceylon two months later at the same time as troops of 79 Armoured Division, which allowed six weeks of actual landing rehearsals (off-loading and reloading and adjusting load plans). The equipment, especially the DD Sherman tanks were much improved over those used at Normandy. After Turkey declared war on Germany on 23 February 1944, the Allied Armies in the Balkans were able to be supplied via Bulgarian and Romanian Black Sea ports and via the Danube River. This meant large numbers of amphibious ships offloading supply-laden trucks across Greek beaches were released to refit and arrive in the East Indies beginning in the spring of 1944.

The British also completed four escort carriers building in Tacoma, Washington as aircraft maintenance ships to conduct repairs and overhauls that otherwise would have to be done in Egypt or the UK. These were HMS Renee (completed February 1944), Queen (March 1944), Rajah and Reaper (both May 1944). This concept was not new, the RN devised it in 1936 after Japan renounced its naval treaty obligations, and in 1938 a 14,000 ton maintenance aircraft carrier HMS Unicorn was ordered. HMS Unicorn arrived in Trincomalee in February 1944 to fill her designed role. USS Vulcan, one of the largest repair ships in the U.S. Navy was used to refit and repair American naval ships in the Mediterranean until the end of the war in Europe, and then moved to Trincomalee to service Lend-Lease ships serving in the Royal Navy in June 1944.

36 Indian Division was given the task of capturing Port Blair and South Andaman Island, with its own 29 Bde and 26 Indian Bde reinforced by one squadron of Sherman DD tanks, one squadron of regular Grant tanks and a squadron of Grant CDL tanks that kept their 75mm hull mounted gun and gave up only the 37mm turret gun. 72 Bde was given the task of clearing North and Middle Andaman Islands. As it turned out, 72 Bde met no resistance, and most of the native population had been conscripted as labor troops by the IJA. 79 Armoured Division, with 30 Armoured Bde (-), 185 Bde and 3 Special Service Bde from Fourteenth British Army was assigned Great Nicobar Island. 99 Indian and 28 East African Brigades were in reserve, intended as permanent garrisons.

Resistance on South Andaman Island was more determined. In March 1944, the IJA withdrew its smaller units from North and Middle Andaman Islands and concentrated them as the 35th IJA Independent Mixed Bde (IMB) totaling 6510 troops. The 35th IJA IMB contained artillery, signal and engineer units well below battalion strength. The 252nd, 253rd and 254th IJA Independent Infantry Battalions were all formed from existing occupation troops, many of whom had been in the Andamans since the late spring of 1942, and whose training and discipline and grown lax. Each had been brought up to strength (930 officers and men) with Korean and Formosan conscripts, and their state of training was low. This was partially because each battalion had to provide a guard force for native labor assigned to grow food, and becoming increasingly sullen and resistant to the brutal treatment and meagre rations they received. The three IJA battalions were also used as construction troops to build additional barracks. The 251st IJA Independent Infantry Battalion was formed from the excellent 5th IJA Guards Infantry Regt, with better than average Japanese conscripts assigned around the cadre. Their state of training was also low, but their morale considerably higher although they also were tasked with building their own facilities. The 255th and 256th IJA Independent Infantry Battalions were the best formations, taken intact from the 32nd IJA Division in China, and they took over existing facilities at Port Blair and the main airfield. In addition, there were two battalions of the Indian National Army (INA) – recruited from POWs captured in Malaya.

The Japanese had ample warning of the invasion fleet, spotted by the IJN submarine I-47 two days in advance, and despite their losses to covering RN fighters, IJN reconnaissance planes kept track. The 35th IJA IMB dispersed the 251st and 254th IJA Independent Infantry Battalions to reinforce the airfield, 252nd IJA Independent Infantry Battalion to Port Blair and the 253rd to the auxiliary airfield. The IJA had no alternative, there were too many potential landing site to cover them all, and the Andamans were not even on the priority list for concrete and steel for fortifications. Those materials were sent exclusively to the islands in the path of the American Central Pacific juggernaut. The pre-invasion bombardment therefore fell on beaches with no defending troops. Astonished at the low casualties, both 26 and 29 Brigades hastened on to the airfield, where the 254th began to disintegrate, and the 251st and 256th alternately engaged in tenacious defense and pointless Banzai charges that were standard tactics of the period. These were often spotted and broken up by strafing from supporting aircraft from the escort carriers. The airfield was secured on the second day of the invasion. About 300 INA troops surrendered without incident, and postwar were placed on trial for collaborating with the enemy. Others fought tenaciously.

Methodically pivoting towards Port Blair, the British troops reached it on 18 March, and found the IJA troops to be not particularly difficult opponents compared to SS troops a significant number of them had previously faced in the France. The port was fully captured on the 21st; the bulk of the British casualties were sustained by 2/Royal East Kent Regiment (Buffs) which by chance drew the strongest IJA elements at both the airfield and the port. On 22 March 1944, 1/1 King George’s Gurkha Rifles led 7/King's African Rifles (Uganda), the first African battalion ashore, to police up the 253rd IJA Independent Infantry Battalion. The weather turned bad and the terrain proved vicious when inundated with water, and as a result these two units were not able to accomplish their mission for a fortnight.

Great Nicobar Island proved to be a tougher nut, with few suitable beaches, and well within range of the available IJN aircraft based on Sumatra. The 36th IJA IMB was assigned there at the same time as the 35th IJA IMB went to the Andamans, but was only half as strong. The 258th IJA Independent Infantry Battalion was formed from garrison troops; and the 259th and 260th IJA Independent Infantry Battalions came intact from the veteran 2nd IJA Division’s 8th IJA Infantry Regt, and the brigade HQ from that division’s Infantry Group HQ. Despite having half the infantry, the artillery, signal and engineer units were as strong as the larger 35th IJA IMB. Unfortunately, the transport Shobu Maru carrying additional construction troops and supplies was sunk by submarine HMS Sea Rover in the Straits of Malacca on 8 March. Consequently, the Japanese troops on Great Nicobar Island fought with a stoic resignation that they would receive no help, and had no supplies for a lengthy battle.

Within an hour of coming ashore on 15 March 1944, 185 Bde was met with a fierce counterattack by 260th IJA Independent Infantry Battalion. Had 3 Special Service Bde (5 Army and 44 RM Commandos) not come ashore under the cover of darkness, the IJA may have prevailed. Outnumbered more than five to one, the 260th still managed to retain the initiative through most of its short combat life; and was vanquished only after the arrival of large numbers of tanks ashore after 30 hours of bloody combat. 185 Bde was so exhausted by the ordeal that two full days were required to rest and reorganize for further combat. 10/Gloucestershire from 72 Bde was re-embarked from Middle Andaman Island and rushed to reinforce on 19 March. By then 185 Bde was deeply engaged with 259th IJA Independent Infantry Battalion and its effective supporting artillery in a main line of resistance, while the Commandos dealt with very lethal sniper groups from 258th IJA Independent Infantry Battalion which used its intimate knowledge of the island to infiltrate and wreak havoc among communications and support troops.

The airfield was captured by 2/King’s Shropshire Light Infantry and 1/Royal Norfolk on 21 March, but last ditch raids and snipers kept it from being operational for another five days, when the last organized resistance came to an end. 99 Indian Bde began arriving that same day, and sheer numbers soon took its toll on the Japanese defenders. On both South Andaman and Great Nicobar Islands the IJA carried out massacres of nearly all the Indian troops captured at Singapore and used as slave labor, and many of the natives. In RAF hands, the airfields later supported three reinforced fighter squadrons and two reconnaissance squadrons that effectively controlled the Andaman-Nicobar island barrier.

VA Somerville took his fast carrier force close to Sumatra to maintain a violent bombing of the IJNAF and IJAAF on their home fields. This had its effect – the fighter carriers over the invasion fleet saw only one attack, on 23 May, in which all but three aircraft were shot down. One bomb did hit the destroyer HMS Pathfinder, and damaged her so badly that for months she was unable to leave Port Blair. Eventually when she was towed home in June 1945 she was written off as a constructive total loss (designated with a dreaded designation of CTL) and scrapped. Fighters from Somerville’s three carriers broke up the few IJNAF aerial attacks – but in truth most skilled IJNAF pilots were waiting for the U.S. Pacific Fleet in the Mariana Islands. The IJNAF could not launch another successful aerial attack until 8 June 1944 when frigate HMS Lawford was torpedoed. Logistics proved a much greater threat. Because the invasion went on longer than expected, the 11 escort destroyers ran so low on fuel that two had to be towed into Trincomalee at the end of the operation when heavy weather prevented refueling from the escort carriers. VA Somerville was able to refuel his destroyers from his capital ships, but arrived back in Ceylon with an average of 18% fuel in each ship. Clearly he could not have fought a naval battle had one materialized; the British had been very lucky.

Holding the Andaman-Nicobar Barrier proved more costly than capturing it. Because of the huge IJN losses at the Battle of the Philippine Sea, the only response that could be mounted was from submarines and Sabang-based MTBs that could only range as far as Great Nicobar. The first loss was to an MTB when frigate HMS Halsted was torpedoed on 10 June and limped into Port Blair under tow; a testament to the toughness of prefabricated all welded ships. The speed of her prefabricated construction also made spending weeks to make her seaworthy and sail her home for repair uneconomical – there was a surplus of escorts after victory in Europe. Adjudged a CTL she acted as an AA guard ship as her sister ships cannibalized spare parts from her hulk from time to time. Aggressive anti-MTB patrols were usually successful in spotting and destroying the IJN mosquito boats, but the Anti-aircraft (AA) Frigate HMS Trollope was hit by a torpedo and was surveyed as a CTL on 6 July 1944. Her sister HMS Quorn was rammed by a remote control explosive MTB after dark on 2 August and foundered the next day.

Because the constant flow of convoys in and out of Port Blair, a constant anti-submarine patrol was necessary, which unfortunately led to predictable steaming patterns. RN sonarmen were also trained in colder North Atlantic and Arctic waters, and the warmer temperature layers in the Bay of Bengal often led them to misjudge depth, speed and course of a submarine contact. The presence of patrolling warships was too tempting for JJN submarine captains and fit squarely into pre-war IJN submarine doctrine which denigrated merchant targets. A defensive minefield was laid to channelize shipping into a protected approach, but regrettably the new destroyer HMS Swift strayed onto that minefield and quickly sank on 24 June. Another regrettable loss to friendly forces occurred on 7 August when AA frigate HMS Melbreak exchanged the wrong signals with RAF aircraft in the Bay of Bengal and was damaged sufficiently in the subsequent rocket attack to require three months’ repair in Trincomalee.

IMS I-47 was unable to score a success until 15 June when her captain’s patience paid off and she sank frigates HMS Mournie and Blackwood just hours apart and escaped two furious but ineffective depth charge attacks. IMS I-166 arrived a few days previously, and caught frigate HMS Goodson with two torpedoes which she miraculously survived to join HMS Halsted and Trollope on CTL row. After one sustained depth charge attack a battery failed to recharge and forced her to set course for Singapore but submarine HMS Telemachus sank her in the Straits of Malacca on 17 July. The pace did not let up – IMS I-36 arrived to replace I-47 bearing a Type A midget submarine from Singapore which penetrated Port Blair and sank destroyer HMS Isis three days later. IMS I-36 then saw no further success for a month until the AA sloop HMS Kite was torpedoed on 21 August.

The first Canadian escort carrier had a short operational life just under a year. HMS Nabob was commissioned on 7 September 1943 at Vancouver with a majority RCN crew and two squadrons (No 852 and 856) composed primarily of RCN aviators. After operating against U-boats she refitted for Far East duties and nearly all of her remaining RN personnel were replaced by RCN – the most notable exception being her captain. HMS Kite was one of her escorts, and her anti-submarine Swordfish aircraft of No 856 Sqn diligently sought her assailant. As luck would have it, in the pre-dawn light of the next morning (22 August) HMCS Nabob and her escorts crossed IMS I-36 and two torpedoes hit – one on the carrier and one breaking AA frigate HMS Bickerton in half.

Although IMS I-36 was able to creep away submerged, HMS Nabob’s crew not only kept her afloat, but managed to launch and recover a pair of rocket equipped Swordfish to conduct patrols four times that day. Her third patrol found IMS I-36 on the surface 75 miles away and hit her with rockets, but a fortuitous rain squall saved the wounded submersible from surface ships sent to find her. HMS Nabob was also a CTL, immobilized once she returned to Port Blair. When her Canadian-manned sister HMS Puncher acting as a ferry carrier arrived, she was paid off on 30 September 1944. Her key personnel and her squadrons transferred to HMS Puncher to make her an operational carrier. With HMCS Puncher came a dozen RCN “River” class frigates – two of which (HMCS Chebogue and Magog) were torpedoed and joined HMCS Nabob as CTL on 4 and 14 October 1944. It was the RCN though, that solved the ASW detection problem and sank the assailant, IMS I-47 on her second patrol with a spectacular explosion and large debris field.

Although Port Blair itself was fully exposed to the open Bay of Bengal, the deep water fjord-like Navy Bay with steep mountainous cliffs ran five miles northward and ten to 12 miles west and south into South Andaman Island. This allowed oilers, cargo, and refrigerated supply ships to anchor in relative safety – as noted the entry way continuously patrolled by the anti-submarine frigates and corvettes arriving after the end of the U-Boat War. In September 1944, the large seaplane tender USS Albemarle arrived from Norfolk, Virginia to tend two squadrons of US Navy Catalina flying boats that at last gave extensive long-range reconnaissance from Central Sumatra across the Kra Peninsula to Rangoon.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

Southeast Asia Campaign Phase II. American preparations in India can be divided into two main engineering efforts. The first entailed the arrival, partially from North Africa but also directly from the United States between November 1943 and February 1944 of the 1051st, 1053rd and 1056th US Port Construction and Repair Groups, dedicated to improving the capacity of key seaports on the Bay of Bengal. Closely linked are the 713th, 715th, 719th, 721st, 725th, 745th, 748th and 759th US Railroad Transportation Corps Battalions tasked with reconditioning the rail network from these ports to Assam. The third component are the 38th, 337th, 330th, 338th, 341st, 353rd, 357th, 368th, 374th (Colored), 377th (Colored) and 393rd (Colored) US GSER between September 1943 and March 1944. These were tasked with airfield and road construction which transformed the eastern seaboard of India.

Combat units initially focused on fighter groups to cover the now massive convoys from Japanese air attack, while RAF Coastal Command and RN escort groups countered the submarine threat. From September 1943 until April 1944, the 80th (P-38/P-40/P-47), 81st (P-40/P-47), 311th (P-51B/A-36), 364th (P-38/P-51), 50th, 339th FG (P-51); 366th, 368th, 371st, 373rd, 404th, 405th, 406th FG (all P-47); 367th, 474th FG (P-38); 33rd and 370th FG (P-38/P-47) all arrived in India, followed by a flood of bomber and transport groups. Having satisfied the need for aircraft for the airborne assault across the Rhine River, from October 1943 onward, the “Hump” had priority for C-46, C-47, C-53 and C-54 aircraft produced in the United States until the Burma Road was reopened. Japanese control of the air was thus systemically destroyed. Major American ground forces allocated to the Theater included newly activated US Fifteenth Army under the command of LTG Joseph Stilwell from August 1943. (LTG Jacob Devers replaced him as Commander, US Army Ground Forces.) XXII US Corps HQ and the 5037th US Composite Unit arrived a month later; 79th US ID in December 1943, 2nd US Cavalry Division (Colored – configured as infantry), 1101st US Engineer Group (Combat) in February 1944, 1107th US EG(Cbt) in March and 80th US ID in April 1944.

Two events occurred which threw the calculated American planning into confusion. The first was a series of Japanese offensives in China – Ichi-Go, whose success briefly imperiled China’s ability to remain in the war. The second events were complementary offensives in Burma – U-Go and Ha-Go. The attacks into Burma eventually led to Japanese defeats at Kohima, Imphal and the Battle of the Admin Box, but IV British Corps was hors de combat until it could reconstitute. The careful American planning of Operation Anakim was eliminated as from May/June 1944 onward, XXXIII British Corps (2 Division, 19 and 20 Indian, 11 East African Divisions, 254 Indian Armoured and 268 Indian Lorried Infantry Brigades) and XXII US Corps began gingerly reoccupying territory lost in the U-Go offensive. Both Stilwell and Slim began to realize the extent of Japanese losses, the resulting thinness of their reserves, and optioned to commence a full-scale offensive into north-central Burma regardless of the incomplete state of preparation. The IJA Fifteenth Army was gradually forced across the Chindwin River to the Irrawaddy.

This decision was supportable logistically in the long run only by the recapture of Rangoon and the restoration of the north-south Burma rail network. This in turn upended the British planning for Operation Culverin, scheduled for September 1944. A new plan for amphibious landings near Rangoon was hastily revived – Operation Vanguard, but with XXXIII British and XXII US Corps pushing deep into central and northern Burma, the scale of the amphibious landings could be significantly drawn down by skipping the landings at Akyab. VI British Corps was again selected with a much reorganized 79 Armoured Division as the main assault force. It transferred the depleted 185 Bde to 36 Indian Division in exchange for 29 and 72 Brigades. 3 Special Service Bde supplemented the 79 Armoured Division. 36 Indian Division was detached to convert from Indian Army Establishment to British Army as 36 Division – completed by September. The follow-on landing force was 70 Division, which has not been converted to a Chindit formation, which had its amphibious training in Ceylon cut short, and was assigned a defensive mission on the flanks of the operation.

If successful, Operation Vanguard would trap the IJA Twenty-Eighth Army between IV British Corps in the Arakan and VI British Corps in the Irrawaddy Delta. The XXIV US Corps was designate as the exploitation force to move northward and link up with XV British Corps committed to cover the right flank of XXXIII British Corps. XXIV US Corps initially contained the 15th US ID and the 124th US Cavalry Regiment, a two battalion infantry unit. Once Rangoon is captured, much of the US Army Engineer force in India will transfer to Burma to rehabilitate the logistical network.

The obvious limitations of Japanese overstretch in 1942 are now made quite clear. Other than coast defense batteries Rangoon was defended by the 105th IJA IMB consisting of second-line troops. Since the landings were staged from Ceylon, they were delayed until 1 July 1944 after the cyclone season had passed. Coastal defenses were quickly neutralized by 3 Special Service Bde, the main landings were unopposed and the main obstacle towards capturing Rangoon was clearing the eastern Irrawaddy Delta of mines. The Japanese evacuated Rangoon five days before the British arrived on 8 July to form a defensive position to the northeast at Pegu. 124th US Cavalry arrived on 10 July and the rest of XXIV US Corps on 23 July, effecting a link up with 5 Indian Division from IV British Corps at Magwe on 11 August 1944, while 20 Indian Division from that Corps linked up with 81 West African Division of XV Corps a week later.

The rest of the year was spent clearing the IJA from Burma west of the Sittang River and establishing the logistical, RAF and USAAF infrastructure to support further advances. Only Wingate’s Chindits, consisting of solely of assets from 77 and 111 Indian Brigades are pushed east of the Sittang. The 103rd US ID (12 October 1944) and 66 US ID (1 December 1944) arrived to complete XXIV US Corps. There was also a considerable reorganization, the US Fifteenth Army reoriented itself northward into China where it would augment Nationalist Chinese forces in liberating the south of China. British Fourteenth Army assumed the task of recapturing eastern Burma (XXXIII British Corps) and the northern section of the Kra Peninsula (IV British Corps). XV British Corps relinquished its Indian army formations and with 2 Division was transferred to British Twelfth Army.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

Southeast Asia Campaign Phase III. The delay in executing Operation Culverin, the 1944 invasion of Malaya from September to late November benefitted both the British and the Japanese, although in terms of scale it was the British who gained more. The main Japanese problem was the same that the Germans had in 1943; Frederick the Great’s adage that he who defends everywhere defends nowhere. The Japanese defensive perimeter in early 1944 ran in a huge circle from the North Pacific through the Mariana and Caroline Islands to Rabaul and westward through the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) and from Sumatra northwards through Burma and into China from the Burma Road to the junction of the USSR, Korea and China near Vladivostok. It was impossible to defend all vulnerable points of that perimeter, and the Japanese prioritized their resources against the American attacks in the Central Pacific and MacArthur’s belated movements from Darwin, Australia into the NEI.

Herein lay the great irony of the Pacific War – the resource rich NEI and Malaya for which Japan went to war are underdefended in favour of resource-dry islands in the Central Pacific, especially in terms of naval and air assets. This was clear recognition of the material superiority of the United States. In addition, Malaya was largely stripped of combat forces to strengthen units dedicated to the U-Go and Ha-Go offensives. The surprise loss of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands then exposed the weakness of the inner stretch of the Bay of Bengal to Allied landings. To help mitigate this, in April 1944, the 35th IJA Division is diverted to Malaya from the NEI. (Historical note: in the OTL, this division was sent to New Guinea. The 35th IJA Division is a huge improvement over the mixture of second and third-rate Japanese occupation troops in Malaya in the OTL.)

Nevertheless, from Central Malaya north to Tavoy in southern Burma, only Thai units can be depended on to face any amphibious landing. Japanese doubts regarding that reliability increased as the war turned in favour of the Allies, and the example of defections from German Allies fed fears of Thailand becoming an “Oriental Italy.” Amplifying these concerns was the fact that although Thailand declared war on Great Britain and the United States on 25 January 1942, the Thai ambassador in Washington refused to deliver it, and the United States never declared war in return. Once discovered, the Thais found it convenient not to redeliver this declaration by other means.

In August 1944, IJA Southern Army HQ ordered the 94th IJA Division be activated at Chumphon, Thailand where IJA troops landed in December 1941 to help cover this gap. (In the OTL, the 94th IJA Division required both the transfer of Korean and Formosan troops from labour units – and their replacement by local manpower – and significant numbers of local conscripts when activated in October 1944. In addition, the 12th and 18th IJA Independent Garrison Units were stripped out of the Malayan countryside to provide cadre. This action was taken in response to Japanese perceptions of British capabilities – as shall be seen, nothing in this scenario changes those perceptions.) While IJA Southern Army HQ was well aware of these vulnerabilities, it also knew the direct threat to Thailand from southeast Burma was more tangible than any potential amphibious assault and would have first call on troops. In addition, since the loss of the Marianas, reinforcements were being poured into the Philippines, Bonin Islands and Ryukyus. Even if reinforcements and replacements were available from Japan, losses of transports to Americans in 1944 were steadily rising and were increasingly unavailable. Increasingly, IJA Southern Army HQ is left to its own resources.

The major combat unit in the Operation Culverin area is the 37th IJA IMB, which never made it to its intended destination in the Andaman Islands. This unit was located near the headquarters of the 29th IJA Army at Taiping, Malaya. Under the command of LTG Ishiguro Taizo, 29th IJA Army was activated in January 1944 and became operational ten weeks later. The 70th IJA IMB formed in July 1944 in French Indochina was moved to area of Kluang in Northern Johore in September 1944 for advanced training. To keep the Malay people in line in the huge swath of territory between Johore and Ipoh left ungarrisoned by the loss of the 12th and 18th IJA Independent Garrison Units, an increased reign of terror was instituted by the remaining military police and administrative units in Malaya. This worked in the short-term.

The British used this time to negotiate a period of turbulence best exemplified by 70 Division. With the end of the war in Europe, there was no way of avoiding major reorganizations within all branches of the armed forces driven by the political necessity of rewarding those who made the victory possible. In April 1944, two major programmes were placed in effect. The first released personnel with more than five years’ service – permitting the discharge of the first conscripts inducted in 1939. Two months were allocated to each calendar month, reducing the service to four years by October 1944. The second repatriated all servicemen with three years continuous overseas service to the UK. Personnel optioning to re-engage or remain overseas became regulars. 70 Division (as 6 Division) was embodied in September 1938 in Palestine, and although normal rotations and wastage through the Greek and North African Campaigns brought considerable numbers of new personnel, about 25% of the division required rotation in 1944. Regular battalions in India had similar turnover.

The second obstacle the British overcame was the withdrawal of USN amphibious forces so generously allocated to the RN from operations in the Balkans onward. These forces were now required for upcoming landings in the Philippines, and left the Indian Ocean once Operation Vanguard was complete. The delay allowed replacement by RN vessels, especially the new LST Type 3 emerging from British and Canadian shipyards. A third aspect adjusted to was the end of US Lend-Lease, which focused the British on their own interests. Following up on his post-Quadrant discussions, in July 1944 Churchill informed the French and Dutch that unless essential for operational success, British forces would follow the American lead and not reconquer their overseas territories. British bases could be used as available by these allies. This was the abandonment of a significant portion of Operation Culverin – planning for invasions of several points in northern Sumatra. The delay also allowed for a major improvement to the planned British Military Administration for Malay. Originally it contained roughly 1000 personnel, only 25% of whom had any previous experience in colonial administration, and less than 100 of whom had any service in Malaya. This delay allowed additional training for the remaining personnel.

The net result was a scaling down of Operation Culverin into a manageable scope and sequence. To establish an air and land chokehold on the Kra Peninsula, during the last week of September, Operation Sceptre was executed. It consisted of a combined airborne and amphibious landing at Victoria Point, the southernmost part of Burma. The former consisted of 50 Indian Airborne Bde (2 Gurkha Parachute, 1 and 4 Indian Parachute Battalions) assigned to take the airfield built by the British in the 1930s, but little used or improved since its capture by the Japanese. The landings were carried out by 36 Division, still short a brigade but recovered from Operation Buccaneer, but reinforced by the attachment of 2 Special Service Bde. The Japanese garrison battalion was able to offer only a token defence before being overwhelmed. Within a few days, 185 Bde crossed the Kyan River and seized the Thai town of Ranong, held by a 330-man Thai infantry force which “bent, rather than broke with the wind.” These initial forces were followed by 7 Indian Division and 22 East African Bde under the command of XV British Corps. Expansion of the port, logistical and airfield capacity commenced, and in mid-November 1944, 8 Indian Division arrived, the first to be redeployed to the Theater from Europe in early July.

3 Mixed Division followed about ten days later after its 33 Tank Bde was reconfigured with 4/Royal Tank Regiment (RTR), 8/RTR and 148/Royal Armoured Corps (RAC) equipped with one squadron of Canadian-built Grizzly duplex-drive (DD) tanks, one of LTV-4 Buffalo amphibious tractors and one of engineering tanks – a mix of CDL, close support, mine-clearing and bridge-laying Grizzly conversions. The division then began amphibious training in Ceylon. 6 Airborne Division arrived in India for training in mid-September 1944 followed by 5 Division a month later and 78 Division in early November 1944.

Operation Culverin was launched on 29 November 1944 with a combined airborne assault by 3 Parachute Brigade from airfields in the Andamans, 16 Brigade Group of 70 Division and 3 Special Service Bde’s 1 and 5 Army Commandos with supporting engineers and artillery landed without opposition on the west coast of Penang – opposite of the coast defense guns at George Town. It was only an 11 mile march for 16 Brigade Group to George Town and the 267-man costal artillery battery of two captured British 6-inch guns. The gun crews had no defenses against attack from land-ward side, and since a number of them lacked small arms, an unusually high percentage of these IJA soldiers were captured. 3 Parachute Brigade cleared the southern part of Penang with little opposition. The airfield captured was small, but useful for fighter detachments and liaison work.

There was little naval opposition to the landings. The British had assembled their largest fleet ever, battleships HMS King George V, Duke of York, Anson, Howe, Rodney, Warspite, Renown; fleet aircraft carriers HMS Formidable, Indomitable, Indefatigable and Implacable to join HMS Victorious and replace departed HMS Illustrious and USS Saratoga. Escort carriers numbered more than twenty, with four heavy and 17 light cruisers; 49 fleet and a whopping 114 escort destroyers and frigates. The IJN Fifth Fleet under the command of Admiral Shima Kiyohide had HIJMS Ise, Hyuga, Haguro, Oyodo and destroyers HIJMS Shimatsuki, Hatsushimo, Asashimo, Kasumi, Ushio and torpedo boats HIJMS Kiji and Tomozuru. HMIJS Haruna had grounded at high speed after the Battle of Leyte Gulf and was barely able to escape from Singapore. Admiral Shima, after assessing the time necessary to sortie from Lingga Roads and reach the invasion fleet decided it would be a pointless sacrifice of men and ships.

(Note: HMS Warspite was reprieved through the romantic sentimentality of Churchill. After being hit by a Fritz X missile she was towed to Malta. With Italy out of the war, and blackout restrictions on the shipyard partially lifted, repairs were made to her hull and machinery for two months to permit her to steam on one shaft to Gibraltar. A complete survey of damage was made to allow HM Dockyard Rosyth to prepare full repairs. At Gibraltar, all damaged fittings, machinery and electrical systems were removed and spaces prepared for renewal. She arrived at Rosyth in March 1944 where new boilers replaced the four damaged ones, and “X” turret was repaired. She emerged again at the end of August 1944. Quite bluntly, the Admiralty did not consider her repair worth the expense or the labour. However, Churchill viewed her repair as akin to the resurrection of American battleships sunk at Pearl Harbour, and HMS Warspite as useful for shore bombardment in the Pacific. The admirals chose not to fight the issue.)

Five days later, landings were carried out near Butterworth and Sungei Patani by the remainder of 3 Special Service Bde – doubled in size since Operation Buccaneer, leading 3 Mixed Division ashore. To the surprise of the British, there was almost no opposition and the second echelon of XV Corps, 2 Division and Corps support troops landed well ahead of schedule. The 29th IJA Army had independently come to the conclusion the Malaya was indefensible given the number of available troops; but also that unlike the Americans in the East Indies, the British could not bypass and leave any undestroyed IJA units. LTG Ishiguro therefore chose the superb defensive terrain around Taiping to make his stand – it dominated to west coast road and rail network, and Ishiguro had ample time to construct mutually supporting hardened defensive positions well stocked with food and ammunition.

In addition to single airfields near the landing sites, the primary objective of 3 Mixed Division was the Alor Star complex of three all-weather airfields built pre-war by the RAF. This move is augmented by a drop by 5 Parachute Bde. The Unfederated Malay States of Perlia, Kedah, Kelantan and Terangganu were ceded to Thailand by the Japanese in 1942; and Alor Star lay within Kedah. Thai rule had proven nominal, subordinate to Japanese demands, and the Thai light infantry forces guarding Alor Star again “bent, rather than broke with the wind” and provided a nominal defence of their nominal rule. While 3 Mixed Division initially concentrated around Alor Star against any counterattack – then to prepare for an advance northward through Jitra into Thailand proper; it was 2 Division which advanced into the Taiping bastion. Although 37th IJA IMB was short one battalion, it nevertheless exacted a heavy toll – nearly a thousand British dead from positions sited to minimize British air and artillery support.

The third set of landings occurred on 14 December 1944 after a lull to allow replenishment of fleet units and transfer of RAF units to captured airfields. VI British Corps was assigned objectives 200 miles (Port Swettenham) and 240 miles (Port Dickson) southeast of Taiping. One landing site, Morib was near disastrous due to poor reconnoitering, the beach sand concealed layers of mud that swallowed amphibious vehicles from 79 Armoured Division and forced abandonment of the site. Had it been defended, casualties may have been horrific. Beaches assaulted by the other elements of the division allowed it to assemble, and move on Kuala Lumpur, capital of Malay Federated States. The 262nd IJA Independent Infantry Battalion defended Kuala Lumpur to the last man, a tough, but relatively quick fight. 70 Division (-) followed the 79 Armoured Division ashore, and moved north to secure links with 2 Division. At Port Dickson, 36 Division came ashore without opposition. Once moving in echelon towards Johore, the British were elated when armoured car squadrons found no defensive lines at the Slim River, or in Johore. The Japanese had withdrawn onto Singapore Island.

The bulk of Japanese combat power was found in the 35th IJA Division and 70th IJA IMB. The Seventh IJA Area Army HQ correctly estimated that combined they lacked sufficient strength to repel assaults across the Johore Strait, and placed both in semi-circular defensive positions around the reservoirs on the island. Well aware of the role this water supply placed in LTG Arthur Percival’s surrender three years earlier, the Japanese believed this could be replicated in reverse – the British would be forced into unprepared and premature frontal assaults to save the civilian population of Singapore. The plan may have been sound as a device to secure maximum British casualties, but three factors undermined it. The first was 35th IJA Division had lost two infantry battalions and all but one mountain artillery battery to USN submarines off Shanghai between 28 April and 6 May 1944, and these had to be rebuilt. This weakened the veteran composition of the division after its service in China. Secondly, no IJA unit had yet faced combat against an enemy enjoying heavy air, artillery and tank support in an attack. Thirdly, this decision was made after fighting commenced at Taiping, and insufficient time and materiel were available for the siting, and then construction of defensive works.

Although 41,100 other Japanese military personnel were on Singapore Island, no organized defense by them was contemplated. Among them were only two infantry formations a 590-man guard battalion for the IJA Southern Expeditionary Army Group Headquarters and a similar 450-man guard force for Seventh IJA Area Army HQ. The former had a detachment of six armoured cars, and was in an upscale Singapore neighborhood while the latter was at Kallang Airfield on the east side of the city. Over 8,000 rear-echelon staff personnel were assigned to these two command centers, the former in charge of all Japanese forces from the Philippines to Burma to New Guinea, and the latter for Thailand, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. Another 3000 were ground personnel assigned to the Seventh IJA Area Army HQ until pilots and aircraft could arrive at their empty airfields from Japan, or as anti-aircraft gunners. The next closest unit to a combat formation was the 16th IJA Military Police Group with nine semi-autonomous companies of 210 to 240 physically tough but lightly armed troops. Four of these companies were assigned to POW Camps in Singapore and the other five elsewhere in Malaya. Other large concentrations were the 25th IJA Transport Support Group with 6300 mechanics and specialists assigned to either the railroad repair depot or the former Ford factory (where LTG Percival surrendered on 15 February 1942) now used to repair and recondition vehicles from all over Seventh IJA Area Army. Another 2750 troops were assigned to supervise local factories and municipal utilities on the island. About 3400 were on staff in hospitals or as patients there.

The 14,300-odd IJN personnel could muster only a single ground combat unit. In the early morning hours of 22 November 1944, half the crew of HIJMS Myoko and 70% of the crew of HIJMS Takao were organized into the 1550-man Onodo Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF) named after the captain of IMS Takao. Accustomed to forming such ad-hoc naval infantry in pre-war China, the Onodo SNLF was no match for regular army troops. HIJMS Takao was left as a floating battery. The IJN role was largely an ignoble one. Once HIJMS Myoko’s crew was mustered into the Onodo SNLF, over 1400 personnel from the shipyard and headquarters staff shoved their way on board, and she departed on 12 December for Camh Ranh Bay. For many, it was cowardice, nothing more, and the next day she was torpedoed by USS Bergall (SS-320); and nearly foundered as a result of chaos between her passengers and what hardly qualified as a crew. Another 4,900 were assigned to the Singapore Naval Base, but most unskilled workers were Korean or Formosan with no military training, and the non-technical IJN personnel were administrative staff at Naval HQ. Almost 2400 were supervisory stevedores on the Keppel Docks or managing factories commandeered for IJN use. 1720 were assigned to coastal battery, observation or anti-aircraft duties. Just over 2000 were assigned to naval hospitals as patients or staff. There was no cooperation between IJA and IJN commanders. If Singapore was no fortress for Churchill in 1942, it was even less of one for the Japanese nearly three years later.

A day after the first British reconnaissance troops peered across the Johore Strait on 19 December, two platoons of Royal Marines crossed the Johore Strait less than two miles from Tengah Airfield. This initial probe found the Japanese patrols porous enough they remained on the island rather than returning. This rapid advance baffled LTG O’Conner, thus far the Italians had put up a better fight during Operation Compass. On 21 December, HIJMS Takao was hit by nearly seventy low-level Avro Lancaster bombers and capsized, removing her as a threat. Overnight on 22-23 December, 2/Royal East Kent Regiment (Buffs), the first unit to reach Johore crossed three miles due north of Tengah, followed throughout the day by the other three battalions of 26 Bde. Engineers began construction of a pontoon bridge on Christmas Eve, when the first refugees from Singapore brought reports the Japanese were sabotaging power plants and cut off the water supply. Once aware, O’Conner recognized the danger – no one would die of thirst, but unsanitary sources would ultimately result in cholera outbreaks.

O’Conner had few immediate options, but he used him after consulting via eleventh Army Group Commander GEN George Giffard and ADM Lord Louis Mountbatten, Theater Commander. It was clear that despite clearing intact of a number of capable ports on the west coast of Malaya, the delay in setting up logistics along Malaya’s road network would be considerable. Sending a single brigade was a calculated risk; gaining a toehold on Singapore Island in the hopes it could be held for the time necessary for additional forces to be supplied. A second brigade, or a full division were not yet supportable by land. Therefore, the RN was given a primary mission to sweep the minefields laid in the southwest approaches to Singapore Island through to Keppel Harbour. RN intelligence believed the reports that the coastal batteries were disabled prior to surrender, and the Japanese were unlikely to have repaired any 15-inch or 9.2-inch guns, and even if they could, production of ammunition would present great difficulties. Six-inch gun batteries were a different matter – the same marks had been sold to the Japanese in the early 1900s and were still in widespread service. The final plan was to also rely on three assaults by airborne units. These were subject to the December weather as the northeast monsoon season came to an end.

The RN was able to commence minesweeping on 28 December, an operation lasting five days. HMS Regulus and Squirrel were lost to mines, and HMCS Mulgrave was damaged beyond repair (CTL). HMS Vestal was sunk by a kamikaze, the first such attack on a RN vessel, and a rare appearance by the IJNAF after the heavy losses in the Philippine Sea, USN raids on Formosa, and at Leyte Gulf. A few weeks later, destroyer HMS Pathfinder became a CTL after a conventional bombing attack. Nevertheless the sea approaches were cleared.

The first airborne assault was at dawn on 27 December when gliders based from Alor Star carried the veteran 2/Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry (Glider) from 6 Airlanding Bde to secure drop zones near Tengah. (Eleven squadrons of glider tugs – four of Halifax, six Stirling V and one Wellington were just able to carry a single airlanding brigade, or the airborne division’s supporting light armour, artillery, medical, signalers or other specialist troops. Unlike Europe, weather and logistical conditions in Asia were such that once a glider was used, it very difficult to salvage or recondition. The remaining gliders were used to ferry in supplies, rather than additional troops.) The Ox and Bucks were followed by a drop of 9/Parachute Regiment (Home Counties) and 1/Canadian Parachute Regiment 90 minutes later. The three battalions made quick, and bloody work of the IJAAF ground personnel and anti-aircraft gunners at Tengah. A small portion of 3 Parachute Brigade’s HQ and support personnel followed in a second jump to establish command and control of the airfield defence until a link up with 26 Bde troops was made.

The second parachute assault on 27 December was made by the third battalion from 3 Parachute Bde – 8/Parachute Regiment (Midland Counties) on the coastal defence positions at Buena Vista. Weather intervened, and the third landing near Ft Silosio on Blakong Mati Island forming the windward side of Keppel Harbour was delayed until 29 December. This drop zone was small and difficult, but as with Buena Vista, there were no significant infantry forces to defend the gunners. These battalions were not relieved by RM detachments until 3 January 1945.

By 5 January, the logistical situation in western Malaya had improved to the point where 36 Division HQ, artillery and support units and 72 Bde were able to cross to Singapore Island, followed two days later by 185 Bde. 26 Bde and 3 Parachute Bde pushed forward to the former Jurong Line held by the Australians in 1942, where two water inlets reduce the island to a narrow point. Only light IJA covering forces were found, then neutralized, and the advance continued to the western side of the Reservoir bastion defensive line where the first fierce combat was engaged. 1 and 3 Special Service Brigades were assigned to clear Singapore City and the southeastern coast of the island as far as Changi, while 3 Parachute Bde skirted the north coast to the naval base to eventually link up on 18 January. The Onodo SNLF was trapped between them and annihilated. Elements of 79 Armoured Division began offloading in Keppel Harbour on 7 January and began working their way north towards the IJA positions. 70 Division crossed the Johore Strait beginning on 9 January 1945, while 78 Division began disembarking in Keppel Harbour a week later.

9 January also marked the beginning of probing attacks by 36 Division on 35th IJA Division’s outer defensive positions, with very slow progress made. As the other British divisions joined the attack, no weak point sufficient to cause an IJA collapse was found. Although armour, artillery and air strikes were used whenever possible, the battle remained one in which the Japanese were cleared bunker by interlocking bunker; from each trench line, and every strongpoint by the poor bloody infantry. Eleven days passed before the reservoir complex was declared secure, at a cost of 3,660 dead and 10,825 wounded – the equivalent of an infantry division. Of some 22,000 IJA defenders, only small handfuls from the 35th IJA Division and 70th IJA IMB were taken prisoner. The last operations in Malaya were an epic march of 2 Division via southern Thailand to Khota Bharu, Kuantan, Jerantut before linking up again with VI British Corps at Gemas.

The Liberation of Malaya and Singapore had an effect significantly different than the OTL on the people of Malaya. The British did not disembark from troopships with starched uniforms gradually wilting in the heat to march in formation to a surrender ceremony made conveniently possible by an American atomic bomb. They arrived in battle dress, fought as furiously as at Kohima or at Agincourt, and thousands left for their homes on hospital litters. Malays and Chinese alike were aware the Japanese had exploded the myth of while racial superiority in 1941-42; but also that British soldiers showed a unique virility in the battles to eject the invaders. They were also aware the British had done it without the aid of native troops – a consideration embraced by Churchill when he approved Twelfth British Army’s composition. Nor did they receive significant aid from the inhabitants of Malaya and the Straits Settlements, who definitely did not liberate themselves from the Japanese yoke.

As much as native nationalists may have wanted independence, the cruel background to this political goal remained harshly in view. In June 1940, there was no threat of conquest by a foreign power. Twenty months later, the Japanese possessed the naval bastion of Singapore. If Malaya were to become independent of, and outside of the British defence umbrella, the fear lay under the surface that 20 months later, a foreign power could conquer the newly independent state. Also well remembered is British rule had never nearly as odious as the Japanese occupation. As much as local autonomy was desired, there was little sentiment for breaking political and defence ties with the Empire, and naturally economic development followed suit.

Another factor is the British did not botch the reoccupation. British Military Administration took over Malaya piece by piece, and over a period of eight weeks instead of on a single day. They established local administration bodies and governments under much less chaotic circumstances than in the OTL. Four American-built turbo-electric frigates were refitted for use as floating power plants at Port Swettenham (HMS Rowley), Malacca (HMS Tyler) and Singapore (HMS Hotham, Stockham). The reestablishment of power to hospitals, port facilities and a host of other essential activities left a solid impression compared the Japanese. Food shipments were prepared, occupation currency established, and pressure for competing black market exchanges decreased.

There was a certain reciprocity from the British population. While the Fourteenth British Army struggling to clear Burma may have remained a “forgotten army”, no such label could attach itself to Twelfth British Army’s efforts in Malaya. The press coverage of this campaign of vengeance to erase the stain of the 1942 surrender was voluminous and postwar the British soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines who took part felt considerable pride for having done their bit.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

Central Pacific Theater: The U.S Navy was able to apply the same assets used historically for the invasion of the Gilbert Islands; and unfortunately, the same historical dead-wrong lessons in naval gunfire support and the adequacy of landing craft were learned. This led to the decimation and near defeat of 2nd MARDIV at Tarawa in November 1943. The success of 27th U.S. Infantry Division (-) at nearby Makin, and the ability to revamp doctrine and training in record time led to the successful invasion of Kwajalein in January-February 1944 by the 24th U.S. Infantry Division (substituting for the 7th U.S. Infantry Division – diverted to Europe – instead of being sent to MacArthur). The capture of Eniwetok by 27th U.S. Infantry Division (-) later in February restored faith in the concept of amphibious landings against coral atolls; but improved armored LVTs and Sherman DD tanks proven in Europe were rushed to the Pacific after Tarawa and helped make the difference.

The 1944 Central Pacific Offensive: climaxed in the Battle of the Philippine Sea (19-20 June 1944) in which submarines and aircraft combined to sink carriers IMS Taiho, Shokaku, Hiyo and severely damage IMS Zuikaku, Junyo and Chiyoda. More than 730 IJNAF aircraft were lost, and the Americans were able to invade and capture Saipan, Tinian and Guam in the Mariana Islands without further naval or aerial opposition.

In July 1944, a small detour was made with the invasion of the Admiralty Islands, occupied by the 2nd U.S. Cavalry Division which had trained in jungle warfare on Guadalcanal for the last five months. The Admiralty Islands acts a bone in the throat of Japanese sea communications to Rabaul and New Guinea. The performance of the 2nd U.S. Cavalry Division was good, and made an impression on MacArthur who valued the addition of a third Regular US Army division to his available forces. MacArthur’s advance through the Netherlands East Indies had an effect on the invasion of Peleliu, making it appear even more essential, and therefore the resulting losses in the OTL are not avoided.

The invasion of Leyte and its attendant Battle of Leyte Gulf will play out as OTL with two exceptions. 2nd U.S. Cavalry Division is substituted for 1st U.S. Cavalry Division, and 24th U.S. Infantry Division for 7th U.S. Infantry Division in the initial assault, and 91st U.S. Infantry Division for 38th U.S. Infantry Division later in November. The OTL Invasion of Luzon in January 1945 is similarly modified. The 13th U.S. Armored Division is substituted for the 6th U.S. Infantry Division in the initial landings at Lingayen Gulf. The division was not required in Europe, while 6th U.S. Infantry Division was a part of Roundup. The mission of the 13th U.S. Armored Division was to rapidly breakout of the beachhead and rapidly overrun Clark Field and capture the key city of San Fernando to block any Japanese retreat to the Bataan Peninsula. The speed of this armored thrust had the inadvertent effect of cutting off the opportunity for LTG Yamashita’s troops to redeploy into North Luzon. Their spirited defense was transferred into South Luzon, and a final stand at Legaspi.

Other substitutions were the 83rd and 85th U.S. Infantry Divisions for the 40th and 43rd U.S. Infantry Divisions sent to Roundup in the initial landings on 9 January 1945; 2nd U.S. Cavalry Division is substituted again for 1st U.S. Cavalry Division on 27 January; 8th Infantry Division, one of the first transferred from the European to Pacific Theater after the surrender of Germany on 29 January; and again 91st U.S. Infantry Division for 38th U.S. Infantry Division on 10 February 1945. The most significant battles, most notably the bloody fight for Manila, will occur as OTL.

The only major change in the Central Pacific Offensive was the invasion of Formosa on 26 February 1945. Although Formosa could have been bypassed as in the OTL, three factors led to its inclusion. The first was trained troops were arriving from the European Theater, and needed to be used somewhere for morale purposes. Most American veterans of Europe felt they had won their war, and the Pacific was the job of slackers still stateside. Their use in a significant offensive operation would hopefully do much to dispel that belief. The second reason was these units were earmarked for the planned invasion of Japan, and it was felt prior blooding against the Japanese was essential to their preparation. Formosa had sufficient land mass to be a useful staging ground for forces committed to the invasion of Japan. An additional minor reason was that significant numbers of Formosan troops captured on Timor had volunteered considerable information regarding terrain and topography, including possible landing sites. A number of Formosans also willingly joined a special operations unit similar to the Alamo Scouts of Sixth U.S. Army.

After the Potsdam Conference, GEN George C Marshall returned to his post as Chief of Staff. After a period of leave, his protégé GEN Dwight D Eisenhower became commander of U.S. Army Pacific, subordinate to ADM Chester Nimitz as Pacific Theater commander. Eisenhower chose LTG Bill Simpson of Ninth U.S. Army to command the Formosa invasion. Because of prior commitments to the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the USN amphibious lift was limited to that formerly supporting the British invasion of Malaya. This lift was sufficient for two divisions and support units. The plan for the occupation was divided into distinct phases. The First Phase was an airborne assault on the Tainan IJNAF airfield complex, and amphibious landings nearby close to the naval base of Takao (modern Kaohsiung). After a buildup, Phase Two would expand the foothold along the western coast of the island. Third Phase was the capture of Taipei, the capital, and the Fourth Phase occupation of the central mountain spine and eastern coast.

XII U.S. Corps, with the 90th and 104th U.S. Infantry Divisions made the landings, while the 101st U.S. Airborne Division staging from Clark Field landed at Tainan. The invasion caught both sides by surprise. The Americans were astounded to find their intelligence was quite faulty, all but two of the IJA divisions expected to be on the island had been moved to Leyte or Luzon, hence the bitter fighting there. They were not yet replaced, the buildup on Okinawa took priority, and the losses in shipping in the Philippines since October 1944 precluded additional reinforcements as well. Only the 50th and 66th IJA divisions were left, and both were Formosan conscripts built around IJA cadres. The Formosan augmentees in XII U.S. Corps by speaking Formosan dialects, and on occasion contacting conscripts from their home areas – some personally known to each other. Formosan draftees had no love for the IJA, and slowly they defected from their colonial masters. Within a couple of weeks, XII U.S. Corps was two months ahead of schedule, and Second Phase was completed.

Because of shipping constraints, 93rd U.S. Infantry Division was not able to arrive at Takao until 10 April 1945. With too few troops to garrison the amount of the island already under American control, LTG Simpson began to regard Formosa as liberated territory, and not a part of Japan. Local Formosan officials willingly traded their Japanese masters for American ones. Formosan conscripts were transferred into a local constabulary under loose American oversight. Unbeknownst to Simpson or anyone else, few of these local Formosans had any more loyalty to Chiang Kai-Shek than to the Emperor Hirohito. A strong nationalist streak was surfacing, and Formosan leaders used the trust placed in them by the Americans to strengthen it. By the time the last Japanese bastion was reduced in late May 1945, the process was nearly complete.

The invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa proceeded as in the OTL.