D-Day in 1943: Plausibility and operations in France

[MUC]

So, it's more like 1200 aircraft and not 1500-3000?

 

[Eric C Johnson]

There are eight major problems that will arise for the Western Allies following the successful landings in Normandy on 12 May 1943. None are fatal to the landings, or the success of the following campaign, but should be addressed. Two are insolvable, the other six can be mitigated or overcome.

The first, as noted previously, the first problem is that Patton will spend the first two months plus attacking and advancing away from Germany and the German Army. The COSSAC Plan briefed at Casablanca in January 1943 projected that by D+14 18 Allied divisions would be ashore and hold an arc from Avranches in an arc though Alencon north of Le Mans to the mouth of the Seine River opposite Le Havre. Under Roundup, I also postulated 18 divisions in France, with a higher number of assault divisions (ten) rather than the four under the COSSAC Plan.

As observed by FM Erwin Rommel in his first inspection tour of France in December 1943, the average age of German soldiers in France was thirty-seven. In his second inspection report submitted a month later, Rommel concluded that German troops in France were those considered unfit for service in Russia. The poor troop quality is compounded by poor selection by Hitler for high command. Command of the German Seventh Army is entrusted by Hitler to Generaloberst Friedrich Dollmann on grounds of political reliability over competence since August of 1939, although Dollmann had not seen combat since 1916 as an aerial observer, and his command saw no combat during the French Campaign of 1940. His performance on occupation duties was marked by considerable inertia, and once summoned to Berlin to explain the loss of Cherbourg, he committed suicide. German command performance steadily improved once Dollmann blew his brains out.

Against I US Armored Corps, the three OTL German infantry divisions in Brittany (76th Infantry Division – Brest- Reformed March 1943 – 70% strength, little unit training, French weapons; 113th Infantry Division – West of St Malo – Reformed February 1943 – 75% strength, little unit training, poor quality, French equipment, 371st Infantry Division – Northeast of Brest – Reformed February 1943 – 75% strength. Just arriving in France with rearguard still aboard trains, little training, Czech equipment) have little chance of making use of the excellent natural terrain for defensive combat because of lack of numbers for a frontage over 100 miles wide. These divisions will be first contained and isolated, then destroyed during the capture of Brest and Lorient. .

Patton will split his corps, sending 2nd AD/3rd ID into Brittany toward Brest and Lorient; and 4th AD/9th ID to St Nazaire and Nantes on the north bank of the Loire River, which were devoid of combat formations and contained only security units. The best resistance will be put up by the the 343rd Occupation Division in Lorient – Formed October 1942 – Transferred to France in March 1943. Above strength with one light reconnaissance, one anti-tank, and one engineer battalions added. The capture of Lorient will take at least one weak. Lorient is also the only port where the Germans will have time and resources to carry out a significant demolition of port facilities. Brest (16,000 tons supply capacity per day) Nantes (I could not find capacity) and St Nazaire (21,000 tons) will ease the US supply position and allow Cherbourg to be devoted to supporting the British and Canadians.

Patton will then be required to reconstitute, rest, resupply and replace losses for probably three weeks after reaching the Loire (end of June/early July). With VII US Corps covering his rear and flank, Patton will find a weak point and cross the Loire and continue advancing away from Germany to capture Bordeaux. Hitler ordered Bordeaux transformed into a “festung stadt” and the 715th Occupation Division was transferred from nearby Dax to double its garrison. Attempts by the Germans to destroy port installations met with considerable success, but led to sharp, morale-sapping clashes with French Resistance. Combined with clear certainty they have been abandoned, and the defenders were unable to prolong the battle, and more willing to surrender to the Americans to avoid the French. But it is only by mid-July that Patton can begin to advance East and then north. This problem, the tyranny of Geography cannot be mitigated.

The second problem is Operation Citadel and the resulting earlier onset of the Cold War. Several others have argued Citadel would be cancelled, and in the OTL it was abandoned after the invasion of Sicily. I also acknowledge the argument that Stalin may launch his own offensive. It may seem counterintuitive, but I believe Citadel would receive the green light for several reasons. Hitler issued his directive (Operations Order 6) on 15 April 1943, with a primary objective of eliminating the Kursk bulge in the German lines for two reasons. The first is to shorten the front and ease lateral movements, and the second is to prevent Kursk from becoming a springboard for an offensive into the Ukraine. Over the previous 15 months, the Germans invested huge resources in trying to restore the oil fields, factories, transport, agriculture, mining and even shipbuilding in the Ukraine to reduce the length of time for resupply of field armies. This huge investment needed protection.

The long-term objective of Citadel reflects just how far Hitler was drifting from reality. It was to regain the lost territory of the previous winter – to return to Stalingrad and the Caucasus. It was in support of this long-term objective that on 4 May 1943 Hitler ordered Citadel delayed until 91 PzKw VI Tiger, 270 Pzkw V Panther tanks (virtually all of these tanks manufactured), as well as 80 Sd Kfw 184 Elefant SP guns arrived. Six days later, when FM Heinz Guderian reiterated GEN Walter Model’s objections to Citadel expressed on 4 May, Hitler remained silent, but FM Wilhelm Keitel responded Citadel must go forward for political and prestige reasons. Hitler is in the same trap as the previous year. Goebbels’ propaganda machine spun Stalingrad up so high that a withdrawal became impossible. The German people are now being fed a diet of decisive year in the East to a point where something must be done to save face.

This is the situation when news of landings in Normandy arrives. Dictatorships in decline seldom choose wiser options, and Hitler was never one to permanently concede territory without a fight. In totalitarian regimes, loss of territory often begets one crisis of confidence after another. The first reaction is the 91 PzKw VI Tiger, 270 Pzkw V Panther tanks and 80 Elefant SP guns are no longer going to Kursk. They are being expedited to France as soon as they roll of the production lines. Without a need to delay to deliver these vehicles, Hitler would likely grant the fervent requests of FM Erich von Manstein to start Citadel immediately. Luftwaffe assets, massive amounts of fuel, ammunition and other supplies have been stockpiled, why not use them as planned? Von Manstein is saying what Hitler wants to hear, an operational level of war offensive that can be done quickly takes attention away from setbacks in France. However, with reinforcements not forthcoming, the burden weighs heavily on Von Manstein’s troops, not Model’s.

Without time to establish fearsome mine belts and anti-tank positions, the Russians give ground rather than risk encirclement, but succeeded in decimating a number of German panzer and infantry formations at the cost of heavy casualties themselves. All told, the Germans shortened their front by nearly 300 miles. But in the end, the ratio of German forces available per mile of front had not changed – the Russian Front was long and too sparsely held. While German ground and air forces could not be replaced, Soviet troops and equipment could. Dramatic as the Kursk victory was, it neither delays nor diminishes scope and scale of the Soviet Counteroffensive planned for August 1943. Von Manstein tried, but the Ukraine could not be saved.

The German Army will have to defend Kiev without the 1st, 14th, and 24th Panzer Divisions, still in France, so the Russian offensive will not be stopped by the dying elements of German military prowess. What will affect the August 1943 Soviet offensive is the diversion of perhaps as many as 80-100,000 one-ton to five-ton trucks from Lend-Lease to support logistical movement in France. In addition, perhaps 8,000 warplanes, 2 million tons of fuel and 3 million of tons of food are not shipped to Russia from January 1943 onward under Lend-Lease. As Russia gradually resumes fighting solely on its own resources, its logistical tail grows more lethargic. This slowing of the Russian advance will allow more of Europe to fall to the Western Allies. Stalin firmly believes much of this territory must be under Soviet control for the future security of the USSR.

Strategically, the only effect of Kursk is to plant additional seeds of doubt in Stalin’s mind concerning the possibility of collusion between the Western Allies and Nazi Germany to ensure that Soviet losses were maximized. This twisted suspicion, while poisonous to events in Postwar Europe, does nothing to save the Third Reich. It does accelerate the forces leading to the onset of the Cold War considerably, and will probably force the Western Allies to hold far greater numbers of troops in Central Europe after the defeat of Germany. This problem cannot be mitigated.

Problem Three is the British “Great Tank Scandal”. The British were unable to produce a tank which combined the necessary qualities of firepower, protection, mechanical reliability, and sufficient range on the battlefield. In the OTL in 1944, it ignited a firestorm in Parliament that further severely damaged public confidence in the Conservative Party’s ability to manage national defence. The loss of Singapore and Tobruk in 1942 was still a vivid memory in the British body politic. Round-up is very much a come-as-you-are affair, and not every Allied unit is fully equipped. The poor performance of (especially cruiser) tanks shows up in the failure of 9 AD to capture Caen before the Germans establish a strong defensive position. The overall best British Commonwealth tank in combat in France is probably the Canadian Ram II tank with a 6-pdr gun.

This problem is rectified, but only after tremendous embarrassment. In March 1943, upon completion of Ram II production at Montreal Locomotive Works, M4A1 Sherman tanks under the Canadian name of Grizzly commenced with the first vehicles coming off the line in May 1943. Production of Grizzly tanks will not be cancelled in June 1943 as in the OTL because it will be clear that US production of Shermans will not be sufficient for Operation Roundup to be fully exploited. After testing the first models, production tanks arrived to replace the Grants in 4 Canadian Armoured Division in early August. Redundant Grants had their 75mm and 37mm guns removed, and internal space made for an infantry squad. This conversion, nicknamed “Grant Kangaroos” was the world’s first true armoured personnel carrier. Later in early 1944, “Ram Kangaroos” would also be converted.

Valentine X tanks built by Canadian Pacific will have given way to Bishop 83.4mm (25 Pdr) self-propelled guns, but after July 1943, the Archer self-propelled ant-tank gun was ordered into production in Montreal. It carried the 76mm (17pdr) gun that was proven to be the first effective Tiger tank killer. The additional Canadian tank production, OTL US Lend-Lease transfers of Shermans, as well as producing in Great Britain 75mm gunned Cromwell tanks will eventually rectify this problem, but only after unexpected delays in Roundup execution. The Germans have a similar problem in that the majority of their tanks in production are not Tigers and Panthers, but PzKw IIIM/N, PzKw IVH and StG III models.

Problem four is the US Army’s Tank Destroyer (TD) Doctrine, as already noted by several other commentators. The problem goes well beyond poor equipment, such as towed M3 37mm (the M1 57mm and M5 76mm had not yet entered service). It was the Doctrine, which specified tank destroyers, including the self-propelled M10 and M10A1 76mm gun TDs would roam the battlefield to search and ambush enemy tanks. TDs would rely on speed and mobility rather than artillery and infantry support. By 1943, TDs were no more mobile than enemy tanks, and both M3 and open topped M10 were appallingly vulnerable to German artillery and infantry weapons – especially mortars and grenades, but also machine gun fire. After the 2nd and 3rd US TD Groups are shredded, TD battalions are assigned on a semi-permanent basis to infantry divisions and used primarily for additional fire support in planned attacks.

This problem can be partially mitigated in the short term, solved over time. The production of the M18 Hellcat will be scaled back to vehicles for which material has already been assembled. Conversion of M36 Jackson TDs (90mm gun) from M10s will proceed on an expedited basis after experience against PzKw V and PzKw VI tanks, but none will be completed in time for combat. The solution is found in the adoption of the philosophy of the best anti-tank weapons is another tank. Production of Allied tanks will outpace the German.

Problem five is 1943 USAAF Close Air Support which was inadequate to combat conditions in France, and frequently led to missed German targets and too frequent friendly force casualties. This is resolved by assigning experienced USAAF pilots from Fifteenth US Air Force (Established in Great Britain instead of North Africa as the tactical counterpart to the strategic Eighth US Air Force) and adequate radio equipment in armored vehicles close to the leading elements of each division. In addition, experience in close air support missions will lead to a deadly combination for opposing German units.

Problem six results from overzealous conversion of US Army mechanized cavalry units to armored formations. Only the 4th, 6th, 15th, 16th, 101st, 102nd, 104th, 106th, 107th, 113th, and 115th Cavalry Regiments exist as Corps assets assigned to VII US Corps, I US Armored Corps, Third US Army, Seventh US Army, XII US Corps, V US Corps, (Inactivated to provide replacements), VIII US Corps, II US Armored Corps and VI US Corps. It will be noted that First (plus III, IX and US Corps) and Fifth US Armies (plus II, IV, and XI US Corps) arrive without an assigned cavalry component. The 2nd, 3rd, 11th, and 14th Cavalry Groups will arrive one to four months after elements of these two field armies, but the shortage of cavalry will last until the end of the war in Europe. Combat losses are also not replaced until after some delay. This problem is only partially mitigated by aerial reconnaissance.

The British and Canadian Armies do not suffer under this handicap due to the assignment of battalion-sized Reconnaissance Regiments to each infantry division beginning in 1941, Royal Armoured Corps regiments to armoured divisions and corps, and finally converting 20 Armoured Brigade into Army and Army Group level Armoured Reconnaissance Regiments.

Problem seven; the combined effects of the previous four problems are the initial setbacks against the German defensive lines. Although Generalmajor Wilhelm Richter, commander of 716th Occupation Division was not the best commander, Richter recognized the importance of Caen, and promptly his four battalions west of the Orne and his artillery battalion to assemble there. He also ordered the Regimental HQ and two remaining battalions of 726th Regiment withdrawn from Seine Estuary Beaches and Lisieux to Caen. The Seine and its open terrain to Paris were someone else’s problem in Richter’s mind. The movement was executed flawlessly. British planners expected reinforcements to be motorized, and come by road from the east. Instead they travelled by rail, despite damage from raids, and the fact rail lines passed within four miles of British paratroopers hunkered in defensive positions.

Bypassing Dollmann and his Korps Commanders, Army Group-West Staff also ordered 1st Parachute Division to reinforce Caen. MG Percy Hobart of 79 AD, an excellent trainer of troops and fervid disciple of armour theories expounded by Fuller, quickly had 27 Armoured Brigade assembled, organized and moving through Bayeux to Tully-Sur-Seulles in an effort achieve the fabled war-ending breakthrough that armour purists had long dreamt of. Hobart, however, found himself laboring under actual terrain constraints the pure armour theorist seldom took into consideration.

27 Armoured Brigade’s Crusader II tanks possessed mechanical reliability, but comparatively elderly and armed with puny 40mm (2pdr) guns. Due to the boscage they were seldom able to leave roads. Anti-tank teams from 1st Parachute Division were able to destroy lead tanks and block all further advances. Attempts to bring up engineer support or to refuel tanks brought accurate artillery fire. Calls for RAF support led to British troops being attacked as often as Germans. Hobart however, quickly adapted, and married 185 Brigade’s infantry battalions closely with armoured regiments, and supported them with dedicated artillery. In addition, 5 Division began to envelop Caen from the west and 3 Division from the east. After milking as much delay as possible, von Rundstedt ordered Caen defenders to withdraw behind the Seine River, thus incurring Hitler’s wrath. Caen was captured on D+12, buying invaluable time for the full equipment allocation for 1st Panzer Division to arrive from Germany. It also allowed 65th Infantry Division from Eindhoven, and 161st Infantry Division from Boulogne to arrive on the Seine.

After allowing the landing of follow-on divisions and transfer of RAF and USAAF squadrons to French airfields, Marshall launched his first major attack against the German defensive lines in early July. It was marginally successful. The initial gains by Third US Army west of Paris were regained by counterattacks spearheaded by 10th Panzer Brigade (PzKw V), 653rd Schwere Panzerjaeger Abteilung and 503rd Schwere Panzer Abtilung. It was here that US Army shortcomings were exposed, and began to be corrected. The only silver lining was the Panther tank’s debut was inauspicious – the earliest models suffered from poor factory workmanship and suffered frequent mechanical breakdowns. This left them exposed to Allied fighter-bombers.

First Canadian Army was able to achieve its objective of crossing the mouth of the Seine after 79 AD and 1 Airborne Divisions are attached for the operation. The mouth of the Seine is crossed by landing craft up to LST in size due to its width. The airborne operation did not go smoothly, unlike Normandy, where the night drops well off the objectives were compensated by the lack of German opposition, there was little margin for error and the jump was scheduled for just after dawn. The 161st Infantry Division was spread far too thin, but all but one of the drop zones had been pre-zeroed by artillery fire. Unable to form up and seize their objectives around Harfleur, they withdrew without heavy casualties towards 1 Canadian Division which encountered little opposition. (Note: 1 Airborne Division is short a brigade, as 3 Parachute has been transferred to 6 Airborne Division.) The Germans shifted 1st Panzer Division and concentrated 161st Infantry Division against the Canadians, but by this time 1 Canadian Army Tank Bde was able to thicken the line. The German PzKw III, PzKw IV and StG III tanks were not superior to the 6pdr gunned Valentines in either gun power or armour, and the constricted space of a bridgehead negated their superior mobility. As 5 Canadian Armoured and 2 Canadian Divisions reinforced, the bridgehead expanded and the Canadians muscled their way into LeHavre. 17th Luftwaffe Field Division – the garrison in Le Havre fought better than most of its contemporaries, but could not hold out against the veteran Canadian units. Coming two months after the invasion, the Germans had ample time to thoroughly wreck the harbor. The Canadians continued to slowly expand along the Channel coast as II Canadian Corps arrived in August.

This was the last time the German Army ever repulsed an Allied offensive.

Problem eight is the return of the U-boat threat in December 1943. The loss of French bases caused the Kriegsmarine (as in the OTL) to examine seriously the Dutch snorkel invention, neglected up until then. Once problems of flooding were resolved – primarily through training with the new device – German U-boats began making more rapid transits from their Norwegian bases. Withdrawal from attacks is also sped up, and corvettes and frigates were too slow to overtake the submarines. Allied shipping losses rose, but it was too late in the war to be decisive.

The problem of the crisis in British manpower from late 1943 onward which led to the disbanding or gutting of a dozen combat-ready divisions, [including the 1, 9, 10, 42 (East Lancashire) Armoured, and 38 (Welsh), 44 (Home Counties), 45 (Wessex), 47 (2nd London), 48 (South Midland), 59 (Staffordshire) and 61 (South Midland) Divisions] is largely, but not entirely averted by execution of Roundup in 1943. The elimination of Luftwaffe bases in France simplifies the air defense problems in Great Britain. The intake of anti-aircraft gunners and construction engineers for home defence is drastically reduced (as it was in the OTL after November 1944.) These conscripts are available for combat replacements. In addition, II British Anti-Aircraft Corps is folded into I and III British Anti-Aircraft Corps; allowing disbandment of 4, 6, 8, 9, 11 and 12 Anti-Aircraft Divisions. Their personnel are more than enough to provide replacements for anti-aircraft regiments serving on Continental Europe, and the surplus will re-role as artillerymen. These leaves 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 10 Anti-Aircraft Divisions still in existence until the spring of 1944, when they too begin to stand down. In addition, the coastal defence regiments will also begin to disband as the invasion threat fades.

In my next post I will address German problems after Roundup.

 

[marathag]

e. The production of the M18 Hellcat will be scaled back to vehicles for which material has already been assembled

The earlier Buick design for a TD, the T-67, would likely been given the greenlight for production as it was in late 1942, 75mm with twin Buick engines and Christie Suspension, as the M-18 in this TL

 

[Bougnas]

The earlier Buick design for a TD, the T-67, would likely been given the greenlight for production as it was in late 1942, 75mm with twin Buick engines and Christie Suspension, as the M-18 in this TL

Doubt it, the Wallies never accelerated programs to enter service for a specific offensive.

 

[marathag]

Doubt it, the Wallies never accelerated programs to enter service for a specific offensive.

Not so much accelerate as take it as it was being trials tested at Aberdeen.

 

[Bougnas]

Not so much accelerate as take it as it was being trials tested at Aberdeen.

Yes but I'm really not convinced the US would put into service something that was deemed unsatisfactory, the US tended to use the long-term projects a lot more.

 

[phx1138]

diversion of perhaps as many as 80-100,000 one-ton to five-ton trucks from Lend-Lease to support logistical movement in France.

Do you presume those are all divisional or organic, or are you counting Red/White Ball also? (I confess, IDK how much that amounts to.) I ask, because it was possible for the Red/White Ball to be more effective & efficient with greater use of semi-trailers (10 tonners is the number I've seen quoted; I could believe heavier, too) & better organization of loading (marshalling); just how big the difference is, IDK. I suspect perceptible, if not overwhelming.

Strategically, the only effect of Kursk is to plant additional seeds of doubt in Stalin’s mind concerning the possibility of collusion between the Western Allies and Nazi Germany to ensure that Soviet losses were maximized.

Bear in mind, when France is invaded, the Soviets get a benefit. France can no longer be used as a safe zone for husbanding, (re)training, & organizing new divisions to be used in the SU: they're more likely to be sent to fight the WAllies. This, obviously, makes the Red Army's job easier.

will probably force the Western Allies to hold far greater numbers of troops in Central Europe after the defeat of Germany. This problem cannot be mitigated.

Presuming it happens. Stalin's been calling for a Second Front for awhile; he's now gotten one. Is he so paranoid as to think that same Second Front is meant to sabotage him? (Yeah, he might... but how likely is it?)

M4A1 Sherman tanks under the Canadian name of Grizzly commenced with the first vehicles coming off the line in May 1943. Production of Grizzly tanks will not be cancelled in June 1943 as in the OTL because it will be clear that US production of Shermans will not be sufficient for Operation Roundup to be fully exploited.

Yay! (Not for lack of M4s. ) Go Canada!

Can you throw in Canadian-built A57 Multibank engines? (The OTL Sherman V used them.) Just slap on DeSoto badges & say they're made in Ontario?

Does this produce manpower shortage issues? Conscription became a Thing in '44, & Canadian production was pretty near full stretch AIUI. Can MLW use more Quebequois, & free Anglo Canadians for the military? More women, ditto? Or does this idea hit a hard limit?

The problem of the crisis in British manpower from late 1943 onward which led to the disbanding or gutting of a dozen combat-ready divisions, [including the 1, 9, 10, 42 (East Lancashire) Armoured, and 38 (Welsh), 44 (Home Counties), 45 (Wessex), 47 (2nd London), 48 (South Midland), 59 (Staffordshire) and 61 (South Midland) Divisions] is largely, but not entirely averted by execution of Roundup in 1943. The elimination of Luftwaffe bases in France simplifies the air defense problems in Great Britain. The intake of anti-aircraft gunners and construction engineers for home defence is drastically reduced (as it was in the OTL after November 1944.) These conscripts are available for combat replacements. In addition, II British Anti-Aircraft Corps is folded into I and III British Anti-Aircraft Corps; allowing disbandment of 4, 6, 8, 9, 11 and 12 Anti-Aircraft Divisions. Their personnel are more than enough to provide replacements for anti-aircraft regiments serving on Continental Europe, and the surplus will re-role as artillerymen. These leaves 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 10 Anti-Aircraft Divisions still in existence until the spring of 1944, when they too begin to stand down. In addition, the coastal defence regiments will also begin to disband as the invasion threat fades.

The issue of infantry replacements in Normandy is liable to arise, as OTL, but it appears it will be less severe. TTL, without the threat from V-1s & V-2s already landing, I suspect some of the intact, unblooded divisions in Britain that OTL were never sent to France (of which there were at least 6, & as many as 12, IIRC, just don't ask me for the source...) would be TTL.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

Do you presume those are all divisional or organic, or are you counting Red/White Ball also? (I confess, IDK how much that amounts to.) I ask, because it was possible for the Red/White Ball to be more effective & efficient with greater use of semi-trailers (10 tonners is the number I've seen quoted; I could believe heavier, too) & better organization of loading (marshalling); just how big the difference is, IDK. I suspect perceptible, if not overwhelming.

Very good question. These are primarily truck companies at Corps, Army and Army Group level as the US Army had already abolished the separate Motorized Division designation because by this stage all Infantry Divisions had adequate organic truck transport. I could not possibly quantify this, but a hefty number would be required to replace the appalling wastage due to German air attacks, accidents, etc.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

Bear in mind, when France is invaded, the Soviets get a benefit. France can no longer be used as a safe zone for husbanding, (re)training, & organizing new divisions to be used in the SU: they're more likely to be sent to fight the WAllies. This, obviously, makes the Red Army's job easier.

Spot on with the loss of a safe zone. As for Stalin's attitudes, the anti-German alliance was a marriage made in Antarctica - not heaven. Just less than two years prior to Stalin was a firm ally of Hitler, and the Western Allies - especially Churchill has not forgotten that. Stalin therefore does expect this marriage to be happy one. In addition, as a doctrinaire Communist, once Nazism is vanquished, the class struggle against Capitalism continues. Therefore, he will not be satisfied with a Second Front, but will move on to his next set of complaints.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

Does this produce manpower shortage issues? Conscription became a Thing in '44, & Canadian production was pretty near full stretch AIUI. Can MLW use more Quebequois, & free Anglo Canadians for the military? More women, ditto? Or does this idea hit a hard limit?

I assume that whatever projects utilizing the same manpower after the Grizzly was abandoned will suffer.

As for conscription in Canada, it came to a crisis head in August 1943 when the enabling legislation passed Parliament. LTG Andrew McNaughton resigned as First Canadian Army commander in protest. Doggone inconvenient timing for my thread.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

The earlier Buick design for a TD, the T-67, would likely been given the greenlight for production as it was in late 1942, 75mm with twin Buick engines and Christie Suspension, as the M-18 in this TL

Probably it would have. But it does not change the problem with Tank Destroyer Doctrine.

 

[marathag]

Probably it would have. But it does not change the problem with Tank Destroyer Doctrine.

The only thing that may come from an earlier D-Day, is McNair won't have the time to convert Self Propelled TD units, back to towed as OTL, with disastrous consequences later in the Bulge. They were slaughtered, while the TDs did pretty all things considered.

He got wrong with what happened in Tunisia , where a big heavy gun like the Flak 36 88mm from prepared positions was deadly to tanks at long distance.

IDs lost their inherent AT platoons, redesignated at TDs

Trying to tow guns towards the sound of the guns, worked about as well as it did during the ACW. Well worse, actually. 12pdr Napoleons could be manhandled around by six guys
That wasn't possible at all with the M5 3" gun, at almost 4900 pounds The M1 57mm, however, was about the same weight as the old Bronze gun, but only had a three man crew, and no nearby horses.

 

[phx1138]

the anti-German alliance was a marriage made in Antarctica - not heaven. Just less than two years prior to Stalin was a firm ally of Hitler, and the Western Allies - especially Churchill has not forgotten that. Stalin therefore does expect this marriage to be happy one. In addition, as a doctrinaire Communist, once Nazism is vanquished, the class struggle against Capitalism continues. Therefore, he will not be satisfied with a Second Front, but will move on to his next set of complaints.

Accepted. There's a difference, however, between complaining and a truce. Beating the Germans is still #1 on his "to do" list.

Very good question. These are primarily truck companies at Corps, Army and Army Group level as the US Army had already abolished the separate Motorized Division designation because by this stage all Infantry Divisions had adequate organic truck transport. I could not possibly quantify this, but a hefty number would be required to replace the appalling wastage due to German air attacks, accidents, etc.

That's enough answer for me. Whatever the Red/White Ball numbers amounted to, they'd have to be a small fraction of the total.

 

[cloistered scholar]

Is there any way Czechoslovakia and Hungary end up on the western side of the Iron Curtain in a scenario like this?

Stalin can make the case for Poland being being a necessity for the safe guarding of the Soviet Union, but I don't think the same applies to them (Czechoslovakia/Hungary).

 

[Eric C Johnson]

German problems arising from the 12 May 1943 landings in France are far worse than Allied problems. Whereas Allied problems were on the tactical level, German weaknesses were on the strategic level.

The first problem was Germany’s inability to reestablish any form of strategic reserve. Within a few days, the successful Normandy landings forced the Wehrmacht to withdraw troops from tertiary fronts to provide reinforcements for France. Two Mountain and one Infantry Corps engaged on the Murmansk front were ordered withdrawn via Norway and Finland, Sweden refusing transit rights. The 20th Wave Mobilization in July 1943 formed only seven new static divisions, the 242nd, 243rd, 244th, 245th, 264th, 265th and 265th; all posted to the Siegfied Line to begin reconstituting the barrier. The fact that the German Army could not provide a third regiment, more than one battalion of artillery (with one anti-tank battery), organic engineer, antiaircraft or transport of any kind shows the depth of German losses. Equipment went to higher priority units during this time frame.
The 21st Wave Mobilization in October-November 1943 had somewhat better results. The ten divisions formed (349th, 352nd, 353rd, 357th, 359th, 361st, 362nd, 363rd, 364th and 367th Infantry Divisions all had the normal complement of units with the exception of the reconnaissance battalion was replaced by a fusilier battalion; which had only one company equipped with bicycles for that role. The remainder of the battalion were straight-leg infantry. Each division had the normal outfit of horse transport. However, the 352nd Infantry Division was formed from the remnants of the disbanded 268th and 321st Infantry Divisions, and the 364th from the disbanded 355th Infantry Division; so in effect the increase was seven, not ten. The 349th, 357th, and 359th Infantry Divisions were sent to Russia; the 352nd and 353rd to the Western Front; 361st to Denmark; 362nd to the Italian border in Austria; 363rd remained in Poland; the 364th was absorbed by the 77th Infantry Division in January 1944; and the 367th Infantry Division was sent to Croatia.
The 22nd Wave Mobilization in December 1943 revealed the accelerating pattern. Only the 272nd, 276th, and 278th Infantry Divisions were new formations on the pattern of the 21st Wave Mobilization. The 271st Infantry Division was formed from the disbanded 137th Infantry Division, the 275th from the disbanded 223rd Infantry Division, and the 277th from the remnants of three disbanded units – the 38th, 39th and 125th Infantry Divisions. Thus on the order of battle, the number of divisions did not increase. (Note: These unit descriptions are taken from the OTL.) I doubt if any coordinated Wave mobilizations past the 22nd would take place, just as in the OTL none took place after October 1944. The Reich will be too close to collapse for central control of mobilization.
The first reaction to the Normandy landings is to realize the “man who never was” fired from a torpedo tube onto a Spanish beach carried deception plans for a supposed invasion of Greece. The 22nd Air Landing Division, a crack unit will be returned to the Russian Front; although its 47th Infantry Regiment had been sent to Tunisia, lost there, and not been replaced. Italy will also be stripped of troops. 1st Parachute Hermann Goering Panzer Division is transferred from Sicily to France. The reforming elements of 15th PanzerGrenadier Division are transferred to home Wehrkreiss XII station in Kaiserslautern, and 90th Panzergrenadier to Potsdam in Wehrkreiss III; where the 21st Panzer Division will also be rebuilt from scratch in Berlin. With cadre from 1st SS Panzer Grenadier “Leibstandarte” Division unavailable to cadre 12th SS Panzer “Hitler Jugend” Division, SS Sturmbrigade “Heinrich Himmler” is used instead of being sent to garrison Corsica. Luftwaffe units are also transferred to France.
The question arises, when does the German Army begin eating its seed corn? In the OTL, the 345th Reserve PanzerGrenadier and 386th Reserve PanzerGrenadier Divisions were ordered absorbed by the 29th and 3rd PanzerGrenadier Divisions prior to May 1943, eliminating their capacity to train additional troops. The 130th “Panzer Lehr” Division was formed in February 1944 – before Overlord, thus it is a near-certainty it will be created within weeks of Operation Round-up. The division will absorb the 10th Panzer Brigade in addition to the 130th Panzer Regiment with a now standard outfit of PzKw IV and StG III assault guns. The 901st and 902nd Panzer Grenadier Regiments each add an understrength battalion of mixed PzKw III and IV. All told, 379 tanks, forty assault guns and 612 half-tracks and other reconnaissance vehicles combined with extensive experience of its men render the 130th “Panzer Lehr” Division nearly invincible on paper. This formidable assembly comes at the cost of reducing Germany’s capacity to train panzer formations by 35%.
This also extends to infantry formations as a number of Reserve Divisions are converted to combat formations, leaving a training gap between the basic conscript training at replacement divisions and assignment to units in combat. The 158th Training Division at La Rochelle was sent to form a defensive line behind the Loir River and lost there. The 156th Reserve Infantry Division at Calais, 171st Training Division at Epinal, and the 191st Reserve Infantry Division at Boulogne were redesignated the 47th, 48th, and 49th Infantry Divisions respectively. The 462nd and 465th Replacement Divisions were disbanded, and their personnel distributed as casualty replacements. This problem cannot be mitigated.

Problem two is the Italian Armistice in September 1943. While Benito Mussolini may have breathed a sigh of relief that the Allies assaulted Normandy rather than Sicily, it was short-lived. Hitler’s withdrawal of German ground combat forces from Sicily and Italy to send to France is the combination of two simultaneous but contradictory emotions. The first is a hope that one fighting on home soil, the Italian soldiers would rise to the occasion and fight like Roman gladiators. The second schadenfreude emotion is if they do not, then the Italians deserve to be a conquered and enslaved people. These are not the only two options however.
The Allies (mostly British Commonwealth) still have over a quarter million troops in North Africa and the Middle East in May 1943. Only part of this force will transfer to France via invasion of its Mediterranean Coast. An initial move is Operation Corkscrew, the occupation of Pantelleria as OTL on 11 June 1943, and the subsequent surrender of Lampedusa, which indicated to the Italian High Command that Sicily would be next. With only the Italian Air Force to contend with, air supremacy is assured. As the next stepping stone, Operation Brimstone, the invasion of Sardinia, and Operation Vesuvius the invasion of Corsica under are authorized, and planning entrusted to GEN Montgomery of 15th Army Group. First British Army LTG Oliver Leese allocates V British Corps to Sardinia; 78 and West 46 (Midland Riding) Divisions, landing around Cagliari and Quartu on the southern tip of the island as the assault force; while 4 Parachute Bde (formed in Palestine in January 1943) jumped into the large airfields a few miles away from the beaches. 4 Mixed and 6 Armoured Divisions are follow-up forces for the 10 July 1943 landings.
The XIII Italian Corps’ 30th Saubauda Infantry Division promptly began to dissolve as did the 205th Coastal Division on the unprepared beaches. These troops were recruited from the local Cagliari region, and most shuffled the few miles to their homes in the face of the overwhelming air bombardment and naval shelling. The 47th Bari Infantry Division located in the center of the island attempted to take advantage of the rugged terrain to form a defensive line, but failed due to inadequate numbers of troops, artillery, and a total absence of tanks. In the North, XXX Italian Corps headquarters, which had scarcely recovered from near destruction in Tunisia, suffered a similar performance to XIII Italian Corps from the 204th Coastal Division, but the 31st Calabria Infantry Division resisted the British for three days before the campaign came to an end in a fortnight.
Once airfields in Southern Sardinia were secured, French XIX Corps began landings on Corsica on 20 July 1943. The Italians had decided to evacuate the island, and the process was well underway as the French arrived.
The successful invasion of Sardinia marked the end of Benito Mussolini’s tenure both as Premier and Il Duce. Mussolini convened a Fascist Grand Council session for the first time in four years on 24 July 1943, to discuss the German abandonment of defensive operations in Southern Italy. The discussion was interrupted when Count Dino Grandi launched a lengthy attack on Mussolini’s conduct of the war, and Marshall Pietro Badoglio and former Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano (Mussolini’s son-in-law) engineered a 19-7 vote to expel Mussolini from the Fascist Party. The next day, King Vittorio Emanuele III dismissed Mussolini as Premier, and appointed Badoglio in his place. Mussolini was promptly imprisoned.
Montgomery continued on with the execution of Operation Anvil on 15 August 1943. First British Army is spearheaded this time by XXX British Corps [7 Armoured Division, 50 (Northumberland) and 51 (Highland) Divisions.] with V British Corps as a second echelon around Toulon and La Seyne. Fifth U.S. Army under LTG Mark Clark (HQ formed in Algiers) will land around Marseilles with II U.S. Corps and XIX French Corps, now reinforced by 2e French Armoured Division. Once ashore, British First Army is poised to move down the coast towards Genoa, and Fifth U.S. Army to link up with Patton’s Seventh U.S. Army.
While Badoglio assured German diplomats of his intention to remain loyal to his allies, he was convinced that disasters in Russia and the liberation of France meant such loyalty was futile. On the 28th of July, two captured British officers, LTG Richard O’Conner and MG Carleton de Wiart were briefed by Badoglio on Italy’s desire for an armistice, transported to the 4th Italian Army sector near Nice, and allowed to “escape” into a French Resistance controlled area. Following delivery to British Commandos they were quickly transported via Gibraltar to London, where one week after meeting Badoglio, the request of an armistice was fully disclosed to the Allied Governments.
The Italian proffer came just prior to the commencement of the First Quadrant Conference in Quebec Canada, therefore Roosevelt and Churchill gave it immediate attention. Through diplomats in Lisbon, Portugal, the U.S. and British Governments negotiated a very rough agreement – for secrecy the Russians and French were not consulted. The Italians insisted that unconditional surrender not be imposed, and this was a vulnerable point for both democratically elected leaders. Unnecessary casualties were not only anathema to voters, but every soldier lost against the Italians is one not available for use against Germany and later Japan. The term “unconditional surrender” remained as a fig leaf, but the Italians gained considerable concessions.
Italy will not be invaded by Allied troops, and will not be required to declare war on Germany. The Badoglio clique is well aware of Italian war weariness and unpreparedness for further combat. An armistice will go into effect on 3 September, and be announced publicly five days later. Repatriation of Allied POWs in Italian custody will commence immediately. Italian units in France will immediately withdraw to pre-June 1940 Italian borders, and likewise, those in the Balkans as soon as Allied troops arrive, or a competent leaders from the national government can assume power. Once these commitments are met the Western Allies will begin repatriating Italian POWs. The Italian Fleet is not surrendered; Italian warships and merchant vessels will be painted with neutrality markings and used to repatriate Italian troops as required. All other issues are postponed until a peace conference.
Both Hitler and Stalin are outraged. Hitler regrets any assistance he ever sent to North Africa, and for a moment contemplates war on his erstwhile ally. Stalin’s suspicious nature is aroused as he can clearly see through the veneer of this “unconditional surrender”. Stalin’s views are reflected throughout the political left in Western nations – the Allies, especially the Americans were more than willing to skinny-dip with Admiral Francois Darlan – a perceived Fascist during Operation Torch; now they are in bed with Mussolini’s long-time cohorts. And the USSR does have legitimate grievances with being locked out of the Armistice negotiations when the Italian Eighth Army fought deep inside of Russia. Stalin announces the USSR is not bound by the Armistice.
The agreement does offer an easier path for British Commonwealth troops to return to Greece from which they were ignobly ejected in the spring of 1941. The remaining forces were centralized under 18th Army Group commanded by GEN Claude Auchinleck. Eighth British Army, now under the command of LTG William “Strafer” Gott is comprised of three Corps. XIII British Corps contains 1 Armoured, 44 (Home Counties) and 10 Indian Divisions. II Polish Corps under LTG Wladyslaw Anders contains 3rd Carpathian Infantry and 5th Kresowa Infantry Divisions, and 2nd Polish Armoured Bde.
I Commonwealth Corps under LTG Bernard Freyberg is a new creation quite impossible without the tertiary effects of executing Roundup in 1943. Australian Prime Minister John Curtin had been at loggerheads with Churchill over strategy since assuming office, and after the loss of Singapore was open about Australia’s postwar security being linked to the United States. Unfortunately, the Germany First strategy left Australia holding the bag as an Economy of Force Theater. 9 Australian Division was left in the Middle East only because Roosevelt promised two American divisions (the 32nd and 41st Infantry) would be sent to Australia. Curtin still insisted 9 Australian Division return home once Egypt was secure, and it departed in late December 1942.
Curtin was confronted with the blunt fact that U.S. troops to fight the Japanese were contingent on the speed with which the Allies entered Berlin, and his generals unanimously pressured him to send 1 Australian Armoured Division to replace 9 Australian Division. Australian Army leadership was aware an armoured division would never see action in the Pacific and having painstakingly built three such formations by November 1942 were anxious that at least one see combat. Curtin was worn down by the arguments, and sent the unit under the condition it not serve under direct British command. This meant assignment to the New Zealand Corps forming in January 1943. 1 Australian Armoured Division trained with American supplied M3 Lee and M3 Stuart tanks in Australia, and 1 Australian Armoured Brigade received identical equipment on arrival in Egypt. 3 Australian Motor Brigade was outfitted with M3 and M5 half-tracks, and artillery units with M7 Priest 105mm SP howitzers.
New Zealanders were also dissatisfied with British tank support, and after Second El Alamein converted 4 New Zealand Infantry Brigade to armour. 6 South African Armoured Division arrived in Egypt in February 1943, and it was a natural for assignment to New Zealand Corps for training alongside the Australians and New Zealanders, and just as natural for the renaming of higher HQ as I Commonwealth Corps. South African commanders were also upset during 1940-42 at the British practice of farming out individual brigades to support British units.
Three armoured divisions were rather unbalanced, and Prime Minister Jan Smuts was persuaded to return 1 South African Division (which rarrived home in January 1943). To provide enough troops, 12 South African Motorized Brigade was transferred from 6 South African Armoured Division, volunteers from 1, 2, 3 and 5 South African Brigades were cobbled to restore 2 South African Brigade to full strength; and 6 South African Brigade was reformed from the 6,000 South African prisoners liberated at Benghazi and Tobruk (see post #94.) Most South African prisoners taken at Tobruk in June 1942 felt that MG Hendrik Klopper had thrown in the towel too soon. The sense of unfinished business with the Germans was strong among them.
Ninth British Army under LTG William Holmes contains two corps. III British Corps under LTG Ronald Scobie contains 8 Armoured, 56 (London) and 4 Indian Divisions. Also attached are the 1st and 2nd Greek Infantry Brigades – the former having fought at Second El Alamein. X British Corps under LTG Herbert Lumsden is assigned 10 and 31 Indian Armoured and 8 Indian Divisions. Amphibious shipping was allocated to the Mediterranean once no longer required for over-the- beach resupply at Normandy – this was a natural calling in of his chits by Churchill for acquiescing to the Americans. With the loan of American shipping came a small USN squadron to protect it. Adoption of Mediterranean strategy however, was to be worked out at the First Quadrant Conference, and the Italian Armistice threw this planning into a succession of ad-hoc opportunities.
A first test of Italian sincerity was therefore made in Crete. After probes by British Commandos of 1 SAS Regiment found the 51st Italian Sienna Division withdrawing to bivouac areas to the southeast of Heraklion; and received intelligence that an emissary from Badoglio arrived with Armistice instructions, the Italians not trusting any other means of communication. 5 New Zealand and 3 Australian Motor Brigades began administrative landings, followed by the remainder of 1 Australian Armoured Division. The ANZACs were a deliberate sentimental choice generated by the loss of the island 28 months earlier. Fortress Brigade Crete, the German garrison on the island was located around Maleme Airfield and Suda Bay. Other than mobile coastal artillery and anti-aircraft units, it contained the 733rd Infantry Regiment transferred from the 713th Occupation Division a few months earlier. The Landesschutzen personnel of the brigade put up a spirited defense for two days before these World War I veterans passed a verdict on the overwhelming odds: Wir hab’n unseren Pflicht vollbracht – we’ve done our duty – and surrendered.
Behind the barrier of Crete there wasn’t much. The Germans had used Greece as they had France, as a secure location to rebuild divisions shattered in Russia. Intelligence provided by Badoglio’s emissaries to the Allies indicated the Germans were badly overstretched in Greece by diversion of replacements to France after Operation Overlord. Most significantly, some 360 Luftwaffe aircraft were transferred to France, leaving only a couple of transport squadrons behind to ferry troops to various islands.
The remainder of the 713th Occupation Division was clustered around Sparta, with the 59th Italian Cagliari and 29th Italian Piemonte (minus 4th Italian Regiment on nearby Aegean islands) Divisions nearby. The 41st Fortress Division, with two regiments guarded the vital Corinth Peninsula and Canal on which communications were dependent. The 7,500-man 440th Sturmdivision (Assault Division) Rhodes shared the island with the Italian garrison of indifferent quality; and the much better, and heavily reinforced 50th Italian Regina Division; less its 10th Italian Regiment deployed on Kos and Leros Islands. 6th Italian Cuneo Division was spread over several other Aegean islands.
On the mainland the 11th Infantry Division was badly mauled and had just arrived in Athens from Russia. It replaced 11th Luftwaffe Division, transferred to Army Group E mobile reserve without any transport other than rail. Near Athens were the 36th Italian Forli Mountain and 37th Modena Infantry Divisions. The 24th Italian Pinerola Infantry Division was near Thebes, while in Northwestern Greece 33rd Italian Acqui and 56th Casala Infantry Divisions were assisting 1stMountain Division in anti-partisan sweeps through the mountains. 4th SS PanzerGrenadier Division “Polizei” also arrived for rebuilding in mid-August; split between Katerini and Lerisa, respectively 35 and 75 miles to the southwest of Salonika.
The Initial German response began on 6 September, as the absence of any Italian resistance was conformed, and inquiries to die-hard Fascist generals gave clear indications that defection by their ally was likely. The Luftwaffe could not return to the Balkans in force after losses in France, but Kampfgeschwader 100 was sent to Bulgarian airfields. The Germans had developed a radio-guided bomb with a 320 kg warhead designated FX1400 or “Fritz X”; carried by Dornier Do 217K-2 aircraft. The first attempt was made against shipping off Cherbourg in July 1943, but no hits were scored. A second attempt with Henschel HS 293 glide bombs on 27 August successfully sank the sloop HMS Egret and severely damaged destroyer HMCS Athabaskan. Crowded Allied shipping off the limited Greek ports presented an irresistibly better opportunity.
On the day of the landings, the elderly battleship USS New York was hit while covering landings near Athens, and violently exploded taking 1227 crew with her. Three days later, the USS Savannah was hit on “C” turret, and barely survived the magazine explosion. On 13 September, HMS Uganda was blown open to her keel plates, but like USS Savannah was towed to the safety of Suda Bay. Finally, on 16 September, battleship HMS Warspite, the venerable veteran of Jutland was struck in the boiler room and lost three of her shafts due to warping from the blast. Fighter cover from escort carriers was increased and losses in Kampfgeschwader 100 became prohibitive until the Germans developed stealth tactics instead of swarms of aircraft.
Ground troops were slower to follow. The first corps withdrawn from Finland, XIX Mountain Corps spent two months recuperating in Germany before being sent to the Balkan Front. It contained the 163rd Infantry Division, which the British knew from their failed campaign in Norway, and a second unit later identified as 6th Mountain Division. Both divisions were tasked with attempting to re-establish a front line in southern Yugoslavia. XVIII Mountain Corps spread its 169th Infantry and 8th Mountain Divisions in defensive positions across the rail and Danube barge routes for oil shipments from Romania after rehabilitation following transfer from Finland. While the former was a good outfit, the latter was one of the more undistinguished German units. XXXVI Korps and 2nd Mountain Division from Finland were moved into the Ploesti oil field sector in late September, and 7th Mountain Division a month later. Notably missing were units whose transfer to Greece was cancelled – 1st Panzer, 60th PanzerGrenadier and 1st Parachute Divisions, in particular.
The Italians interpreted the Armistice clause requiring turnover of positions to competent leaders from the national governments somewhat loosely. In Italy proper, on 8 September, German personnel (mostly logistical, Luftwaffe anti-aircraft and Kriegsmarine personnel) were quickly disarmed and transported by rail to the Austrian border and allowed to walk across. The commander of the 440th Sturmdivision Rhodes was allowed to communicate with Army Group E HQ, and evacuation by air and coastal vessels was arranged. Throughout Yugoslavia and Greece, the Italians turned their positions over to the first armed group to approach them; regardless of whether they were Germans or British, Communist or Monarchist Greeks, Ustasa, Chetniks or Titoists. The Italians returned home by the most expeditious manner possible.
In addition to the forces in Crete, Eighth British Army sent XIII British Corps to Salonika, occupied only by security troops and detachments of 4th SS PanzerGrenadier Division “Polizei” off-loading rail cars of replacement vehicles. Quickly improvising, the SS conceded the port, but moved their trains outside the city while concentrating the rest of the division at that location. In doing so, a blocking position was established while XIII British Corps was still off-loading from ships and organizing, the SS were joined by 1stMountain Division which abandoned anti-partisan actions to explande the right flank.
To the south, III British Corps disembarked 1st Greek Brigade at Piraeus where 37th Modena Infantry Division stepped aside. The Greeks proceeded to occupy government buildings and key points within the capital city. 56 (London) Division followed in second echelon, and its lead 167 (1 London) Brigade soon found itself in brutal combat with two battle groups – the full strength the weakened 11th Infantry Division could muster. The next day, joined by 169 (3 London) Brigade the division began house-by-house clearing of the Germans, as the remainder of the division disembarked. After destroying the German forces, 56 (London) Division began advancing into central Greece, followed by 2nd Greek Brigade to re-establish government authority. 4 Indian and 8 Armoured Divisions moved south to clear 41st Fortress Division and the Peloponnesus. 234 (Malta) Brigade was transferred from the island garrison to supervise Italian troop withdrawals from Aegean islands and was attached to Ninth British Army.
The American contribution at sea has already been noted. Although no ground combat troops were committed to the Balkans, US general service and airfield construction regiments in the Middle East were used to expand port and airfield capacity and road networks in Greece. Without this logistical help, the British could never have generated momentum to advance northward. The US Ninth Air Force, stationed in Egypt and Libya since 1942, but never built up to its OTL strength due to the priority of Roundup for reinforcements, still performed yeoman’s work in support of the Commonwealth efforts.
In a little over a fortnight, the Italian Armistice provided the Allies with three major strategic advantages. First, the sea lanes through the Mediterranean were completely reopened, saving time and fuel from the Cape route. Secondly, the Allies were able to concentrate their efforts in France solely on the advance into Germany. Thirdly, the Romanian oilfields were directly threatened by the opening of the Balkan Front. In the last few months of the war, Italy does declare war on Germany (primarily to fulfil Johnson’s First Rule of War – always pick the winning side), but its contribution to final victory is negligible. There is nothing Germany can do to mitigate the effects of the Italian defection.

The third major problem faced by Germany is the Reconstitution of French Army, and the gradual return of France to full participation in the war. Ironically, all planning for Roundup was completed without much French participation, and none of that on a witting basis. This partly stemmed from deliberate desire on the part of GEN Marshall, who in the First World War encountered uncompromising attitudes among French officers while serving on GEN John J Pershing’s staff. Marshall was content to direct the establishment in France of an Allied Military Government for Occupied Territories, a legal concept drawn largely from U.S. diplomatic recognition of the Vichy Government in 1940.
A far greater factor than Marshall was infighting among the French themselves. GEN Charles De Gaulle was personally despised by Churchill, but the British Government nevertheless worked with the Free French and granted diplomatic recognition. The Americans would not, and promoted instead GEN Henri Giraud as an alternative to De Gaulle’s leadership. But Giraud exhibited the political astuteness of a bowling ball, quickly losing the loyalty of former Vichy garrisons in North Africa that passed to him after the assassination of Admiral Darlan. Throughout the spring of 1943, De Gaulle successfully outmaneuvered Giraud politically, and in the first week of May moved his government-in-exile from London to Algiers, considered a part of Metropolitan France.
The mixture of strict secrecy concerning Roundup, the absence of any French troops participating outside of 10th Commando combined with De Gaulle’s obsession with reasserting French independence acted to leave this staunchest of French patriots blind to dramatic change in his country’s fate. De Gaulle found out about the landings in Normandy over the BBC. It was a humiliation that permanently scarred post-World War II French political life and foreign policy. De Gaulle did react very astutely to this personal setback. Recognizing Marshall held all the high cards, De Gaulle quickly made a broadcast pledging full cooperation with the Allies and calling on Frenchmen to aid the invasion in all respects. In a matter of weeks, France was removed from the Allied Military Governments for Occupied Territories, a recognition of De Gaulle as a full ally. De Gaulle believed that for the stain of Vichy to be washed away and to obtain an equal seat at any peace treaty; France needed at least two full field armies under French command fighting inside Germany at the time of her capitulation.
In early 1942, US Ambassador to Vichy, William Leahy asked then French Premier Francois Darlan what it would take for Vichy France to rejoin the war against Germany. Darlan responded, “When you Americans arrive with 500,000 men, 3,000 tanks and 5,000 airplanes.” Although Roundup did not meet those numbers, the Allies had arrived. Other than current Premier Pierre Laval and his closest supporters, Vichy French officials responded instantaneously to the shifts in the wind. One of the first actions was the release of GEN Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, imprisoned for having resisted by force the German invasion of Unoccupied France in November 1942.
De Tassigny returns to his former command in Toulouse where one of the five German divisions in Southern France, the 148th Training Division expanded its training of French volunteers, mostly Vichyists from the disbanded Division Militaires who held Fascist beliefs and were susceptible to German propaganda. De Tassigny began reorganizing the remaining former members of his command in anticipation of liberation, and Toulouse was soon wracked by a mini-civil war. The 159th Reserve Infantry Division, used for training since November 1939 and located near Vichy was ordered to retain its personnel under training and was upgraded to a combat formation. The 305th Infantry Division, scheduled for reforming in mid-May and 334th Infantry Division, scheduled for reforming in July and August was still-borne, and its personnel diverted to existing units.
The Nineteenth German Army headquarters was well aware of the value of the port of Marseilles. The 338th Infantry Division, on occupation duty in France since January 1943, completed extensive training and received orders for Russia on 8 May 1943, but these orders were cancelled after the Normandy landings, and the unit moved to Marseilles. It soon found itself in street combat with reforming French Army personnel. Reformed around the 271st Feldherrnhalle Fusilier Regiment after destruction in Russia only two months previously, the 60th Panzer Grenadier Division, (at full strength in personnel and equipment but sorely lacking in training) was ordered from Lyon to the coast to take up anti-invasion duties.
This left a huge gap in the interior of Southern France. 10th SS Panzer Grenadier “Karl Der Grosse” Division was just reaching full strength in personnel, but was withdrawn within a week of the invasion of Normandy to join 9th SS Panzer “Hohentaufen” Division, at St Dizier. Together these units would form II SS Panzer Korps. It was replaced by the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division which did its best to screen from Bordeaux through Limoges to Bourges – well over 200 miles while simultaneously training for combat from June through late July before retreating eastward.
Consequently, Nineteenth German Army was in no condition to stop the landings by 15th Army Group in August 1943. Montgomery’s troops methodically pushed 60th Panzer Grenadier and 338th Infantry Divisions up the Rhone River Valley. De Gaulle arrived with the French XIX Corps, and found his political opposition among Vichy officials melting. US Lend-Lease equipment began to pour in, and de Gaulle’s wish for a seat at the peace conference table was well on its way to fruition. The Germans cannot mitigate or prevent the resurrection of this Allied nation.

The fourth problem is the Finnish request for an Armistice. Although Great Britain declared war on Finland on 6 December 1941, the United States did not. As early as 20 March 1943, Secretary of State Hull attempted to secure a separate peace for Finland, but Soviet demands were too severe and were rejected by the Finns in early May 1943. Only a week later, the Finns were having second thoughts. With the German abandonment of the Murmansk Front, the only German troops in the country were on the Karelian Peninsula facing Leningrad.
The Finns saw the writing on the wall, and reopened secret negotiations with the Americans, guaranteeing that Finnish troops would not replace Germans outside of pre-1939 Finnish territory. In early June, the Finns proposed the Germans turn over the Northern Leningrad Front to Finnish command, and shift German troops to elsewhere on the Russian front. As the situation in France continued to deteriorate and German intelligence had detected the impending Soviet post-Kursk counteroffensive, the Germans agreed on 2 July. The last German troops left Finnish soil on 9 August 1943.
As they left, Finnish troops never moved forward to replace them, and made contact with Russian troops only as they reached pre-war Finnish territory. The siege of Leningrad was unilaterally lifted on 29 July, and on 5 August 1943; the United States resumed diplomatic relations. The Soviets had little incentive to open large-scale movements against the Finns. It would greatly damage Soviet-American relations at a time when Moscow’s termination of diplomatic relations with the Polish Exile Government in London had relations with Churchill at low-ebb. Soviet troops were required to re-conquer the vast sections of Belorussia and Ukraine still in German control. With Allied successes in liberating France the Soviet priority was on the race to Berlin.
Consequently, from late August 1943, a de facto cease-fire emerged on the Finnish front. After negotiating through American intermediaries, Great Britain signed an armistice with Finland on 4 September, and Churchill declared that Soviet-Finnish differences should not be discussed until post-war peace conferences convened. The Soviets refused to accept this British condition, but the Finns recognized their weak negotiating position and offered to evacuate Karelia to a line only six miles from the city of Viipuri; well out of artillery range of Leningrad. This concession was enough to convince the Soviets to agree to an armistice on 19 September 1943. Finland declared war on Germany on 1 October 1943. The Germans could offer no incentives for the Finns not to defect.

The fifth problem is the loss of Romania. Three days after Italy’s publication of armistice terms, King Michael led a coup that overthrew the Fascist Iron Guard Government of Ion Antonescu. Romanian dissatisfaction with German use of the 3rd and 4th Romanian Armies on the Eastern Front after the commencement of Soviet counteroffensives in November 1942 was the immediate cause of the coup. Significant numbers of Romanian troops were on the Crimean Peninsula, declared by Hitler a fortress not to be evacuated. When the Romanian High command acquiesced to this decision, the conspiracy became serious. The Italian surrender gave King Michael courage to dismiss the Antonescu Government, and the King found a groundswell of popular support. The evacuation of the Kuban east of Kerch began immediately, Romanian ships carrying supplies there were ordered to load troops. The Romanian Government offered to evacuate the Seventeenth German Army troops afterwards, German and Bulgarian ships joining in to complete the task on 27 September 1943. No German troops were permitted in Romania; they were disembarked at Odessa, or other Russian ports.
Simultaneously, reinforcements for Russia were suspended, and on 12 September, Romanian units in the Ukraine were ordered to turn their positions over to German troops, commencing a retreat to Romania within seven days. When the Germans protested, the new Romanian Government acidly responded that since the destruction of the Second Hungarian Army at Stalingrad, few Hungarian troops had served in Russia, but Germany had sent considerably less arms and material to Romania than to Hungary. Hungary had been rewarded with vast amounts of Romanian Transylvania for little war effort; and with the loss of Italian garrisons in the Balkans, the security of Romania required its forces at home. The Germans sought to reinforce their anti-aircraft units around Ploesti and other oil installations, but Romania refused. When XXXVI Korps arrived on Romanian soil, the Romanians then relented.
As Eighth and Ninth British Armies completed consolidating and building up supplies, XIII British Corps began an offensive against 16th Bulgarian Infantry Division in Thrace on 25 October 1943. The Bulgarian infantry were tough, brave, and individually skilled fighters; but without transport, tank support, effective anti-tank guns or air cover, and with significant amounts of World War I vintage equipment, they could do nothing to stop the British assault. This opened the way for a broad attack into central Bulgaria. This cleared the way for I Commonwealth Corps to launch its own offensive five days later against XIX Mountain Corps which had assumed command of 4th SS PanzerGrenadier Division “Polizei” and 1stMountain Division on the Greek-Yugoslav border. On 3 November, II Polish Corps launched its own attack to the west of I Commonwealth Corps, focused on V Bulgarian Corps. Its units were widely dispersed on static defense or anti-partisan duties, 15th Bulgarian Division to the south clustered around Bitola, well to the west of the axis of LTG Anders’ advance, with only two infantry battalions guarding the road and rail corridor. 14th Bulgarian Division, centered on Skopje further north was square in the path of and directly on the objective of the offensive.
The Axis Front could not hold, especially against the Allied advantage in armour and in the air. Within a week, the Bulgarians on either side of XIX Mountain Corps collapsed and few German divisions escaped going into the bag. Bulgaria requested and received an armistice on 13 November, and Eighth British Army reoriented itself towards Romania, while Ninth British Army assumed responsibility for the advance up the Danube Valley. On the 17th of November, Romania requested an armistice and declared war on Hungary, but not Germany. German troops were escorted out of Romania into Yugoslavia, and oil stopped flowing soon thereafter.
The German position was dire. Kiev was recaptured on 6 November by the Russians, and between Romania and Kiev, there was a very real danger of Army Group South being cut off and destroyed. Manstein ordered an all-out retreat and was relieved by Hitler, but the German withdrawals, once started could not be stopped until the line from Zhitomir-Carpathian Mountains was reached. Churchill also saw the potential and offered to send British Eighth Army into the Ukraine. Churchill was making a promise he could not deliver, British forces required considerable rest and resupply.
This threw another log on the infant flames of the Cold War. Stalin bluntly refused to allow British troops on Soviet soil, and made it clear this included Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina seized from Romania in June 1940. Churchill hotly responded that Great Britain did not recognize the Soviet move and gave Romania a guarantee of her territorial integrity in May 1939. Stalin responded angrily, and Churchill ordered XIII British Corps to cross into Bessarabia. At this the Commonwealth countries balked – they had no interest in being used to bolster British prestige in the Balkans, and I Commonwealth Corps was exchanged for X British Corps. Romania declared war on Germany on 6 January 1944.
The Germans could do nothing about the loss of Romania. Germany simply lacked resources to fight successfully on three major fronts.

The collapse in France was Germany’s sixth major problem. Although Marshall’s July offensive failed in its objectives, Allied attacks continued on a local basis through August and into September. Much of this involved new Allied units and commanders to be blooded, part to exploit local opportunities, and part to allow 15th Army Group to arrive from Southern France. The final part is to keep the seven German panzer divisions (1st, 14th, 16th, 24th, 26th, 130th “Panzer Lehr”, and 1st Parachute Hermann Goering Panzer Divisions from building up their strength. During this time there was a change in command structure. Churchill and Brooke wanted GEN Dill gone, and in late August removed him on grounds of ill-heath. Dill is replaced by GEN Alexander, to whom Marshall is amenable, and Alexander at 21st Army Group is replaced by Montgomery. LTG Paget is promoted and assigned to 15th Army Group, and a protégé of Montgomery’s LTG Miles Dempsey replaces him at Second British Army.
Throughout July and August, the Canadian bridgehead east of Le Havre is expanded, with First Canadian Army hugging the coast, and Second British Army, unit by unit assuming positions on the right flank. Gradually additional bridges – mostly pontoon are set up across the Seine are set up to handle the logistics. The Allied armies are arrayed in an “L” shape, with First Canadian, Second and Fourth British Armies under 21st Army Group north of Paris; 12th Army Group with First French Army (XIX and XX French Corps, both organized in North Africa) facing Paris from the west and south; Third and Seventh US Armies facing north from west of Troyes to Chaumont; and 15th Army Group with First British and Fifth US Armies running to the Swiss border. First US Army is in reserve. The offensive begins on 26 September 1943,
Marshall starts with 16 armoured divisions (seven US, six British, two Canadian and one French) plus two Canadian and five British tank brigades and two independent armoured brigades, one British and one Polish. The US armoured divisions are still under 1942 Tables of Organization and Equipment with two armored regiments instead of three tank battalions. A total of 232 Medium and 158 light tanks were assigned to each US armored division, well over twice as many as the standard panzer division. All US infantry divisions had one Tank destroyer battalion attached, and most had a tank battalion as well. The Allied superiority in armour was overwhelming.
Marshall’s plan was for Canadian First Army to continue to drive up the channel coast – each port liberated lessoned the supply line somewhat. Dempsey’s Second British Army would drive directly east towards Rheims, and near there be met by Patton’s Seventh US Army, enveloping the bulk of Army Group B. The armies in the center were to fix and hold the Germans, preventing a disengagement and 15th Army Group was to cover Patton’s eastern flank. It worked. Hitler would not countenance a retreat, but it took Marshalls just under two months to extinguish the last German resistance. The schwerpunkt of the offensive was the commitment of II SS Panzer Korps under Obergruppenfuhrer Paul Hausser gainst Patton at Chalon. It was another example of using seed corn, none of its three divisions were fully trained or equipped for combat, but the SS fought with formidable fanaticism, and blocked linking the two pincers for three weeks.
In the end, the 4th U.S. Armored Division deserved much of the credit for the destruction of the II SS Panzer Korps. Commanded since May of 1942 by MG John S Wood, known to his troops as “the Professor”, a thorough scholar-warrior who had drilled his subordinates into a common tactical philosophy that allowed any units to task organize with any others, and whose orders most clearly mirrored German auftragtaktik (mission-type orders) that would become common post-war. Wood enjoyed the support of several superlative subordinates: most prominently, COL Bruce Clarke, commander of CCA; LTC Creighton Abrams, commander of 2/37th U.S. Armored Regt. Wood’s philosophy was “the purpose of this division is to terrify the enemy infantry. The way to do that is to plan attacks carefully and execute them violently. The task at hand is to figure out how best to do that.”
The Canadians rumbled into Antwerp in mid-October 1943, and with the completion of the destruction of Army Group B, the remainder of Belgium was liberated in late November. After recovering for a month, Marshall resumed his offensive on 9 January 1944, again on a broad front as he had logistically prepared to. The shattered front could not be restored, once found, resistance was bypassed, and the pocket mopped up later. There was no fuel for training panzer units, much less sending them into combat. The Rhine was crossed north of Duisburg by Second British Army on 20 January after an airborne assault by 1 and 6 Airborne Divisions of I British Airborne Corps. Two days later, Third US Army crossed south of Koln led by XVIII US Corps consisting of 82nd and 101st US Airborne Divisions.
The Western Allies then rolled across Germany, surrounding Berlin on 6 March 1944 with First British, Third US Armies and smaller units from each combatant except the USSR, which refused to send units that would appear as tokens. I Polish Corps was transferred to Second British Army, which together with Fourth British Army and Seventh US Armies were tasked with advancing into Poland. First and Fifth US Armies were ordered to advance into Czechoslovakia and Hungary, while First and Second French Armies cleared Austria.
After allowing hunger and despair to take its toll on Berlin’s defenders, Marshall launched attacks on 16 April 1944. These were slow and methodical, to lessen casualties as much as possible. Hitler committed suicide on 30 April, and the last resistance ceased on 2 May 1944.
There was nothing Germany could do to stave off defeat in the West.

Collapse in the East was Germany’s seventh and last problem arising from the landings in Normandy in 1943. Slowed by the lack of US Lend-lease trucks, the Dneiper-Carpathian Offensive by the Russians was delayed until 6 January 1944. The Germans fought with the desperate savagery the Eastern Front was accustomed to, then retreated as the situation grew hopeless, the main Russian difficulty was that the Germans were hundreds of miles still inside the USSR. The Germans continued scorched earth tactics as they retreated, slowing the advance as bridges, tunnels, roads and rail lines were rebuilt. Once Berlin was surrounded, the Germans began a non-stop march to the west, recognizing the war was lost. The Germans also gave up resisting II Polish Corps and allowed it to reach Lvov on 27 March 1944.
Troops of Seventh US Army met Russian troops near Brest-Litovsk on 29 April. First British Army met the Soviets at Grodno on 4 May 1944. With Hitler safely dead, Reichsmarschall Hermann Goring surrendered to the Allied powers at Konigsberg on 7 May 1944. The War in the East was lost 15 months earlier, after Stalingrad, and the Germans did nothing to reverse that verdict.

 

[Garrison]

Spot on with the loss of a safe zone. As for Stalin's attitudes, the anti-German alliance was a marriage made in Antarctica - not heaven. Just less than two years prior to Stalin was a firm ally of Hitler, and the Western Allies - especially Churchill has not forgotten that. Stalin therefore does expect this marriage to be happy one. In addition, as a doctrinaire Communist, once Nazism is vanquished, the class struggle against Capitalism continues. Therefore, he will not be satisfied with a Second Front, but will move on to his next set of complaints.

Stalin was never an ally of Hitler's. The M-R Pact was signed at a moment when it seemed to Stalin that Britain and France were both unwilling to fight and that they were hoping that Hitler would focus his attentions on the East. At a stroke the Pact practically guaranteed that the Germans would turn their attention to the destruction of France. Prior to Barbarossa Stalin did try to squeeze the Germans for further concessions on technology and territory. It's not like Stalin kept his reasoning secret. He was very candid during his meeting with Stafford Cripps in July 1940 about his motivations, he wanted to upset the balance of power in Europe and in that he had succeeded, though of course he hadn't foreseen the rapid collapse of France.

 

[DrakonFin]

The fourth problem is the Finnish request for an Armistice. Although Great Britain declared war on Finland on 6 December 1941, the United States did not. As early as 20 March 1943, Secretary of State Hull attempted to secure a separate peace for Finland, but Soviet demands were too severe and were rejected by the Finns in early May 1943. Only a week later, the Finns were having second thoughts. With the German abandonment of the Murmansk Front, the only German troops in the country were on the Karelian Peninsula facing Leningrad.
The Finns saw the writing on the wall, and reopened secret negotiations with the Americans, guaranteeing that Finnish troops would not replace Germans outside of pre-1939 Finnish territory. In early June, the Finns proposed the Germans turn over the Northern Leningrad Front to Finnish command, and shift German troops to elsewhere on the Russian front. As the situation in France continued to deteriorate and German intelligence had detected the impending Soviet post-Kursk counteroffensive, the Germans agreed on 2 July. The last German troops left Finnish soil on 9 August 1943.
As they left, Finnish troops never moved forward to replace them, and made contact with Russian troops only as they reached pre-war Finnish territory. The siege of Leningrad was unilaterally lifted on 29 July, and on 5 August 1943; the United States resumed diplomatic relations. The Soviets had little incentive to open large-scale movements against the Finns. It would greatly damage Soviet-American relations at a time when Moscow’s termination of diplomatic relations with the Polish Exile Government in London had relations with Churchill at low-ebb. Soviet troops were required to re-conquer the vast sections of Belorussia and Ukraine still in German control. With Allied successes in liberating France the Soviet priority was on the race to Berlin.
Consequently, from late August 1943, a de facto cease-fire emerged on the Finnish front. After negotiating through American intermediaries, Great Britain signed an armistice with Finland on 4 September, and Churchill declared that Soviet-Finnish differences should not be discussed until post-war peace conferences convened. The Soviets refused to accept this British condition, but the Finns recognized their weak negotiating position and offered to evacuate Karelia to a line only six miles from the city of Viipuri; well out of artillery range of Leningrad. This concession was enough to convince the Soviets to agree to an armistice on 19 September 1943. Finland declared war on Germany on 1 October 1943. The Germans could offer no incentives for the Finns not to defect.

I am not at all sure that Germans would so easily give up all of their presence in Finland. Petsamo nickel was very important for the German war industry, and becoming moreso, in 1943, so they would likely attempt to hold on to the northern part of Lapland for sometime longer, at least. This means that withdrawing troops from Finnish Lapland would not happen very fast. See Operation Birke IOTL, aimed to protect access to Petsamo nickel prior to withdrawing from Lapland. There is also the matter of securing iron ore shipments from Sweden and keeping control, at least to an extent, of the Gulf of Finland to stop Soviet attempts to interfere with the German transports in the Baltic Sea. IOTL, the plans for taking over the Åland islands and Suursaari (Hogland) were made (Tanne West and Tanne Ost, respectively) to maintain German maritime presence in the northern Baltic Sea area even if southern mainland Finland was lost. If Finland attempts to make an armistice with the Allies in 1943, when Germany is still stronger in the northern Baltic Sea area than IOTL in the fall of 1944, the Germans wil most likely kick off such plans. Tanne Ost was attempted IOTL in September 1944, it failed when the Finns managed to protect Suursaari against the German attack, also with Soviet air support. ITTL, as the Germans have more assets to commit to these operations, it is quite possible that the Germans could take over both the Ålands main island and Hogland, which would make the Finnish position quite uncomfortable.

In general, too, in 1943 the Germans both had a lot of men and assets in Finland, and the Finns were practically dependent on Germany for food and fuels. The main leverage the Germans have for stopping Finland changing sides is that in 1943, Germany can still hurt Finland *a lot* if the Finns attempt a truce with the Allies. IOTL, Finland jumping out from the Axis train was timed in such a way that Germany could no longer punish Finland severely, as its strategic position around Finland had weakened significantly during 1944. In 1943, the power parity up north would be different, with Germany still stronger, and I can't see Germany just meekly giving up control over Petsamo and the northern Baltic Sea, as doing that could quickly deprive them of important strategic resources, namely Swedish iron ore and Finnish nickel. At worst, the Germans could try to coup the Finnish government, to put a pro-Nazi Finnish (Fascist) government in power to continue the war. IOTL, the Nazi leadership had plans for this eventuality, too.

All in all, I think that your scenario as presented above would be very optimistic from the Finnish perspective, the Germans deciding to give up their presence up north that easily, as well as the Soviets not advancing against the Finns and then presenting them with heavy peace terms as per IOTL prior to the fall of 1944.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

So, it's more like 1200 aircraft and not 1500-3000?

Depends on the date of the count, and how the Italians are counted. The dates of the numbers I posted earlier are right after the air battle for Tunis or the Sicilian Strait, a low point, tho to was probably lower the week before. The Axis put a fair number of non operational aircraft back into combat squadrons in May as they recovered from the Tunisian battle. & aircraft were arriving from Germany. There is also the matter of who is counting. ie: John Ellis in 'Brute Force' counts 4,667 German "..front line combat aircraft" on all fronts including defending Germany as of December 1943. (Table 41 Sourced primarily from Baumbach & Hale 'The Broken Swatstika'.) Conversely this Table take more directly from German records places air strength at over 8,000 in the last quarter of 1943. Excluding non combat types including reconnaissance does not account for the entire difference between the two.

Then there is the problem of the Italian air strength. As I stated in my earlier post:

The Italians are slippery & I don't have any definitive sources here. The lower numbers tossed out are in the neighborhood of 200 fighters 1 July, or 200 total depending on the source. The high end is up around 1,000 but those may not be differentiating between squadrons of obsolete aircraft that were not counted as 'operational' by the Italians, which were deadlined to save fuel and pilots for the better equipped air groups. Maybe some useful numbers will turn up from some other participant here.

This problem of different counts extends to the Allies as well. The low end place some 3,500 air craft available for Op HUSKY. Others using different methods come up with a strength 50% to 75% larger.

German anti invasion doctrine such as it was in 1943 - 1944 included concentrating the bombers against the invasion fleet off shore. Tho plenty of examples of fighters strafing the beaches can be found. Results were less than hoped or feared. ie: For Op HUSKY 22 of 2,500 "ships" were sunk. The Allies were prepared to endure a estimated worst case of 200 sunk.

 

[McPherson]

Hi everyone,

Hello; right back at you.

So there has recently been a subtopic about a cross-Channel invasion in May-June 1943 in the thread on Axis Spain. I would be particularly interested in discussing the subject in a specific thread, in particular to understand potential consequences of an earlier invasion on the rest of the war and postwar.

Roundup. This has been a topic I have previously avoided since I think it is Alien Space Bat territory.

Regarding the invasion itself, @Eric C Johnson has so far presented compelling, sourced arguments about it. It does appear that the landing and initial fighting itself may be more favourable than in 1944 for the Allies: weather is more favourable, Atlantic Wall defenses are weaker, German forces appear to be of overall worse quality than in 1944, especially the armored components. Meanwhile, if the Allies do decide on the invasion early enough in mid-1942, they can apparently concentrate enough forces to attack with comparable numbers as in 1944, at least initially. Relatively speaking the Allies would also actually be in a more favourable position in armored warfare, which would reduce the stopping power of that part of the German forces in Normandy.

The Allies will face an intact LW fighter force that can stage into France (About 450-600 day-fighters with 70% veterans.). The Wally air forces might be 65%/35% RAF/USAAF. I frankly have no faith in the RAF air staff. This is the same outfit that is fixated on the Ruhr and which mismanaged the Rhubarb Campaign. The USAAF in the UK has not lesson learned anything appropriate, yet, either, so the air battle will be a repeat of the RAF debacle of 1942. If one cannot achieve air superiority over the Channel from Brest all the way to Ostend, one cannot land the landing force. It is THAT SIMPLE. Sea Lion in reverse.

At sea, the Allies have only enough sealift and CARGO LIFT to sustain a HUSKY sized operation in May 1943. There is no ready stream of US infantry divisions outfitted and ready to go and only about 5 green armored divisions, of which 3 have just stood up.

Of course some logistical aspects may be weaker than OTL for the Allies and stronger for the Germans (possibly less time to bomb French logistical lines and hubs), although this may not be as bad as expected since the Allies would put serious effort on the invasion in 1942-43. This and the possibly greater German strategic reserves could however slown down the overall liberation of France.

There has not been a year of needed Maquis work to disrupt and dislocate German C3I1L.

---

Regarding some impacts on the entire war, a focus on 1943 D-Day would certainly momentarily reduce manpower and material resources in the Pacific, the Mediterranean and the Russian and Asian-Pacific parts of Lend-Lease. In particular the US forces needed in the ETO would have to come from units that were sent to the Pacific OTL after the invasion was delayed to 1944. This could somewhat slow-down the Soviets but Lend-Lease was not very important until 1943 and this would be offset by the newly-opened French front drawing out German forces AND denying the forces that were rebuilding in France. One would have to actually check the movements of different units OTL but this would definitely affect German reinforcements to the Eastern Front. Combined with the psychological effect of the invasion AND the likely coordinated Soviet offensive, this would probably be advantageous to the Soviets by late-1943.

How? Someone has forgotten something very specific and important as to HOW the Americans fought their "two front" global war. The Pacific Campaign relied on resources and allocations based on the American Pacific coast states infrastructure and assets. The European War was based on the American resources east of the Rocky Mountains. There was some limited cross transfer, but that was in the main how the war was distributed. If one wants to allocate PACWAR resources to the American eastern front, then that is going to snarl up CONUS logistics allocations and distributions. This is about 2,500 locomotives and 15,000 cars worth of rolling stock dislocated and will mean traffic jams at St Louis, Kansas City, Chicago and Atlanta.

Also, I will point out a few more sour notes in this Orchestration der Kleiner Schlact Musik. (Rearrangement of Combat Compositions)

a. The Americans still have to fix the naval mess on their Eastern Sea Frontier.
b. Torch and Tunis has not gone anywhere. Remember Kasserine? The US Army has yet to lesson learn the HARMON LESSON.
c. The Americans (the Wallies in fact) have no BIM capacity or air superiority day-fighter to support such a BIM capacity. for France 1943.
d. Lend Lease is actually not going anywhere. If Sledgehammer / Roundup is a thing, then it is even more vital for Russians to kill Germans in 1943 than it historically was. Germans can shuttle East Front veterans west easier in 1943 than they will be able in 1944, All they need is about 10 division equivalents in 30 days and the Allies are finished in France. The Germans can afford to thin their eastern front that much in Mid-1943 because they did it FOR ITALY.

In the Pacific however operations could slow down quite significantly for a long time. This would change with US mobilization progressing further, some European assets (mainly shipping) becoming increasingly available for redeployment and the likely earlier end of the war in Europe (at least by several months).
The biggest impact on the Asian theater IMO is that the USSR will likely be able to invade Manchuria and Korea at least months before V-J Day instead of a couple days/weeks.

See my previous comments about how American resources were localized and distributed.

Another interesting question is Italy. Shipping concerns and the invasion of France would favor invading mainland Italy as late as possible and focusing (in late 1943 and 1944) on targets like Southern France, Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily. However D-Day will show the Italians that the Germans are clearly about to lose. There is probably a high possibility that Italy does very little or outright changes sides ala Finland/Hungary before it is even invaded, which would save the Allies and Italians a lot of pain and resources.

The maintenance of Italy as an intact Axis air base has HORRIBLE fallout and consequences as regards the air war in the Mediterranean, the Balkans campaigns for which the Russians will not thank the Wallies, and the continuation of the full output of the Rumanian oil fields into 1944. The failure to knock out Ploesti has always been a WWII air campaign bolo, but at least the feeble attempts to disrupt it, had serious if short term benefits on the Eastern Front at crucial times when the Red Army needed a Wehrmacht breather. The Foggia air complex did have that important benefit as well as present another threat axis to Eastern Germany through the air, thereby stretching the LW fighter force out to their break limit in 1944.

Regarding postwar, it's hard to say exactly if the events in Europe would change the location of the Iron Curtain a lot (in theory the Allies invade while the Soviets are further East but if the German war effort collapses earlier the Sovs may push faster). However with the USSR invading Manchuria and Korea a few months before V-J-day there is a far greater likelihood that the entirety of Korea becomes communist and the CCP may be further entrenched, although the Nationalists may be in a better starting position if the Japanese can't launch an equivalent to Ichi-Go in time.

Russia will be in no position to start earlier than 1945. They needed 1944 LL to mount their Manchurian operations and now they do not have it.

What are your thoughts on these different points?

See my comments. Specifically to add, the Shermans are not being produced in enough numbers yet, the P-38 Lightning is a disaster being retro-fixed, the heavy bomber forces, American and British, are still small and not well used. The medium bomber force (BIM capable) is still too small and deployed to the Mediterranean. The Battle of the Atlantic is still knife edge as of April 1943. US artillery is still being outfitted. Not enough US infantry for something like Roundup is trained yet. Not enough landing craft, in the right places in the right quantities, is available and the FIRST TEAM is still busy in the Mediterranean and has not spent the nine months needed to staff, plan and logistically prepare for Sledgehammer, much less Overlord. People forget that the invasion of France happened AT WARP SPEED once Eisenhower and crew were able to transfer their experience (after Husky) out of the Mediterranean Theater.

There are eight major problems that will arise for the Western Allies following the successful landings in Normandy on 12 May 1943. None are fatal to the landings, or the success of the following campaign, but should be addressed. Two are insolvable, the other six can be mitigated or overcome.

We'll see.

The first, as noted previously, the first problem is that Patton will spend the first two months plus attacking and advancing away from Germany and the German Army. The COSSAC Plan briefed at Casablanca in January 1943 projected that by D+14 18 Allied divisions would be ashore and hold an arc from Avranches in an arc though Alencon north of Le Mans to the mouth of the Seine River opposite Le Havre. Under Roundup, I also postulated 18 divisions in France, with a higher number of assault divisions (ten) rather than the four under the COSSAC Plan.

How many divisions? 18? 14 of them will have to be BRITISH or Canadian.

As observed by FM Erwin Rommel in his first inspection tour of France in December 1943, the average age of German soldiers in France was thirty-seven. In his second inspection report submitted a month later, Rommel concluded that German troops in France were those considered unfit for service in Russia. The poor troop quality is compounded by poor selection by Hitler for high command. Command of the German Seventh Army is entrusted by Hitler to Generaloberst Friedrich Dollmann on grounds of political reliability over competence since August of 1939, although Dollmann had not seen combat since 1916 as an aerial observer, and his command saw no combat during the French Campaign of 1940. His performance on occupation duties was marked by considerable inertia, and once summoned to Berlin to explain the loss of Cherbourg, he committed suicide. German command performance steadily improved once Dollmann blew his brains out.

Actually, based on France 1944, German leadership performance was mediocre at the command level above battalion. And there is the AIRPOWER question.

Against I US Armored Corps, the three OTL German infantry divisions in Brittany (76th Infantry Division – Brest- Reformed March 1943 – 70% strength, little unit training, French weapons; 113th Infantry Division – West of St Malo – Reformed February 1943 – 75% strength, little unit training, poor quality, French equipment, 371st Infantry Division – Northeast of Brest – Reformed February 1943 – 75% strength. Just arriving in France with rearguard still aboard trains, little training, Czech equipment) have little chance of making use of the excellent natural terrain for defensive combat because of lack of numbers for a frontage over 100 miles wide. These divisions will be first contained and isolated, then destroyed during the capture of Brest and Lorient.

How? Never mind the rains, never mind the disputed airspace over the battlefield, never mind the non-disrupted German LLOCs, or the non-existent US armored divisions that are performing these 7th Cavalry miracles, nor the terrain (bocage): Patton happens to be in Tunisia still putting II Corps back together after Fredendall screwed it up in February 1943. Maybe if Adna Chaffee was still alive, somebody had listened to Chennault in 1937 or Kelly Johnson had been shown the NACA 1927 Supercharger/ Turbocharger report, and McNair had not screwed up the lessons learned from the Louisiana Maneuvers or Gladeon Barnes had gotten some needed help with the tank program in 1940, those would be Maurice Rose led US T-34 clones slashing their way through the hedgerows with P-38Qs growling overhead providing Zuni rocket support.

Patton will split his corps, sending 2nd AD/3rd ID into Brittany toward Brest and Lorient; and 4th AD/9th ID to St Nazaire and Nantes on the north bank of the Loire River, which were devoid of combat formations and contained only security units. The best resistance will be put up by the the 343rd Occupation Division in Lorient – Formed October 1942 – Transferred to France in March 1943. Above strength with one light reconnaissance, one anti-tank, and one engineer battalions added. The capture of Lorient will take at least one weak. Lorient is also the only port where the Germans will have time and resources to carry out a significant demolition of port facilities. Brest (16,000 tons supply capacity per day) Nantes (I could not find capacity) and St Nazaire (21,000 tons) will ease the US supply position and allow Cherbourg to be devoted to supporting the British and Canadians.

With the fictional fixes I gave, it will take a month at the most optimistic. The Allies do not have that month.

Patton will then be required to reconstitute, rest, resupply and replace losses for probably three weeks after reaching the Loire (end of June/early July). With VII US Corps covering his rear and flank, Patton will find a weak point and cross the Loire and continue advancing away from Germany to capture Bordeaux. Hitler ordered Bordeaux transformed into a “festung stadt” and the 715th Occupation Division was transferred from nearby Dax to double its garrison. Attempts by the Germans to destroy port installations met with considerable success, but led to sharp, morale-sapping clashes with French Resistance. Combined with clear certainty they have been abandoned, and the defenders were unable to prolong the battle, and more willing to surrender to the Americans to avoid the French. But it is only by mid-July that Patton can begin to advance East and then north. This problem, the tyranny of Geography cannot be mitigated.

Note the bolded? I might have chosen the word "terrain". A modern city is a nightmare military obstacle. It does not take much innovation or smarts to make a Stalingrad happen. All that is required is basic small unit proficiency and a certain willingness to fight house by house and building by building. Low quality troops can tie down high quality troops for weeks in a place like Brest or St Nazaire.

The second problem is Operation Citadel and the resulting earlier onset of the Cold War. Several others have argued Citadel would be cancelled, and in the OTL it was abandoned after the invasion of Sicily. I also acknowledge the argument that Stalin may launch his own offensive. It may seem counterintuitive, but I believe Citadel would receive the green light for several reasons. Hitler issued his directive (Operations Order 6) on 15 April 1943, with a primary objective of eliminating the Kursk bulge in the German lines for two reasons. The first is to shorten the front and ease lateral movements, and the second is to prevent Kursk from becoming a springboard for an offensive into the Ukraine. Over the previous 15 months, the Germans invested huge resources in trying to restore the oil fields, factories, transport, agriculture, mining and even shipbuilding in the Ukraine to reduce the length of time for resupply of field armies. This huge investment needed protection.

But that does not mean Jomini (interior lines advantage; cref Dennis Mahan) has gone anywhere. The Germans can tap Norway, the Balkans, even the northern Russian front for the few divisions they need to wreck Roundup.

The long-term objective of Citadel reflects just how far Hitler was drifting from reality. It was to regain the lost territory of the previous winter – to return to Stalingrad and the Caucasus. It was in support of this long-term objective that on 4 May 1943 Hitler ordered Citadel delayed until 91 PzKw VI Tiger, 270 Pzkw V Panther tanks (virtually all of these tanks manufactured), as well as 80 Sd Kfw 184 Elefant SP guns arrived. Six days later, when FM Heinz Guderian reiterated GEN Walter Model’s objections to Citadel expressed on 4 May, Hitler remained silent, but FM Wilhelm Keitel responded Citadel must go forward for political and prestige reasons. Hitler is in the same trap as the previous year. Goebbels’ propaganda machine spun Stalingrad up so high that a withdrawal became impossible. The German people are now being fed a diet of decisive year in the East to a point where something must be done to save face.

So Hitler gets Roundup as a late birthday present and even the incompetent OKW can figure out: "Strike here now, you guys, and the Wallies will be kiboshed for two years. Delay Kursk. The Russians ARE NOT GOING ANYWHERE (No Lend Lease sufficient, yet, thanks to the logistics diverted to Roundup.)."

This is the situation when news of landings in Normandy arrives. Dictatorships in decline seldom choose wiser options, and Hitler was never one to permanently concede territory without a fight. In totalitarian regimes, loss of territory often begets one crisis of confidence after another. The first reaction is the 91 PzKw VI Tiger, 270 Pzkw V Panther tanks and 80 Elefant SP guns are no longer going to Kursk. They are being expedited to France as soon as they roll of the production lines. Without a need to delay to deliver these vehicles, Hitler would likely grant the fervent requests of FM Erich von Manstein to start Citadel immediately. Luftwaffe assets, massive amounts of fuel, ammunition and other supplies have been stockpiled, why not use them as planned? Von Manstein is saying what Hitler wants to hear, an operational level of war offensive that can be done quickly takes attention away from setbacks in France. However, with reinforcements not forthcoming, the burden weighs heavily on Von Manstein’s troops, not Model’s.

See... my... previous... comment.

Without time to establish fearsome mine belts and anti-tank positions, the Russians give ground rather than risk encirclement, but succeeded in decimating a number of German panzer and infantry formations at the cost of heavy casualties themselves. All told, the Germans shortened their front by nearly 300 miles. But in the end, the ratio of German forces available per mile of front had not changed – the Russian Front was long and too sparsely held. While German ground and air forces could not be replaced, Soviet troops and equipment could. Dramatic as the Kursk victory was, it neither delays nor diminishes scope and scale of the Soviet Counteroffensive planned for August 1943. Von Manstein tried, but the Ukraine could not be saved.

See... previous... comment.

The German Army will have to defend Kiev without the 1st, 14th, and 24th Panzer Divisions, still in France, so the Russian offensive will not be stopped by the dying elements of German military prowess. What will affect the August 1943 Soviet offensive is the diversion of perhaps as many as 80-100,000 one-ton to five-ton trucks from Lend-Lease to support logistical movement in France. In addition, perhaps 8,000 warplanes, 2 million tons of fuel and 3 million of tons of food are not shipped to Russia from January 1943 onward under Lend-Lease. As Russia gradually resumes fighting solely on its own resources, its logistical tail grows more lethargic. This slowing of the Russian advance will allow more of Europe to fall to the Western Allies. Stalin firmly believes much of this territory must be under Soviet control for the future security of the USSR.

See underlined. Those 2 million Germans not being killed in the East will still have to be killed by somebody because that is war is in the era.

Strategically, the only effect of Kursk is to plant additional seeds of doubt in Stalin’s mind concerning the possibility of collusion between the Western Allies and Nazi Germany to ensure that Soviet losses were maximized. This twisted suspicion, while poisonous to events in Postwar Europe, does nothing to save the Third Reich. It does accelerate the forces leading to the onset of the Cold War considerably, and will probably force the Western Allies to hold far greater numbers of troops in Central Europe after the defeat of Germany. This problem cannot be mitigated.

See previous comment. There is a reason I believe FDR/Marshall was the finest grand strategy team America produced since Abraham Lincoln and Winfield Scott. Russia was the secret weapon those two used to win WWII. The Russians did not have to win. They just had to fight. So whatever it took to keep Stalin spending Russians and killing Germans in the East, was what was needed for the Americans to have a chance to win in the West. As it turned out, the Russians still lost, even though they overran Eastern Europe. One in nine of them died and they never recovered from the "Great Patriotic War". And as could be foreseen, (Containment) they lost Eastern Europe. Now they play third fiddle to China.

Problem Three is the British “Great Tank Scandal”. The British were unable to produce a tank which combined the necessary qualities of firepower, protection, mechanical reliability, and sufficient range on the battlefield. In the OTL in 1944, it ignited a firestorm in Parliament that further severely damaged public confidence in the Conservative Party’s ability to manage national defence. The loss of Singapore and Tobruk in 1942 was still a vivid memory in the British body politic. Round-up is very much a come-as-you-are affair, and not every Allied unit is fully equipped. The poor performance of (especially cruiser) tanks shows up in the failure of 9 AD to capture Caen before the Germans establish a strong defensive position. The overall best British Commonwealth tank in combat in France is probably the Canadian Ram II tank with a 6-pdr gun.

It is the SHERMAN. See my comments above about what has to happen to make the SHERMAN better as the core of a Wally combined arms system of systems. One would want a T-23/M23 with the 90mm gun... but Gladeon Barnes does not get the money or staff he needs in 1940.

This problem is rectified, but only after tremendous embarrassment. In March 1943, upon completion of Ram II production at Montreal Locomotive Works, M4A1 Sherman tanks under the Canadian name of Grizzly commenced with the first vehicles coming off the line in May 1943. Production of Grizzly tanks will not be cancelled in June 1943 as in the OTL because it will be clear that US production of Shermans will not be sufficient for Operation Roundup to be fully exploited. After testing the first models, production tanks arrived to replace the Grants in 4 Canadian Armoured Division in early August. Redundant Grants had their 75mm and 37mm guns removed, and internal space made for an infantry squad. This conversion, nicknamed “Grant Kangaroos” was the world’s first true armoured personnel carrier. Later in early 1944, “Ram Kangaroos” would also be converted.

Grants were DEATHTRAPS. Grizzlys would be the Kangaroos or nothing. Note that Shermans with wet stowage will not be available until May 1943?

Valentine X tanks built by Canadian Pacific will have given way to Bishop 83.4mm (25 Pdr) self-propelled guns, but after July 1943, the Archer self-propelled ant-tank gun was ordered into production in Montreal. It carried the 76mm (17pdr) gun that was proven to be the first effective Tiger tank killer. The additional Canadian tank production, OTL US Lend-Lease transfers of Shermans, as well as producing in Great Britain 75mm gunned Cromwell tanks will eventually rectify this problem, but only after unexpected delays in Roundup execution. The Germans have a similar problem in that the majority of their tanks in production are not Tigers and Panthers, but PzKw IIIM/N, PzKw IVH and StG III models.

The Archer was a bodge. Cromwells are going to be proven to be mechanically and ergonomically less than stellar, and will not be as prominent as claimed. RTL results for their lackluster performance have good reasons behind them. German tanks (IIIs and IVs) will be competitive in the mid 1943 timeframe. Better push the 3.5 inch bazooka HARD.

Problem four is the US Army’s Tank Destroyer (TD) Doctrine, as already noted by several other commentators. The problem goes well beyond poor equipment, such as towed M3 37mm (the M1 57mm and M5 76mm had not yet entered service). It was the Doctrine, which specified tank destroyers, including the self-propelled M10 and M10A1 76mm gun TDs would roam the battlefield to search and ambush enemy tanks. TDs would rely on speed and mobility rather than artillery and infantry support. By 1943, TDs were no more mobile than enemy tanks, and both M3 and open topped M10 were appallingly vulnerable to German artillery and infantry weapons – especially mortars and grenades, but also machine gun fire. After the 2nd and 3rd US TD Groups are shredded, TD battalions are assigned on a semi-permanent basis to infantry divisions and used primarily for additional fire support in planned attacks.

Tank destroyer doctrine was faulty. The tank destroyers in defense (Battle of the Bulge) proved effective. And having all those self propelled guns clanking around proved accidentally fortuitous when German improvised field fortifications needed high explosive adjustments to suit the American army's preferred contingent condition for same. TDs were not just for tanks. Everybody enemy got the 7.6 cm birthday party gifts. Especially German mortars teams, machine gun crews and panzer grenadiers. Just apply American dragoons as bodyguards. Even a tank needs infantry as bodyguards you know?

This problem can be partially mitigated in the short term, solved over time. The production of the M18 Hellcat will be scaled back to vehicles for which material has already been assembled. Conversion of M36 Jackson TDs (90mm gun) from M10s will proceed on an expedited basis after experience against PzKw V and PzKw VI tanks, but none will be completed in time for combat. The solution is found in the adoption of the philosophy of the best anti-tank weapons is another tank. Production of Allied tanks will outpace the German.

Sherman and Jackson say hello.

Problem five is 1943 USAAF Close Air Support which was inadequate to combat conditions in France, and frequently led to missed German targets and too frequent friendly force casualties. This is resolved by assigning experienced USAAF pilots from Fifteenth US Air Force (Established in Great Britain instead of North Africa as the tactical counterpart to the strategic Eighth US Air Force) and adequate radio equipment in armored vehicles close to the leading elements of each division. In addition, experience in close air support missions will lead to a deadly combination for opposing German units.

Might point out why Italy is important again?

Problem six results from overzealous conversion of US Army mechanized cavalry units to armored formations. Only the 4th, 6th, 15th, 16th, 101st, 102nd, 104th, 106th, 107th, 113th, and 115th Cavalry Regiments exist as Corps assets assigned to VII US Corps, I US Armored Corps, Third US Army, Seventh US Army, XII US Corps, V US Corps, (Inactivated to provide replacements), VIII US Corps, II US Armored Corps and VI US Corps. It will be noted that First (plus III, IX and US Corps) and Fifth US Armies (plus II, IV, and XI US Corps) arrive without an assigned cavalry component. The 2nd, 3rd, 11th, and 14th Cavalry Groups will arrive one to four months after elements of these two field armies, but the shortage of cavalry will last until the end of the war in Europe. Combat losses are also not replaced until after some delay. This problem is only partially mitigated by aerial reconnaissance.

Organic reconnaissance was and is an organizational fault of the American army. This, by experience, is a divisional level necessity, not just corps. I am not convinced that turning existent cavalry into armored formations was incorrect. It was the lack of a modern version of the ACW dragoons or hussars (DCL in the French context of the time.), which was the problem. This could be solved at division level with a recon battalion attached to the formation HQ. (Rangers for want of a better term and org.).

The British and Canadian Armies do not suffer under this handicap due to the assignment of battalion-sized Reconnaissance Regiments to each infantry division beginning in 1941, Royal Armoured Corps regiments to armoured divisions and corps, and finally converting 20 Armoured Brigade into Army and Army Group level Armoured Reconnaissance Regiments.

And they still misuse their cavalry? Why?

Problem seven; the combined effects of the previous four problems are the initial setbacks against the German defensive lines. Although Generalmajor Wilhelm Richter, commander of 716th Occupation Division was not the best commander, Richter recognized the importance of Caen, and promptly his four battalions west of the Orne and his artillery battalion to assemble there. He also ordered the Regimental HQ and two remaining battalions of 726th Regiment withdrawn from Seine Estuary Beaches and Lisieux to Caen. The Seine and its open terrain to Paris were someone else’s problem in Richter’s mind. The movement was executed flawlessly. British planners expected reinforcements to be motorized, and come by road from the east. Instead they travelled by rail, despite damage from raids, and the fact rail lines passed within four miles of British paratroopers hunkered in defensive positions.

See what I mean? (^^^)

Bypassing Dollmann and his Korps Commanders, Army Group-West Staff also ordered 1st Parachute Division to reinforce Caen. MG Percy Hobart of 79 AD, an excellent trainer of troops and fervid disciple of armour theories expounded by Fuller, quickly had 27 Armoured Brigade assembled, organized and moving through Bayeux to Tully-Sur-Seulles in an effort achieve the fabled war-ending breakthrough that armour purists had long dreamt of. Hobart, however, found himself laboring under actual terrain constraints the pure armour theorist seldom took into consideration.

Like a gentle rising slope that exposes the belly plate of the tank to an anti-tank gun line. The cure is infantry and mortars.

27 Armoured Brigade’s Crusader II tanks possessed mechanical reliability, but comparatively elderly and armed with puny 40mm (2pdr) guns. Due to the boscage they were seldom able to leave roads. Anti-tank teams from 1st Parachute Division were able to destroy lead tanks and block all further advances. Attempts to bring up engineer support or to refuel tanks brought accurate artillery fire. Calls for RAF support led to British troops being attacked as often as Germans. Hobart however, quickly adapted, and married 185 Brigade’s infantry battalions closely with armoured regiments, and supported them with dedicated artillery. In addition, 5 Division began to envelop Caen from the west and 3 Division from the east. After milking as much delay as possible, von Rundstedt ordered Caen defenders to withdraw behind the Seine River, thus incurring Hitler’s wrath. Caen was captured on D+12, buying invaluable time for the full equipment allocation for 1st Panzer Division to arrive from Germany. It also allowed 65th Infantry Division from Eindhoven, and 161st Infantry Division from Boulogne to arrive on the Seine.

Nope. The Crusader was never reliable. Also across that MUD, I have serious concerns about ground flotation.

After allowing the landing of follow-on divisions and transfer of RAF and USAAF squadrons to French airfields, Marshall launched his first major attack against the German defensive lines in early July. It was marginally successful. The initial gains by Third US Army west of Paris were regained by counterattacks spearheaded by 10th Panzer Brigade (PzKw V), 653rd Schwere Panzerjaeger Abteilung and 503rd Schwere Panzer Abtilung. It was here that US Army shortcomings were exposed, and began to be corrected. The only silver lining was the Panther tank’s debut was inauspicious – the earliest models suffered from poor factory workmanship and suffered frequent mechanical breakdowns. This left them exposed to Allied fighter-bombers.

Since the Panthers are on defense and do not actually have to move far from their railhead dismounts, I am going to proclaim; "Assumptions are not valid." Also if one is using P-38s and P-40s and Hawkers on tanks instead of the German Logtrains operating forward of the Evreaux and Paris railheads, then one should be court-martialed as an air general or marshal.

First Canadian Army was able to achieve its objective of crossing the mouth of the Seine after 79 AD and 1 Airborne Divisions are attached for the operation. The mouth of the Seine is crossed by landing craft up to LST in size due to its width. The airborne operation did not go smoothly, unlike Normandy, where the night drops well off the objectives were compensated by the lack of German opposition, there was little margin for error and the jump was scheduled for just after dawn. The 161st Infantry Division was spread far too thin, but all but one of the drop zones had been pre-zeroed by artillery fire. Unable to form up and seize their objectives around Harfleur, they withdrew without heavy casualties towards 1 Canadian Division which encountered little opposition. (Note: 1 Airborne Division is short a brigade, as 3 Parachute has been transferred to 6 Airborne Division.) The Germans shifted 1st Panzer Division and concentrated 161st Infantry Division against the Canadians, but by this time 1 Canadian Army Tank Bde was able to thicken the line. The German PzKw III, PzKw IV and StG III tanks were not superior to the 6pdr gunned Valentines in either gun power or armour, and the constricted space of a bridgehead negated their superior mobility. As 5 Canadian Armoured and 2 Canadian Divisions reinforced, the bridgehead expanded and the Canadians muscled their way into LeHavre. 17th Luftwaffe Field Division – the garrison in Le Havre fought better than most of its contemporaries, but could not hold out against the veteran Canadian units. Coming two months after the invasion, the Germans had ample time to thoroughly wreck the harbor. The Canadians continued to slowly expand along the Channel coast as II Canadian Corps arrived in August.

You better be using Buffaloes (which one does not have.). The Seine has a nasty current. Where are the C-47s? Oh, yeah, Brereton. The paras will be SLAUGHTERED. First Canadian will suffer the same. Le Havre is not where one wants to feed armor, either. The ground is HORRIBLE

This was the last time the German Army ever repulsed an Allied offensive.

Ahhh. nope.

Problem eight is the return of the U-boat threat in December 1943. The loss of French bases caused the Kriegsmarine (as in the OTL) to examine seriously the Dutch snorkel invention, neglected up until then. Once problems of flooding were resolved – primarily through training with the new device – German U-boats began making more rapid transits from their Norwegian bases. Withdrawal from attacks is also sped up, and corvettes and frigates were too slow to overtake the submarines. Allied shipping losses rose, but it was too late in the war to be decisive.

The Germans never figured out the sneeze box problem. Too bad; they did not consult their Italian allies who HAD pre-war. It was called the Ferretti Snort. So the U-boats are a non-issue post August 1943.

The problem of the crisis in British manpower from late 1943 onward which led to the disbanding or gutting of a dozen combat-ready divisions, [including the 1, 9, 10, 42 (East Lancashire) Armoured, and 38 (Welsh), 44 (Home Counties), 45 (Wessex), 47 (2nd London), 48 (South Midland), 59 (Staffordshire) and 61 (South Midland) Divisions] is largely, but not entirely averted by execution of Roundup in 1943. The elimination of Luftwaffe bases in France simplifies the air defense problems in Great Britain. The intake of anti-aircraft gunners and construction engineers for home defence is drastically reduced (as it was in the OTL after November 1944.) These conscripts are available for combat replacements. In addition, II British Anti-Aircraft Corps is folded into I and III British Anti-Aircraft Corps; allowing disbandment of 4, 6, 8, 9, 11 and 12 Anti-Aircraft Divisions. Their personnel are more than enough to provide replacements for anti-aircraft regiments serving on Continental Europe, and the surplus will re-role as artillerymen. These leaves 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 10 Anti-Aircraft Divisions still in existence until the spring of 1944, when they too begin to stand down. In addition, the coastal defence regiments will also begin to disband as the invasion threat fades.

A lot of hand-wavium is invoked. I figure about ~100,000 men. Not all of them are fit for combat on the line or they would have wound up as infantry in the first place. Plus... that is three months worth of casualties. What then? That is assuming the OKW screws up the German reinforcement schedule and fails to shove the Wallies into the sea after Roundup falters near St Lo where the counterattack should be massed and launched.

In my next post I will address German problems after Roundup.

And I will address those problems a bit later.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

From Post 315

As the next stepping stone, Operation Brimstone, the invasion of Sardinia, and Operation Vesuvius the invasion of Corsica under are authorized, and planning entrusted to GEN Montgomery of 15th Army Group. First British Army LTG Oliver Leese allocates V British Corps to Sardinia; 78 and West 46 (Midland Riding) Divisions, landing around Cagliari and Quartu on the southern tip of the island as the assault force; while 4 Parachute Bde (formed in Palestine in January 1943) jumped into the large airfields a few miles away from the beaches. 4 Mixed and 6 Armoured Divisions are follow-up forces for the 10 July 1943 landings.

At the January 1943 SYMBOL Conference (@ Casablanca) the Joint Chiefs considered using the Brit 1st Army to seize Sardinia/Corsica March 1943. Brooke quickly reconsidered & and successfully argued for seizing Sicilly first. Pros & cons both ways.

Theres been a number of posts on Soviet or Red Army actions.

I briefly returned to Zhukov and Shtemenko's memoirs as well as a few Kursk books to reestablish the timeline for Soviet strategy. Sometime in early 1943 Stalin will be informed that a Second Front is a sure thing in Summer 1943, May-June, and it will be requested that the USSR launch an offensive to support the invasion within a month of its start.

IOTL from April 8-12 the Genshtab visited the Voronezh and Central Fronts, established the situation, and formulated recommendations for the Summer campaign. They also solicited recommendations from the Front commanders, Vatutin and Rokossovsky. At the strategy meeting on April 12 it was decided - on the universal recommendations of Zhukov, Antonov, etc. - that the RKKA would stay on the defensive until Germany attacked first.

ITTL this obviously is not possible, because Stalin has already committed to launch a supporting offensive for Roundup. Yet they are also aware that Germany intends to resume the offensive against the Kursk sometime in the next month - defensive preparations are necessary, and a half-cocked attack with no defensive preparations will end the same way as 1942.

For a solution, we can return to the recommendations of Vatutin and Rokossovsky for their respective Fronts. Vatutin only described the strong enemy forces in front of him and recommended a strategic defense - only in late May did he begin suggesting a preemptive offensive. Rokossovsky, however, clearly recommended a preemptive offensive against the Orel salient by the Central, Bryansk, and Western Fronts to destroy the German ability to launch a concentric attack against Kursk and defeat 9th Army before it could be properly reinforced. As I noted above, 9th Army only had some 314 operational AFVs in May, which tripled in strength by June, and had severe ammunition shortages until the end of June. Rokossovsky was aware of this temporary weakness, and wanted to strike first with the 700 AFVs he had ready in early May.

So sometime in early-mid May, the USSR will begin the summer campaign against the Orel salient with a preemptive offensive from all sides. Voronezh Front will remain on the defensive for the moment, with a transition to the offensive in late May if German reserves are attracted. Probably secondary/diversionary offensives against Izium/Mius and Smolensk as well.

So roughly coinciding with the Allied landings, you would have an escalating series of Soviet offensives against still-unprepared German forces.

To digress slightly. The weakest link, or largest unknown in this 1943 invasion speculation is the ability of the Allies to concentrate sufficient cargo shipping to build up and sustain the campaign. I've never seen solid numbers on Allied cargo ship capacity 1942-1943, where they were & what they were doing. Fragments are plentiful, but nothing I bet short odds on. One knowledgable person on this subject stated with out intending humor that Allied leaders, their staff, and clerical army did not know either. they lacked far into 1943 any accurate or consolidated accounting of their mass of cargo ships.

What does seem evident is if the build up and sustainment for this campaign is to happen the Allied cargo shipping needs to be concentrated better in the Atlantic, for this purpose. That is substantially less used for material to China, to S Pacific for 1943 offensives there, ect... and most important less to the USSR. Material aid was roughly tripled from late 1942 to early 1944. Thats unlikely to happen here. The result is if material sent remains at 1942 levels the ability of the Red Army to conduct broad front deep offensives is severely curtailed. They may be able to still execute killing blows, but the attacks would be more selective & lack the operational depth.

I interpret this as the Red Army severely damages the Axis armies in the east, but don't have the ability (logistics) to push as far west as rapidly

I doubt it changes anything, if he wanted an earlier US involvement he should maybe reflect on why he signed MR pact in the first place and let it start when the democracies were not ready....?

The main issue is that they can't not hate each other, USSR has to suppress Eastern European independence and elections or its loses its victories, and they end up a US friendly neutrals, US/GB/France will always hate them for this. US/GB/France may not be willing to fight to free Poland or the Czechs, but they will immediately ramp up tension against USSR for it.....

This could lead to Allied armies standing in Prague, Budapest, perhaps even Warsaw when the end comes. Nothing about the agreements reached on Occupation Zones ect... were set in stone & substantially different circumstances in the ATL equivalent of the Terhan & Yalta conferences would lead to different political 'understandings'.