D-Day fails, worst-case scenario, does it make this intra-German border plausible?

D-Day failing likely leads to the revised intra-German border shown

  • yes

    Votes: 4 12.1%
  • no

    Votes: 14 42.4%
  • the intra-German border shown is implausibly generous to the USSR, given the PoD

    Votes: 6 18.2%
  • The intra-German border shown implausibly generous to the Western Allies, given the PoD

    Votes: 12 36.4%

  • Total voters
    33
How would D Day fail in summer of 44?

The only thing I can see would be a catastrophic change in the weather, but the forecasting tech of the day would have a high chance of predicting this and postponing.

The decision to go forward was pretty last second and based primarily, IIRC, on data collected by a Destroyer out in the Atlantic; just a few weeks later one of the largest Channel Storms in history hit without warning to the Allies. Incidentally, this was the hours/day following the next likely invasion window in the 18th, had the weather or perception of the weather been sufficient to prevent the June 6th window. The storm shut down resupply, air and naval support and further reinforcements for several days, which would've been a death blow for troops still establishing beachheads in Normandy.

Say D-Day fails and the WAllies need to re-group and try again. However, they launch operation Anvil on schedule and more of their force gets projected in to France via the French riviera.

To my knowledge, Operation Dragoon was never intended to be a stand alone operation and was always meant to be in tandem with Overlord landings due to the nature; the nature of the terrain meant it's a long slog to both Germany proper and the French heartland areas, as well as the fact said slog would be through hilly and mountainous terrain that would basically make the campaign another Italy. Further, given that IOTL shipping requirements for Overlord were sufficient to significantly delay Dragoon, which was supposed to occur much closer to the timing of the Normandy landings. A failed invasion likely implies high shipping losses as well as the need to begin stocking back up for another attempt which, when combined with a desire to avoid another Italy (Especially after a high casualty loss in Normandy), would can the operation.

As for what I expect to happen thereafter, me and Obssessed Nuker sparred on this recently, and my personal opinion is that nothing in so far as borders are changed Post-War. You just get the war lasting into the fall of 1945 in the ETO with a lot more dead.

By the time the Allies have recovered enough shipping and got new divisions into England for another attempt, it'll be too late in the year to try again and the next invasion window thus becomes April of 1945. The retention of Western European industry as well as the strategic buffer it provides means that the Western Allies face much greater difficult in waging the Air War of 1944-1945, in that tactical air commands don't have French and Belgian airfields to use and that FLAK has a much higher area to work with. That last is important, as new methods of AA defenses and new technologies, most particularly the dual fuse rounds coupled with the direct fire method, had reduced shell expenditures to achieve a shoot-down from around 13,000 rounds to somewhere around 1,500. Efforts to deploy the Egerland Radar system were also underway in 1945 IOTL and here might see greater success, given the greater strategic breathing provided to the Germans. The Swedes will also, given the lack of a two front war against the Germans, likely continue supplying the Germans with iron ore instead of shutting down shipments like they historically did.

As for the general situation of the East, this was a particular contention between myself and Obssessed. In my personal opinion, the situation was ripe for a major Soviet disaster in the event of a failed D-Day. IOTL, despite the horrid state of Army Group Center after Bagration, Hossbach still managed to perform some excellent counter-attacks on the Soviets. It's easy to see why in my assessment, as Soviet rifle divisions were averaging 60-85% understrength, were exhausted after months of combat, and were logistically overstretched. To this, by the start of August, the Germans will have nearly 10 Panzer and Panzer-Grenadier divisions freed up in the West with the clear realization that the main Allied effort in the West for the year has been defeated.

Now, my personal belief is that the introduction of a fresh Panzer Army would, given the situation of the Soviet forces, open them up to a major defeat if not near annihilation of Rokossovky's 1st Belorussian Front, given it's exposed position as the furthest forward element of the Soviets as well as the exhausted nature of the Soviets at this time. Obsessed strenuously disagreed with me on this, although he did make the concession it's possible the front could end up along the San/Bug instead of the Vistula as per OTL. To allow sleeping dogs to lie, we'll go with this compromise position. We'll also, for now, focus on the North European Front.

Now, operating from the position the the Soviets are stalled out on the San/Bug, this has great strategic consequences for 1945. IOTL, the Vistula-Oder offensive was supposed to start on January 22, but this was moved forward due in part to Western Allied pressure in the face of the Bulge Offensive. Here, it probably starts on the 22nd. Further, without the various disasters and the late prioritization placed on the Western Front in the form of the aforementioned offensive, the Germans have potent armored forces with which they can reinforce the Alt-"Army Group Bug" as well as Luftwaffe forces not destroyed in air offensives as they were IOTL January of 1945. As well, the Soviets will have been deprived of a major advantage they had IOTL in terms of crossing the Vistula, in that they had established bridgeheads across it prior to the main combat crossing, allowing them to stockpile logistics across the river and then launch the attacks from these sites. Here in this ATL, they will have to do a major combat crossing of the river, if not doing the same for the San/Bug, as the Germans could potentially eliminate bridgeheads over the river(s) prior to January. If Hitler can be convinced to do a better defensive planning, that's all the better for the Germans as well.

So, with this all said, what happens? Well, IOTL the Vistula-Oder covered the distance between the two rivers in about a month and then spent two months clearing out large German remnants in their flanks and rears while building back up their logistics network. Here, with a much larger German force facing them further to the East in better defenses, I don't think it's a stretch to say the operation could last two months, say from January 22 to March 2. A quick glance at Wikipedia says the Germans had 450,000 men to oppose the Soviet thrust IOTL and adding the forces used in the West would double the defenders in the ATL, as about 500,000 took part in the Bulge; I think it's sane to say a doubling of the troops opposing them can thus double the time it takes the Soviets to achieve victory. Aiding the defenders would also be the weather as another reason the Soviets brought forward the offensive was due to concerns of an upcoming thaw, which could hamper their advance if they're still facing strong opposition east of the Vistula.

So, we're saying the offensive takes two months longer, but it's also starting to the East of where it did IOTL. If it covers the same general distance as the IOTL offensive did, it probably collapses somewhere near the Vistula after taking Warsaw. The Soviets then spend some months eliminating surviving German forces at their flanks, most prominently in East Prussia, as well as forces cut off in their rear while building back their logistics. Given likely higher losses, more ammo expenditures, and the fact they had to cross two major rivers, I think it's justifiable to say instead of nearly ten weeks (February 2-April 16) as per OTL, it's 14 weeks in this ATL. So, to recap:

January 22-March 2: San/Bug to ~Vistula/Warsaw.
March 2-June 8: Clearing flanks, rebuilding logistics.
After June 8: Vistula-Oder offensive

By June I think the Germans will be in a state similar to what they were in January of 1945, and so the Soviets advance from the ~Vistula to the Oder at the rate they did historically, in about a month so that by the start of July they are on the Oder. Again, they'll need to pause and clear out Germans in their flanks (Breslau, Kustrin, Operation Solstice, etc IOTL) and rebuild their logistics, so it could be 10 weeks as per OTL, but we'll say six weeks since by July of 1945 I'd expect economic issues would be affecting the Germans badly. So, instead of doing August Storm against the Japanese as they did historically, in this ATL they're doing a major offensive against Berlin by about Mid-August. There after and concurrent, they could be overrunning the same places they did historically.

Switching gears back to the West, if you'll recall earlier I stated the next invasion window is probably April of 1945. I expect this to occur relatively easily, as by April the Ost units IOTL in use in Normandy will probably be even happier to surrender than they were IOTL and even many Germans will see the writing on the wall given the Soviet advances in Poland. More importantly, tactical and strategic air will have had long since established such a dominance over Western Europe, counter-attacks will have long since become impossible and logistical lines likely at their breaking point. I can the Western Allies landing and, with the lack of troops, logistical lines in shambles and poor morale, the Germans in France rapidly collapsing and being unable to offer serious resistance; there will be no holdups in the hedgerows nor any Mortain offensives in this ATL. IOTL, the Allies landed at the start of June and by the end of August had secured Paris and were beginning to move into Belgium; given the state of the Wehrmacht opposition they'd face in this ATL, you could halve this advance time in half I think justifiably into a month instead of the two as historically.

So, presuming a landing in Mid-April, by Mid-May they'd have largely overrun France and be in the process of doing the same in Belgium. They probably still take Antwerp intact but also will in a position to more rapidly bring it online, given the weaker abilities of the Germans to contest the sea lanes leading into it. We'll say by June the port is operational and this grants the logistical capability to secure Holland be establishing bridgeheads over the Rhine by sometime in July. Thereafter, for any remaining time in July and into August, the Western Allies will be rapidly advancing across Germany as they did over the course of March-April of 1945. They then meet the Soviets at the Elbe sometime around late August. Mop ups continue into September, but at this point the war is largely over. Luckily for the Germans, it ends before nuclear weapons can be used against them. Unluckily for the Japanese, the continue dedication of forces in the ETO means for sure no invasion of the Home Islands, meaning the Allies probably go for the starvation strategy advocated by the USAAF and USN as well as delay the atomic bombings until September; they'll make up for that by doing more of them at once instead of just two as they did IOTL.
 
IOTL, despite the horrid state of Army Group Center after Bagration, Hossbach still managed to perform some excellent counter-attacks on the Soviets. It's easy to see why in my assessment, as Soviet rifle divisions were averaging 60-85% understrength, were exhausted after months of combat, and were logistically overstretched. To this, by the start of August, the Germans will have nearly 10 Panzer and Panzer-Grenadier divisions freed up in the West with the clear realization that the main Allied effort in the West for the year has been defeated.

Now, my personal belief is that the introduction of a fresh Panzer Army would, given the situation of the Soviet forces, open them up to a major defeat if not near annihilation of Rokossovky's 1st Belorussian Front, given it's exposed position as the furthest forward element of the Soviets as well as the exhausted nature of the Soviets at this time.

Hossbach's counterattacks only worked against a single Tank Army whose flank protection had slipped. Everywhere else, they were soundly repulsed. A counter-attack of similar size to the one your talking about was directed against the Soviet Baltic Fronts in August of '44, who were in a similar state to that of 1st Belorussian Front, and those were only thrown back a dozen kilometers and were never remotely threatened with destruction. Given 2nd Belorussian Front would still outnumber the Germans, would have rough parity in armor, still had plenty of supplies and air cover, and could count on 1st Ukrainian Front's support due to it's position being alongside it immediately to the south they may or may not be stalled further east, but it's outright delusion to claim they could be defeated badly enough for the Soviets to really notice.

As well, the Soviets will have been deprived of a major advantage they had IOTL in terms of crossing the Vistula, in that they had established bridgeheads across it prior to the main combat crossing, allowing them to stockpile logistics across the river and then launch the attacks from these sites. Here in this ATL, they will have to do a major combat crossing of the river, if not doing the same for the San/Bug, as the Germans could potentially eliminate bridgeheads over the river(s) prior to January.

Even ignoring that the Soviets are liable to have bridgeheads over the river, Bug's frozen solid in January. It's no more a obstacle then if the Germans were defending open fields.

So, with this all said, what happens? Well, IOTL the Vistula-Oder covered the distance between the two rivers in about a month and then spent two months clearing out large German remnants in their flanks and rears while building back up their logistics network.

Incorrect: the Vistula-Oder offensive covered almost 430 kilometers. The distance between the Vistula and the Bug is around 190 kilometers, more then half that figure. That translates to the IATL Vistula-Oder Offensive terminating around Gneizno, about 50 kilometers short of Poznan.

But even assuming the Soviets are only able to get as far as the Vistula, I do not see why it would take them the same amount of time to shift their logistical lines forward a much smaller distance nor why they would even need to take time to clear the flanks given that the concurrent offensives into East Prussia got far enough that it would do that for them.

January 22-March 2: San/Bug to ~Vistula/Warsaw.
March 2-June 8: Clearing flanks, rebuilding logistics.
After June 8: Vistula-Oder offensive

More like:
January-March: Bug to Gneizno
March-June: Clearing Flanks
June onwards: Gneizno to... well, probably Magdeburg if their maintaining a similar pace to the Vistula-Oder. That means Berlin falls during this offensive.
 
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Hossbach's counterattacks only worked against a single Tank Army whose flank protection had slipped. Everywhere else, they were soundly repulsed. A counter-attack of similar size to the one your talking about was directed against the Soviet Baltic Fronts in August of '44, who were in a similar state to that of 1st Belorussian Front, and those were only thrown back a dozen kilometers and were never remotely threatened with destruction. Given 2nd Belorussian Front would still outnumber the Germans, would have rough parity in armor, still had plenty of supplies and air cover, and could count on 1st Ukrainian Front's support due to it's position being alongside it immediately to the south they may or may not be stalled further east, but it's outright delusion to claim they could be more then stalled.

I'm not wanting to reopen that debate as we've both made our opinions clear and I think further discussion on this line would be pointless. It's specifically why I went with "Well, we both agree the German attack probably results in the San/Bug instead of Vistula". It's the compromise we both can accept, given how heated it got last time.

Incorrect: the Vistula-Oder offensive covered almost 430 kilometers. The distance between the Vistula and the Bug is around 190 kilometers, more then half that figure. That translates to the IATL Vistula-Oder Offensive terminating around Gneizno, about 50 kilometers short of Poznan.

I did say around the Vistula, so I can accept something like that.

More like:
January-March: Bug to Gneizno
March-June: Clearing Flanks
June onwards: Poznan to... well, probably Magdeburg if their maintaining a similar pace to the Vistula-Oder.

The first I agree with, the second and third I don't as it took them IOTL from February 2nd to April 16, over ten weeks, to clear out the flanks and then resume the advance across the Oder. You're thus speculating that despite nearly three weeks less time to do the above, and despite having faced much stiffer opposition in doing their ATL advance with requisite effects on logistics and need for replacements, they somehow then advance a much further distance. I don't see that as reasonable at all.
 
I'm not wanting to reopen that debate as we've both made our opinions clear and I think further discussion on this line would be pointless. It's specifically why I went with "Well, we both agree the German attack probably results in the San/Bug instead of Vistula". It's the compromise we both can accept, given how heated it got last time.

Fair enough.

The first I agree with, the second and third I don't as it took them IOTL from February 2nd to April 16, over ten weeks, to clear out the flanks and then resume the advance across the Oder. You're thus speculating that despite nearly three weeks less time to do the above, and despite having faced much stiffer opposition in doing their ATL advance with requisite effects on logistics and need for replacements, they somehow then advance a much further distance. I don't see that as reasonable at all.

Erm… no? I used your timeline exactly, just applied for the distance. Plus, whether the Soviets would need to bother clearing the flanks is dubious IATL, as the advance terminating around Gneisnau means the IATL Vistula-Oder (Bug-Gneisnau?) Offensive doesn't become disconnected from the concurrently executed East Prussian offensive enough for the Baltic Balcony to form. And the 1st Ukrainian's southern flank would be connected with 4th Ukrainian and protected by the Carpathian mountains instead of exposed to a thrust from Breslau.
 
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Erm… no? I used your timeline exactly, just applied for the distance.

My bad, for some reason I read March-June as two months for some reason; it's been a long day already. if I'm reading you right, you do agree with my general idea that both sides probably meet up along the Elbe in ~August?

Plus, whether the Soviets would need to bother clearing the flanks is dubious IATL, as the advance terminating around Gneisnau means the Vistula-Oder Offensive doesn't become disconnected from the concurrently executed East Prussian offensive enough for the Baltic Balcony to form. And the 1st Ukrainian's southern flank would be anchored on 4th Ukrainian and the Carpathian mountains instead of exposed to a thrust from Breslau.

It's a shortened balcony, certainly, but the fact they faced more German forces in the offensive itself means that they likely have more forces to their rear to make up for it. This also doesn't address the logistical issues that would be present from a harder fought campaign. Another thing to consider is that even IOTL the Germans did manage to attempt things like Operation Solstice and here would it would appear much more threatening given the more exhausted nature of the Soviets and the face they're just "barely" over the Vistula. I think it's better to keep the mutual estimate we have, in that operations don't resume till early June.
 
My bad, for some reason I read March-June as two months for some reason; it's been a long day already. if I'm reading you right, you do agree with my general idea that both sides probably meet up along the Elbe in ~August?

No, but largely because I disagree about your assertions involving Western Europe. The Atlantic Wall in the minds of Anglo-American planners would be much more formidable appearing, regardless of it's actual hollowness. Not to mention the British preference for a Meditteranean Strategy would be reinforced by a failure. So I think Anvil would be upgraded in importance, reinforced, and executed with only modest delays. The Germans would be able to mount a defenses in Central France to stymie the advance as the WAllies push north and then again near the border in northern France after they inevitably break that sometime in the spring or summer. Around 3-4 of the German panzer divisions would also have been left in the west to guard against Allied landings, as was the case up until the Spring of 1944.

Although, perhaps I should observe that I don't completely discount your idea happening, just that I regard it as less likely.

Even leaving that aside, however, given the rate of advance the Soviets managed during Vistula-Oder, they would be on the Elbe by the end of June and there would be practically no German forces left to stop them. Given that the excellent summer weather and good infrastructure of Germany would render their logistical situation far greater then during the OTL while the Anglo-Americans are still almost two months off even according to your schedule, what would be stopping their armored spearheads from pushing on further west?

It's a shortened balcony, certainly, but the fact they faced more German forces in the offensive itself means that they likely have more forces to their rear to make up for it. This also doesn't address the logistical issues that would be present from a harder fought campaign. Another thing to consider is that even IOTL the Germans did manage to attempt things like Operation Solstice and here would it would appear much more threatening given the more exhausted nature of the Soviets and the face they're just "barely" over the Vistula. I think it's better to keep the mutual estimate we have, in that operations don't resume till early June.

Shortened? Try non-existent. The front face of 2nd Belorussian would be right alongside that of 1st Belorussian, instead of 200+ kilometers behind it. I also don't see Solstice being any more threatening then OTL, particularly not with most of the Germans destroyed between the Vistula and the Bug and the lack of any sort of flank to strike. The lack of any flank clearing operations lets the Soviets devote all their attention and resources to bringing up their logistics without the complication of having to support the redeployments to clear the flanks and then bring them back, which sucked up transport that could have been used for supply stockpiling and servicing rail repairs. As for being "barely over the Vistula", that would only be the case for 2nd Belorussian because of the way the Vistula bends to the west once your north of Warsaw and even then it would be solidly across. 1st Ukrainian and Belorussian would have left it well behind. It's also worth considering that if the East Prussian Operations continue as per their OTL pace, 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic Fronts would be free to add their weight come early-May.
 
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No, but largely because I disagree about your assertions involving Western Europe. The Atlantic Wall in the minds of Anglo-American planners would be much more formidable appearing, regardless of it's actual hollowness.

I continue to maintain the only way the landings could be defeated is if Ike cancels June 6th and does June 18th, allowing the Channel Storm to collapse them and then counter-attacks by Rommel to finish them off. In such a case, I think the Western Allies would rightfully recognize the weather was to blame, not German defenses, particularly after aerial reconnaissance makes it clear how hallow they get moving forward.

Not to mention the British preference for a Meditteranean Strategy would be reinforced by a failure. So I think Anvil would be upgraded in importance, reinforced, and executed with only modest delays. The Germans would be able to mount a defenses in Central France to stymie the advance as the WAllies push north and then again near the border in northern France after they inevitably break that sometime in the spring or summer. Around 3-4 of the German panzer divisions would also have been left in the west to guard against Allied landings, as was the case up until the Spring of 1944.

Anvil was actually cancelled due to a lack of resources, which would definitely be exacerbated in this situation. Further, the main impetus to revive the operation, a need for port capacity, is non-existent here.

Although, perhaps I should observe that I don't completely discount your idea happening, just that I regard it as less likely.

Agreed, as between both scenarios I think we both still realize the Western Allies will make it into Germany.

Even leaving that aside, however, given the rate of advance the Soviets managed during Vistula-Oder, they would be on the Elbe by the end of June and there would be practically no German forces left to stop them.

That I disagree with, as we've assumed forces used for Bulge can be used on the Bug in January. Forces used for the Ruhr Pocket and Spring Awakening can be used for the ATL Vistula Oder.

Given that the excellent summer weather and good infrastructure of Germany would render their logistical situation far greater then during the OTL while the Anglo-Americans are still almost two months off even according to your schedule, what would be stopping their armored spearheads from pushing on further west?

Because excellent summer weather and infrastructure targets means the 8th Air Force is going to be dropping bombs like crazy on said infrastructure. My scenario also doesn't imagine they are that behind:

Mid-April/Mid May - Take Northern France, move into Belgium and secure Antwerp
Mid-May/Start of July - Take Holland, open Antwerp, secure bridgeheads over Rhine, begin moving in
July/August - Overrun everything.

Assuming the advance from the ~Vistula to Madgeburg is following the Vistula-Oder, the Soviets are going to need a month to two months at least to rebuild their logistics and clear out German remnants (Berlin will still likely be a fight). By the time the Soviets are logistically prepared to do that, the Allies will have largely overrun the rest of Germany as IOTL they managed to do from March 23rd (Start of Operation Plunder) to April 25th when they met the Soviets on the Elbe.

Shortened? Try non-existent. The front face of 2nd Belorussian would be right alongside that of 1st Belorussian, instead of 200+ kilometers behind it. I also don't see Solstice being any more threatening then OTL, particularly not with most of the Germans destroyed between the Vistula and the Bug and the lack of any sort of flank to strike. The lack of any flank clearing operations lets the Soviets devote all their attention and resources to bringing up their logistics without the complication of having to support the redeployments to clear the flanks and then bring them back, which sucked up transport that could have been used for supply stockpiling and servicing rail repairs. As for being "barely over the Vistula", that would only be the case for 2nd Belorussian because of the way the Vistula bends to the west once your north of Warsaw and even then it would be solidly across. 1st Ukrainian and Belorussian would have left it well behind. It's also worth considering that if the East Prussian Operations continue as per their OTL pace, 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic Fronts would be free to add their weight come early-May.

My understanding is that we're basically assuming roughly 1914 borders as defining the front by March of 1945? As such, an Operation Solstice emerging from West Prussia or East Prussia, no matter how realistic, would still be a concern for the Soviets just as the IOTL was.
 
I continue to maintain the only way the landings could be defeated is if Ike cancels June 6th and does June 18th, allowing the Channel Storm to collapse them and then counter-attacks by Rommel to finish them off. In such a case, I think the Western Allies would rightfully recognize the weather was to blame, not German defenses, particularly after aerial reconnaissance makes it clear how hallow they get moving forward.

And I disagree with that conclusion. The concentration of Germany's good infantry divisions in the west backstopped panzer divisions for a prompt counterattack on the beaches in the first few hours have a realistic chance of driving the WAllies into the sea. WAllied intelligence superiority would certainly detect such preparations as German panzer divisions honing in on the beaches. The bigger problem there frankly is how you get the landings to occur at all under such conditions: Had the Germans moved massive forces into Normady in the months prior to D-Day while also showing clear indications that they had correctly predicted all the planned invasion beaches, the plans for Overlord would certainly have been revised to go wherever the Germans had left uncovered. Aerial reconnaissance was unable to reveal how hollow the Atlantic Wall was before landings, given all the agony and uncertainty the WAllied leadership felt over it's strength (Eisenhower didn't draft that letter of resignation for no reason), so I don't see why that will suddenly change post-landings IATL.

Anvil was actually cancelled due to a lack of resources, which would definitely be exacerbated in this situation. Further, the main impetus to revive the operation, a need for port capacity, is non-existent here.

Yeah it was, although I goofed and was thinking Dragoon which was simply a renamed Anvil. In any case, the leftover resources from Normandy (the assault forces only used a small fraction of WAllied shipping) would certainly be used to reinforce Anvil-Dragoon. And the main impetus will be more to get into France before the end of the year to make up for D-Day's failure, although port capacity will play a role too (since the Southern Ports will be the only ones in WAllied hands).

Agreed, as between both scenarios I think we both still realize the Western Allies will make it into Germany.

Through political agreement, if not military conquest. Although I imagine those occupation zones the Soviets do agree too would be looted clean and sowed with communist cells.

That I disagree with, as we've assumed forces used for Bulge can be used on the Bug in January. Forces used for the Ruhr Pocket and Spring Awakening can be used for the ATL Vistula Oder.

The forces "used" for the Ruhr Pocket likely get demolished as handily as OTL, as they had little combat value (which is why the WAllies destroyed them so easily). I don't see why Spring Awakening wouldn't go as per OTL and the Soviets rapidly annihilated them too. Although speaking of the Bulge and Spring Awakening I should likewise observe we have also assumed in all this that Hitler doesn't do something crazy with the Normandy/Bulge forces in the fall or winter of '44, like try to retake Ukraine or Eastern Hungary, which I doubt would be the case.

Because excellent summer weather and infrastructure targets means the 8th Air Force is going to be dropping bombs like crazy on said infrastructure.

8th Air Force never bothered to bomb the Autobahn for a reason (namely, the Germans didn't get much economic use out of it) and I don't see that reason changing IATL. So the infrastructure will still be there.

Mid-April/Mid May - Take Northern France, move into Belgium and secure Antwerp
Mid-May/Start of July - Take Holland, open Antwerp, secure bridgeheads over Rhine, begin moving in
July/August - Overrun everything.

You said they don't meet the Soviets until late-August. That means they aren't at the Elbe until two months after the Soviets are. That leaves large swathes of West-Central Germany that OTL fell to the WAllies open to being overrun by the Soviets while their still breaking out of the bridgeheads over the Rhine.

Assuming the advance from the ~Vistula to Madgeburg is following the Vistula-Oder, the Soviets are going to need a month to two months at least to rebuild their logistics and clear out German remnants (Berlin will still likely be a fight). By the time the Soviets are logistically prepared to do that, the Allies will have largely overrun the rest of Germany as IOTL they managed to do from March 23rd (Start of Operation Plunder) to April 25th when they met the Soviets on the Elbe.

Except that is based on the assumption there are any further forces west of Berlin to face the Soviets, which is unlikely. Whatever German forces are left will be facing the WAllies by this point. Stretched logistics only matter if there's an enemy in front of you. For the Soviets, it'll basically be more of a joyride at that point.

My understanding is that we're basically assuming roughly 1914 borders as defining the front by March of 1945? As such, an Operation Solstice emerging from West Prussia or East Prussia, no matter how realistic, would still be a concern for the Soviets just as the IOTL was.

Both West and East Prussia will be in Soviet hands, as will Galicia and part of Silesia. The jump-off points for 2nd Belorussian has barely changed and 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic haven't changed at all, so there is no reason to suppose those operations turn out differently. It's Pomerania and the rest of Silesia which are still in German hands IATL. I drew a map a few hours back...

EDIT:... which doesn't seem to be popping up. Does AH.com not like imgur now?
 
And I disagree with that conclusion. The concentration of Germany's good infantry divisions in the west backstopped panzer divisions for a prompt counterattack on the beaches in the first few hours have a realistic chance of driving the WAllies into the sea. WAllied intelligence superiority would certainly detect such preparations as German panzer divisions honing in on the beaches. The bigger problem there frankly is how you get the landings to occur at all under such conditions: Had the Germans moved massive forces into Normady in the months prior to D-Day while also showing clear indications that they had correctly predicted all the planned invasion beaches, the plans for Overlord would certainly have been revised to go wherever the Germans had left uncovered. Aerial reconnaissance was unable to reveal how hollow the Atlantic Wall was before landings, given all the agony and uncertainty the WAllied leadership felt over it's strength (Eisenhower didn't draft that letter of resignation for no reason), so I don't see why that will suddenly change post-landings IATL.

I think we will have to agree to disagree on this issue, especially given the "how" is irrelevant to the thread. As for the Atlantic Wall, we both envision the beach defenses not stopping the offensive but the Panzer Divisions (Heavily aided by the Weather in my case). Once it becomes clear the Germans have significantly drawn down Panzer divisions in the West, the Western Allies will know they have an opening.

Yeah it was, although I goofed and was thinking Dragoon which was simply a renamed Anvil. In any case, the leftover resources from Normandy (the assault forces only used a small fraction of WAllied shipping) would certainly be used to reinforce Anvil-Dragoon. And the main impetus will be more to get into France before the end of the year to make up for D-Day's failure, although port capacity will play a role too (since the Southern Ports will be the only ones in WAllied hands).

Overlord sucked up so many resources, Anvil was cancelled as a result while Dragoon only became possible over two months later. Given the equipment losses to be expected for a failed offensive, I doubt they will have the ability to do and wouldn't be eager to get into another Italy after such a loss. I can, however, see minor operations taking place; minor landings along the Yugoslav coast to aid the partisans and endanger the resource shipments, same for the Aegean islands wit regards to Romanian oil and pressuring Bulgaria.

Now that I think about it, that leads to some interesting thoughts. IOTL the destruction of German forces in Romania led to the disintegration of the Balkan Front and allowed the Brits to much more easily move into Greece. Presuming the rupture in Romania occurs and the Anglo-Americans have seized Aegean Islands in, say, July or August, it might be entirely possible for Bulgaria to end up neutral in the Cold War or even Western--aligned as the Western Allies could be getting forces on scene in Bulgaria at the same time or even sooner than the Soviets.

Through political agreement, if not military conquest. Although I imagine those occupation zones the Soviets do agree too would be looted clean and sowed with communist cells.

So basically IOTL. The Soviets got a lot of industrial goods from the Western zones, as you already know.

The forces "used" for the Ruhr Pocket likely get demolished as handily as OTL, as they had little combat value (which is why the WAllies destroyed them so easily). I don't see why Spring Awakening wouldn't go as per OTL and the Soviets rapidly annihilated them too. Although speaking of the Bulge and Spring Awakening I should likewise observe we have also assumed in all this that Hitler doesn't do something crazy with the Normandy/Bulge forces in the fall or winter of '44, like try to retake Ukraine or Eastern Hungary, which I doubt would be the case

The Ruhr Pocket forces resisted for nearly two weeks despite only 75,000 being armed and managed to inflict 10,000 casualties. Given we've avoided things like the Luttich Offensive and Falaise Gap as well as an improved industrial picture for Germany going into 1945, there would be a lot more veterans to fill out such units and a lot more equipment to go around.

8th Air Force never bothered to bomb the Autobahn for a reason (namely, the Germans didn't get much economic use out of it) and I don't see that reason changing IATL. So the infrastructure will still be there.

If it's being used extensively by the Germans as a logistics train or the Anglo-Americans are concerned about the Soviets overrunning more of Germany by using it, I can definitely see that changing. We also need to recall that roadways are not as important as rail networks at this time for logistics, although they do aid the rapid nature of movements.

You said they don't meet the Soviets until late-August. That means they aren't at the Elbe until two months after the Soviets are. That leaves large swathes of West-Central Germany that OTL fell to the WAllies open to being overrun by the Soviets while their still breaking out of the bridgeheads over the Rhine.

My assumption was both sides would be in Germany by August and then meet in late August because they Germans resistance would be more effective to extend it out to then; with this prediction, I was rolling with your assumption they'd collapse slightly faster. As for the Soviets, if they reach the Elbe at the start of the July and we're using Vistula-Oder as the logistical baseline, it's going to be a month to two months to build back up the logistics to do such an offensive. Given that the Western Allies managed to do Operation Plunder and reach the Elbe in a month, by the time the Soviets have the logistics to resume the advance most of Germany will have already been taken.

Except that is based on the assumption there are any further forces west of Berlin to face the Soviets, which is unlikely. Whatever German forces are left will be facing the WAllies by this point. Stretched logistics only matter if there's an enemy in front of you. For the Soviets, it'll basically be more of a joyride at that point.

Stretched logistics always matter because if you don't have gas or rations, your troops aren't going anywhere. If we're also assuming the Germans have militarily collapsed at this stage, I see no reason to assume the situation would not be the same on both fronts, especially after the Germans reduced forces in the West since June of '44.

Both West and East Prussia will be in Soviet hands, as will Galicia and part of Silesia. The jump-off points for 2nd Belorussian has barely changed and 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic haven't changed at all, so there is no reason to suppose those operations turn out differently. It's Pomerania and the rest of Silesia which are still in German hands IATL. I drew a map a few hours back...

If we're using Vistula Oder as the baseline, they won't be in the case of West Prussia at the least because that offensive failed to achieve it IOTL. If we're presuming they do the East Prussia offensive as part of the general offensive, then the rest time needed before doing the final major push will likely be lengthened.

EDIT:... which doesn't seem to be popping up. Does AH.com not like imgur now?

Try imgbox, it's what I use.
 
Overlord sucked up so many resources, Anvil was cancelled as a result while Dragoon only became possible over two months later. Given the equipment losses to be expected for a failed offensive, I doubt they will have the ability to do and wouldn't be eager to get into another Italy after such a loss.

Equipment losses would have been but a tiny fraction of the overall whole, being as they were concentrated among the assault forces, which made up a tiny fraction of the overall WAllied landing force. The WAllies would have a plethora of resources in the aftermath of a failed Overlord, more then enough for ATL's Anvil-Dragoon. The main delay is moving them into position.

Now that I think about it, that leads to some interesting thoughts. IOTL the destruction of German forces in Romania led to the disintegration of the Balkan Front and allowed the Brits to much more easily move into Greece. Presuming the rupture in Romania occurs and the Anglo-Americans have seized Aegean Islands in, say, July or August, it might be entirely possible for Bulgaria to end up neutral in the Cold War or even Western--aligned as the Western Allies could be getting forces on scene in Bulgaria at the same time or even sooner than the Soviets.

I don't see how they could manage that though. The British were moving as fast as they could and the Americans would have none of it.

So basically IOTL. The Soviets got a lot of industrial goods from the Western zones, as you already know.

Well, yes. The difference here is that IOTL the Soviets got a set amount, whereas IATL they basically get everything that isn't nailed down and on fire.

The Ruhr Pocket forces resisted for nearly two weeks despite only 75,000 being armed and managed to inflict 10,000 casualties.

The Soviets had crushed much more fearsome pockets in a fraction of the time in 1944. It lasting so long can be attributed more to WAllied caution then anything about the pocket.

Given we've avoided things like the Luttich Offensive and Falaise Gap as well as an improved industrial picture for Germany going into 1945, there would be a lot more veterans to fill out such units and a lot more equipment to go around.

German industrial picture is going to be pretty much as awful going into 1945 as it was IOTL, as that was dictated by the raw material constraints and overmobilization before it was dictated by air bombardment (the winter of '44/'45 actually saw a decline in bombs dropped as the weather hampered air power, yet German production still radically fell in January-February 1945). You can probably substitute foolhardy eastern offensives for stuff like the Luttich Offensive and Falaise Gap.

If it's being used extensively by the Germans as a logistics train or the Anglo-Americans are concerned about the Soviets overrunning more of Germany by using it, I can definitely see that changing. We also need to recall that roadways are not as important as rail networks at this time for logistics, although they do aid the rapid nature of movements.

It wasn't, which was why the WAllies ignored it. By the time they realize the Soviets are over running most of Germany by using it, it'll be a bit late in the day. Soviet rail lines were running fine and would handily be up to the Oder by early-July, based on the rate they were being extended westward during Vistula-Oder and afterwards. The Soviets were putting bombed out rail bridges that were supposed to take a month to repair back into service in as little as a week.

My assumption was both sides would be in Germany by August and then meet in late August because they Germans resistance would be more effective to extend it out to then; with this prediction, I was rolling with your assumption they'd collapse slightly faster. As for the Soviets, if they reach the Elbe at the start of the July and we're using Vistula-Oder as the logistical baseline, it's going to be a month to two months to build back up the logistics to do such an offensive. Given that the Western Allies managed to do Operation Plunder and reach the Elbe in a month, by the time the Soviets have the logistics to resume the advance most of Germany will have already been taken.

Given the weakness of German resistance post Bug-Gneisanau, the Soviets are going to be in Germany before the end of June is out, not as late as August. All of the German savings will have already been wiped out by then by the time of the Gneisanau-? offensive.

Stretched logistics always matter because if you don't have gas or rations, your troops aren't going anywhere.

In the absence of enemy resistance, gas and rations can be acquired from the locals.

If we're using Vistula Oder as the baseline, they won't be in the case of West Prussia at the least because that offensive failed to achieve it IOTL. If we're presuming they do the East Prussia offensive as part of the general offensive, then the rest time needed before doing the final major push will likely be lengthened.

Erm… no it didn't? The Soviets seized East Prussia IOTL and more then half of West Prussia in the initial thrust. It was Pomerania that the IOTL offensive failed to take at all, which formed the Baltic Balcony, and which the Soviets had to spend February/March cleaning up, but that's much further west. Your last assumption doesn't make any sense: the Soviets did the Prussian offensive concurrently with the Vistula-Oder offensive IOTL and it didn't extend the rest time at all. I don't see why that would be different at all IATL.

Try imgbox, it's what I use.

It's working now. I assumed the additional German forces shifted eastward in August '44 were also sent against and imposed a similar delay upon 1st Ukrainian as it did upon 1st Belorussian, because otherwise the Germans counter-attacking against 1st Belorussian Front in that time would have had their southern flank lanced by the 1st Ukrainian and the Soviets would then be starting from their OTL positions. I'mma update with the assumed IATL start positions in a bit.

EDIT: rough IATL start positions in deep red.

wYlGLTw.jpg
 
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There is absolutely no way a German counterattack drives Overlord back into the sea. At Salerno the Germans were ready in much better defensive terrain than the Normandy beaches against a weaker allied force with a stronger reserve. The allies lacked any parachute operations, preliminary bombardment, or air assault. The Germans still failed to drive them back into the ocean because once you enter the range of the beachheads you are also in range of the shore bombardment force. While the initial defensive forces have some protection due to fortifications and concealment, a panzer force trying to attack has neither. The supporting destroyers, cruisers, and battleships would shred any counterattacking force with impunity just as they did at Salerno. The allies were willing and able to absorb massive losses if it meant successfully gaining their foothold in France.

Weather might be able to severely disrupt the invasion. The allies had several back up plans. I doubt they would have waited a year to try again. More likely they would have launched a bigger invasion of Southern France or a landing in the Netherlands.
 
There is absolutely no way a German counterattack drives Overlord back into the sea. At Salerno the Germans were ready in much better defensive terrain than the Normandy beaches against a weaker allied force with a stronger reserve.

And at Salerno, the Germans almost managed to drive the Americans into the sea. Citino, in describing the breakthrough of German panzers through the German lines, notes it was a freak accident of the terrain that gave the Americans time to bring their firepower to bear before they could be overrun. He notes that by evening of September 12th, the Germans had cracked the American line and were in the clear with a beeline to the American artillery positions and headquarters on the beach:

"The bridgehead hung in the balance at this point, and it might well have fallen were it not for a single humble feature of the terrain: a burned bridge over the Calore River. It halted what had been a fullbore drive of the 29th Panzergrenadier Division, and there are at least a few witnesses who claimed to have seen German commanders dismounting from their tanks and consulting their maps at this point. There are other ways over the Calore, but the pause lasted just long enough to give US gunners time to open up and pour on destructive fire." - TheWehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943, Pg 261

Had that bridge not been burned, the German tanks and panzergrenadiers could have overrun the 5th Army's Headquarters (which was right next to the artillery gunline) before the American arty and warships could have zeroed in on them. At that point, if the American warships had chosen to fire anyways, they would have been shelling their own troops as well as the Germans and the Americans would have basically wiped out by their own beachhead with their own firepower. As Mark Clark later wrote of the incident: "It was obvious that we had barely escaped disaster." The worry of counter-attacking panzer divisions suddenly overrunning the beachhead before the supporting firepower could be brought to bear against them was why the British and Americans sought to ensure that the bulk of German panzers were as far away from the beaches as they could be before they landed.
 
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And that counterattack consisted of six crack German divisions thrown against a smaller force than participated in the D-Day landing. The Germans didn't have such a force available in Normandy. The 21st Panzer division attempting a counterattack wouldn't be the equivalent of the action on the 12th. Instead it would resemble the attack by the 16th panzer division which was quickly broken up. Also Citino claims the Germans almost scored a big win for every action in 1943 against the American Army (see his description of the numerous chances the Germans had to break the US army in North Africa). His writing is generally good but as shown by his addition of fictional conversations among the German high command does sacrifice history for a good read. I also get worried any time a historian uses an argument based around "Prussian Military Tradition," especially when, as Citino does, they claim the Germans sought out fights where they were outnumbered.
 
And that counterattack consisted of six crack German divisions thrown against a smaller force than participated in the D-Day landing. The Germans didn't have such a force available in Normandy. The 21st Panzer division attempting a counterattack wouldn't be the equivalent of the action on the 12th.

Six crack divisions is something of an exaggeration. The fallschirmjager divisions at this point in the war weren't much better then regular infantry. In any case, yes the Germans didn't have all their potential forces at Normandy. That's why I said the following:

"The concentration of Germany's good infantry divisions in the west backstopped panzer divisions for a prompt counterattack on the beaches in the first few hours have a realistic chance of driving the WAllies into the sea. WAllied intelligence superiority would certainly detect such preparations as German panzer divisions honing in on the beaches. The bigger problem there frankly is how you get the landings to occur at all under such conditions: Had the Germans moved massive forces into Normandy in the months prior to D-Day while also showing clear indications that they had correctly predicted all the planned invasion beaches, the plans for Overlord would certainly have been revised to go wherever the Germans had left uncovered."

And sure... the Anglo-American forces coming to Normandy were stronger. But then so are the forces the Germans could field if they hypothetically identified the assault beaches and concentrated them there. The Germans had 30 divisions in the west classified as offensive capable, 5 times what they had at Salerno, whereas the Anglo-American landing forces, both sea and air, was only slightly stronger then three times that. The problem for the Germans, and any alt-historian who wants to see D-Day fail by force of arms, is how the Germans are supposed to be able to concentrate their forces without the Anglo-Americans picking up on it and changing their plans.

Instead it would resemble the attack by the 16th panzer division which was quickly broken up. Also Citino claims the Germans almost scored a big win for every action in 1943 against the American Army (see his description of the numerous chances the Germans had to break the US army in North Africa).

I only see him giving the Germans one chance to score a big win in North Africa and even he does not go so far as to say it would be enough to break the American army as opposed to merely setting it back. While I do take issue with some of Citino's historicity at times, I see no case in this particular instance to doubt the possibility of that here.

I also get worried any time a historian uses an argument based around "Prussian Military Tradition," especially when, as Citino does, they claim the Germans sought out fights where they were outnumbered.

He never claims such. Citino does argue that the Germans way of war ignored the odds but that is not the same thing as seeking out fights where one is outnumbered.
 
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Sorry that was supposed to be crack "in comparison to what they had in Normandy."

Yes if the Germans had concentrated prior to the invasion that completely changes the situation. I agree the allies might have decided to land elsewhere as they have the mobility the Germans lack but also if those units were already "in range" of the beaches they would have suffered from airstrikes and bombardment. Considering the accounts of German units moving in the open and the allied air power over France prior to the invasion I doubt Germany could even manage to achieve such a mass concentration. Admittedly even half that gives them a large force but again Salerno saw no preparatory airstrikes or bombardment.

While it has been a while since I read Citino and I don't have my copy handy a quick google search for scholarly reviews confirms that "essentially he is talking about a tradition that did not know when to quit, one that emphasized mobile warfare, that could not adapt as easily to defense, but most importantly one that found war with a numerically superior enemy a comfortable challenge rather than a reason to seek a political end to a conflict."
 
Wouldn't Bavaria be under russian controll?
It's a question. The German command of Italy in early May 45 cooperated with allies in surrender of German forces. It is possible that rather than seeing Soviets occupying Bavaria, Germans in northern Italy would let allies cross the Alpes to be in Bavaria first.
 
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