Czech not giving in in 1938?

[Eurofed]

I think we need a PoD with the left not getting in power in France. With Laval still running around trying to build a coalition against Germany, neither Britain nor France might be willing to sell out the Czechs. Perhaps no Laval- Hoare pact (would probably make Franco- Italian relations slightly worse, but at this point it would be no secret that Mussolini has lost interest in containing Germany).

Again, if the Entente drops appeasement at Munich, there won't be any war since German generals put a gun to Hitler's neck as soon as he starts making belligerant rumors.

Why people have to try forcibly defaulting any conceivable alt-WWII scenario to the OTL anti-German screw-up or worse, regardless of actual circumstances ? Despite what some may think, the supreme concern of the universe is not to screw Nazi Germany even if man-eating demons invade the Earth.

 

[Zaius]

France taking a defiant anti-German stance would require Britain taking that attitude.

Or a French leadership sufficiently determined to fight even without British support. Which would indeed require a PoD well before Munich.

 

[I Blame Communism]

But Germany would have the benevolent neutrality of Britain and France, and full access to world markets.

What exactly is "benevolent neutrality"? One trusts it does not include, say, France giving Germany the majority of all civilian motor-transport and damn the consequences. That's what happened. The milk turned to cheese in the barns because of the Blitzkrieg on the eastern front.

And that is only one example. Take for another Germany's exploitation of the coal reserves of foreign countries.

What exactly is a cash-strapped, war-mobilised economy going to give in exchange for anything it will supposedly receive? And what of the clear American hostility to German ambitions?

ITTL, Hitler has done absolutely nothing to alienate the West yet, he's fighting because the Czech refused an internationally-sanctioned, sensible solution to a national-self-determination dispute, and the Soviets are exploiting the situation to make another grab for Poland. I do expect a lot of sympathy for Germany in London.

Well, he's built up a vast military machine and repeatedly refused offers to put the brakes on re-armament and return to economic normality, for a start. You'd think he'd have had to do something for us to be issuing gasmasks to the civilian population, and so he had.

From Chamberlain's point of view, an indecisive German-Soviet war is broadly a good thing. So what you mean is that Chamberlain will not actually do anything against Germany. This is different from 'London' - where Churchill and Eden and Clem live - being actively 'sympathetic'.

And what good did sympathy ever do anyone?

And they won't have any Land-Lease.

They will have the vast reserves of manpower, agricultural land, and industrial capacity of the Ukraine and the other regions that were rapidly occupied.

The Germans, however, do not have their colonial empire and its reservoires of slave-labour, whose importance you seem determined to ignore. Do you know how the Germans mobilised all those men? Making a few million press-ganged Ukrainian girls make the weapons, that's how.

And the Red Army was much more of a mess in 1938-39 than in 1941, when serious action had been taken to correct the flaws revealed by the Winter War.

The Red Army is also not at the wrong end of the equipment cycle. The great purge has passed its zenith and the lesser one not begun.

There is no denying, however, that the Red Army was not very good. I return to my essential point: the German army is less experiences, more battered, less well-armed...

While the Poles are fighting the war they long prepared for.

The Poles can do the best they can - so I'm sure they will - and the profound imbalance of numbers and industry will tell. For the duration that Germany has its hands full with the Czechs, it's not as though one can actually imagine the Poles attacking, unless they're terribly overconfident.

Which still leaves Germany with freedom to own and Germanise Czechia as they wish, an eager client Poland, and a reputation as the anti-Soviet bastion in the eyes of the West. Not too bad.

'Eager'? Ay, right.

(Some grammarians say there is no such thing as the double-positive analogous to the double-negative. To this I say ay, right.)

But in any case this involves the replacement of Hitler with somebody whose goals and priorities are completely different. It was not Hitler's "dream" to do anything less than carve out the vast European colonial empire that would enable Germany to match the standards of living and economies of scale of the United States. To do what the west wanted and what a stalemated war with the Untermensch implies - normalise the economy, give re-armament a defined end, and buddy up to the Entente - was just a longer way of inviting colonisation by American Jewish capital and race-death.

Germany had the chance to take that path, several times. The right-wing Entente governments were keen on the idea. If Hitler refused it, he had his reasons.

Why people have to try forcibly defaulting any conceivable alt-WWII scenario to the OTL anti-German gangbang or worse, regardless of actual circumstances ?

I find it hilarious that when Germany decides to make war on the majority of the world's industrial strength, this is an "anti-German gang-bang".

 

[I Blame Communism]

Nothing really changed in the British political landscape till Hitler invaded Czechia.

Yes, Hitler invading Wee Czechia - that is, precisely what you propose he should now do! - alienated a lot of people from appeasement. But the jubilation after Munich was arranged to a large extent by Chamberlain, who was an effective PR man and kept the BBC on a tight leash. Shortly afterwards, people were saying "Right, so... what did the man do?". Chamberlain commemorative mugs went unsold in the shops. Daladier, for his part, was dreadfully surprised to find that the crowd who greeted him back to France were cheering.

It didn't take Munich to make Eden leave the ship.

A fringe bunch of warmongers with very little following till March 15, 1939.

Hohohohohohohohohohohoho! *slapping of thighs*

That you're looking at the world through a distorting mirror has seldom been less obvious. That the head of the opposition and the third party opposed Munich makes the suggestion of a "fringe" perfectly absurd, but that you can in all seriousness attack Churchill, Eden, and Attlee as "war-mongers" because they were suspicious of Hitler is as hilarious as it is horrifying.

Seriously, though. Are you off your nut?

I'd like a straight a straight answer to the following question: was it morally wrong to oppose the Nazis in making was on a smaller country thanks to a manufactured crisis for the purpose of conquering it and enslaving its people?

Only after German invasion of Czechia showed Hitler to be deeply untrustworthy and put the lie to the widespread expectation that his foreign policy was all about the fulfillment of sensible German irredentist claims.

We wanted his foreign policy to be about this, and we wanted it to be done neatly and peacefully. That doesn't mean we were blind to any other possibility. We had begun war-measures in 1938. We were clearly able to confront the possibility of a fight.

True, but there is absolutely no evidence that 1938-39 France had any willingness to do it, much less without British support and assent.

Sure. But it is an element that must figure in everybody's calculations.

 

[Zaius]

I have difficulty imagining Soviet involvment if Czechoslovakia defies Munich and war between it and Germany ensues. Would the cautious Stalin have been bold enough to attack Poland in such a situation, with the Red Army of 1938? The Polish Army had indeed been preparing for just such a conflict. And attacking would have had a high probability of bringing Romania and Germany (albeit weakened due to the invasion of Czechoslovakia) into the conflict.

 

[Eurofed]

What exactly is "benevolent neutrality"? One trusts it does not include, say, France giving Germany the majority of all civilian motor-transport and damn the consequences. That's what happened. The milk turned to cheese in the barns because of the Blitzkrieg on the eastern front.

Admittedly not, but then Germany won't have to make any build-up oriented against Britain. To make an example, all those u-boats won't need to be built, and air flak shall need much less attention.

What exactly is a cash-strapped, war-mobilised economy going to give in exchange for anything it will supposedly receive?

There is a huge difference between suffering a blockade and not being able to buy everything you need.

And what of the clear American hostility to German ambitions?

The usual assumption that FDR is a dictator or political god and his personal anti-fascist foibles shall always be shared by the Congress, American elites, and US public opinion at large, still deeply isolationist in 1938, regardless of circumstances.

Well, he's built up a vast military machine and repeatedly refused offers to put the brakes on re-armament and return to economic normality, for a start.

The war with the Soviets retroactively justifies that. Those weapons get put to an use which the Entente may sympathize or at least be confortable with.

From Chamberlain's point of view, an indecisive German-Soviet war is broadly a good thing. So what you mean is that Chamberlain will not actually do anything against Germany.

And Chamberlain's approach remains the British foreign policy.

They will have the vast reserves of manpower, agricultural land, and industrial capacity of the Ukraine and the other regions that were rapidly occupied.

True.

The Germans, however, do not have their colonial empire and its reservoires of slave-labour, whose importance you seem determined to ignore.

IMO at the very least it balances out with no blockade and no war with the West.

The Poles can do the best they can - so I'm sure they will - and the profound imbalance of numbers and industry will tell. For the duration that Germany has its hands full with the Czechs, it's not as though one can actually imagine the Poles attacking, unless they're terribly overconfident.

True, but the Poles can defend. Despite climactic differences, it may easily turn out in the Winter War, writ large.

'Eager'? Ay, right.

Ok, willing client.

But in any case this involves the replacement of Hitler with somebody whose goals and priorities are completely different. It was not Hitler's "dream" to do anything less than carve out the vast European colonial empire that would enable Germany to match the standards of living and economies of scale of the United States. To do what the west wanted and what a stalemated war with the Untermensch implies - normalise the economy, give re-armament a defined end, and buddy up to the Entente - was just a longer way of inviting colonisation by American Jewish capital and race-death.

Not Hitler's long-term geopolitical Lebensraum dream, his medium-term strategic dream of a solo German-Soviet war with the West neutral.

I find it hilarious that when Germany decides to make war on the majority of the world's industrial strength, this is an "anti-German gang-bang".

Pileup, if you prefer, regardless of whom caused it.

 

[Eurofed]

Yes, Hitler invading Wee Czechia - that is, precisely what you propose he should now do! - alienated a lot of people from appeasement.

Circumstances were radically different. IOTL, he was blatantly tearing up the Munich Agreement. ITTL, he's apparently making war as a last resort to bring Sudetenland Germans home because stubborn Czechs refuse a sensible national-self determination solution to the dispute that the non-Communist great powers agreed upon.

But the jubilation after Munich was arranged to a large extent by Chamberlain, who was an effective PR man and kept the BBC on a tight leash. Shortly afterwards, people were saying "Right, so... what did the man do?". Chamberlain commemorative mugs went unsold in the shops. Daladier, for his part, was dreadfully surprised to find that the crowd who greeted him back to France were cheering.

None the less, the crowds did cheer, and they certainly were not coerced into it.

That you're looking at the world through a distorting mirror has seldom been less obvious.

I'm simply annoyed by the attitude of some board members that in any conceivable WWII scenario, all non-Nazi actors should be expected to act like they had been just handed a 1945 history book by a time-traveler.

The OP proposed a scenario that obviously requires a PoD after the Munich Agreement, indirectly upholds appeasement, and one way or another most likely leads to a German-Soviet war with a neutral Entente and quite possibly the interesting twist of an Axis Poland. And people cheerfully talk about starting 'our' WWII in 1938 with Czechoslovakia in the shoes of Poland (perhaps the most clichè Alliedwank scenario ever) which is a wholly different scenario, requires an anti-appeasement PoD well before Munich, and is actualy quite unlikely since a defiant Entente in 1935-38 in all likelihood causes a swift domestic collapse of the Nazi regime.

That the head of the opposition and the third party opposed Munich makes the suggestion of a "fringe" perfectly absurd, but that you can in all seriousness attack Churchill, Eden, and Attlee as "war-mongers" because they were suspicious of Hitler is as hilarious as it is horrifying.

Admittedly I was oblivious of Attlee. I was arguing from a PoV that ignores hindsight.

Personally I have no problem whatsoever with regarding a slightly more defiant Entente pushing the Heer to overthrow Hitler at Munich as a near optimal solution to the Nazi problem (overall, I deem the optimal realistic solution to the Nazi problem an Heer coup just after Maurice Bavaud successfully guns down Hitler in November 1938 and the other Nazi bigwigs tear each other apart in the succession struggle).

I'd like a straight a straight answer to the following question: was it morally wrong to oppose the Nazis in making was on a smaller country thanks to a manufactured crisis for the purpose of conquering it and enslaving its people?

It depends on what one means by "enslaving". If you mean the serf-like harsh colonial exploitation that the Nazi actually meant, even taking actual democide off the table, of course not. And being ruled by a totalitarian regime is scarcely a good thing.

If you mean simple annexation and forced cultural assimilation of Czechia by an hypothetical sane Germany, you already know my opinion about the issue. Anything that reduces Balkanization short of democide, long-term colonial inequality and exploitation, totalitarian oppression, or large-scale cultural stagnation (and hypothetical harmful conditions of similar severity I may be oblivious of) is a good thing; if war, conquest, and temporary political coercion need be a tool to bring the world any closer to the utopian end-goal of political unity of mankind, so be it and bring the popcorn. I cheer for the Alexanders, Caesars, and Napoleons of (alt-)history and pity or despise the Vercingetorixes, Arminiuses, and Boudicas as misguided fools at best.

We wanted his foreign policy to be about this, and we wanted it to be done neatly and peacefully. That doesn't mean we were blind to any other possibility. We had begun war-measures in 1938. We were clearly able to confront the possibility of a fight.

Sure, sure. No contention about that. But my point is that ITTL hindsight actually vindicates appeasement and Chamberlain's foreign policy.

Sure. But it is an element that must figure in everybody's calculations.

Are you arguing that mistaken expectations of this sort in Prague might be the cause for the defiance of Czechoslovakia, even without actual Soviet guarantees of support ? Possible, but I doubt it.

 

[MSZ]

I don't know where this attitude that Poland would invade Czechoslovakia for a piece of it's territory comes from. OTL Poland moved into Teshen on October 3 - 2 days after it was surrendered to Germany. So a german-polish alliance seems very unlikely to me.

If the Czechs resisted, both the Polish and French stance would depend on how well the war would go for the germans. Once the war starts, Poland and France would propably at least partly mobilise, and if the Czechs put up a strong resistance (which i doubt though), it's likely that calls for aiding the Czechs in their fight would appear in both France and Poland. With the German Army still weak Nazi Germany would propably fall in a few weeks after the entante gets involved.

 

[Marko]

It seams that people forget that though Little Entante was formed with aim of preventing Hungarian expansionism and Habsburg restoration they wouldn't be co-operative on other questions.

People in Yugoslavia were very disturbed by the Anschluss and the fact a considerable number of south slavs came under Nazi-Germany was accepted with trepidations. After all there is a seizable German population in Yugoslavia and there were worries before Munchen that Germans might push Yugoslavia to offer local germans special rights and forms of Authonomy. Croats and Serbs (and to extent Slovenians) may act like cats and dogs but a threat of foreign invasion always in the end unites them. Should Czechs decide to resist there is a high likely hood that Cvetković-Maček agreement is reached much sooner and the Yugoslavia stands with Czechoslovakia under pretext of liberating their "blood-brothers" in Austria from an opressive German goverment.

This leaves the reactions of Hungary, Italy and Romania open. Though I could see Czechoslovakia resisting beeing the spark that would ignite "the Great (Central) European War".

Cheers

 

[yourworstnightmare]

Again, if the Entente drops appeasement at Munich, there won't be any war since German generals put a gun to Hitler's neck as soon as he starts making belligerant rumors.

Why people have to try forcibly defaulting any conceivable alt-WWII scenario to the OTL anti-German screw-up or worse, regardless of actual circumstances ? Despite what some may think, the supreme concern of the universe is not to screw Nazi Germany even if man-eating demons invade the Earth.

I agree, if France was still under an anti- German right wing government Hitler would be much more cautious. Especially if Anschluss have happened and France wages a diplomatic war against Germany as the consequence (Anschluss could happen since the Abyssinian war and the Spanish Civil War would probably turn Mussolini to Hitler's camp as OTL). Heck there might not even be a Munich if the word from the Entente and especially France is very hostile. Hitler's advisors would tell him it's not the right time. (And if Hitler tried it anyways he would probably drop the question after a failed Munich).

 

[ivanotter]

The thing is, with 36+ divisions and a good weapons base, Czech was not so defenceles, really.

US: FDR: I am not sure whether he was particular anti-nazi or anti-german. I don't think he cared too much, except abut the 10+ million german ancestry voters he had to consider.

The case is: could Czech have stood up to germany at that time on its own? not sure, but not voting it out either.

Beck in Poland was happy with getting a slice of the action, but it comitted him the agressors more than to the democracies.

Didn't Stalin have more than enough on his plate at that time? when did Stalin actually start to realise that a war with Hitler would come at some point in time? Despite all the rhetoric, Hitler was not in a position to do anything about Russia and after all, Rapallo had been a success.

I don't think there was any desire in France or UK for supporting anything in 1938. Later, yes.

Comments?

Ivan

 

[abc123]

It seams that people forget that though Little Entante was formed with aim of preventing Hungarian expansionism and Habsburg restoration they wouldn't be co-operative on other questions.

People in Yugoslavia were very disturbed by the Anschluss and the fact a considerable number of south slavs came under Nazi-Germany was accepted with trepidations. After all there is a seizable German population in Yugoslavia and there were worries before Munchen that Germans might push Yugoslavia to offer local germans special rights and forms of Authonomy. Croats and Serbs (and to extent Slovenians) may act like cats and dogs but a threat of foreign invasion always in the end unites them. Should Czechs decide to resist there is a high likely hood that Cvetković-Maček agreement is reached much sooner and the Yugoslavia stands with Czechoslovakia under pretext of liberating their "blood-brothers" in Austria from an opressive German goverment.

This leaves the reactions of Hungary, Italy and Romania open. Though I could see Czechoslovakia resisting beeing the spark that would ignite "the Great (Central) European War".

Cheers

Sorry, but I don't see anything short than full blown Italian ivasion of Yugoslavia that could make Croats and Slovenes in 1938 to fight for Yugoslavia.

 

[Marko]

Sorry, but I don't see anything short than full blown Italian ivasion of Yugoslavia that could make Croats and Slovenes in 1938 to fight for Yugoslavia.

Not fighting for Yugoslavia but fighting for Slovenians and Croats now under Nazi rule.

 

[yourworstnightmare]

Not fighting for Yugoslavia but fighting for Slovenians and Croats now under Nazi rule.

Correct, while Slovenians and Croats sure as hell didn't like being a part of Yugoslavia there was one thing they liked even less, being a part of another foreign nation.

 

[Eurofed]

Sorry, but I don't see anything short than full blown Italian ivasion of Yugoslavia that could make Croats and Slovenes in 1938 to fight for Yugoslavia.

In all likelihood, not even then since they did not fight for Yugoslavia when the Axis invaded it in 1941.

 

[I Blame Communism]

I have difficulty imagining Soviet involvment if Czechoslovakia defies Munich and war between it and Germany ensues. Would the cautious Stalin have been bold enough to attack Poland in such a situation, with the Red Army of 1938? The Polish Army had indeed been preparing for just such a conflict. And attacking would have had a high probability of bringing Romania and Germany (albeit weakened due to the invasion of Czechoslovakia) into the conflict.

Romania was actually sitting anxiously on the fence here: they were bound to Czechoslovakia by the anti-Hungarian pact, they were not friendly to Germany (if a great-power ally was necessary they would prefer it be us), and so IIRC they gave the Soviets permission for aircraft overflies. I don't see why they should feel compelled to attack the USSR. Their alignment with Poland was defensive in nature, and they had good reason to worry since the USSR had never properly renounced Besserabia.

But yes, it wouldn't be in line with anyone's policy: the potential costs of a war with Poland, which won't be a walkover, and Germany, with an, ahem, 'unsympathetic' Entente, are high from the point of view of someone like Stalin. But he took a few gambles in his time.

IOTL, the Soviets warned Poland not to try anything or the non-aggression pact would be torn up. This was an empty buff, but supposing someone took it the wrong way. "Nervous local officers" and similar handwaves. Stupider things have happened.

Not the most likely contingency, but neither is CZS deciding to Rage, Rage Against the Dying of the Light anyway.

 

[KACKO]

Slovaks cannot be relied upon to fight for Czechoslovakia, they were on the brink of secession and switching to the side of Germany (and if they weren't, Hungary can be expected to jump in to grab in, which is part of the reason the Slovaks were willing to switch sides).

Actually, Slovaks wanted autonomy or kind of self rule as agreed on in Pittsburg in May 1918 between Czech an Slovak politicians. But during partial mobilization and full mobilization in spring and fall 1938 there were no problems with Slovak soldiers. They acted as supposed and there were no disciplinary problems. Actually there was good support from civilians for defense of the country. Situation changed after Munich when Slovakia also lost territories to Hungary an Poland. There was uproar against Prag government for not defending Slovakia against Hungarians and Poles.

BTW there was treat with Romania to allow transport of equipment from Soviet union through or over Romanian territory. Also Soviet union threatened with war to Poland if attacked Czechoslovakia. Romania and Yugoslavia had treaty with Czechoslovakia against Hungary and actually I think in Romania partial mobilization was in effect and troops on border with Hungary were reinforced. Romania and Yugoslavia had however not obligation to enter the war against Germany but both countries allowed volunteers to join Czechoslovak army. According to some sources around 60 000 volunteers from Yugoslavia and Romania. Czechoslovakia had enough arms to fully arm around 80 000 of them.

I also red somewhere that Germany didn't has enough ammunition for heavy weapons and bombers then for up to 2-3 weeks of heavy fighting.

Czechoslovak generals were indeed afraid from flank attack from Austria as borders there were covered only with light fortification. My question is if Germans had enough capacity to supply operating army in Austria. I don;t know in what state was transportation from southern Germany to Austria and what was the capacity of these lines.

Problem for Czechoslovakia was how to gain support in west if refused to comply with Munich agreement. As Czechoslovakia would be country which gave the reason for another war. Poland was just lucky that after occupation of Czech parts and independence of Slovakia Hitler was not trustworthy in England and France anymore.

Let's say Czechoslovakia didn't comply with Munich. England stay on the said. Question is if France would stand behind treaty with Czechoslovakia. I believe there were signals from some parts of French government that they would. But even if they do, how strong action would French army took? If they sit it behind Maginot line it would tied some parts of German army. Or if the defense in Czechoslovakia managed to mauled parts of German army, maybe then they would commit to more offensive actions.

As to Soviets, they were obliged to help Czechoslovakia if France declare so either. As I mentioned before, transport through Poland wasn't necessary as Romania allowed some. Supplies of material for Czechoslovak air force would be helpful and pretty easy at least from point of Czechoslovak pilots as Czechoslovakia produced in license soviet SB-2 (60 bought and 101 manufactured). Fighter planes would be of course preferred as even if B-534s could hold some more would be needed. I-153 or I-16 would be probably pretty easy to handle for well trained Czechoslovak pilots. And there was more then enough of them as of the Czechoslovak air force policy in 30-ties called "1000 pilots for the Republic". For example some future Slovak fighter aces (as Reznak for example) were trained in that time. Of course in 1938 they would be less experienced.

 

[Marko]

With Slovaks loyal and Poland and Hungary staying on the fence Czechoslovakia would sudenly get a lot of operational depth especialy for its airforce to hamper German eforts.

 

[I Blame Communism]

Admittedly not, but then Germany won't have to make any build-up oriented against Britain. To make an example, all those u-boats won't need to be built, and air flak shall need much less attention.

Leaving more to build all those tanks that Germany doesn't have? We're not adding and subtracting from the '39 or '41 numbers here. The German army of '38 is smaller and severely underarmoured even before its arduous battle with the Czechs.

There is a huge difference between suffering a blockade and not being able to buy everything you need.

Of course there is. In fact, Germany by itself is more coal-secure than the Grossraum, IIRC (France used like 30% British coal, Italy like 80% or something). Food, too: the flip-side of a functioning French agriculture is that export.

But there is less coal. What we are talking about here is not "Europe's industrial resources against the remains of the USSR with some outside support" but "Germany versus the entire USSR, no outside support".

That first scenario? Soviets still won.

Of course I'm not proposing Soviets in Berlin: that's silly. But I am proposing that a German-Soviet war is no kind of "dream" unless the Germans are going to win. If they can scrape a draw, why do it?

They decided not to have a war with CZS. Not every PoD benefits them, you know.

The usual assumption that FDR is a dictator or political god and his personal anti-fascist foibles shall always be shared by the Congress, American elites, and US public opinion at large, still deeply isolationist in 1938, regardless of circumstances.

How isolationist now? I am only talking about measures already taken in terms of re-armament - measures that certainly entered German calculations. America, Berlin thought, was a reservoir of industrial strength and capital for the Entente. Don't their opinions matter?

There is no reason for America to underwrite Germany's war effort in any way.

The war with the Soviets retroactively justifies that. Those weapons get put to an use which the Entente may sympathize or at least be confortable with.

People aren't going to get amnesia. They made these offers and Hitler refused. They're going to keep hoping for the success of appeasement - if the same people stay in charge - but there was always a large element of caution in the policy.

And Chamberlain's approach remains the British foreign policy.

It is interesting that, after lecturing us about how presidential leadership doesn't mean you can just do whatever, you apparently assume that prime-ministerial leadership does.

IMO at the very least it balances out with no blockade and no war with the West.

We're not making direct comparisons here. Germany is a much smaller economy with a lower capacity for mobilisation is the point. You can't just replicate its feats, among them "appearing to have a hope in hell of defeating the USSR in battle". And if you can't do that, why is war with the USSR a good thing?

True, but the Poles can defend. Despite climactic differences, it may easily turn out in the Winter War, writ large.

So in spite of the fact that it's not winter... and it's a series of foresty and swampy tracts and a heavily fortified isthmi which negate numerical advantage... it will be just like that war the Soviets won on the battlefield when they rolled up their sleeves and went at it?

Not Hitler's long-term geopolitical Lebensraum dream, his medium-term strategic dream of a solo German-Soviet war with the West neutral.

I don't see what's so great about a war with the Soviets that you don't expect to win.

It seems to me that you feel compelled to argue that practically any PoD benefits the German regime. This one doesn't. That's why they decided, after assesing the situation, not to have a war in 1938. I don't see why this is controversial. Not everything is Hitler's dream scenario.

Pileup, if you prefer, regardless of whom caused it.

I take issue with the terminology of Puir Wee Nazis.

 

[I Blame Communism]

Circumstances were radically different. IOTL, he was blatantly tearing up the Munich Agreement. ITTL, he's apparently making war as a last resort to bring Sudetenland Germans home because stubborn Czechs refuse a sensible national-self determination solution to the dispute that the non-Communist great powers agreed upon.

That the circumstances are different is obvious: it's a hypothetical, after all. But the whole, ekhem, warmongering fringe played up the Wee Little Czechia talk in terms of their opposition to Munich. Why should this change?

The remark was anyway an aside. The point is that yes, plenty of people questioned appeasement before 1939.

None the less, the crowds did cheer, and they certainly were not coerced into it.

This is a truism. What had happened was more-or-less "It's war!... It's war!... It's war any second now!... It's PEACE!" Any sensible person would be happy at that. And war seems pretty real when people are being called up and Timmy has received his gasmask.

It didn't take long for disillusion to set in. The lesson? The public were not pro-appeasement. They had no burning desire for colonial consolidation or special opinion about Danzig. They were pro-peace - but, as OTL showed, ready to face war with grim resignation.

I'm simply annoyed by the attitude of some board members that in any conceivable WWII scenario, all non-Nazi actors should be expected to act like they had been just handed a 1945 history book by a time-traveler.

Who's doing this?

The OP proposed a scenario that obviously requires a PoD after the Munich Agreement, indirectly upholds appeasement, and one way or another most likely leads to a German-Soviet war with a neutral Entente and quite possibly the interesting twist of an Axis Poland. And people cheerfully talk about starting 'our' WWII in 1938 with Czechoslovakia in the shoes of Poland (perhaps the most clichè Alliedwank scenario ever) which is a wholly different scenario, requires an anti-appeasement PoD well before Munich, and is actualy quite unlikely since a defiant Entente in 1935-38 in all likelihood causes a swift domestic collapse of the Nazi regime.

Who's suggested that the Entente would be galloping into war three days after the invasion of CZS. All I can see is me saying that Germany's total inability to do anything about France should be taken into account.

Admittedly I was oblivious of Attlee. I was arguing from a PoV that ignores hindsight.

What hindsight? And being 'oblivious' to the leader and party-line of the parliamentary opposition... well, don't become PM, that's my advice.

Personally I have no problem whatsoever with regarding a slightly more defiant Entente pushing the Heer to overthrow Hitler at Munich as a near optimal solution to the Nazi problem (overall, I deem the optimal realistic solution to the Nazi problem an Heer coup just after Maurice Bavaud successfully guns down Hitler in November 1938 and the other Nazi bigwigs tear each other apart in the succession struggle).

A splendid piece of evasion:

"Were people warmongers who said Britain should defend small countries?"

"Hypothetical people who wanted to do something different were not warmongers."

Gonnae answer the question? Who were the warmongers and what were their wicked deeds of warmongering?

It depends on what one means by "enslaving". If you mean the serf-like harsh colonial exploitation that the Nazi actually meant, even taking actual democide off the table, of course not. And being ruled by a totalitarian regime is scarcely a good thing.

It was a poetic turn of phrase - the Czechs, unlike the Soviets, didn't actually get the cattle-trucks-factories-and-rifle-butts regime meted out to Ukrainian women. I refer merely to the more ordinary type of colonialism as practiced by the other great imperialisms at that time. Or, as you may know it...

If you mean simple annexation and forced cultural assimilation of Czechia by an hypothetical sane Germany, you already know my opinion about the issue.

The invasion of a country, the stripping of rights from its citizens, the rule of it on behalf of the conqueror, and the destruction of the native society. Or 'annexation and forced assimilation', if you like. It's still horrible.

You are dicker-dackering, in any case. As usual, a "hypothetical san Germany" has hoven into view. This chimera is not relevant to the question.

Anything that reduces Balkanization short of democide, long-term colonial inequality and exploitation, totalitarian oppression, or large-scale cultural stagnation (and hypothetical harmful conditions of similar severity I may be oblivious of) is a good thing; if war, conquest, and temporary political coercion need be a tool to bring the world any closer to the utopian end-goal of political unity of mankind, so be it and bring the popcorn. I cheer for the Alexanders, Caesars, and Napoleons of (alt-)history and pity or despise the Vercingetorixes, Arminiuses, and Boudicas as misguided fools at best.

On a side-note, I vaguely recall somewhere that you professed a "liking for Celtic culture". The appearance of Gauls and Britons called this to mind. I must say, for someone who is actively in favour of destroying small languages and dispossessing small people to call themselves a Celtophile is a bit rich.

Anyway, without making any criticism of your odd ideas of morality, I will simply say that you are doing precisely what you accuse your opponents of doing and using egregious hindsight. People are bad and warmongers, and other people are good and heroic, because of outcomes to their actions which they cannot possibly know.

So to return to, you know, the actual question: Churchill was a bad person because he worked on behalf of small countries and empires breaking up? Tell him that!

Sure, sure. No contention about that. But my point is that ITTL hindsight actually vindicates appeasement and Chamberlain's foreign policy.

The goal of the policy was to make Germany do something that the Nazis weren't willing going to do, and fight the USSR it wasn't. This unwanted development may well force the Nazis into what we wanted, but the fact of their being fighting is not it.

We wanted the Nazis to sign up for conservative and colonial Europe against the outside powers.

Are you arguing that mistaken expectations of this sort in Prague might be the cause for the defiance of Czechoslovakia, even without actual Soviet guarantees of support ? Possible, but I doubt it.

I am arguing that Germany is not in its "dream scenario" and that being held to ransom by France is part of that. The reason I'm determined to make this case is because your belief that Hitler's "dream scenario" was actually your own - Germany creates big Germany, fights Soviets, aligns with Entente, handily doesn't get the chance to murder millions and millions of people - betrays a dangerous misunderstand of Nazism.