Of course the allies also had the M114, which had a range of just over 14km
M107 with the 175mm was good to 35km, and reduced accuracy to 40km. The 203mm howitzer version, the M110, was 17km to 25km
Of course the allies also had the M114, which had a range of just over 14km
While the naval action did have effetct on sea infiltration
equipment was mostly supplied internally
the north was sending large numbers of troops down as 'volunteers' in the late 50's
If you want massive participation of US regular forces (or at least, the upper-end of the regular) in Indochina, you need a PoD in the 50s. Note, in OTL, there were only advisers and spies operating in Vietnam. The (fabricated) Tokin Incident was the excuse to send in mass number of men and material in 1964. So, if you wanted to push the schedule 4 years earlier, you need something fucked up in 1950s for the Western block.
My best scenario is a combination of the following
- Dien Bien Phu fell much faster (it took 56 days and nights of fighting OTL). This time, it only took a month and the French suffered catastrophic casualties
- More units were wiped out in the southern region of Vietnam, the Central Highland, Laos and Cambodia (OTL, there is only a major incident: GM100)
- Public and mass demonstration in the southern region of Vietnam demanding general election, and/or increase in sympathy toward northern region and/or communism
- US took even a more hawkish attitude against communism (show down in Berlin, bashing and slandering the Soviet in the accidental battles right after WW2, toning down the effort and suffering of USSR during WW2...)
I think you get it wrong. Tet Offensive was launched because mass materials were sent in via the trails (both on Mountain and on Sea). If the trail was cut off, there would be no offensive like in OTL. And because the cut off was launched in 1960, I expect the situation would get even more deadly - for both sides. The NLF/VC would ramp up on their intelligence and infiltration, they would promote corrupted and incompetent men into RVN officials' positions, and through them, gather US-made weapons, tools, equipment...
I think that from December 1960 (when NLF/VC was officially formed) to mid-1964/65 (where materials started to flow in with sufficient quantity), NLF/VC was pretty much fighting on their own. With an increase in materials gathered by USA, they would become even more deadly.
Sure, the Vietnamese would become much more cautious... and that is where you American messed it up again. According to a recent book, written by a Vietnamese with recently declassified documents, Le Duan (General Secretary of VCP) launched a coup against Ho Chi Minh in 1965, effectively starting the aggressive attempt to unite Vietnam. With the American involvement in 1960 (much earlier), expect the man to remove the idea completely. Ho Chi Minh preferred building up his force in the North (to make it much more self-reliant) before pushing out. With this trend, you can believe that once we pushed out, the USA would have no choice but to burn the entire country to stop us.
And yes, I say burn. They needed to make Rolling Thunder and Linebacker looked like a shame in this case.
Sure, the Vietnamese would become much more cautious... and that is where you American messed it up again.
With the American involvement in 1960 (much earlier), expect the man to remove the idea completely. Ho Chi Minh preferred building up his force in the North (to make it much more self-reliant) before pushing out. With this trend, you can believe that once we pushed out, the USA would have no choice but to burn the entire country to stop us.
And yes, I say burn. They needed to make Rolling Thunder and Linebacker looked like a shame in this case.
That last point could be enough on its own, it can be achieved rather easily. Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy acting more against the comintern than they did and having that be successfull would mean more and earlier participation by the US in Vietnam.
Even if the cutoff was launched in 1960 i'd say the VC will still continue to function, except with maybe not even half of its strength of OTL. Supplies and reinforcements will be critically low, but unless the sea route is cut off as well, the supplies will never be cut off completely and not low enough not to do an offensive, an offensive the DRV believed would lead to a general uprising in South Vietnam by the population, so for them it wouldn't even need that much manpower and supplies, just good strategic and highly aggressive attacks. Only after attacks like that, continued blockade of the trail would destroy the VC and NVA presence in South Vietnam.
Johnson definitly wouldn't have a problem with that. And Nixon would have done it before you can say "watergate", used a nuke or 2 even. May not be the best outcome for North Vietnam. Because at that point they would be playing America's game.
The remaining part is correct enough. I just think that the NLF/VC would ramp up their intelligence and political campaigns to offset the low count on materials.
Edit. Given that Sihanouk allowed the communists to run supplies through Cambodia but officially was 'neutral' I wonder what would have happened if he had been isolated from the north more. With the trail cut, pro US countries on all 3 land borders, would a little subtle pressure have made him also pro-US or at least truly neutral?
I recall at least one case: Mary Ann in 1971.
What about the Chinese? It is my understanding that after the Korean War, the US understood that China would not allow an enemy army near their borders. Would this provoke a response from China?
This would be a PR nightmare for the US government to handle. US's government claim was that it was merely always reacting towards ''Communist aggression''. ( If that's true actually is a different story) That's why the US tend to act on a pretext of defense during the war.From a military and technical viewpoint it seems like a good idea for the U.S. and its allies in the region. But how to work it politically? Someone back then must have considered this approach or something similar. So why didn't the Americans build this barrier? What prevented it? And if it had been built, how long would it have been needed?
I think thats right. Though i do wonder what they would actually do. Lets say, with the trail cut off, they would gamble at the tet offensive in 1968 or 69. With what they would have available, where would the actual attacks take place? I suppose they would be as big as the "mini-tets" or May Offensive. Obviously Saigon, Da Nang and Hue are targets, direct assaults on government installations and important buildings there(like the radio building and post offices). But would there be offensives across the Laotian and Cambodian border like OTL? Or would they not exhaust supplies for that and jhust go with the ambushes on the cities?
From a military and technical viewpoint it seems like a good idea for the U.S. and its allies in the region. But how to work it politically? Someone back then must have considered this approach or something similar. So why didn't the Americans build this barrier? What prevented it? And if it had been built, how long would it have been needed?
Search Colonial Route 4 in 1950. The French thought the same, and they were fucked.
If the NVA was able to counter the para-drop of supply, and the American would be in the same situation as the French. And don't forget, the USA was the first party to extend the fight to Laos. Support from Royal Laotian Gov't or not, they would have to deal with the now-agitated Pathet Laos (communist-aligned force). So, may be the DRVN would not have to fight those firebases, the Laotian allies could do that for them and the USA would have no excuse to brutalise the northern region of Vietnam.
The big problem was that the French couldn't commit enough force to do the job. The US can, but unless it does along with the political will to do this it will fail just as spectacularly - half measures won't cut it...
Airpower in particular. Strangling French firebases was doable,but Khe Sahn would never become DBP.The big problem was that the French couldn't commit enough force to do the job.
A different strategy could have done the trick, political will aside. The politician did not want another Korean War on their hands.. The US can, but unless it does along with the political will to do this it will fail just as spectacularly - half measures won't cut it...