Cutting off the Ho Chi Min Trail ... in Laos

Good spot marathag. I'm not sure how many were available at division or corps level but they would certainly improve the situation; less bases needed, better counter battery ability. I could see the US building and deploying more of these to support the line.

In answer to Creidiki's post, the north was sending large numbers of troops down as 'volunteers' in the late 50's and early 60's via the trail and there were supply depots along that route by the early 60's, so it was a big factor even in the early days. Whilst sea infiltration was certainly a factor it is relatively 'open' to interception. The trail through Laos and Cambodia was through jungle and harder to see and intercept, which is what made it such a bugbear for the allies. Cutting it at the top would have stopped material getting to Cambodia and therefore the VC in the first place as Cambodia doesn't have a border with anyone other than allied nations (South Vietnam, Laos in this thread and Thailand) and then the VC could only receive supplies bought in by air or the small coastal strip, not something I see happening when Cambodia is allegedly neutral. I think it would have had a major impact on the VC personnel and supply situation before they could build to the levels we saw later. As that CIA document states "the countries through which most of these supplies pass immediately before infiltration into South Vietnam are North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia". No trail through Laos, no supply line to Cambodia or the VC.
Another factor would be that cutting the border would isolate the VC not just from men and material but also from the heartland of the revolution. They would lose direct links with the political powers up north. Fewer political commissar types would get south to encourage the revolutionaries and conduct terror attacks on the hamlets. As sweeps from the new border downwards pushed the VC further and further from the North they would be increasingly isolated.

Edit. Given that Sihanouk allowed the communists to run supplies through Cambodia but officially was 'neutral' I wonder what would have happened if he had been isolated from the north more. With the trail cut, pro US countries on all 3 land borders, would a little subtle pressure have made him also pro-US or at least truly neutral?
 
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the north was sending large numbers of troops down as 'volunteers' in the late 50's

No they bloody weren't. The VWP in the South led the Northern VWP into a line against the RVN, BECAUSE the southern VWP were being immediately and personally destroyed up to 1959. The Southern VWP prefigured the allowance for continued struggle for reunification: they were pre-mature anti Ðiemists.

yours,
Sam R.
 
1500 troops went via the trail into South Vietnam in '59, when it was decided to ignore the peace protocols. 5000 troops were maintaining it then.
By '65 CIA estimates out 90 tons per day of supplies coming in during the dry season.
Both sourced the Vietnam war.com

By '67, estimates suggest 20000 troops per month
Source US History

Smithsonian magazine, Mar 2008 states 12000 troops entered SV in '64.

And so on. My post said late 50's & early 60's.
 
A question arises as to why the US would cut the ho-chi-minh trail so early, since they didn't see it as such a threat untill 1964. i see it logical if they would cut it off completely as OP in 1964 but not earlier, except maybe bombing starting in 1960. Moving up operations barrel roll and steel tiger 4 years seems logical if they knew everything they could know about the trail.

If you want massive participation of US regular forces (or at least, the upper-end of the regular) in Indochina, you need a PoD in the 50s. Note, in OTL, there were only advisers and spies operating in Vietnam. The (fabricated) Tokin Incident was the excuse to send in mass number of men and material in 1964. So, if you wanted to push the schedule 4 years earlier, you need something fucked up in 1950s for the Western block.

My best scenario is a combination of the following
  • Dien Bien Phu fell much faster (it took 56 days and nights of fighting OTL). This time, it only took a month and the French suffered catastrophic casualties
  • More units were wiped out in the southern region of Vietnam, the Central Highland, Laos and Cambodia (OTL, there is only a major incident: GM100)
  • Public and mass demonstration in the southern region of Vietnam demanding general election, and/or increase in sympathy toward northern region and/or communism
  • US took even a more hawkish attitude against communism (show down in Berlin, bashing and slandering the Soviet in the accidental battles right after WW2, toning down the effort and suffering of USSR during WW2...)

That last point could be enough on its own, it can be achieved rather easily. Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy acting more against the comintern than they did and having that be successfull would mean more and earlier participation by the US in Vietnam.


I think you get it wrong. Tet Offensive was launched because mass materials were sent in via the trails (both on Mountain and on Sea). If the trail was cut off, there would be no offensive like in OTL. And because the cut off was launched in 1960, I expect the situation would get even more deadly - for both sides. The NLF/VC would ramp up on their intelligence and infiltration, they would promote corrupted and incompetent men into RVN officials' positions, and through them, gather US-made weapons, tools, equipment...

I think that from December 1960 (when NLF/VC was officially formed) to mid-1964/65 (where materials started to flow in with sufficient quantity), NLF/VC was pretty much fighting on their own. With an increase in materials gathered by USA, they would become even more deadly.

Sure, the Vietnamese would become much more cautious... and that is where you American messed it up again. According to a recent book, written by a Vietnamese with recently declassified documents, Le Duan (General Secretary of VCP) launched a coup against Ho Chi Minh in 1965, effectively starting the aggressive attempt to unite Vietnam. With the American involvement in 1960 (much earlier), expect the man to remove the idea completely. Ho Chi Minh preferred building up his force in the North (to make it much more self-reliant) before pushing out. With this trend, you can believe that once we pushed out, the USA would have no choice but to burn the entire country to stop us.

And yes, I say burn. They needed to make Rolling Thunder and Linebacker looked like a shame in this case.

Even if the cutoff was launched in 1960 i'd say the VC will still continue to function, except with maybe not even half of its strength of OTL. Supplies and reinforcements will be critically low, but unless the sea route is cut off as well, the supplies will never be cut off completely and not low enough not to do an offensive, an offensive the DRV believed would lead to a general uprising in South Vietnam by the population, so for them it wouldn't even need that much manpower and supplies, just good strategic and highly aggressive attacks. Only after attacks like that, continued blockade of the trail would destroy the VC and NVA presence in South Vietnam.

Sure, the Vietnamese would become much more cautious... and that is where you American messed it up again.

I'm not an American;). Not by a long shot.

With the American involvement in 1960 (much earlier), expect the man to remove the idea completely. Ho Chi Minh preferred building up his force in the North (to make it much more self-reliant) before pushing out. With this trend, you can believe that once we pushed out, the USA would have no choice but to burn the entire country to stop us.

And yes, I say burn. They needed to make Rolling Thunder and Linebacker looked like a shame in this case.

Johnson definitly wouldn't have a problem with that. And Nixon would have done it before you can say "watergate", used a nuke or 2 even. May not be the best outcome for North Vietnam. Because at that point they would be playing America's game.
 
That last point could be enough on its own, it can be achieved rather easily. Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy acting more against the comintern than they did and having that be successfull would mean more and earlier participation by the US in Vietnam.

You are correct in this regard. In fact, I believe the last point it the sole reason (or "starting point") for the scenario here. In my opinion, they should be able to make Reagan look tame in comparison if we really want to push that.

Even if the cutoff was launched in 1960 i'd say the VC will still continue to function, except with maybe not even half of its strength of OTL. Supplies and reinforcements will be critically low, but unless the sea route is cut off as well, the supplies will never be cut off completely and not low enough not to do an offensive, an offensive the DRV believed would lead to a general uprising in South Vietnam by the population, so for them it wouldn't even need that much manpower and supplies, just good strategic and highly aggressive attacks. Only after attacks like that, continued blockade of the trail would destroy the VC and NVA presence in South Vietnam.

In OTL, NLF/VC was formed in December 1960... Pushing it a few years earlier would be tough, because they would be Viet Minh - the independence movement (with communist alignment) then. In fact, from 1941 to 1960, any people supporting the independence of Vietnam and/or showing the red flag with golden star of Viet Nam would be considered as a Viet Minh. The French and their puppets/collaborators took... issues with that.

The remaining part is correct enough. I just think that the NLF/VC would ramp up their intelligence and political campaigns to offset the low count on materials.

Johnson definitly wouldn't have a problem with that. And Nixon would have done it before you can say "watergate", used a nuke or 2 even. May not be the best outcome for North Vietnam. Because at that point they would be playing America's game.

The nuke part is pretty risky... but I agreed with the remaining part. I don't think Johnson or Nixon had much love for Vietnamese in general. As long as communism is contained, they would (probably) gladly kill a few more millions of us.
 
The remaining part is correct enough. I just think that the NLF/VC would ramp up their intelligence and political campaigns to offset the low count on materials.

I think thats right. Though i do wonder what they would actually do. Lets say, with the trail cut off, they would gamble at the tet offensive in 1968 or 69. With what they would have available, where would the actual attacks take place? I suppose they would be as big as the "mini-tets" or May Offensive. Obviously Saigon, Da Nang and Hue are targets, direct assaults on government installations and important buildings there(like the radio building and post offices). But would there be offensives across the Laotian and Cambodian border like OTL? Or would they not exhaust supplies for that and jhust go with the ambushes on the cities?
 
Edit. Given that Sihanouk allowed the communists to run supplies through Cambodia but officially was 'neutral' I wonder what would have happened if he had been isolated from the north more. With the trail cut, pro US countries on all 3 land borders, would a little subtle pressure have made him also pro-US or at least truly neutral?

He was pretty solid pro-Chinese before the trail was really in operation, so I'd say little chance of a pro-US outlook.
 
From a military and technical viewpoint it seems like a good idea for the U.S. and its allies in the region. But how to work it politically? Someone back then must have considered this approach or something similar. So why didn't the Americans build this barrier? What prevented it? And if it had been built, how long would it have been needed?
 
From a military and technical viewpoint it seems like a good idea for the U.S. and its allies in the region. But how to work it politically? Someone back then must have considered this approach or something similar. So why didn't the Americans build this barrier? What prevented it? And if it had been built, how long would it have been needed?
This would be a PR nightmare for the US government to handle. US's government claim was that it was merely always reacting towards ''Communist aggression''. ( If that's true actually is a different story) That's why the US tend to act on a pretext of defense during the war.
 
We need a greater Hmong presence in the government. Vang Pao dope or no dope, seemed to have his head in the game. In otl the king was a little nervous about rural folk.
 
I think thats right. Though i do wonder what they would actually do. Lets say, with the trail cut off, they would gamble at the tet offensive in 1968 or 69. With what they would have available, where would the actual attacks take place? I suppose they would be as big as the "mini-tets" or May Offensive. Obviously Saigon, Da Nang and Hue are targets, direct assaults on government installations and important buildings there(like the radio building and post offices). But would there be offensives across the Laotian and Cambodian border like OTL? Or would they not exhaust supplies for that and jhust go with the ambushes on the cities?

Assuming the situation progressed as it was in OTL until 1960 (when the series of firebases was introduced), I'd say that the LNF/VC will not attempt any Tet Offensive (or its equivalent) in 1968 or 1969, unless the aforementioned intelligence and political campaigns pay off. Still, it would be a matter of time before such operation was launched.

Regarding Laos and Cambodia... well, for starter, USA had already pushed into Laos already, so an offensive campaign like Lam Son 719 (in 1971) would raise less eyebrows. The same can be said for Cambodia (in 1970) - "We have already hauled our arse to Laos before, it ain't gonna be different if we shift it a thousand kilometer south"

If you want to talk about Vietnam campaigns on Laos and Cambodia, most of them were response to the American offensives. With the firebases now built, I'd say the situation is messier...

From a military and technical viewpoint it seems like a good idea for the U.S. and its allies in the region. But how to work it politically? Someone back then must have considered this approach or something similar. So why didn't the Americans build this barrier? What prevented it? And if it had been built, how long would it have been needed?

Political speaking, this is a major landmine. Unless USA had been able to have a more hawkish attitude, anti-communist ideal immediately after WW2 (bordering on the douchebag side), I don't think that they could even consider it. Both Vietnam and Laos were "too small" for them to notice, putting that much men and material there would be hard to explain and gain support in front of the Congress. That is even before considering the population and the media (though I think the Witch Hunt of McCarthy could solve this problem).

Internationally speaking, the Communist-bloc would have some ammunition to use, something on the idea that the USA neglected the will and the independent right of some countries to pursue their own interest.
 
Search Colonial Route 4 in 1950. The French thought the same, and they were fucked.

If the NVA was able to counter the para-drop of supply, and the American would be in the same situation as the French. And don't forget, the USA was the first party to extend the fight to Laos. Support from Royal Laotian Gov't or not, they would have to deal with the now-agitated Pathet Laos (communist-aligned force). So, may be the DRVN would not have to fight those firebases, the Laotian allies could do that for them and the USA would have no excuse to brutalise the northern region of Vietnam.

The big problem was that the French couldn't commit enough force to do the job. The US can, but unless it does along with the political will to do this it will fail just as spectacularly - half measures won't cut it...
 

Ian_W

Banned
The big problem was that the French couldn't commit enough force to do the job. The US can, but unless it does along with the political will to do this it will fail just as spectacularly - half measures won't cut it...

There is also the political problem of getting enough support for the deployment of 2-3 American divisions plus call most of a division of allies to a fundamentally defensive deployment in Laos.

If you were feeling unkind, you could call it "A maginot line of firebases in Laos, doing nothing to stop the VC apart from occasionally shelling jungle".
 

longsword14

Banned
The big problem was that the French couldn't commit enough force to do the job.
Airpower in particular. Strangling French firebases was doable,but Khe Sahn would never become DBP.
. The US can, but unless it does along with the political will to do this it will fail just as spectacularly - half measures won't cut it...
A different strategy could have done the trick, political will aside. The politician did not want another Korean War on their hands.
 
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