Operation Hussein was the name given to the operation in which the Arabian Socialist Republic invaded the British-held Hejaz region of Arabia during the Suez Crisis. Carried out in conjunction with General Abdel al-Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, the seizure had the intended effect of paralysing any military reaction to the move. it was carried out with no casualties on either side, as it was only intended as a show of force and not an act of war, and the prisoners were released unharmed after the conclusion of the crisis.
Prelude
After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, the British annexed the Hejaz region and forced the client KIngdom of Central Arabia to agree to it's accession into Egypt. This move gave the British control over the entire Red Sea and allowed better protection of the Suez Canal. The British took great pains in developing the coastal area, with Jeddah becoming a prominent port for the Royal Navy.
In 1936, Egypt was given de facto independence, but the British were allowed to keep ten thousand soldiers on Egyptian soil to protect the Suez Canal and the Hejaz region. In British war plans, the Hejaz region became a de facto fallback point in the event of aggressive Egyptian moves towards the Canal.
While the Suez Canal was prominent in the minds of British imperialists, the people who lived in both the Canal Zone and the Hejaz region were much less so. Towns were created to accommodate the technicians in the Canal and their families, but these towns were segegrated. One side was European in culture with first world housing, the other side retained it's Arabic heritage with bazaars, etc, where poverty was widespread. With the opening of the Canal, foreign businesses tended to restrict their interests to the European half, leaving the Egyptian towns to practically drown in poverty, unemployment and misery. The same state of affairs were repeated in the Hejaz, with Jeddah, for instance, being segregated between Europeans and native. The Hejazis attempted to assimilate into either English or French culture, but this only awarded them with second class status in the eyes of the Europeans.
These conditions would prove to be the spark that lit the bonfires of the independence movements in both countries. Egypt's independence in 1936 was soon followed by the overthrow of King Farouk in 1952. Bashar al-Maliki would follow Nasser's lead in 1955.
As soon as Bashar took power in Arabia, he nationalized all sources of Arabian oil and expelled British servicemen from the country, with the last serviceman leaving for the Hejaz by December 1955. When they were gone, Bashar ordered his Vice President to begi nputting together Hejaz Force - a special group of 15,000 soldiers to liberate the Hejaz.
From the September Revolution onwards, the people of Arabia were the targets of sustained propaganda, promsing the liberation of the Hejaz. Though he downplayed it's religious significance in his manifesto, Bashar, after some encouragement from the Society of Islamic Brothers, who still had influence among the military, highlighted that same significance in speeches printed in the new state-controlled press.
Much as they attempted to do with Nasser in 1952, the British and the Americans began attempts to woo Bashar, with the Americans promising him a place in a proposed Middle East Defence Organization, based on NATO. But at the same time, the Americans were attempting to convince Bashar to stop his claims on the Hejaz, cliaming that since no Arabian state had existed to previously hold that region, then the ASR had no legitimate claim to it. This was in sharp contrast to the American position on the British occupation of the Suez Canal, which they saw as anachronistic. Bashar repeatedly told the Americans that he didn't care if his claims were legitimate, it was the boon to the Arabian economy provided by the Hejaz that he cared about.
In 1956, Secretary of State Dulies reiterated his 1952 declaration that the Arabs believed that the US would support them in a conflict with Israel and that the two sides only cared about their disputes with the British and French. Secretary Dulies's lack of appreciation for the Anglo-American friendship in 1952 had led Eisenhower to support the Egyptian side when it came to the Suez Canal debacle. Their policy of 'even-handedness' had betrayed their seeming disregard for the Anglo-American relationship by openly supporting Arab states in disputes with Israel.
Bashar did not trust the Americans, especially after they began supporting Jordan after the latter's peace treaty with Israel, helping them bear the brunt of the Arab League economic boycott [1]. In response, in March 1956, he made a big show of his intentions to have close relations with the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact in general, declaring his intention to participate in the arms race which had begun between Israel and Egypt. Arabia was soon receiving T-34 tanks and MiG-15 jet fighter planes, starting in April 1956.
In May 1956, the relationship between the Egyptians and the Americans came to ahead when Nasser recognized the People's Republic of China, leading to Eisenhower withdrawing all American financial aid for the Aswan High Dam. Nasser rejected all American attempts to sow peace between himself and Israel in exchange for a return of the financial aid.
While relations with America were breaking down, Nasser sent his ambassador to Arabia to Bashar's palace in Ha'ail. There, the mbassador disclosed Nasser's plan to nationalize the Suez Canal in June and he conveyed Nasser's decision to allow Bashar to do whatever he wanted with the Hejaz. With this permission, Bashar authorized the military to begin prepations for Operation Hussein.
The operation
In June 1956, Nasser gave a speech in which he pronounced the name ofFerdinand De Losseps, the builder of the Canal, signalling to the Egyptin military that the Canal was to be seized. Nassser also announced that all assets relating to the Suez Canal would be frozen. Egypt closed the Canal to Israeli shipping and blocked the GUlf of Aqaba.
At the same time, Hejaz Force, equipped with bombers and T-34 tanks and consisting of three divisions of 5,000 men each, charged into the Hejaz region, in three separate pincer strikes. Division Aqaba encircled Jeddah while Division Coast encircled Jeddah while Division Jihad encircled Abha, with reserves coming up behind them to sabotage crucial infrastructure such as the roads between the cities.
The British, though substantial in size, were lacking in propper equipment due to post-WWII austerity. The headquarters of the Hejaz Command was in Jeddah and was being helmed by the former head of Egypt Command, Francis Festing. Festing was completely cut off from the other divisions in the Hejaz and there were no Royal Navy ships nearby to render assistance. The Arabian commander, Brigadier General Mustafa Abdullah, promised that his men would be treated humanely if he surrendered. Festing complied and handed over his weapons and ordered all British troops within the region to stand down.
Propaganda crews were keen to record newsreels of British troops throwing their weapons into large piles and being concentrated into large areas in the centre of the major cities, surrounded by barbed wire. A military government in the Hejaz was declared with Brigadier General Abdullah at it's head.
In Ha'ail, Bashar publicly made a speech in which he announced the integration of the Hejaz into the Arabian Socialist Republic. He did admit to taking British servicemen prisoner and pormised that no harm would come to them if the British made no efforts to take back the Hejaz or the Suez Canal. He finished the speech by declaring that Egypt and Arabia were now in a 'blood pact' and an attack on Egypt would be considered an attack on Arabia.
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The response[CENTER}
Britain
"That evening, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden was hosting a formal dinner at Downing Street. After an aide brought in the news from Egypt the meal ended early and Eden held an emergency meeting with a few of his Cabinet ministers which went on until 4 a.m. Nasser’s action was, as The Times phrased it the following morning, “a clear affront and threat to Western interests, besides being a breach of undertakings which Egypt has freely given”. The Egyptian president’s takeover of the canal was a potential threat to Britain’s oil supplies, as the country only had six weeks’ reserves, and it was also a profound embarrassment to the nation which had been joint custodian of the canal since its creation and whose soldiers had, until a few weeks before, been its guardians. The fall of the Hejaz to the Arabians also deeply offended him as a country the British had viewed as inferior had just committed a bloodless act of war against them.
A determined Eden sent a courteous but clear message across the Atlantic to the White House: “my colleagues and I are convinced that we must be ready, in the last resort, to use force to bring Nasser and his Arabian partner to theirsenses. For our part we are prepared to do so.” The Suez Crisis had begun. Nasser’s seizure of the Suez Canal was not just a shock to politicians in Britain. When Nasser informed his own ministers on the morning of 26 July what he planned to say in his speech that evening, most sat in stunned silence before asking nervous questions."
United States
"Nasser’s action was a shock, but it was not illegal under international law and if the original terms of the de Lesseps canal arrangement were upheld the concession would revert to Egyptian ownership by 1969 in any event. There was outrage in London and Paris, but in Washington, Eisenhower was rather more sanguine. When he first received warning from the chargé d’affaires in London that military action was being considered by Eden’s government he responded that nationalizing the canal “was not the same as nationalizing oil wells” which would run out; rather, the canal was more like a “public utility”. From the outset there was a strong sense in Washington that the response in Britain and France was out of proportion."
Israel
"Nearly 6,000 miles east of Washington, another leader debated how to respond to Nasser’s actions. For David Ben-Gurion, an aggressive, nationalistic Egypt was a much more pressing concern, given that Egypt was on Israel’s southern border. Alongside Ben-Gurion was Israeli Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan. Born and raised in the first kibbutz – collective settlement – in Palestine, he was an unflinching personification of the ideals that birthed his homeland through the fires of war. Dayan lost an eye fighting Vichy French forces in Lebanon in 1941 and thereafter wore an eyepatch that gave him a piratical air, although decades later he would become a surprising critic of militaristic Israeli foreign policy. In 1956, both men were concerned above all with the security of their young nation. The State of Israel was less than a decade old and its first act had been to fight for its life against a coalition of Arab armies which included Egypt. Although the 1948 war ended in a victory for Israel, it was not the end of the fighting. Armed struggle against Israel was taken up by Palestinian refugees who had been displaced by the conflict and who organized bands of fedayeen – guerrilla fighters – with aid and support from Egypt."
"The loss to Israel in the war of independence was a cause of deep embarrassment in Egypt and Nasser was ardently and openly hostile to Israel. Following the Czech arms deal, Ben-Gurion’s predecessor as prime minister recorded in his diary he felt a “deep concern to our security, the likes of which I have never experienced since the days preceding the establishment of the State”. Ben-Gurion thus found himself in power facing awkward odds: in 1955 Israel only had fifty jet fighters, none as good as the MiGs the Egyptians had on order. The Israelis turned to France."
"In June 1956, Moshe Dayan flew to a military airfield near Paris in an Israeli Air Force transport plane painted with French insignia. He left having agreed a $100 million cash deal for French Mystère IV fighters, along with tanks and ammunition. The first tranche of arms reached Israel the night before Nasser nationalized the canal, delivered to a deserted beach near Haifa by a French amphibious landing vessel. Ben-Gurion and Dayan were waiting on the sand to meet it and after the thirty tanks, ammunition and spare parts had been unloaded, the pair boarded the ship and drank champagne with the French captain. Even before the Suez Crisis began there was an arms race in the Middle East. War between Egypt and Israel was simply assumed to be an inevitability. The Israelis could not afford for Egypt to gain military superiority, as it was perceived that as soon as it was achieved Egypt would attack and Israeli would again be fighting for its life."
Though the Arabian Socialist Republic had not supported the fedayeen as Egypt did, the Israelis still saw the newly-proclaimed socialist state as a potential enemy. Bashar's affection of Nasser did not help assuage their fears. As soon as the planes were bought, different war plans were drawn up about how to deal with the ASR. Onew ar plan involved using Jordan as a springboard to sweep over Ha'il. Another involved simply levelling the city from the air. But the Israelis perceived Egypt as a bigger threat to their security.
The Arabian Socialist Republic
As soon as the advance into the Hejaz was announced, crowds burst into the streets to celebrate the achievement, with songs praising the President's 'bravery and swiftness' in seizing the region, but behind the scenes, the military didn't believe they could hold their conquest against a Franco-British-Israeli assault, assuming Jordan stayed out of any potential war. Bashar had tapped into the Czech arm deal too late for his military to have the proper equipment necessary to win a prolonged conflict. In 1956, th eewly renamed Revolutionary Arabian Army only included 30,000 enlisted men. Any conflict inv involving the two empires and Arabia was going to result in Arabia's defeat. With this information in hand, Bashar began using the Soviet embassy in Ha'il to seek a olive branch with the British and French. Both refused all offers out of hand, as long as he backed Nasser.
Breakdown with Nasser
With the two empires once again treating Arabia as a mat, Bashar approached the Americans and asked them to help him find a diplomatic solution to the problem. Secretary of State Dulies, himself a virulent anti-Communist and anti-Nasserite, stated that the American government, while it opposed Anglo-French intervention in the Suez Crisis, would not look kindly on a regime which continued to support a regime that was backed by the Soviet Union. In other words, Bashar had to give up his support of Nassser before the Americans could even consider the arrangement.
Bashar contacted Nasser and informed him of the arrangements, but Nasser's tone during the call not only surprised Bashar, it infuriated him. Nasser demanded that Bashar reject the American offer and stand side by side with Egypt as one Arab nation. Nasser refused to hear Bashar's objections and Bashar slammed the phone down. His Vice President would later write in his diaries.
Before the call, the President was hopeful Nasser would be reasonable and accept that Arabia had to make a compromise to benefit it's own self-interest. After the call, the President was blood red in the face and he was swearing his head off in English. He never spoke English unless he couldn't contain himself
THe next morning, Arabian state run media denounced Nasser as being just another imperialist who was taking advantage of Arabia and Bashar's goodwill. The US Secretary of State was satisfied with this action and invited Bashar to attend a multinational maritime conference in London to discuss a British, French and American plan to establish international authority to operate the canal in accordance with prior agreements of access, while also ensuring Egypt received an “equitable return”. Twenty-four governments were invited, including the Russians, who responded to their invitation through a statement published in Pravda on 10 August. They highlighted the fact that Nasser had already promised to allow freedom of navigation through the canal (for everyone except the Israelis), asserting the conference “cannot in any way be regarded, either in its composition or in character and purposes, as an international meeting authorized to take any decisions whatever on the Suez Canal”. A Russian delegation came to London anyway, but insisted it didn’t commit them to anything, or make the outcome legitimate. Only two countries turned down their invitations to attend: Greece and Egypt. Remarkably, Nasser had considered attending the London conference in person. His first instinct was to go and he had to be talked out of it by his Cabinet; one told Nasser that Egypt should not be a “mere invitee”. After several days of consideration, Nasser came round, concluding that “the Egyptian case would not even be considered”, claiming that the agenda had already been fixed and the decisions already made. Any possibility of his attending was then immediately scuppered when Eden made his BBC televised address, comparing Nasser to the Fascists Britain had fought in the war and condemning him as “not a man who can be trusted to keep an agreement”.
Bashar was somewhat relieved when Nasser refused to attend. He did not want his case to be overshadowed by Nasser's obstinate and in his eyes, offensive, behaviour. To protect his image back home, he pretended to object to the idea of a international authority guarding the Suez and voted against the idea, but behind the scenes, Secretary of State Dulies was greasing the wheels between Bashar and Prime Minister Eden. Both men still loathed each other, but Bashar made it clear unlike Nasser, he wanted to talk. Eden was not and flatly rejected any attempt at contrition, even comparing Bashar to Benito Mussolini.
The conference itself failed, with Nasser flatly rejecting the idea of a international authority in the Suez Canal, denouncing it as colonialism.
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October 29th came and the Israeli invasion of the Suez Canal began. Jeddah received reports of Israeli paratroopers being dropped near the Mitla Pass, east of the Suez Canal and sent these reports to Ha'll. Bashar and Mohammad Abdullah spent the first days of the operation in Bashar's office, receiving reports of the invasion from Jeddah. Bashar gave strict orders that no Israeli aircraft, soldier or property was to be fired upon unless in retaliation.
WHile he was listening to reports of the invasion, he was listening to Egyptian radio too. On the 5th of November, Nasser proclaimed the crisis to be a 'people's war' in which ciivlians were to arm themselves and fight the Israelis. When he heard this, Bashar mused to Abdullah that perhaps Arabia should have a similar system, but that was the only positive thing Bashar had to say about the whole debacle. As he listened to reports of Israeli and now British forces sweeping over the Sinai Peninsula, Bashar loudly asked "How can the fucking Zionists and imperialists fight better than native Arabs!?"
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The British defeat at home
The invasion concluded on the 12th of November. By this time, though they had effectively won the conflict, the British were humiliated. Eden's failure to strike the Canal in July had robbed the conflict of any legitimacy from the British public, or perhaps it is more appropriate to say the conflict had been robbed of what little legitimacy it had, as the Eden government had barely explained the reason for the conflict to their own people.
According to public opinion polls at the time, 37% of the British people supported the war while 44% were opposed.
[289][290] The Observer newspaper in a leader (editorial) attacked the Eden government for its "folly and crookedness" in attacking Egypt while the
Manchester Guardian urged its readers to write letters of protest to their MPs.
The Economist spoke of the "strange union of cynicism and hysteria" in the government and
The Spectator stated that Eden would soon have to face "a terrible indictment". The majority of letters written to MPs from their constituents were against the Suez attack.
[292] Significantly, many of the letters come from voters who identified as th Conservative.
After learning of the public discontent, Bashar decided to finally put the British prisoners to good use. He had a small radio station set up at the Khaibar prisoner of war camp, which consisted of a collection of hastily-constructed huts and several holes dug into the ground for urination, and he had the British prisoners address the Arab world, condemning the British aggression against Egypt and claiming that they did not sign up to shoot at Arabs for British imperialism.
On the 2nd of November, the United Nations General Assembly passed the US-proposed Resolution 997 which...
1. Urges as a matter of priority that all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area;
2. Urges the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements;
3. Recommends that all Member States refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of the present resolution;
4. Urges that, upon the cease-fire being effective, steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to observe and report promptly on the compliance with the present resolution to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, for such further action as they may deem appropriate in accordance with the Charter
Subsequent emergency sessions would lead to the creation of the first UN peacekeeping force. The British withdrew in November. However, the Israelis refused to host any UN force on Israeli controlled territory and left the Sinai in March 1957. Before the withdrawal the Israeli forces systematically destroyed infrastructure in Sinai peninsula, such as roads, railroads and telephone lines, and all houses in the villages of Abu Agelia and El Queseima. In January of that year, Anthony Eden had resigned as Prime Minister.
Eden's resignaton had opened a door for Bashar to again, request the official handover of the Hejaz to Arabia. Harold Macmillian, a more pragmatic and in Bashar's eyes, sensible Prime Minister finally conceded to the demand in exchange for the return of the 3,000 British prisoners, who were swiftly handed over over the course of a month.
On the 15th of Feburary 1957, Bashar addressed his people. He crowed
"The tyrant Anthony Eden, to my face, compared President Nasser to Hitler and me personally to Mussolini. Well, just as Mussolini did in Ethiopia, we have emerged victorious and I shall paraphrase Mussolini: The Hejaz is Arabian!"
to the mass adulation of the crowd.
Aftermath
The Arabian Socialist Republic engaged in the Hejazi adventure, ocnfident of a strong alliance between it and Egypt. As a result of the stoush between the two leaders, the trust between the two nations was shattered, with one side seeing the other as a potential foe and accusing the other of betrayal.
The Arabian High Command studied the war in depth and determined that in desert warfare, fast and fluid operations were key, along with air supremacy. With this in mind, Bashar instituted the Ales-Gaith (The Sheath), the first ever Arabian special forces unit and permitted the Spetsnaz to train them. Bashar also used his country's oil funds and zakat taxes to heavily invest in an air force.
Following a debate with the Society, Bashar allowed Mecca and Medina to retain their autonomous status, but effectively tore up the Treaty of Hejaz as a practical document as Egypt was no longer in control of the Hejaz.
The liberation of the Hejaz gave Arabia a land border with Israel. While Bashar, unlike Nasser, was not anti-Semitic, he still loathed Israel for it's ejection of the region's Arab inhabitants and refused to even consider diplomatic relations with it. The Arabian-Israeli border was militarized with Soviet-issued landmines and barbed wire
Operation Hussein would be the last time the Arabian Army would use it's British style khaki uniforms. Towards the end of the '50s, this uniform would be phased out in favour of lizard camouflage fatigues. Soldiers fighting as members of the Ales-Gaith would wear the woodland pattern, with both forces using SSH-40-style helmets. .
[1] I will definitely explain this in a future post.