Cut off One Head: What if Wahhab Was Beheaded TL

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Introduction
In our timeline, the founder of Wahhabism, Mohammad ibn al-Wahhab, spent much of his life touring the Middle East. Upon his return to his hometown of Uyayna in 1744, he began putting his accumulated ideology, inspired by the works of Ibn Taymiyyah, into practice. His actions, which included levelling the grave of a companion of Mohammad and the stoning of adulters, so outraged one of the largest powerbrokers in the Nejd region that the powerbroker demanded Wahhab either be exiled or executed. The leader of Wahhab's village exiled him. Soon after, Wahhab would encounter the leader of the al-Saud clan and would make a power-sharing agreement that would alter the fate of not just the Middle East, but the world as a whole.

But what if Wahhab was executed for his unpopular beliefs?...


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In our timeline, the founder of Wahhabism, Mohammad ibn al-Wahhab, spent much of his life touring the Middle East. Upon his return to his hometown of Uyayna in 1744, he began putting his accumulated ideology, inspired by the works of Ibn Taymiyyah, into practice. His actions, which included levelling the grave of a companion of Mohammad and the stoning of adulters, so outraged one of the largest powerbrokers in the Nejd region that the powerbroker demanded Wahhab either be exiled or executed. The leader of Wahhab's village exiled him. Soon after, Wahhab would encounter the leader of the al-Saud clan and would make a power-sharing agreement that would alter the fate of not just the Middle East, but the world as a whole.

But what if Wahhab was executed for his unpopular beliefs?...​
It would certainly bring quite a lot of religious change in relation to RL SA.

But would it stop the leader of the al-Saud Clan from gaining influence if he would follow a different form of his religion?
 
But would it stop the leader of the al-Saud Clan from gaining influence if he would follow a different form of his religion?

From what I understand, no one took Ibn Saud seriously until he allied with Wahhab. What other forms of Islam were there for him to ally with? Would the Mamluks, for example, really ally with a unknown Bedouin chief like Ibn Saud?
 
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Proof of Execution - circa 1744
(The following scene was described by a Bedouin tribesman to an Ottoman soldier sometime after Wahhab's execution)

"I was in Sulaiman Ibn Ghurayr's entourage and I was discussing on enforcing a land tax on some small tribe when one of Sulaiman's soldiers entered into the tent and said 'Sulaiman, a messenger from Uyayah is here'. Sulaiman waved the man away, but not before inviting the messenger in. My nose was then assaulted by some horrible, stinking scent. From where I was standing, I could see something dripping blood as it entered the tent. The messenger from Uyayad had a thick black beard and he was slightly middle aged. He had rose water dripping off of him[1}. He held a sack in the air and said "Sulaiman Ghurayr, Uthman ibn Muammar sends his regards and a gift", He handed Sulaiman a letter. It read

"As-salaam 'alykm[2], Brother Sulaiman. You threatened to withhold my right to collect land taxes if I didn't get rid of the parasite that called himself Mohamamd ibn al-Wahhab. This messenger brings you proof that I have committed the deed. I have no need for his head, so I give it to you as a gift and example of my loyalty",

Sulaiman thanked the messenger for his 'gift' and in Bedouin hospitality, offered the messenger a stay in his mekaad raabia{3}. When the messenger left to relax, Sulaiman Ghurayr simply tossed the head into the metal fireplace, saying "No one will remember who he was", as he did so.

The gift had so offended the women in the tent that when the head was burned, i could hear a collective gasp for air, as if the head's stink had been ddepriivng them of oxygen to such an extent that even the tattoos on their faces couldn't heal them.

I never saw the head. It never left it's sack in which it was burned, but I could imagine the expression on the head's face. Did it accept it's fate? Did it plead for mercy one last time before this troublemaker was snuffed out? I imagined all three and all three disturbed me. What had this man done that warranted Sulaiman Ghurayr, the leader of the Bani Khalid{4}, to call for his death?"




{1} When Bedouins completed their long journey, it was traditional for them to be covered with rose water to cleanse them of unpleasant smells.

[2} Translated as 'Peace be upon you",

{3} Bedouin tents were gender segregated. Men lived in the mekaad raabia which translated to 'men's apartment'. Women had their own section called 'meharrem'.

{4} The tribal confederation's territory extended from Iraq in the north to Oman in the south, with the centre of power being Al-Mubarazz, along the Persian Gulf.
 
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(The following scene was described by a Bedouin tribesman to an Ottoman soldier sometime after Wahhab's execution)

"I was in Ibn Ghurayr's entourage and I was discussing on enforcing a land tax on some small tribe when one of Ibn's soldiers entered into the tent and said 'Ibn, a messenger from Uyayah is here'. Ibn waved the man away, but not before inviting the messenger in. My nose was then assaulted by some horrible, stinking scent. From where I was standing, I could see something dripping blood as it entered the tent. The messenger from Uyayad had a thick black beard and he was slightly middle aged. He had rose water dripping off of him[1}. He held a sack in the air and said "Ibn Ghurayr, Uthman ibn Muammar sends his regards and a gift", He handed Ibn a letter. It read

"As-salaam 'alykm[2], Brother Ibn. You threatened to withhold my right to collect land taxes if I didn't get rid of the parasite that called himself Mohamamd ibn al-Wahhab. This messenger brings you proof that I have committed the deed. I have no need for his head, so I give it to you as a gift and example of my loyalty",

Ibn thanked the messenger for his 'gift' and in Bedouin hospitality, offered the messenger a stay in his mekaad raabia{3}. When the messenger left to relax, Ibn Ghurayr simply tossed the head into the metal fireplace, saying "No one will remember who he was", as he did so.

The gift had so offended the women in the tent that when the head was burned, i could hear a collective gasp for air, as if the head's stink had been ddepriivng them of oxygen to such an extent that even the tattoos on their faces couldn't heal them.

I never saw the head. It never left it's sack in which it was burned, but I could imagine the expression on the head's face. Did it accept it's fate? Did it plead for mercy one last time before this troublemaker was snuffed out? I imagined all three and all three disturbed me. What had this man done that warranted Ibn Ghurayr, the leader of the Bani Khalid{4}, to call for his death?"

Minor nitpick, "ibn" is the patronymic- Uthman ibn Muammar is Uthman, the son of Muammar. No one would use just "ibn " as a short name.
 
Is "cut off one head" an allusion to Marvel HYDRA --and the response is invariably, "Two more shall grow"?
This is an interesting topic...
 
From the Journal of a Mamluk Officer - 24th May 1755
I don't know why, but I feel like what we have done today is a gift to both mankind and to Allah.

Several days ago, a man calling himself Mohammad bin Saud came to Sulayman Abu Layla Pasha[1} and demanded that we assist his campaign to establish an emirate within the Arabian Peninsula. As we are attempting to repair our relationship with our former Ottoman enslavers, the Porte turned him down. This is when Bin Saud attempted to bully us into complying, threatening to sack Baghdad with his 'legions of tribesmen'. But Sulayman challenged him saying, 'You have farmers. I have warriors'. Bin Saud soon left in a huff.

I don't know how, but the Ottomans became aware of Bin Saud's visit. They sent a emissary on horseback to tell Sulayman if he wanted good relations with the Exalted Ottoman State and most importantly, the Caliph, then Bin Saud must pay for attempting to solicit aid in a uprising against the Caliphate. If I may contradict a emissary of the Caliph, I am more inclined to believe that the Caliph more desired the safe transit of his trade caravans than he did the solidity of the State. The State has to acquire it's money from somewhere after all, though I didn't dare speak up when the Turkish emissary was in the room.

The Pasha dispatched myself and several of my troops to the Peninsula to break this rebellious emir. Our first target was the city of Riyadh. We surrounded the city on all sides and I sent a emissary forward to demand Bin Saud's surrender. The emissary came back without his head atop his body, with the head resting on the saddle. Following the emissary's body was Bin Saud's army. They were holding black flags of jihad as they charged at us. I raised my sabre and ordered for my cavalry to charge. Bin Saud was exaggerating when he tried to threaten us with his 'legion', because the tribesmen were cut to pieces. I personally decapitated and bisected a dozen of his 'warriors'. Those tribesmen who weren't killed during the scrape broke ranks and ran for their lives. They had no heart, no stake in the fight, other than to expand their leader's reach.

By the time we had cut through Bin Saud's men, he had fled to Diriyah. As we settled into Riyadh, we came across butchery. Decapitated bodies, just left to be claimed by sandstorms. I surmised that these were tribesmen who either refused to join Bin Saud's crusade or perhaps trade caravans which fell victim to Saudi raids. The bloodshed only emboldened my resolve to crush this threat to the Caliphate.

The next morning, we assaulted the settlement, which now had some reinforcements from other villages or tribes. Like the tribesmen we fought before, as we cut down their numbers, they just cut and ran. When we got inside, anyone who so much as raised a scimitar to us was cut down. We searched every building for the rebel leader and his children, who our scouts had previously reported had fled the city with their father.

And we found them. Mohammad bin Saud and his four sons were dressed head to toe in niqabs and attempted to escape us, dressed as women. Some of my men wanted them put down, but the Porte wanted me to take them alive, for some reason. We had our fun, tormenting them by offering our 'services' to them. After burning Dariyah to the ground and looting what could be taken, we returned to Baghdad, where we washed our hands clean of Mohammad bin Saud's filth.

After Mohammad bin Saud's capture, the villages who had previously followed him sheepishly fell into line. They reaffirmed their allegiance to the Caliph and as far as I am aware, trade caravans are proceeding throughout the Nejd region unmolested. In regards to Mohammad bin Saud and his sons? They're not my problem and until I began writing this entry, I hadn't devoted one thought to them. They tried to wage war against the Caliph, they'll get what's coming to them.

I feel like I've done a favour by getting rid of this menace. I don't know why, I just have a strong gut feeling that I've done something noble.


{1} For those who don't know, Turkish surnames didn't exist until the Republic of Turkey in 1922. Instead, in Ottoman times, a Turk's name was followed by his title, so Sulayman is the Pasha of the Mamluk dynasty in what is now Iraq.

[2} Contrary to his contemporaries, Mohammad bin Saud was not a nomadic Bedouin. He was the emir of a agricultural settlement which bore the name Dariyah.

{3} The Wadi Hanifa (meaning Hanifa Valley) was and still is a dry valley with a length of 120 kilometres and it cuts through the city of Riyadh, which in ancient times, used to only occupy the north-eastern side of the valley. Riyadh and Diriyah are only 20 kilometres away from each other.
 
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An Argument Between the Sharif of Mecca and the Governor of Jeddah, circa 1831
(Taken from a journal of one of the Pasha's bodyguards during the First Egyptian-Ottoman War)

"The Egyptians have surrounded the city of Jeddah and they are demanding the surrender of the city. If this city falls, then so do the Sharifate of Mecca, as most of the Ottoman forces in the region are concentrated here. The Egyptians see the Pasha of Jeddah as nothing more than a pencil-pushing bureaucrat. They wanted the Sharif of Mecca's signature on any surrender papers. The Pasha locked himself in a room with the Sharif. Through the doors, I can hear the Pasha beg the Sharif not to surrender, since if the Sharif surrenders, then no one along the whole of the Hejaz will fight for the Exalted Ottoman State. The Sharif tells the Pasha to give into reason and not delusion. Further fighting could result in damage to Mecca and Medina and that would bring a torrent of anger down on the Pasha's head. The Pasha wants to die a martyr, to give his life meaning after being expelled to this... post[2}, the Sharif accuses. The Pasha accuses the Sharif of not having a spine and only holding the position because he likes the power. The Sharif, reserved and calm, reminds the Governor who he is descended from{3]. The Pasha blatantly tells the Sharif that the Egyptians don't care about who he is descended from. They only want the people of the Vilayet to join Egypt, the 'bastard child of Western imperialism and Islam', as he so politely calls it.

The meeting is interrupted by the arrival of the Sharif of Medina. He immediately sides with his Meccan counterpart, accusing the Governor of trying to achieve a martyr's death at the expense of the holy sites. The Pasha eventually caved and allowed the Sharifs to surrender Jeddah to the Egyptians",


[1} The Ottomans never had a tight grip on the Hejaz region as a whole. Within the whole 250,000 square kilometre area, only Jeddah and Mecca had permanent garrisons.

[2] In OTL, being given the job of governing Jeddah was essentially the same as being exiled, as far as those burdened with the position were concerned.

[3} The holders of the title of Sharif of Mecca were descendants of Hasan bin Ali, the grandson of the Prophet Mohammad.
 
A Reflection on the Causes of the Great Rebellion And What The Islamic World Could Learn from It and India - 1884
(Taken from an essay written in the Firmest Bond newspaper[1] by Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani)

The Great Rebellion[2] which consumed the Indian subcontinent proved that the European imperialists have gotten a foothold onto the Indian subcontinent. The continent is now lost. We, as Muslims, must look towards the Middle East and ensure it's protection from European colonialism.

For years, the British have subjugated the Indian subcontinent. Their private armies force their soldiers to handle their guns, greased with pig and cow fat, and they demand exorbitant taxes from poor villages. The East India Company looks at profit margins and not the deleterious effects their lust for profits are having on their... investments, I believe is the proper word to be used within this context. Judging by how the larger states practically stood by while the other Indians fought for their freedom, the British have weeded their way into Indian society, bribing them with trinkets for their neutrality, at a time where unity between the two rival clans of Islam and Hinduism could've permitted victory. Those who fought within the East India Company are effectively treated like slaves with insultingly low wages and their rights as human beings were ignored. No matter how much a Indian worked for his imperial master, they were paid a pittance.

The British believed themselves to be the legitimate successors of the Mughals. They thought a Christian imperialist company could rule over a mixed continent of non-Christians. But it is the Hindu and Muslims who should be the next incarnation of the Mughals. Before the British came, the Muslim Mughals ruled their Hindu brothers with a firm, but soft hand and the subcontinent prospered financially as a result, with the Empire only failing with incompetent Emperors, beginning and ending with a emperor named Bahadur Zafar, refusing to work with their Hindu brethren. That same brethren flocked to the seemingly open arms of the British. But if the Muslims learn from the mistakes of the Mughals, then Islam can rule the continent again.

As aresult of the Imperial collapse, the subcontinent began falling backwards, with a drop in agricultural productivity which drove up the prices of textiles and food prices. This si what attracted Britain to India. India had lost it's place in the textile world and this provided a oppurtunity for the British to come in with it's imperialist company and begin making friends with the impoverished princes.

The British subjugated the continent with their modern weaponry. Cannons, ships, guns. These weapons are the weapons Muslims must obtain if the Middle East and most improtantly, the Arabian Peninsula, is to survive the age of European Christian imperialism. The Mughals were somewhat modern in their own right, having a expansive road network which sustained the Mughals' economic infrastructure. A powerful economic infrastructre would prevent imperialism from grabbing onto pieces of the region, while a modernized military would be the teeth of the Islamic world.

A economic infrastructure would allow the Islamic world to replicate the Mughals' success in trade. There was a time where the Mughals had the British practically eating out of their hands and not the other way around. A strong economic base, untarnished by ludicrous spending, would also prevent the Middle East from suffering the fate of Egypt in 1882, which was to be invaded and then occupied by the Christians, though the Christians pretend Egypt is still part of the Ottoman State. If Muslims work together and come together as a community, we will be able to copy the successes of the Mughals and put European imperialism on the backfoot and keep them out of our heartland.

But as we modernize, we cannot forget that we are Muslims and as Muslims, we are followers of the most sustainable creed for a uprising against the imperialists. We are submissive to one Allah and we have the Qur'an, which contains the word of Allah. We must follow the word of Allah if we are to survive in the age of European encroachment into the holy lands. There is nothing in the Qur'an against modernizing how we see the world. The Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) had no intention of retarding humanity so that it will always be the age of the Bedouin. The ways of the salaf, the people who followed Mohammad, are behind us. Anyone who says we should go back to those times has no idea of what they are talking about. Muslims must receive both a spiritual and a scientific education, one to learn about Allah and the other to learn about reason. There must be the firmest bond between Muslims. There also must be the firmest bond between Islam and science and reason. The idea that Muslims are divided over how Islam should fit into the modern age contradicts the Qur'an.

In conclusion, to prevent the loss of the Middle East, as we lost the Indian subcontinent, we must severely modernize the region through such means as building viable economic infrastructures and modern weaponry, but we must also become educated in science and reason. If we apply these methods to our civilization, then we may be able to slow the spreading of the virus that is European imperialism.


[1] This was a real Arabic newspaper published in Paris, France by al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh in 1884. These two men are considered the forefathers of Islamic Modernism. However, the essay you read above was written entirely by me.

[2] Another term for the Indian Mutiny of 1857.
 
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And he will never know it, but he is right in so many ways owing to the suffering Wahhabi Muslims have unleashed on the world and the harm it has done to the reputation of Islam.
As a Muslim I must agree with you 1000/100 and more because they distorted the image of islam and they give rise to all kinds of terrorist groups
 
Change must come to the position of Caliph and Islam as a whole - 1905
(Taken from a essay by Rashid Rida[1] in 1892[2])

In 1882, after the so-called Ismail the Magnificent drove the Khedivate’s economy into the ground, the British invaded and effectively established a protectorate over Egypt. They tell us we’re still technically part of the Exalted Ottoman State, but the Egyptian Army has been reorganized according to a British model and it is now staffed with British officers, so I am not very much inclined to believe them.

While this is happening, the so-called Caliph Abdul Hamid II did nothing. He was too busy wallowing in self pity after losing a war to Russia in 1878, which resulted in the loss of territories that had been a part of the Ottoman State for 500 years. Before then, the Caliph was steeped in debt with foreign powers as a result of the Crimean War.

The fact that the Caliph has been humiliated not once, but twice, by the Christian powers naturally leads the State’s subjects to question the Caliph’s legitimacy to claim leadership of the State. Translated from Arabic, the word ‘Caliph’ means ‘successor’. Abdul Hamid II, when he wears this title, is claiming to be the successor of the Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him). But he is not just the successor of the Prophet. He is only one in a long line of caliphs, which began with the Prophet’s father in law, Abu Bakr. The Rashidun Caliphs expanded Islam’s reach from Arabia into North Africa and onto the European continent and into Persia.

But the righteousness of the Caliph and his right to rule, in my view, ended with the death of Hasan bin Ali. After him, the title of caliph became a meaningless title held by someone who just happened to be leader of a Islamic empire.

Muawiyah didn’t come to power through his devotion to the faith. He came to power through his family ties to the Umayyad clan and even while he was Caliph, he never made mention of the Prophet publicly and focused on pleasing the Christians in Jerusalem.

Yazid I came to power, not through devotion to faith, but through hereditary means. He murdered Husayn bin Ali at Karbala and pillaged Medina. He has been rightfully called a ‘arrogant drunken sot’.

But in my view, it is the Sultans of the Ottoman State who have disgraced the title more than any other in history.

Ibraham the 1st was a mentally ill child who pleasured himself with a haram of concubines.

Mustafa was keept in a cage from age 11 and was entertained by two slave girls.

Murad the 4th ordered mass exeecutions merely for his own entertainment.

The position of Caliph has been utterly disgraced ever since the last of the Rashidun Caliphs died and it has lost it’s once-treasured religious significance. The utter failure of the Ottoman Caliphate, under it’s present leadership, to protect it’s sacred territories and to prevent one of it’s most important areas from coming under unofficial Christian occupation only shows how weak the Caliph’s hold on his dominion is.

After his death, there should still be a Caliph, of course, but it’s religious sanctity needs to be restored. This can be done by giving one who is faithful the position of being consulted by the Caliph into the functions of government. This consultant, or perhaps, a group of consultants (Shura) will ensure that Allah has influence on the policies of the government.

But of course, a Caliph, if he wants to remain in his position, should be open to new ideas. Hanzala ibn Abi’ Amir, the son of a companion of Mohammad (peace be upon him), said “A dirham of riba which a man receives knowingly is worse than committing adultery thirty six times”, In essence, Islam forbids the taking of interest because it makes the poorest poor and the rich very much richer. The laws governing social relations (muamalat) must be changed, to a degree not contradicting Islamic law, simply due to the reality that in Western capitalism, taking interest is as common as taking money from the poor and giving it to the rich. The Muslim ummah must be willing to accept Western economic practices if it is to survive in the modern era.

Yes, Islam, as a religion, must be upheld, but this does not mean we have to follow every word of the faith in the same context as the Prophet (peace be upon him) did. The Prophet Mohammad’s time has passed like sand in the hourglass. The ulama must learn to adapt to these changing times.

These changing times include the undeniable fact that science has a role to play in Islam. In particular, the theory of evolution. The stories which are told in the Qur’an, in regards to how the world was created, are allegorical at best and are not to be taken completely seriously. The history, which is told in the Qur’an, at worst, is a Hebrew fairy tale and so is not to be believed by Muslims.

There must be more scientists and more people of reason within Islam. The Western world, with all of it’s advancements has much to teach the Islamic world, and contrary to what some believe, it is inevitable that the Islamic world accepts these advancements. Allah created all life. That includes the life that the West calls 'microbes'. The existence of microbes must be acknowledged by the Islamic world.

But, as Islam modernizes, we should always remember that Sharia must be at the centrepoint of all Muslims. Koran 5:44 says "Indeed, we sent down the Torah, in which was guidance and light. THe prophets who submitted to Allah judged by it for the Jews, as did the rabbis and scholars by that which they were entrusted of the Scripture of Allah. So do not fear the people, but fear Me, and do not exchange my verses for a small price. And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed, then it is those who are the disbelievers",

Qur'an 5:44 applies to `...whomsoever thinks it distasteful to rule in accordance with the just rules which God sent down, and does not rule by them because he has different views, or because he has worldly interests. According to these verses, they are unbelievers; because true faith requires obedience. Obedience requires deeds, and is not consistent with omission", [3]

In conclusion, the position of Caliph must be returned to it's place of treasured religious significance. This should be followed by a emphasis on the integration of the prevalence of scientific advances with religious doctrine, all the while maintaining that we are a Islamic people and that we should follow our core beliefs, but with some major alterations to co-exist with and perhaps demystify the West.

[1] Another real person from history and another Islamic modernist.

[2] Like the last one, this essay is entirely fictitious, but it is based on Rashad Radi's beliefs.

[3] Actual quote from Rashid Rahid. Islamic modernism is not the same thing as secularism.
 
The Emirate of Ha'ii and It's Relationship with the Ottoman Empire
(Queen of the Desert: The Extraordinary Life of Gertrude Bell)​
[1}

The clan’s royal family, the Shanmar, is very hierarchical. There is the emir, Abd al-Aziz, ibn Mutib (or his nickname Ibn Rashid), who is 43 years old at present. He occasionally goes on raids of opposing camping grounds. He already had four wives and two baby sons. The highest authority in the Amir’s absence was his son, Homound. Women can hold honoured positions within the inner circle, such as grandparents, who can hold the royal purse-strings. Women in the inner circle wear jewels that belonged communally to the harem and were lent to favoured wives or borrowed for special events.

According to a judgement handed down from the fourteenth century, a woman should leave her house on only three occasions: when conducted to the house of her bridegroom, on the deaths of her parents, and when she went to her own grave. Ordinary women in Hayyil do venture out at night, completely veiled, but only to see female members of their family. The more powerful the family, the more strictly did it interpret the rules. Every woman should have a male guardian, even if this was a boy half her age, and it would be he who contracted her marriage. A husband could have up to four wives, provided he behaved with equal generosity to all, and as many concubines as he wanted. He could divorce a wife without giving a reason, by speaking a simple form of words in the presence of witnesses.

Overseeing the harem were the eunuchs, brought from Mecca or Constantinople. Some had important outside duties: the eunuch Salih, for instance, was also the watchman of Hayyil. Then there are the male slaves, whose importance was far greater than the word suggests. These men, taken in raids along with horses and camels, were divided into two categories. If they were judged ugly or stupid, they would spend the rest of their lives making themselves useful to their owners. If they were intelligent, handsome and presentable, they would be taken into the wealthiest families and given trusted positions. Charles Doughty had called them the ‘slave-brothers’. Of these, the elite would become part of the royal household, living in the palace. They were allowed to carry arms. Turkiyyeh led Gertrude to understand that she would do well to make allies of these men if she could. Chief of the slave-brothers was Sayyid, who was also a eunuch, and a direct conduit to the Emir.


[2]


In early 1870, the Ottoman government made two notable attempts to integrate Najd into the Ottoman administration. However, these were not initiated through a decision by the central government, but by two prominent statesmen of the Tanzimat era: Midhat Pasha, the governor general of Baghdad, and Abdullatif Subhi Pasha, the governor of Syria, who persuaded the central government of the necessity to expand Ottoman rule in the region. This stemmed from their respective regional concerns, and thus the perspectives of the two governors were rather different from one another. As will be detailed below, while Midhat’s plan was conceived so as to secure Ottoman power in Iraq and the Persian Gulf, Abdullatif Subhi was concerned with maintaining order in Syrian lands and along the pilgrimage route to the Hijaz.

At about the same time, in 1872, another ambitious Tanzimat statesman, Abdullatif Subhi Pasha, was making a similar attempt to pacify another tribal dynasty of Najd, the Rashidis, and penetrate into that region. Much as with Midhat Pasha’s expedition, Abdullatif Subhi was invited into the Jawf region by the residents, who wished to be saved from the “atrocities” of Amir Muhammad ibn Rashid, the newly emerging independent power in the city of Ha’il. For this, Abdullatif Subhi prepared a two-stage plan. First, he would establish a kaimakamate (kaza district) in Jawf in northern Najd, which had already been captured by Hiza ibn Shalaan, chief of the Ruwala tribe, on behalf of the government and with the encouragement of the governor of Damascus. Following this, Ottoman troops would be able to move southeast into central Najd. If Ibn Rashid resisted the establishment of Ottoman control in Jawf, the sheikhs of the Seba and Ruwala, branches of the Anizah tribal confederation and rivals of the Rashidis, would stand ready to assist. The reason Subhi wanted to establish a kaimakamate in Jawf was to be able to settle and control the Bedouin tribes there. He planned to annex the villages of the rich district of Khaybar near Medina to Jawf and to post Ibn Shalaan’s brother Sattam there as kaimakam, since it was thought that he would act in harmony with the Ottoman administration. In this way, the administration of Jawf would be strengthened both financially and politically. With Jawf thus under control, there would be great economic and political benefits, the pilgrimage route from Syria to Medina would be secured, Ibn Rashid would be weakened, and the threat posed to Ottoman order in Syria and Iraq by the mobile Bedouin tribes of the desert would be eliminated. Ultimately, however, the first stage of this plan failed, and at the recommendation of Abdullatif Subhi’s successor, Halet Pasha, and the Protector of Medina, Halid Pasha, Ottoman administration over Jawf was abolished in 1873, just one year after its establishment.12 The region was thus left to Ibn Rashid, with whom an agreement was made stating that an Ottoman officer with eighty soldiers would remain in the region and an annual tribute of 70,000 kuruş would be paid to the treasury of Mecca and Medina. According to Süleyman Şefik Söylemezoğlu, however, these tributes were never paid.15 Another significant reason behind the Ottoman withdrawal from Jawf can be found when the wider regional context is taken into consideration. The Ottoman administration was consolidated in al-Hasaand Transjordan,


In the 1870s, the Rashidis were not powerful enough to be considered threats to Ottoman order in the region, and so it was effectively meaningless for the Ottomans to attempt to maintain the Jawf administration



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It was during this period as well that British and French officials and travelers who visited Muhammad ibn Rashid were allegedly providing him with military aid. Ottoman reports from 1883 state that Ibn Rashid was visited by British officials disguised as travelers,26 while in 1884 the French traveler and scholar Charles Huber was murdered by his guide around Jeddah as he was on his way to Ha’il to pay Ibn Rashid a visit.27 Also in 1884, some seventeen British officials paid him a long visit to donate nine boxes of Martini rifles.28 There were also two other foreigners who came to the amir and presented him with considerable quantities of rifles and ammunition.29 Another French traveler, Marquis, was planning to go to Ha’il, but had to delay his visit.30 Later, in the 1890s, Muhammad ibn Rashid also seemed to incline toward becoming a potential ally of the British, due to talks regarding a project to connect the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf via a railway that would run from Suez through Akaba and thence across Arabia to the gulf.31 The Ottoman government, meanwhile, was especially concerned that the British would proclaim a protectorate over Jabal Shammar32 and provoke the Rashidis to attack Baghdad.33 As such, in order to maintain control in Arabia as well as in Iraq, Syria, and even Yemen, the Ottomans considered it crucial to bring the Rashidi under control.

Midhat Pasha and Abdullatif Subhi Pasha’s experiences had already demonstrated the inefficiency of the methods of the Tanzimat period, and so now the Ottomans were moreinclined to favor their earlier approach of controlling the region through an amir.34 All of these factors ultimately compelled the imperial authorities to strengthen their local alliances so that the Ottoman government in the Hijaz, Iraq, al-Hasa, and Syria could become immune to threats emanating from Najd. The Rashidis obtained great advantage from their partnership with the Ottomans. Due to Sultan Abdulhamid II’s reliance upon Muhammad ibn Rashid and the latter’s promotion of their relationship, the spread of Rashidi power was tolerated—in stark contrast to Ottoman policy toward the Saudi dynastyandtothedetrimentoftheSaudisandotherlocalpower-holders.The Ottoman governments in Medina, al-Hasa, Basra, Baghdad, and Syria would be admonished by the central government whenever they intervened militarily in conflicts between the Rashidis and other tribes. However, when the Rashidis would attack tribes under the government’s jurisdiction and tax lands controlled by the empire, Ibn Rashid would be sternly warned to abstain from such actions. In 1892, for example, Ibn Rashid levied taxes in the kazas of al-Ula and Khaybar, in Medina.37 Following complaints from villagers and tribesmen, he was then warned that the region was under the jurisdiction of the Protector of Medina and cautioned not to do this in the future.38 Similarly, when in 1895 some tribes annexed to the province of Najd in al-Hasa were plundered by Ibn Rashid, the government reprimanded him and returned the stolen goods.39 By securing the friendship of Ottoman representatives in the surrounding region, Muhammad ibn Rashid was able to broaden his tribal networks from Iraq and Syria to the Hijaz. In Basra, the Rashidis allied with the Sadunis and the al-Zafirs of the Muntafiq tribal confederation.

In coastal Najd, Qasim al-Thani, the sheikh of Qatar, also developed close relations with Muhammad ibn Rashid. In Mosul and Aleppo, the Hamound tribes advised him on trade.

What is more, under Ibn Rashid, the Rashidis were able to increase their revenue through the pilgrimage route and trade caravans.43 As for the Ottomans, they further cemented Rashidi loyalty by paying considerable salaries and providing grain44 to Ibn Rashid and other prominent figures under him, as well as annually sending him a prestigious hil’at (robe of honor). This latter gift was initially opposed by the Hijazi authorities because it was claimed that for Ibn Rashid to receive such a gift directly from the sultan would make him equal to the emir of Mecca, which would not be fitting; instead, it was explained, Ibn Rashid should be given the hil’at by the amir of Mecca and the governor of the Hijaz, as was the case with other tribal leaders in the region. It was in this manner that the Rashidis, most especially under the leadership of Muhammad ibn Rashid, were able to establish their hegemony in Najd between 1887 and 1902.


#

Muhammad ibn Rashid’s astute strategies for keeping the empire on his side were the main factors that ensured the continuation of the Ottoman-Rashidi partnership, and in subsequent years the sultan would dismiss any exaggerated reports by local bureaucrats regarding his supposed inclination to independence. He took advantage of any opportunity to demonstrate his loyalty to the sultan, and studiously avoided any actions that might be misperceived by him. When the Ottoman center grew anxious that he might make an attempt to control tributaries along the coast of the Najd and put an end to its administration there, he successfully defused these concerns by not approaching the coast. He also took care to avoid any liaisons that might be misunderstood by the Ottomans .A notable example in this regard was his close relation with the sheikh of Qatar, Qasim al-Thani. Immediately following the invasion of Riyadh, Muhammad ibn Rashid promised to support al-Thani in his dispute with Zaid, the sheikh of Abu Dhabi. Ottoman authorities, however, interpreted this as an attempt to extend Rashidi influence into the old Saudidomains,and as a result, Ibn Rashid entered into no further engagements with al-Thani during the course of his reign. He was also careful to abstain from engaging in conflict with Ottoman soldiers and to obey the orders of the imperial authorities. For instance, even after he had established hegemony over Najd, he returned, upon the authorities’ request, the goods and animals that his Bedouin forces had plundered from tribes under Ottoman jurisdiction

#


Muhammad ibn Rashid’s death in 1897 and the accession of Abd al-Aziz to the amirship changed Rashidi policy, and this, in turn, affected the Ottoman partnership. The new amir was ambitious about expanding his territories in Arabia,and to that end, immediately after assuming the Emirship, he opened new hostilities with the tribal sheikhs in Basra, Baghdad, coastal Najd, Yemen, and Asir: in April 1899, he attacked the Anizah Bedouins of Deir ez-Zor;64 in September 1899, he clashed with Bedouin groups connected to the subprovince of Najd and in September 1900,he initiated hostilities against the tribes to the east of Asir (i.e., those of Wadi al-Dawasir and Wadi Najran, on the Yemeni border). The Ottoman authorities grew anxious regarding his plans to expand his authority over the Persian Gulf. His authority over Najd and his thirst for power also made other local power-holders concerned for their territories. Eventually, Abd al-Aziz’s intention to depose the sheikh of Kuwait, Mubarak al-Sabah, and his disputes with Sadun Pasha of the Muntafiq prompted an alliance between these two sheikhs, led by the former. They were able to organize their alliance without Ottoman intervention because Mubarakal-Sabah had British support.

Ottoman state documents show that the empire did not intervene directly in this issue, but continued to make great efforts to reconcile the sides up through 1904, when Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud recaptured Qasim and moved closer to the Hijaz.76 These efforts at reconciliation on the part of the Ottoman center were motivated primarily by three major concerns. First, local and central authorities were concerned that, in the event of a Rashidi victory, the Rashidi amirate would develop connections with the Persian Gulf and thereby potentially threaten the Ottoman administration in coastal Najd and Basra.77 Second, if the Rashidis were defeated, it would mean the collapse of the regional imperial order, which had been built on the Ottoman-Rashidi partnership. The Ottomans therefore pressed Sadun Pasha and those Anizah tribes hostile to the Rashidis to make peace withAbdal-Aziz ibn Rashid, which led to their withdrawal from the conflict and left Mubarak al-Sabah on his own.79 The third and most acute Ottoman concern, however, was the possibility that the British might exploit the tribal dispute in such a way as to be able to intervene in the region, thus threatening the Ottoman position in the Persian Gulf and Arabia. As the Ottoman authorities had it, the British hoped that the hostility between Abd al-Aziz ibn Rashid and Mubarak al-Sabah would create an opportunity for them to intervene in the region.80 Despite its concerns, though, the Ottoman authorities did benefit from the dispute between the Rashidis and Mubarak al-Sabah in that they managed, to some extent, to wean the sheikh of Kuwait away from the British, compelling him to accept imperial authority. When Mubarak refused to admit a garrison of Ottoman soldiers and an Ottoman judge into Kuwait and turned to the British, the Ottomans began to plan a military expedition, supported by Abd al-Aziz ibn Rashid.81 The Rashidi amir was quite willing to support the expedition, as it would result in the removal of Mubarak and the appointment of an Ottoman bureaucrat in his stead.82 The British, however, warned the Ottomans that they would not permit action against the sheikh by either the empire or Ibn Rashid.83 As a result, the Ottomans ultimately persuaded Abd al-Aziz to withdraw from Kuwait, partly by compensating him for the military expenditures he had made.84 Thus, though the Ottomans were unable to bring Kuwait under their full control, they nonetheless did manage to maintain the status quo.





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The flag of the Emirate of Ha'ii


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Abdul Aziz bin Mut'lib, the sixth Emir of Ha'ii


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The Emirate at it's height of power

[1} This is a real book, though I had to change the name of the Emir to more fit the alternate history. Check it out if you feel so inclined.

[2} After months of scouring the Internet, I FINALLY found some expanded information on the Emirate of Ha'ii. I put a link to the PDF this information came from, just in case others want to learn more about it. Also, yeah, I left most of the information unaltered, except for excising references to the Al-Sauds.
 
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The Fall of Mecca - December 1914
The Great War: From An Arab Perspective​

(A man is sitting in a chair inside a house, talking to a camera. The footage is in colour, but grainy, indicating that it is from the 1970s-80s)

Narrator: The Ottoman Empire allowed diplomats from allied nations to observe a meeting of tribes that took place just after the Ottoman declaration of war. The sole surviving diplomat is the Austrian consul.

Interviewer: What was the Ottoman Empire's policies towards the tribes of Arabia after the declaration of jihad?

Consul: The declaration of jihad signified that it was to be a war by Islam against the Christian powers of Europe, so naturally, the Ottomans wanted to get the tribes of Arabia on side. They wanted the Al-Rashids to possibly work with the Hashemites.

Interviewer: Did the Hashemites attend the meeting?

Consul: Yes, but it immediately got off to a bad start.

Interviewer: How so?

Consul: Al-Rashid still wanted Kuwait. He wanted Ottoman assurances that he would get Kuwait if the Ottomans won the war. The Ottoman representative said that it couldn't be done as it would be a threat to the Empire's security.

Interviewer: And the Hashemites?

Consul: Hussain bin Ali wanted the Rashidis to recognize his family's rightful dominion over Mecca. He said 'I am of the Prophet's family, so I have rights to that city'. In exchange, he would allow the Rashids to attend the Hajj.

Interviewer: What was Al-Rashid's reaction?

Consul: Oh, he was livid. He almost called Hussain something that began with kuf1], but the representative silenced him. I didn't know what that meant at the time.

Interviewer: Did the meeting end there?

Consul: Oh God no. Then the Hashemites began petitoning the Ottoman representative for autonomy for the Hejaz. He said 'I will give the Turks 100 of my best riders if the Caliph agrees to autonomy for the Hejaz'. The representative turned him down and made a big speech about streghtening the unity of all Muslims against the Christian West. But you know what Hussein said to that?

Interviewer: What?

Consul: "Then why are you fighting alongside Germany, a Christian nation?" The representative then said 'We're not here to debate the Empire's foreign policies'.

(The consul laughs at the blatant hypocrisy)

Consul: After that, Hussain just stormed out. Later that day, the Emirate would declare war on the Entente.

Interviewer: And what about Hussain?

Consul: He would remain in Hejaz until Rashid invaded and he fled to Egypt with his four sons and about a dozen or so of his tribesmen.


#

(A old man is pointing to the road leading into Mecca)

Narrator: This is Abdul. As a child, he lived in Mecca and watched with his father as the Ottomans invaded the Holy City.

Old man: The Rashidis came marching down this road, single file, with their Mausers like this.

(Pretends to hold a Mauser upwards)

(Cut to a scene outside of the Grand Mosque)

Old Man: This is where they put their Mausers, because weapons are forbidden within the sanctity of the Grand Mosque. They marched to the Kabaa.

(The old man walks inside and spreads his arms out)

Old man: They line up in single file in front of the Kabaa and Ibn Rashid comes out to address the soldiers. He calls out 'Takbir' and the soldiers shout 'Allahu Ackbar' at the top of their voices. He declares 'The false SHarif Hussain and his spawn have been expelled from the Holy City! I, Ibn Rashid, hereby declare myself and the Emirate of Ha'ii to be the true custodians and protectors of the Grand Mosque and city of Mecca!" Then Ibn Rashid says 'Takbir' again and the soldiers bellow out 'Allahu Ackbar' again.


#

Correspondence between Enver Pasha and the Emir (Janauary 1915)​

From: Envar Pasha
To: Emir Ibn Rashid

"The Exalted Ottoman State never gave you permission to launch an assault on Mecca. We do not recognize your claim to be Sharif of Mecca. But, I understand that you may've crushed a rebellion before it had chance to take root. I compliment you on that accomplishment. From hereon out, the Emirate's task will solely be Bedouin suppression. You are to cut the head off anything that resembles a uprising among the tribesmen. The regular Ottoman Army will deal with British invasions from the Sinai and Kuwait. Unless you are called upon, you will not, under any circumstances, interfere in the functioning of the Ottoman military.

I will ensure that several amounts of artillery will be sent to you in the event the British or the Sharif attempt to retake the Hejaz. Aqaba is a strategic port and must not fall into enemy hands. Reinforcing Aqaba will be your sole responsibility.

From: Emir Ibn Rashid
To: Envar Pasha

"I do not need your recognition to consecrate what I know as true, nor do I need your permission. In regards to your orders, they will be followed. Jeddah and Aqaba will be reinforced with tribesmen, who have become quite acquainted with the weapons our respective European friends have bequeathed them. Until that artillery arrives, the Royal Navy will continue using the Suez Canal, so it is on the Ottoman State to close the canal

As for the Bedouin, aside from a few tribesmen in the Najd bordering Yemen and the Muntafiq in Baghdad, I doubt there will be much resistance coming from the communities. Not as long as they buy from the Emirate. Inshallah[2], there shall be no tribal revolt for either myself or the Ottoman State to worry about",


[1] Kuffar, Arabic for 'unbeliever'.

[2] Inshallah, Arabic for 'if God wills it',
 
Disgrace and Oppurtunities, circa 1915-16
Jerusalem: A Biography​
[1]

ON NOVEMBER 5, 1914, when Turkey entered World War I on the side of Germany, she posed no immediate threat to Great Britain, although that country would have preferred her neutrality or active support. But grave dangers to Britain existed much closer to home. During August and September 1914 the German juggernaut rolled westward, smashing through Belgian and French defenses; it crushed the British Expeditionary Force sent to halt it, the boom of the big guns carrying like the rumble of distant thunder all the way to Dover and Folkestone. The Allies finally did stem the German tide, but they could not throw it back. Soon muddy trenches rimmed by barbed wire extended from the North Sea to the Swiss border, the two sides separated by a thin ribbon of cratered no-man’s-land, dotted with mines, unexploded shells, and rotting human and animal corpses, or pieces of them. Now commenced the war of attrition, where advances of even half a mile were rare and not worth the blood spilled and lives lost. The world had never experienced war on so vast a scale, and there would be no let-up for four years. The major powers lost millions of men.

Against this backdrop of carnage on the Western Front, the British strove mightily, sometimes stealthily, sometimes bloodily, for gain in the Middle East; and diplomats maneuvered silkily for their own country’s benefit, and contending lobbies and pressure groups vied determinedly for advantage in London, where the decisions were made and directions cabled to British agents around the world.

But if the Middle East was far from the main battlefield, nevertheless war of another kind had begun there. The Ottomans could not immediately bring military force to bear upon British troops, but as the seat of the caliphate, Turkey was revered by Muslims across the world. Already the Ottomans were calling upon believers to wage jihad, holy war, upon the enemies of Turkey. If Britain’s Muslim subjects on the Indian subcontinent and in Egypt and Sudan heeded this call, then her position would be more parlous than it was already. The steps taken by British imperialists in India to protect against a Muslim jihad do not concern us. In the Middle East, however, they are of the essence. The Suez Canal was Britain’s windpipe. Without that crucial line of trade and communication, she would suffocate.

Having taken charge of Egyptian finances in 1882, Britain now discarded the pretense that the Turks exercised ultimate authority over this Ottoman province and declared her own protectorate. She deposed the Egyptian khedive, Abbas Hilmi, who was inconveniently pro-Ottoman, but conveniently absent in Constantinople, and proclaimed his Anglophile uncle, Hussein Kamel, to be the country’s sultan, Hussein I (a new title for the leader of Egypt). Through him Britain decreed martial law. Through him she curtailed civil liberties and imposed censorship.

British intelligence agents2 identified potential troublemakers in Egypt and collected seditious circulars, pamphlets, and wall posters. “Now the One Powerful God has come forth to take vengeance,” threatened a fatwa issued by a cleric in Constantinople and brought to the attention of Sir Ronald Storrs. “Behold the sun of the Glory of Islam and his grandeur rise up over you. Watch it arise out of the horizon which is dyed with crimson gore and lit up with blazing fires.” The unflappable oriental secretary placed this document, along with similar messages, in an in-tray on his desk between four telephones presided over by an ivory figure of the Buddha. A warning arrived, issued by the commandant of the Fourth Turkish Army, that the Turkish force would soon be ready to invade Egypt: “The Ottoman Army is3 coming to embrace you. Shortly by the will of God you will see its sharp swords and glittering bayonets thrust into the hearts of its enemies, tearing their entrails up.” Storrs slipped it into the tray.


Storrs was the Englishman to whom Abdullah had appealed for machine guns in April 1914, after the consul general, Lord Kitchener, turned him down. Portraits reveal a squarely built and fine-featured youngish man sporting a dandy’s mustache, perhaps to compensate for a receding hairline. He had studied Eastern literature and Arabic at Pembroke College, Cambridge, gaining a first-class degree. But he was not completely at ease with the language, a fact that would have significant repercussions later. Within a year of graduating in 1903, he had gone out to Cairo to work in the Egyptian civil service. He gained the appointment as oriental secretary in 1909. Storrs was urbane, knowledgeable, arrogant, and catty, “too clever by4 three-quarters,” according to one expert, but his boss, Lord Kitchener, regarded him highly.

Even before Turkey entered the war on the German side, Sir Ronald thought it might, and picked up the marker so fortuitously laid down by Abdullah during his visit to Cairo the previous spring. Perhaps Britain could supply machine guns to Abdullah’s father after all, and much else besides. Storrs could think of no better figure to undermine a Turkish call for jihad than a descendant of the Prophet himself who was also the grand sharif of Mecca. And no one in Britain could think of a better bridge to the Middle Eastern Muslim world either. The Imam Yahya was pro-Turk or at best neutral in the war and would not oppose the Turkish call for jihad; Ibn Saud had British backers, especially in the British government of India, but the leader of the Wahhabi sect could not speak for a broad Muslim movement. Hussein seemed the obvious choice then, but Storrs, a civilian, lacked authority to send him military aid; nor was he senior enough to set policy. A higher-ranking official, with military connections, must be enlisted.

Storrs consulted Sir Gilbert Clayton. Before the outbreak of war, Clayton had been director of intelligence and Sudan agent in Cairo; with the onset of war, he assumed the additional position of director of military intelligence. (Soon he would become unofficial father figure of a newly established agency, the fabled Arab Bureau, in which swashbucklers like T. E. Lawrence were to cut such a dashing figure.) Clayton sat at the nexus of Egyptian and Sudanese politics and military intelligence. He too had no doubt that Britain should pick up Abdullah’s marker. He directed Storrs to put the matter to Lord Kitchener in writing.

Kitchener, however, was no longer in Cairo. When war broke out, he had been in England intending to return to Egypt to resume his duties as consul general. While standing upon the deck of the ferry at Dover, he received the summons from Prime Minister Asquith to become Britain’s secretary of state for war.

A man of few words, he yet had a commanding presence. Many revered him as the victor of Omdurman and thus the avenger of General Gordon, slain by the forces of the Mahdi at Khartoum in 1885. He was known too as the general who had faced down the French at Fashoda thirteen years later, thereby maintaining British supremacy in the Sudan; also as conqueror of the Boer rebels in South Africa two years after that. He had been governor general of eastern Sudan, commander in chief of the armed forces in India, inspector general of the Egyptian police, sirdar (military commander) of Egypt, governor general of Sudan, and finally consul general in Egypt. His great ambition was to become viceroy of India. Had the war not intervened, perhaps he would have realized this dream. He was close to the Cecil family, a fountainhead of Conservative leaders including Prime Ministers Salisbury and Balfour. The former had advanced his career at critical junctures. Among some of his subordinates he inspired great devotion and admiration.

But he had critics too. They drew attention, sotto voce, to defects in the imperial hero’s character: an inability to delegate authority or to organize paperwork (they called him “Lord Kitchener of Chaos” behind his back); a predilection for brutality in his dealings with colonized peoples; and very strangely, a kind of kleptomania. When he saw something he wanted (he had a particular fondness for objets d’art, antiques, and silver), he took it—even from the homes of his hosts. One of the doubters, Margot Asquith, the prime minister’s wife, said of him: “He may not be5 a great man—but he is a great poster.”

Still, Kitchener knew the Middle East very well and grasped Britain’s strategic position and needs there. He was a close student of the fledgling Arab nationalist movement, such as it was, and of the intrigues at the Ottoman sultan’s court. Despising both Old and Young Turk methods of government, he had long hoped Britain would replace their rule with hers throughout the Middle East, not incidentally guaranteeing the British position at Suez and creating a new swath of imperial territory to complement India. The best way to win the war, he believed, was to concentrate on defeating Germany on the Western Front, but unlike other “westerners” in the British cabinet, he remained attuned to developments in the east. When Storrs’s letter reached him, he acted at once. The situation now, he recognized, was potentially more dangerous for the grand sharif than it had been six months earlier. If Hussein displeased the regime in Constantinople, it could call upon Germany to help deal with him. The first step, therefore, must be to ensure that Hussein was still interested in British assistance.


“Tell Storrs,”6 Kitchener directed Sir Milne Cheetham, who was acting in his place in Cairo until a longer-term replacement could be appointed, “to send secret and carefully chosen messenger from me to Sherif Abdullah to ascertain whether ‘should present armed German influence at Constantinople coerce Calif against his will and Sublime Porte to acts of aggression and war against Great Britain, he and his father and Arabs of Hejaz would be with us or against us.’”


This directive reached Storrs on September 24, 1914. He acted immediately, choosing as messenger to Abdullah X, “the father-in-law of my little Persian agent Ruhi.” Travel to Mecca with all speed, Storrs directed X. But it took X four days to reach his destination, traveling the last fifteen hours by donkey overnight. Then he waited five days more for the grand sharif and his family to return from the summer palace in Taif.

When X finally did enter the palace in Mecca, he dined sumptuously with the grand sharif and his sons. Afterward he gave Abdullah the message Storrs had composed according to Kitchener’s instructions. Presumably Abdullah gave it to his father, who quickly read it, for soon a servant appeared: Grand Sharif Hussein would receive X in another room. X climbed stairs to the top of the palace and entered a very fine, large chamber. There the emir, pacing back and forth, informed him that he no longer felt obliged to honor his duties to the Ottomans because they had “made war upon our rights.” Throwing back the sleeve of his garment in a dramatic gesture, he declared: “My heart is open to Storrs, even as this. Stretch forth to us a helping hand and we shall never at all help these oppressors. On the contrary we shall help those who do good.” As always with Hussein, religious conviction spurred activity: “This is the Commandment7 of God upon us: Do good to Islam and Moslems—Nor do we fear or respect any save God.”


#

The Arabian Front: Disgrace and Opportunities​

To say that the expulsion of Hussain from Mecca was a disaster was a under-characterization of the feelings being felt in Cairo. Mecca was now in enemy hands and Britain's most powerful asset in the region was now a exiled old man, with a small legion of followers and his sons behind him. Sharif Hussain personally met with Lord Kitchener after he arrived.

Kitchener, though not livid, was greatly displeased with this turn of events and he let the Sharif and his sons know it. The Sharif re-emphasised his commitment to waging war against the Ottomans, but Kitchener was blunt in telling them that the loss of Mecca would reflect badly in London.

And it did. The British government in London, already viewing the Middle Eastern front as a sideshow, couldn't care less about Sharif Hussain or his sons. They were effectively made Kitchener's responsibility. Sharif Hussain and his sons were given their own private house to live in in Cairo.

Occasionally, Hussain's exile was punctuated by news from the front. He had learned from Faisal of the 26th January - 4th February 1915 assault on the Suez Canal by the Ottomans, an attack which was broken up by Egyptian artillery. He had heard of the attack on Gallipoli in April 1915. What he did not know, however, was that Lord Kitchener had recommended Alexandretta be the target of the Entente invasion, with the intent on causing an Arab revolt, but the plan was changed by First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill.

But Gallipoli was significant for another reason aside from the politics around where it would take place. Gallipoli was an absolute disaster for the Entente, with 46,000 Entente servicemen wounded or killed in action in an attempt to end the bring the Ottoman State to it's knees. This defeat would be followed by a even greater stain on Britain's imperial record in the form of the Siege of Kut. In Mesopotamia, the 6th (Poona) Division of the Indian Army had retreated along the Tigris River from the village of Ctesiophon and it's commanding officer, General Townsend, had chosen to hold at Kut rather than complete the retreat to Basra. After having already suffered a casualty rate of 40% at Ctesiophon, the resulting Ottoman siege of the city of Kut al-Amara resulted in the deaths of 30,000 soldiers. 140 days would pass before in what historian James Morris would call 'the most abject capitulation in British military history', Townshend surrendered to the Ottomans. 3,000 British and 6,000 Indian prisoners were taken on a death march towards Anatolia.

These two defeats, combined with the multiple repulsed attempts to relieve the Siege of Kut, precipitated a change in tactics for the British. In January 1916, a bureau specifically tasked towards Arab affairs was set up as a annex of Sudan Intelligence, headed by Brigadier General Gilbert Clayton, but answering to High COmmissioner of Egypt Henry McMahon.

Based in the Grand Continental Hotel, the Arab Bureau's task was to 'harmonise British political activity in the Near East and keep the Foreign Office, the India Office, the Committee of Defence, the War Office, the Admiralty and the Government of India simultaneously informed of the general tendency of the Germano-Turkish Policy'. In other words, it's task was to collect intelligence about the Arab regions of the Middle East. It's secondary task was to assist Sharif Hussein in his goal of freeing the Arabs from Ottoman rule. For what was left undetermined even after the Bureau was established.

One of it's most important members was the archaeologist Gertrude Bell. Bell's new task was to collect togheter all of her previously assembled information about the region's tribes and identify their affilitations and enmities. Previously, she had spent the beginning of the war as a member of the Red Cross.

While the Arab Bureau was finding it's feet, Foreign Secretary Edward Grey authorized High Commissioner McMahon to begin negotiations with Sharif Hussain, with Ronald Stoors as translator. Though the British government now saw Hussain as a potential asset, they still didn't think he was reliable, due to the fall of Mecca, so McMahon refused to support the creation of a independent Arab state. Instead, he said that the British would support an offensive to retake the Hejaz region and Mecca. Whatever happened after that was left for then to be decided. Hussain was quite frustrated with the British refusal to commit to his goals, but Faisal advised his father that British help was required to retake Mecca, so Hussain was forced to accept the compromise[1].

Secretly, even the head of the Arab Bureau refused to support the idea of an Arab state. Gilbert Clayton would write

"We don't want a strong and united Arabian kingdom. Not under the Sharif or anyone else. if it is even possible"

Despite the bloodbath that was the Western Front, General Archibald Murray was able to convince Chief of the imperial General Staff William Robinson not to strip the Egyptian Expeditionary Force of men. Murray got the support of David Lloyd George to leave him with ten infantry divisions, with three going to France and four heavy assault batteries to protect the Suez Canal.

In March 1916, Murray's force was joined by the ANZAC Mounted Division, consisting of three Australian light horse units. Many of these men had previously fought in the bloody quagmire that was Gallipoli.

But, the most prominent arrival had already taken place with the arrival of Thomas Edward Lawrence, a man familiar to British Intelligence from a archaeological/spy mission in 1913. A man already in love with the Middle East, he had supervised the preparation of maps and with Bell's information, determined which tribes were likely to join the Entente cause. Specifically, he focused on the tribes in Mesopotamia and along the Nejd, hugging Yemen. Unfortunately, he wasn't able acquire the fealty of the Mesopotamian tribes to Sharif Hussein, the reason for which Bell would summarize in one of her papers.

"Political union is a conception unfamiliar to a society which is still highly coloured by its tribal origins and maintains in its midst so many strongly disruptive elements of tribal organization . . . The conditions of nomad life have no analogy with those of the cultivated areas and not infrequently the direct interests of the tribes are incompatible with those of the settled areas . . . It is well to dismiss from the outset the anticipation that there exists any individual who could be set up as a head or a figure-head for the Arab provinces as a whole . . . The sole individual who might be regarded as a possible figure-head is the King of the Hejaz, but though he might become the representative of religious union among the Arabs, he would never have any real political significance. Mesopotamia being preponderately Shi’ah, his name carries no weight there . . . His religious position is an asset; it is probably the only element of union which can be found. But it cannot be converted into political supremacy."

In other words, the mostly Shi'ite tribes in Mesopotamia couldn't care less about Sharif Hussein and his desire for power. But, they did have a disdain for the Ottomans, so they would rise against them if they were given the opportunity.

On 3rd of August 1916, the last attack by the Central Powers on the Suez Canal would take place. The German Pasha I formation and the Ottoman 3rd Infantry Division attacked the village of Romani from Kaifa, but soon encountered a screen by the Anzac Mounted Division, which was reinforced by the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, 5th Mounted Division and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade. By nightfall, the Ottomans and Germans had been pushed back to Kaifa. The Egyptian Expeditionary Force then pursued the enemy to Beir er Abd on the 9th, where superior Ottoman forces convinced Harry Chauvel to retreat to Ograhtina for water.

Despite their failure at Beir er Abd, the Central Powers had been pushed back 30 kilometres and the Anzacs had captured a ton of enemy booty. This battle would mark the end of Central Powers attempts to seize the Suez Canal. But, it would also mark the start of the Meccan expedition, as several days after the battle, Auda Aba Tayi, a sheikh of a section of the Transjordan-borne Howeitat tribe, would defect to the Entente, with dozens of his warriors. Lawrence would describe Auda's appearance when he approached the Anzac positions

"Auda was very simply dressed, northern fashion, in white cotton with a red Mosul head-cloth. He might be over fifty, and his black hair was streaked with white; but he was still strong and straight, loosely built, spare, and as active as a much younger man. His face was magnificent in its lines and hollows [...] He had large eloquent eyes, like black velvet in richness. His forehead was low and broad, his nose very high and sharp, powerfully hooked: his mouth rather large and mobile: his beard and moustaches had been trimmed to a point in Howeitat style, with the lower jaw shaven underneath

With the British now on the move and signs that Hussain may have more support waiting in the wings, Lawrence, Faisal and Auda began planning the retaking of the Hejaz[3]...



[1] Once again, a real book in OTL.

[2] Basically, in this timeline, there is no McMahon-Hussain Correspondence. Instead, they talk face to face in Cairo. Rest assured, there still will be a Sykes-Picot Agreement. I'd welcome any advice as to how it could be changed in this timeline.

[3] I will be writing about the Sinai and Palestine campaign in the near future. I would like some advice about how it would go differently with a delayed Arab Revolt.
 
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The Arab Revolt: April-September 1917
Palestine: The Ottoman Campaigns of 1914-1918

"In the late fall of 1916, Murray’s Egyptian Expeditionary Force began to push east from El Arish toward the frontier. The Ottoman Fourth Army established a defensive line between Gaza and Beersheba. However, Cemal and von Kress believed that a counter-offensive was possible should the EEF move to attack Gaza. In turn, they positioned the Ottoman Fourth Army in a mobile defence rather than a traditional defensive line by mid-March 1917. They defeated the EEF at First Gaza in March 1917. Then rapidly constructing a defensive line, the Fourth Army again turned back the EEF at Second Gaza in April. These twin defeats, after two-and-a-half years of war against the Ottoman Empire, proved how little the British had learned about fighting the Ottomans and were ‘Murray’s doing’.1 In the operational pause that followed Second Gaza, Cemal reorganized his army into conventional army corps. This was followed by the activation of the Yildirim Army Group under German General Erich von Falkenhayn and the marginalization of Cemal. Reinforcements poured into Syria and Palestine as Enver envisioned and planned dramatic offensives by the new army group. By the fall of 1917, Cemal was left in command of Syria and western Arabia. As another British offensive drew near, under General Edmund Allenby, the Yildirim Army Group struggled to establish cohesive defences along the Gaza–Beersheba line."

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The Arabian Front: April-September 1917


British casualties from the failed attacks at Gaza were enormous. In the First Battle of Gaza, Phillip Chetwode's Desert Mounted Corps was planned to make a sweep around Gaza to cut the Ottomans off, followed by a two division assault. It worked at first, but dense fog crept in, delaying the 53rd Division's advance towards Al-Muntar Hill. until the Turks were dug in and offered them serious opposition, massacring the Division, resulting in a British retreat. Archibald Murray would exaggerate the Ottoman casualties in his dispatch to London, writing off the bloodbath at Gaza as a small setback.

For the second attack, Lieutenant General Charles Dobbell would command the attack. As if he was commanding the Western Front, he ordered a head-on attack with eight Mark I tanks in support The Ottomans had constructed a series of redoubts and concealed trenches, which stretched to Beersheba. The strong Ottoman defences, again, massacred the attacking forces and their artillery destroyed two of the eight tanks.

As high as the casualties for the second Gaza attack were, it taught Lawrence and his Arab allies some lessons, for the same fortifications were being used to defend Aqaba. The Ottomans had withdrawn their troops from the Hejaz region, save for Mecca and Medina, and had replaced them with Emiratis, though some Turks had already defected to the Entente.

By this time, the legions of Hashemites, Turkish defectors and Jordanian tribesmen had coalesced into the Sharifian Army. Responsibility for operations in and around Jordan and Palestine fell within the purview of Auda Aba Tayi and operations within the Hejaz fell within Faisal's command. These were called the Northern and Southern Armies, respectively. But the Sharitian Army was not as large as Lawrence hoped it would be, only counting 3,000 Arabs among it's ranks.

Lawrence's main problem was that the Ottomans had taught the Emiratis how to fight like a proper army. They had knowledge on the operation of artillery and had extended the defensive line around Aqaba 40 miles west, so there was no possiiblity of a feint attack against Aleppo breaking apart the Emirati defences.

But, perhaps, another deception could fool the Emiratis into leaving the coastal fortress. Faisal and Lawrence both hatched a plan for a Bedouin tribesman to dress up in Emirati dress and spread a false rumour about Ibn Rashid's death. The Emiratis may've adopted modern doctrines, but liek any other tribal emirate, they ultimately relied on the Emir to give orders and maintain order. In April 1917, the plan was put into action. Three tribesmen dressed in Ottoman uniforms rode to Aqaba on horseback and delivered a false message to the Emirati commander which said that Ibn Saud had been killed in an attack by rogue Bedouin and Ha'ii was in danger of falling.

Much to Lawrence's surprise, the deception worked and 40% of the Emiratis at Aqaba left for Ha'ii, taking a large amount of ammunition with them. As soon as the breakways were out of sight, the self-styled Sharifian Army attacked. The remaining defenders put up a fight, but they were overwhelmed. Aqaba fell within the day.

Within the week, Royal Navy ships were docking at Aqaba and the Sharitan Army was supplied with armoured cars and even some air support from the Royal Flying Corps. In recognition for his part in the taking of the village, Allenby gave Lawrence total freedom of action in the Hejaz, but recommended that he focused on launching attacks on coastal cities such as Jeddah. Soon after, a large portion of the Bani Sakher tribe would join the Sharitan Army.

After that, the Arabs seized Tabuk Castle, along with it's valuable water source. It was here that Arab historiography says that the Arab Revolt began, as Sharif Hussain fired a single shot at the Ottoman fortress, signifying the beginning of the uprising. Several dozen Emiratis were taken prisoner. A few even joined the rebellion.

It was here at Tabuk in June 1917 that the rest of the revolt was planend out. Lawrence wanted to draw Ottoman troops away from the two-month stalemate that had emerged after the British defeat at Gaza. Faisal wanted to continue the advance towards Mecca, but Lawrence pointed out that the Ottomans would defend Mecca tooth and nail. The tribes were not prepared, equipped or trained for a siege, even with the armoured cars they had.

"One company of Turks firmly entrenched in open country could have defied the entire army of them and a pitched defeat would've ended the war by sheer horror. I concluded that the tribesmen were good for defence only. Thy were too free-minded to endure command or fight in a team. A man who could fight well by himself made generally a bad soldier",

While the two leaders bickered, the Emiratis dug in around Yonbu. The deception at Aqaba caused the Emir to send his own son, Mut i'bin Al-Aziz, to command the reinforcement of the last city before Jeddah. But instead of protecting the city, Al-Aziz planned an offensive against Tabuk. He scrounged up what he could, as the Ottomans were still recovering from the fall of Baghdad (which Al-Aziz would go to the grave believing the Emirate could've prevented if the Caliph wasn't so suspicious of his father), but he was able to get his hands on several armoured cars and a dozen or so Fokke airplanes.

Lawrence's prophecy would come true, as the Emiratis launched their attack, strafing the Arabs from the air and blowing them apart from afar with artillery. After Tabuk was pulverized, The Ottomans sent in their ground troops. A surprise counter-attack by Entente armored cars warded off the attack, but it showed that the Ottomans weren't going to give up without a fight. Tabuk could've been the death knell of the rebellion if it weren't for the mechanized infantry.

Faisal suggested that before the Arabs advanced any further, the Emirate must be destroyed from within. Perhaps with the death of the Emir? For once, he and Lawrence were in agreement. But how to achieve such a goal? A tribal assault on Ha'il, at a time where the Sharifian Army was so small, was infeasible. Lawrence decided that the Arab Revolt could not risk being expanded into Najd. That was until a Bedouin living near the border of the Sharifian Army's territories gave them a life-line. The Emir ocasisonally left the safety of Ha'il to inspect Emirati troops at Riyadh. The Bedouin suggested the assassination could take place on that route?

The events around the assassination of Emir Ibn Rashid are one of many events in Lawrence's mission to the Middle East that are controversial. According to Lawrence's own account, he travelled with a bunch of Auda's warriors into Najd on the 20th of July 1917, where they hid on a path frequently used by Bedouins to travel between the settlements.

The Bedouin spy picked out the Emir as he travelled at night. According to Lawrence, he used a Lee Enfield rifle to shoot the Emir in the head. The Emir perished with that single shot, falling off his horse and falling into the sand. But according to one of Lawrence's teammates, it was Auda Aba Tayi himself who pulled the trigger. Lawrence excised any mention of Auda from his recollection of the event. In any event, the team killed all of Ibn Rashid's guards, except for one soldier who was allowed to survive and report the event to the Emir's family at Ha'ii.

Upon the team's return on the 23rd, British radio reported that word of the Emir's death had been reported all across the region. Later that day, a Emirati caravan, flyign a white flag, approached Tabuk. They claimed they wanted to defect from the Emirate. To show their sincerity, the leader of the caravan brought forward Al-Aziz, in handcuffs, and forced him to knees. The Emiratis in charge of securing Jeddah had mutinied. In line with tribal custom, Al-Aziz was the new legitimate Emir. The Emiratis offered their prisoner to Lawrence to be killed, as they felt no loyalty to their new Emir.

Lawrence refused the perverse present and Faisal scorned the Emiratis for even thinking of such a thing. The new Emir was taken into custody. The capture of both the presumptive Emir and Jeddah were propaganda boons for the Sharifian Army. The Emir, in particular, since he was interrogated by none other than Gertrude Bell. He held nothing back, relaying information that as the British consumed more of Mesopotamia, especially after the fall of Baghdad, the Ottomans were finding it more difficult to pay off the tribes in the Najd. He was even trying to convince his father to break with the Turks before he was sent to Jeddah.

Armed with this information, the Arab Bureau went on a propaganda blitz, having the Royal Flying Corps distribute the following pamphlet, written in Arabic, over the Najd region

Tribes of the Najd! The Emirate has collapsed and the Ottomans won't pay you a lira! Join the Sharifian Army

While the Emirate had not completely collapsed, it was starting to shrink. Sultan bin Hammud had come to power in Ha'il at the young tender age of 20, but he was completely inexperienced when it came to commanding the Emirate's puppet tribes. After the Southern Army conquered Al-Wajeh, from which attacks could be launched on the Hejaz Railway, Lawrence ordered the Northern Army to sack Ha'il, which they did, while Lawrence took a small detachment to sabotage the Hejaz Railway. There was a episode during the sacking which greatly disturbed Lawrence.

According to Auda, some of the Arabs in his tribe were resentful of the Emirate for being the puppets of the Turks, so when they got the opportunity to sack Ha'il, they went on a rampage, throwing themselves onto the women who were respected within the Emirate. They slit their throats and forced themselves upon those they didn't kill and then throwing the victims on the fire. I specifically ordered for Sultan bin Hammud to be taken alive, but the tribesmen drove their scimitars through his gullet instead.

After the fall of Ha'il, a large number of Najd-resident tribes joined the rebellion, though some of them made quite clear they wanted to be paid for their services, so the idea of pan-Arab nationalism hadn't exactly caught on. But most of the non-Turkish people in the Hejaz supported the rebellion. The Sharifian Army had gone from 3,000 soldiers in April to 7,000 in August.

With the Emirate effectively destroyed and most of the Hejaz under Arab control, Lawrence and the other Allied military and technical advisers finally agreed with Faisal that an attack on Mecca could take place. The objective was not to liberate the city per se, but to draw away Ottoman troops to protect the Hejaz Railway.

On 10th August 1917, Faisal assembled his armies of 2,000 men in total and surrounded the city from north, south and east, commanded by Faisal and two of his brothers (Abdullah and Ali). Unlike the rest of the Hejaz, the people in Mecca were predominantly pro-Ottoman and the Caliph did not trust the belated Emir enough for him to protect Mecca, so 11,000 troops were sent to protect the holy city in 1914.

The Ottoman commander failed to protect his only ventricle, the Hejaz Railway, which was cut by a combined cavalry/armoured car attack against the hapless Ottoman defenders. After this, the Arabs fired artillery into the city, though their spotters had to be very precise to avoid damaging the Grand Mosque or the Kabaa.

With the Ottomans focused on maintaining the Palestine and Mesopotamian fronts, they couldn't spare the manpower to help the Ottomans in Mecca, so the Ottomans in Medina were resigned to simply preparing their defences while the Ottomans in Mecca were forced to capitulate after a month in September.

The next scene was described by Lawrence in his book, Seven Pillars of Wisdom.

Always the traditionalist, Sharif Hussain insisted on being out in the open, so the people of Mecca could see their liberator. I warned him against such a move and so did Faisal, but he was not to be dissuaded. I rode on the horse next to him and Faisal rode from the back. As we neared the Grand Mosque, there was a loud sound in the air. I recognized it as a gunshot, so I immediately ducked for cover. It didn't take me long to realize the Sharif had been shot in the heart. Faisal tended to his father and even cradled him as he passed. He said the words 'It was not meant to be...' before his spirit left his body

The assassin turned out to be a Emirati who still vowed loyalty to the Ottomans. He killed himself by slitting his own throat.

Despite Mecca's pro-Ottoman sympathies, the people came out in droves to farewell their exiled Sharif. Ali, Faisal's brother,
took the opportunity to formally declare the establishment of a Hashemite caliphate and anointed himself as the new Sharif of Mecca.

Lawrence watched the announcement with a great sorrow in his heart, for Mark Sykes had already informed him of what the British really had planned for the region...
 
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