CSA War Strategy in Civil War Victory

TFSmith121

Banned
My point is that these are not the type of men

And originally that was my premise - a conspiracy among officers and politicians in the South for the purposes of securing their independence. Yes, many fancied themselves gentlemen, but wars are often won by any means necessary, so I think there might be room for 'moral flexibility' among a sizeable minority. Remember, the highest ranking Confederate general was a New Yorker by birth.

My point is that these are not the type of men who are going to play the secret agent; AS Johnston's decision-making in California in 1861 is a perfect example.

Cooper, of course, is another.

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How does Lincoln being scared more result in no amphibious attack?:confused:

Also what do you mean by "brittle"?:confused:

Also thanks alexcoppoe for the scenarios.:)
 
If the South had successfully pulled off their shenanigans during the Far-Western campaigns in New Mexico, they might have been able to get close to a victory- cutting off the main Union forces from the California gold fields, stealing a bunch of the gold for themselves, inciting some revolts among Californian sympathizers. Unfortunately, the campaign was so hare-brained it would almost never have been carried out the way it was planned.
 
How does Lincoln being scared more result in no amphibious attack?:confused:
Since Lincoln has already lost the capital once, the idea of going overland is so much more appealing since it would (a) protect Washington D.C from any form of a Confederate assault, the Confederates can't launch an amphibious campaign of their own so going overland is their only option and (b) deny the Confederacy any route to raid the Norh. Or at least that's what I assume.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
If the rebels actually advance on Washington

How does Lincoln being scared more result in no amphibious attack?:confused:

Also what do you mean by "brittle"?:confused:

Also thanks alexcoppoe for the scenarios.:)

If the rebels actually advance on Washington after 1st Bull Run, they will be defeated, and by forces under the command of (presumably) Scott and McDowell; numbers and logistics are all in the US favor.

However, this gets us through 1861 and into the spring of 1862, with, presumably, either McDowell or McClellan in command in the eastern theater, facing (presumably) JE Johnston or Beauregard.

McDowell, with forces that are 3-year volunteers (rather than 3-months) is likely to argue his strategy of an overland movement will work, which gibes with Lincoln's desire to keep the US forces on the inside chord; McClellan, if he is in command, may want to argue for the amphibious movement, but Lincoln - with the example of the 1861 campaign - is probably going to say no, go overland, river line by river line, which certainly makes Johnston's or Beauregard's task that much more difficult.

"Brittle" in the sense that southern nationalism, the southern nation state, and the general state of the rebel government's institutions and domestic resources and internal politics were all much less resilient than their equivalents for the US, which is born out in (for example) the internal opposition to the Richmond government, which ran the gamut from the southern governors refusing to release their state forces and militia to "conferate" command to outright armed rebellion in locations as diverse as western Virginia, eastern Tennessee, western North Carolina, and Jones County, Mississippi.

Despite some of the mythology, southern society was far more divided over the Civil War than the north and west ever were; the reality that roughly 100,000 white men, of military age and residing in southern states in 1861, ended up serving in the US forces makes that clear, and historians ranging from Victoria Bynum and Richard Current have done great work laying it out ... add the white loyalists to the men of African ancestry (free or enslaved) who volunteered for the USCTs in 1863-64 (roughly half of the 180,000 men enlisted into the USCTs did so in southern rebel states) and it is very clear that the demographics of the rebellion were even weaker than they appear, based solely on population.

As an aside, there were loyal "white" USV units raised in every southern state but South Carolina, and USCT units in every state (including SC); there were no "rebel" units raised north of the border states.

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TFSmith121

Banned
Yep - ninjaed.

Since Lincoln has already lost the capital once, the idea of going overland is so much more appealing since it would (a) protect Washington D.C from any form of a Confederate assault, the Confederates can't launch an amphibious campaign of their own so going overland is their only option and (b) deny the Confederacy any route to raid the Norh. Or at least that's what I assume.

Yep - ninjaed.

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