Croatia switches sides after Operation Storm

That never stopped Tuđman and Miloševič from making deals, however Germany and USA pressured Croatia into abandoning Herzegovina and warned them via back channels what the consequences of renaging on the deal would be.
 
What consequences would there be?
Well there have been accusations that Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI), a private military contractor run by and employing retired senior American military officers, rather than just consulting on reforms to pave the way for Croatia to join NATO's Partnership for Peace programme might have actually provided planning and intelligence advice on behalf of the US government for Operation Storm. If the Croatians started doing things the US didn't like MPRI could be recalled or, if the accusations were correct, moved back to providing just what they were publically there for. IIRC it was the US lifting arms bans on Croatia one of its neighbouring countries that allowed them to gain access to supplies again, reinstating the ban or tracking the shipments more closely so that they can't be diverted is another way of limiting the Croatians actions.
 
IIRC it was the US lifting arms bans on Croatia one of its neighbouring countries that allowed them to gain access to supplies again, reinstating the ban or tracking the shipments more closely so that they can't be diverted is another way of limiting the Croatians actions.
Couldn't they just smuggle in arms and if they switched sides wouldn't Bosniak forces be in an even far worse position when it comes to arms given they are surrounded by Croat or Serb territory ?
 
Could Croatia switch sides and ally with the Serbs after Operation Storm and try to take Croat parts of Bosnia

Welcome to the area of alternate history! It is always nice to see young people showing interest in world history. I am not sure what level of history education is yet available to you in your school, but I recommend to use the library regardless and start reading, even if starting with textbooks prior to starting history classes.

The question is posed rather naively so I do want to emphasize before my explanation that real life conflicts do not follow computer game rules of "switching sides." You'll certainly become learn more about the world as you start to grow into adulthood, just keep the interest and add to it with reading. :) I'll try to provide a brief explanation of the context and reasons why the scenario is unplausible for other posters.

For one, there are no clear sides in the conflict nor there are openly declared wars, especially in the Yugoslavian dissolution in the nineties (nearly everyone is fighting their war of independence against Belgrade endorsing Serbian irredentism, although with overlapping agendas in the case of Bosnia). The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the third war (chronologically) in the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and is the most diplomatically complicated. Croatia is at war with Serbian paramilitaries since 1991, which are helped by the Serb Yugoslav forces which have provided logistics, equipment and have at various times participated through air and artillery strikes. The paramilitary Serb states in Croatia and Bosnia have local leaders which are indirectly controlled by Milosevic who is leader of truncated Yugoslavia and can influence their decision through promises of economic, military and diplomatic support.

Prior to the military operations of 1995, a third of the country is occupied and all but one major city has been directly threatened, transport lines have been broken and the occupied area has been ethnically cleansed of all non-Serb population. The rebel Serb forces have by 1995 refused an international diplomatic plan which would grant them an autonomous state inside a confederal framework, including their own currency, government, police, flag, judiciary, economy etc., making them a member part of Croatia in name only. The plan was begrudgingly accepted by Croatian leadership under international pressure but flat out rejected by the rebel paramilitary forces. Then in 1995, as a part of retaliation for Operation Storm, rebels targeted civilian object in Croatia's capital, including theaters and children's hospital. Following Operation Storm, there was still a strategically important and ethnically cleansed part of Croatia occupied by Serb paramilitaries in the East, along with the border with the Yugoslav (Serbian) province of Vojvodina.

In addition to that, at the time the leading party in Croatia is at height of its historical power, yet is still received 45.2% of the vote riding on the coattails of Operation Storm, is deeply mistrusted by most of the population over corruption and is deeply internally fractured over opposing nationalist, conservative and patriotic forces which only the authority of the Croatian president manages to keep under control. In years prior to that, prominent members of the party (including SFRY's last president/Croatia's first prime minister) already broke with the Croatian president, leaving the party over the issue of conduct of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and secret meeting with Milosevic which were tacit negotiations of the eventual outcome of conflicts between sides in which they were more or less leaders of the opposing sides.

By now it should be clear that it is simply politically untenable for Tudjman (better said insane).

And switching of sides already happened OTL: The "breaking" of sides, namely the rise of influence of circles close to the Croatian president which promoted breaking the Croat-Bosnian defensive alliance and encouraging Croats in Herzegovina to create their own state. The Croatian president was under the influence of signals from foreign diplomats in the initial years of conflict to legitimize redrawing the borders in accordance with the ethnic majorities and this was the precipitating factor for secret meeting with Milosevic, establishing dual lines of command, sending Croatian soldiers as unmarked "volunteers" to help out the war effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina while formally defending against Serbs and allied with Bosniaks against them.

This already resulted in "war within a war" between Croatians and Bosniaks in Herzegovina that lasted about 18 months between 1992 and 1994 and was highly unproductive politically both domestically and internationally, it prolonged the war of Independence by impeding collaboration against Serbian aggression and so on.

1) Croatian president switching sides by forming an open alliance with paramilitary Serb forces in Bosnia/Croatia and/or Yugoslavia would be a political suicide that would in political and economic isolation of Croatia for a month or two at most before the government would fall since opposition outside and within the ruling party would easily unite and most likely a new temporary national unity government would be formed while the lunacy would be ascribed to Tudjman's developing cancer. And the international community would wholeheartedly support this outcome.

2) Croatia secretly trying to ally with Serbian side in order to carve a state for Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina already happened and ended in 1994. It was a nasty experiment the completely ruined any diplomatic credibility of Tudjman, permanently ruined Croatia's reputation as a victim of the war, caused Croatia to finance various quasilocal crony fiefdoms, angered their Bosniak ally and led to a split in the ruling party. And that was a nightmare for Croatia as it required hiding that aspect of the war from domestic media in Croatia, lying about volunteers, establishing dual command hierarchies and so on. Even OTL conduct towards Bosnia and Herzegovina prior and post-Dayton has made Tudjman internationally marginalized at best while the outcome failed to secure even a Croat entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3) Switching sides in 1995 against Bosniaks would crumble the entire combine military efforts of Bosniaks and Croats in Bosnia as while Serbs are on the retreat, this would enable them to fortify their positions, recuperate and use the opportunity to attack Croats and Bosniaks while they are occupied and Croatia now politically unstable and fully diplomatically isolated for decreasing diplomatic credibility of Croatia to the level of Germany in 1939. And it creates a nasty precedent for Milosevic and Serbia.

4) Attacking Bosniaks now and betraying months of planning and collaboration with Western diplomats and commanders to force the Serbian side to the negotiation table for the peace treaty would jeopardize even the recently liberated areas as Croatia would no longer count on any kind of diplomatic support and would have to return to the artillery war with Serbs which still occupy parts of Croatia and potentially disrupt or threaten half the country through occupied areas of Bosnia. And Croatia is not equipped for long-term warfare without international support, what with most industries ruined, out of business and economy dependent on tourism.

At best, it risks withdrawal of NATO/American support and full economic isolation on the par with that of Milosevic's Serbia, and at worst, it risks limited airstrikes at "most-definitely-volunteer-Croatian" forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a reminder to return to the table, in the miraculous event that Tudjman manages to hold on to power.

5) Let's say that Tudjman does not have to deal with domestic problems, support, economy or international pressure. By attacking Bosniaks he might try to regain dreams of diving Bosnia with Milosevic, a deal which also acknowledges that Eastern parts of Croatia would be eventually lost to Serbia and in which majority of Bosnia would fall into Serbian hands, which would lead Croatia with thrice the border with antagonistical Serbs and mini-state of Bosniaks which are now in a siege mentality.

And this pipe-dream was totally dependent on the understanding that the international community would approve of such an agreement which included breaking the post World War Two taboo of no forced territory changes and was a gross overestimation of favorable signals being sent in 1990-1992 which were more aiming at border adjustments and creating confederacies rather than outright division of a country. To say the least, this is definitely not the case in 1995 and is clear to both Tudjman and Milosevic who from 1992 onwards have evolved into a kind of great game understanding of their conflict. Even extreme Croat nationalist favored a confederation between Bosnia and Croatia (where Bosnia would likely be the lesser partner) and opposition nationalist criticized the 1992-1994 war in Bosnia as strategical lunacy.

Domestically Tudjman gains a long-term voting bloc in Herzegovina (which already votes OTL in Croatian elections) which is also now a totally devastated area and requires fortifying against Serbs likely trying to reach their 1991 goals of Greater Serbia in a generation or less, while at the same time permanently alienating moderates, the international community and quite likely putting Croatia into economic isolation on the par with Serbia. At best. Not to say the likelihood of the government falling under domestic and international pressure leading to a domestic crisis of authority as the presidential system would have to turn into a dictatorial to keep Tudjman in government, the ruling party probably splintering this time for good and international community later forcing a renewed agreement which would resurrect Bosnia as some kind of confederate abomination.

5) Paramilitary Serb forces are a poor ally. OTL "alliance" was more that of mutual understanding and looking the other way. Such as bypassing embargos by trading ammunition and supplies, provided they were paid, or inconveniencing Bosniaks such as during the siege of Sarajevo and surrounding areas. They will turn on Croatian affiliated forces sooner or later, especially when Bosniaks are gone and after 200 000 Serbs have fled Croatia, claiming fears of genocide. The conflict fuels Serbs paramilitary leaders, who are extreme nationalists who have previously ousted previously comparatively moderate separatists. If Bosnia is divided there has to be a new enemy for their grip on power, and the only immediate one is Croatia which has banished thousands of Serbs and divided Bosnia, just as the Serb nationalist propaganda has claimed in the eighties.

Short answer:

A) Overt alliance with Serbians against Bosniaks is borderline ASB and would likely lead to a month or two of domestic instability in Croatia along with economic isolation and possible limited airstrikes by NATO against advancing forces in Bosnia which leads to a nasty crisis of government as within and outside the national party oppositions unite as Tudjman now has no political capital whatsoever and is likely considered to have grown mad. It is borderline ASB, as in while theoretically possible, extremely unlikely as it would require massive implausible changes in cognition and behavior in Tudjman, Karadzic and others while preserving political authority on both sides.

B) Covert alliance against Bosniaks already happened 1992-1994 and was a mid-term and long-term failure with the circumstances for such a thing repeating gone (ambiguous diplomatic approach, lack of American interest in stabilizing the region). OTL sources, like Richard Holbrooke noted that Tudjman was the least quarrelsome party in the Dayton treaty negotiations so this would again be borderline ASB unless his disease processed much quicker and clouded his mind as OTL. Conditions for a repeat of this are simply not there and would require the absence of international pressure while dependent of Croatia at the same time retaining all the gains from previous years in regards to logistical and arms support.

***

A plausible counter-factual over 1995 was not Croatia randomly deciding to ally with its enemy but being given approval or enough diplomatic coverage to continue advancing in Bosnia towards Banja Luka, forcing a full rout of Serbian forces in concert with Bosniak army.

OTL Clinton administration signaled in no certain terms to Zagreb (capitol of Croatia) to not advance into Bosnia as the goal of forcing all sides in the conflict to negotiate a peace deal was reached (and Clinton could claim a diplomatic triumph for the 1996 election). Even former US ambassador Peter Galbraith later stated that this was a mistake and Croat army should have been allowed to advance into Bosnia and towards Banja Luka (the capitol of Republic Srpska).

Combined Bosniak and Croat forces would be able to crush the Republic Srpska in 1995, but that would only galvanize local Serbs not to agree to any treaty not recovering their "lost territory" (OTL Dayton agreement nearly failed, as Milosevic barely agreed to 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina) which would then prolong the war.

This, in turn, would risk either a return to a previous state of the conflict border-wise in a few years (if Serbs get support though Russia provoking a stop in international support to the Croat-Bosniak alliance and/or international community implicitly condoning ethnical cleansing of Serbs who would be forced out or would preemptively escape into Serbia fearing retribution. It would be a catastrophic diplomatic and ethical outcome with possible 600 to 700 000 refugees from Croatia and Bosnia fleeing into Serbia proper and leaving Izetbegovic and Tudjman to come to blows over the issue of the 1992-1994 war within war, Tudjman supporting his main rival Fikret Abdić and even his microstate during the war, the issue of territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and so on.

Even this non-borderline ASB counter-factual is dependent on America. A different president, leaving the war to the European mediation, would likely butterfly away Operation Storm in 1995 and thus the counter-factual itself. And any president involved in the conflict would want the war to be settled with a peace treaty in 1995 in order to not be hammered with the issue by the opponent in 1996 elections.
 
Last edited:
What consequences would there be ?
Jack Hawksmoor already gave in depth answer but in short, even it Tuđman miracleously survived the political fallout of openly allying with Milošević, there is the fact that Croatia would be hit with international sanctions, which would be devastating for already shaky Croatian economy. And if Germany can drive an economic wedge between Slovenia and Croatia, the hardships will that much more severe.
 
Jack Hawksmoor already gave in depth answer but in short, even it Tuđman miracleously survived the political fallout of openly allying with Milošević,
The same principle applies to Milosevic and Karadzic even more. Operation Storm resulted in 200 000 Serbs fleeing from their breakaway political state, and happened only weeks after Serbs killed over 8000 Bosniak civilians in Srebrenica.

And if Germany can drive an economic wedge between Slovenia and Croatia, the hardships will that much more severe.
Actually, this is completely incorrect. Trade relations between Croatia and Slovenia were already on the decline, mostly tied up in "invisible" services (transportation etc.). Croatian exports to Slovenia in 1995 only accounted for 13% of trade and 10% of imports. Trade with Slovenia massively naturally decreased throughout the nineties since better trade partners was simply found in the global free market.

upload_2018-10-24_12-14-53.png


Yugoslavian economy was not well integrated while it had preferential trade agreements concluded with the EU from the 1970s onwards. The commercial terms of the agreement carried over to all former republics in the nineties.

Germany, Italy, and Austria are already the main Croatian trade export partner since 1970s. EU covers 50 to 60% of the Croatian trade depending on the industry. EU can simply suspend trade agreements with Croatia proper to apply pressure.
 
Last edited:
There are two areas where falling out with Slovenia would hurt Croatia in 1995, in tourism Slovenians represented nearly half of all guests in this time and electric supply, especially before the Peruča dam is repaired and refilled.
 
There are two areas where falling out with Slovenia would hurt Croatia in 1995, in tourism Slovenians represented nearly half of all guests in this time and electric supply, especially before the Peruča dam is repaired and refilled.

I admire your educated guesses but they are not really feasible (in the sense that they are a better alternative to a direct international embargo) if we take a closer look at the data.

1) In order to pressure Croatia IC would have to pressure Slovenia to pressure Croatia, which just defies common sense. Why expend time and effort on pressuring Slovenia when UN and EU could simply impose an international embargo that would be much more destructive and immediate?

2) How would exactly forcing pressure on Slovenia to pressure Croatian tourism work? Should EU pressure Slovenia to force its citizens to stop visiting the neighboring country? Should the country forcefully close its borders to Croatia and restrict movement of its citizens at the final third of the tourist season with many of them already in Croatia?

Setting aside that question, Slovenian tourists have low purchasing power, are mostly unregistered tourists relying on owned property and unregistered private accommodations and spend little, especially in 1995.

3) OTL the year of 1995 was already among the top three worst in the nineties for Croatia.

upload_2018-10-25_14-29-7.png


The drop of tourists already happened by July of 1995 with many of them canceling planned visits due to news of the military action. The unpractical option of forcefully cutting off any flow of Slovenians would have a negligible additional impact compared to the already existing OTL one based on private decisions of the tourists.

4) Croatia in 1995 imports 4.4 million kwH of energy. Only 15% actually originates in Slovenia, mainly through the jointly owned nuclear power plant. OTL Slovenia would stop exporting electrical energy from Krsko to Croatia in 1998 but Croatian power grid did not collapse in the following five years, simply imported more. Slovenia is actually more dependent on energy imports than Croatia (roughly 1/2 compared to 1/3 of total consumption).

Most of the energy imports from Slovenia are actually natural gas and that only transits through Slovenia to Croatia so in other words, an international trade embargo would already take care of that.

Anyway, since the issue OP asked was settled, I'll force myself to go back to finishing updates for my timelines.
 
Top