As someone working on this sort of ATL, I would say the best case is a stalemated end to the war. The Western front was effectively there, given a cessation of American financial resources beginning at the end of 1916 the British will need to dig deeper into internal debt and inflated currency to sustain the war, support France and not simply lose. If Falkehayn had chosen to focus East instead of attempting to attrite the French we might see Russia fold far earlier, Romania not fall out, Italy be less a distraction and no rise of the H-L dictatorship. Generally I think we still see a 1917 much akin to OTL but Germany is here more victorious but also just as spent. If we can get the more level headed to negotiate a status quo cold peace by the end of 1917 then we get the groundwork for a more stable post-war.
Generally I do not think this Germany gets the full B-L "peace" but the fluidity in the East likely does tumble a lot of turf into CP hands. A-H is already dependent upon Germany but I doubt it implodes, contrary I think Germany holds it very much together, it likely gets Poland as Germany takes the Baltics, the Ukraine gets some compromised joint rule weighed in favor of Germany, but I am not convinced Germany here overruns the Ukraine, especially if the Provisional Government opts for peace. That might water down the revolution and simply plague Russia with a long twilight of disorder, perhaps a right-wing versus Bolshevik dictatorship. Russia is screwed no matter but long term could look far different than the USSR. In the West I would think Germany evacuates Belgium and agrees to indemnify for damages, that is really the minimum Britain will demand, likely some limits on German naval power, likely a return of her colonies if the British are savvy, it weakens Germany and keeps her at play globally. The French will need to give up a lot to get Germany off French soil, so A-L is now gone forever, some minor colonial tidbits to appease the Germans, a once more neutral Belgium, no reparations and a war for nothing. France should drop into a long bitter inner recriminations political soul searching but are now wedded to the British as the opposite to Germany's customs union. It will be a virtual cold war, Germany needs to rebuild its trade and Britain is likely shifted towards discouraging such easy commerce with its Empire. That handicaps the world and recovery, Britain here is neither better or worse off, but the continent will have a coherent trade network rebuilding. I do not think we totally head off the economic mess of the 1930s but I do not see another war as easy to pull off.
I think we see the new German led continent slowly rebuild, slant towards autarky but reach into the other markets, Latin America and China, it should reconcile with Russia on trade, oddly realigning Europe, the British can recovery upon the strength of her Empire and the French, the USA is the wildcard but certainly wanting to see the closed systems opened. It is a coin toss if Germany or the British win the alignment of the USA to their trade zone, I am betting Germany, both her and the USA have far weaker Empires so trade between them may be the way around things. If Russian resources are unlocked then we still get a potent Russia, a fiercely independent USA and a German industrial powerhouse uniting Europe, the Anglo-French hold on as colonial powers and reengage closer to peers, creating a four way global power structure of virtual equals. Since not one of these are going to truly align with another, it is a less static world, only a hostile USSR would disrupt it but under Stalin it should remain insular enough to let things get very cozy.
Long term we might see political instability in A-H and the German dominated areas but that will arrive later, after the recovery and during the peace as it usually does. An undefeated Germany, rather than victorious, returns to its political evolution towards a limited monarchy and fuller democracy, it internalizes its debts and recycles wealth to pay it down and funding growth, its "rule" is likely as unpopular as any dominant state is, its dominance is as imperfect as any other, but this Europe should solidify into a stability that can foster prosperity, unity and peace.