Crazy idea - Italo-Japanese war in 1936

You keep saying that, "Once the Suez is closed after the Japanese attack", but where in this thread is that written? I don't see the Japanese going into this unless the Italians are already having to go the long way round Africa, as only that would make their supply ships vulnerable. So the proper sequence is, the UK closes the Suez, and if that doesn't do the trick, then the Japanese DoW Italy.

If you were not thinking along those lines, that would explain much. So;

1) UK closes Suez to Italian shipping sometime after the fighting starts. (If they close it before, then we get no war)
2) Italy continues their war (to be fair, they have little choice, and I myself would order the same thing).
3) Japan jumps into the fray. (And now we can have an unlikely, but very interesting little war)

Someone posted the Japanese conducting naval bombardments, but what about minefields? If you try to race in during the hours of darkness, conduct a bombardment like during the OTL Guadalcanal campaign, and then race away to be out of range of land based air attack, you are taking a huge risk with no hope of being able to clear the mines from your path.

Someone also posted the use of small landing parties conducting raids, but this begs the issue of how to pull them out again. A nighttime naval bombardment takes a short time, a nighttime landing, followed by movement to contact, conducting the attack, getting back to the extraction point, and only then being able to begin the withdrawl portion of the operation...

Infiltration of small teams, bearing gifts for the locals, that can get "boots on ground in country", and enabling setting up a network to smuggle supplies, arms and ammunition to the Ethopians would make sense, but you wouldn't want to mix commando raids with this effort.

I keep telling that because is the only way that made sense; if the British close Suez after the invasion (in totally contrast of their previous policy and showing a risk taking attitude previously unseen) is started there will be a serious diplomatic crisis between the two nation and Benny will go for other way to try to supply the military effort but as LordKalvan as said, things in the end will cool down and some negotiating way will be found...even if the risk of a shooting war will looming over all the process and the diplomatic situation will be a mess in the aftermath.
If the Japanese intervene the entire situation will precipitate immediately, and frankly it's very probable that the British will sunk the japanese ships themselfs for having transformed a complicated and tense situation in a clustefuck of epic proportion war what it seem no reason.

Conduction night raids and nightime bombardment it's not that easy...at least if you desire make it efficient; sending time bringing gifts pose a simple problem aka how this team will reach the Ethiopians? The coast and a lot (and i mean a lot) of hinterland are italian held, the territory itselfs it's not very forgiving and without locals helping they don't stand a change to survive long.
Plus you can't do that for very long unless you have some base for the ships and lot of supply.
 

trurle

Banned
Persian "independence" in the 1930s is somehow limited: Khuzestan is in practice (if not in theory too) a British protectorate, and the only port would be Bandar Abbas on the strait of Hormuz (which is not much to write home in the 1930s, and lacks any industrial capacity). Someone should explain me anyway why Reza Shah would find any interest in supporting Japan in a war in which Persia is not involved at all). Portuguese territory of Goa is postage-stamp size, and again does not have any capacity to support a fleet.
There are in excess of 150,000 Italian troops in Somalia (plus another 30,000 native troops), and Italy have been building up materials there since February 1935. There are another 300,000 Italian troops in Eritrea (plus 80,000 Askari), and again the build up has been going since February 1935. How could one or two Japanese brigades (which would not have a lot of heavy equipment most likely) be able to create "havoc" there?
The British did not have any troops in Khuzhestan (or at least i cannot find a reference to it) in 1921-1941 period. Could you clarify?

The territory of Portugese Goa is 3702km2. A huge postal stamp indeed.. Also, i just found an interesting fact. Portugese colony of Macao intended to sell (or alredy sold) aviation fuel to Japanese as late as in 1945. If it worked in Macao, why it should not work in Goa? As about Persian motivation, the cost the Reza Shah may ask from Japanese is the development of Bandar Abbas into first-class naval base and seaport. Actually it is the sort of cooperation both Persia and Japan would benefit.

As about Italian army size, do not let numbers mislead you. Italian army had in Ethiopia and Eritrea: 7 line "divisions", 5 CCNN "divisions", 2 garrison "divisions" and a lot of independent garrison troops. Each Italian line division in 1936 was approximately equivalent in firepower and training to Japanese Independent Mixed Brigade (attack type) - the type of unit likely to be deployed by Japan far oversea war. Actually, equivalents of 1st and 11th IMBs (formed IOTL in middle 1937) were the most likely expeditionary forces sent to Ethiopia by Japan IF the war would happen. Acting defensively, these forces may tie up over half of offensive-capable Italian troops for weeks or even months, allowing Ethiopian forces to counter-attack. Do not forget about 3:1 advantage of defender. Also, Japanese, acting offensively, would have an edge in armoured vehicles. 12 or 24 of Type 95 Ha-Go tanks would be superior in all aspects to Italian L3 tankettes - and did Italian forces in 1936 has any 47-mm Bohler AT-guns in Ethiopia? I think Italian will resort to truck-mounted Cannone da 65/17 Modello 13 as anti-tank, but efficiency would be dismal against fast-moving Ha-Go due to limited traverse and range of Cannone da 65/17 Modello 13. What remains of Italian anti-tank means is the Solothurn anti-tank rifles and hand grenades, but these require a very rigorous training to operate effectively - and Italian army had a severe problems with training due endemic problems with social stratification. "Tank-fobia" is possible to develop in Italian troops with all sad consequences. Like Italian battalions running away after sighting a single Japanese tank (even if it has no ammunition and running a last liter of fuel).

Overall, my forecast: would Japanese land ~10000-strong mobile force in Eritrea in 1936, it will pierce any makeshift Italian blocking forces (composed of may be up to ten battalions) and break through to Ethiopia proper. Italian forces will need 3 weeks to 3 months to completely encircle and wipe out Japanese, and it will take 3 or 4 line divisions from the Ethiopian front. If Japanese would be periodically supplied, supported by naval bombardment and reinforced, complete encirclement may become impossible and trench warfare will continue until either side would made a strategic error. Of course, the re-supply is frequent enough only if Japanese would have a naval base with fuel tanks at reasonable range.

P.S. I calculate the Ki-20 can theoretically fly 3700km from Goa to eastern Ethiopia or Eritrea, drop 1100kg of bombs or supplies, and still return to base. Well, i do not have enough data to calculate Ki-20 wing*propeller efficiency (typical 0.65 assumed), so i may be wrong. Worst airplanes pre-WWII had efficiency as low as 0.3 (although these were biplanes). Also, in July 1936 Japanese first flown H6K seaplane which is even faster and longer-range. In case of war, it can be pushed in mass production as a supply dropping version, operating from seaplane tenders on relatively safe distance.

P.P.S. In case of full-blown war, the naval superiority will be of paramount importance. If Japanese would be unable to secure any regional seaports, their naval efforts are doomed. If they have a ports at reasonable range, outcome of Japanese-Italian naval battles is unpredictable like any naval engagement before discovery of the radar.
 
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The h6K had flown in 1936 but fist deployed in January 1938; this mean that they will have a very hard job in do it and throw it a lot of resources for results that can even be worse than OTL due to the rush. The Ki-20 it's basically at the extreme range and will flight without escort...and they built only 6 of that (plus i don't really know why the Portugese will allow that, as they have much more to lose in case of an hostile Italy).

The Type 95 was mass produced in 1938 so to get in 1936 you need to rush thing and will be the less capable early production model and you will need a lot of fuel and spare parts to make them work in the notorious hard terrain of the Horn of Africa, expecially due to the fact that road are very very rare.

Regarding throwing a mobile force, not trained or equipped for that very harsh terrain and probably without local guide or in any case knowledge of the terrain and/or reliable map...well, good luck; expecially because the true mobile force aka the local cavalry will make them bleed till they are no more.
 

trurle

Banned
The h6K had flown in 1936 but fist deployed in January 1938; this mean that they will have a very hard job in do it and throw it a lot of resources for results that can even be worse than OTL due to the rush. The Ki-20 it's basically at the extreme range and will flight without escort...and they built only 6 of that (plus i don't really know why the Portugese will allow that, as they have much more to lose in case of an hostile Italy).

The Type 95 was mass produced in 1938 so to get in 1936 you need to rush thing and will be the less capable early production model and you will need a lot of fuel and spare parts to make them work in the notorious hard terrain of the Horn of Africa, expecially due to the fact that road are very very rare.

Regarding throwing a mobile force, not trained or equipped for that very harsh terrain and probably without local guide or in any case knowledge of the terrain and/or reliable map...well, good luck; expecially because the true mobile force aka the local cavalry will make them bleed till they are no more.
Yes, you have the point with the aircraft. Long-range airdrops for Japanese troops are likely to be very limited, at least in 1936. This may change if war will drag in 1937 though.
As about Ha-Go tanks: early prototypes were tested and bugs fixed by November 1935. IOTL the production was started in November 1936 after completing cold-climate field tests for Manchuria - unnecessary for operation in Ethiopia. Actual number of Ha-Go available for Japanese in 1936 thus will depend on the length of the lead-up to the conflict and details of decision-making. Production cycle for first batch of vehicles is likely to take about 3 months.
Also, Ha-Go tank was especially noted for its exceptional off-road capabilities. Operating successfully in the world worst terrains (see Burma campaign).
As about local guides, do not forget about substantial trade links with Ethiopia. I think several tens Ethiopian traders and cargo masters who happened to be in Japan at outbreak of war can help to establish initial contacts with the local population.
About Japanese experience: Japanese had a forces specialized in landings since 1928 (SNLF). These forces were extensively used since 1932 in China/Manchuria, lessons were learned, equipment adjusted etc. By 1936, Japan had the likely the most experienced and best-trained landing forces in the world. These would steadily improve to 1941, contributing much to initial Japanese OTL successes in 1941/1942.

P.S. The OP for this thread require Japanese it act before end of land war in Ethiopia (in May 1936). Well, given all constraints, i think by that time Japanese can organize only naval raid. The landing of any forces should wait until ~October 1936. 4-5 months for organization plus 4-6 months for exchanging dispatches and mail with the all parties involved. I assume here the decision to make a war was made as early as in December 1935 (earlier decision will require some spy-novel level improbable intrigue complexity).

P.P.S. The Portugese motivation is the question for which i do not have clear answer. IOTL, they proved to be quite pliable to the Japanese requests though.
 
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