Coup of 18 Brumaire w/o Napoleon

Something else occurred to me -- would no Consul Napoleon butterfly away the Concordat of 1801? Or was reconciliation with the Papacy pretty much a done deal by this point?

The relationship between the papacy and the French government wasn't consistent during the French Revolution.

The moderate revolutionaries of 1789 were merely interested in seizing the goods of the Church to solve France's financial problems and in giving the French Church a distinct, republican organization. Striving for an independent French Church (within the Catholic Church) wasn't new; it had the main objective of Gallicanism for centuries, an ideology supported by many French Kings like Louis XIV. However, the Civil Constitution of the Clergy (a law adopted in 1790) was different in two aspect: first, the democratic spirit, since the Civil Constitution ruled that the Bishops and Priests were elected by the citizens, Catholics or not. Second, that clergymen were civil servants, paid by the state (since the clergy had been expropriated and had no own income) who had to pledge allegiance to the new order. Another interesting ruling of the time was the that clergymen were allowed to marry.

The Pope's reaction was to be expected. He refused to recognize the Civil Constitution, and recommended Louis XVI to do the same. Many clergymen equally refused to accept the new order and to swear their oath. What followed was a division between the Refractory Clergy and the Constitutional Church. Most of the juring clergymen were low clerics, and concentrated in the "revolutionary" regions (Paris, Grenoble). Around 50% of the pastors accepted the Civil Constitution. But of 136 French Bishops and Archbishops, only seven (!) joined the constitutional clergy, among them Talleyrand. The remaining positions were filled by elections, resulting in the election of men like the famous Abbé Grégoire, a radical revolutionary, democrat and abolitionist. Thus, the Civil Constitution completly divided the French clergy, which was one of the reasons why the Pope opposed the law in the first place.

The first reaction of the French legislative power was a quite tolerant one. Though the refractory priests were removed from office and replaced by elected clergymen, they had the right to rent edifices to celebrate the Holy Mass. This decree had been proposed by Talleyrand and Sieyès. But the French National Assembly was replaced by a new Legislative Assembly, once the Constitutions had been adopted in September 1791, and the new legislature was much more radical than the former one. One repressive law followed the other. Refractory clergymen were denied liberty of religion and later deprived of their citizenship. The king vetoed most of these laws, which was one of the main reasons for his impopularity. After the abolition of the French monarchy, on 26 August 1792, a decree ordered refractory priests to leave the country.

The following years saw the Reign of Terror and the repression of all Christian clergy, both constitutional and refractory. The revolutionaries even tried to replace Catholic Religion by the Cult of Reason and Robespierre's Cult of the Supreme Being. Only after Robepierre's overthrow on 9 Thermidor, the Freedom of Religion was restored. For reasons of austerity, the National Convention abolished the clergy's stipend on 2 Sanculottide of the Year II (18 September 1794). This decree is remembered as the first separation of Church and State in France. In the following months, the Convention confirmed the religious freedom and the churches were finally reopened.

The Directorate saw the zenith of the Constitutional Church. Even though France was a laicist country, the clergy was allowed to organize himself and to practice Catholic religion.* The animating spirit of this revival was obviously Grégoire, who worked towards a truy independent and gallican Church. A first national council was assembled in 1797, which confirmed the Civl Constitution. At the same time, the Directorate pressured the Pope to finally accept the Civil Constitution and to end schism afflicting France. The Pope didn't accept. A second national council was held in Paris in 1801, but Napoléon prevented it to take any important decisions, and concluded a Concordat with the Pope. The elected bishops were forced to resign, and the old schism was replaced by a new one: the Petite Église opposed both to the Civil Constitution and the Concordat.

So what will happen if instead of Napoléon, Sieyès and his followers took power in France? The government needs to heal the religious division afflicting France, and therefor a reconciliation with the Pope is essential. But it might be a more democratic reonciliation. The Pope accepts the election of priests and bishops, but clergymen have to be endorsed by the Pope. Also, refractory clergymen are allowed to return and reintegrate the French clergy. This might work, especially if you take into account that on Christmas 1797, the bishop of Imola (who became Pope Pius VII in 1800) gave a homily asserting that democracy and Catholic faith aren't incompatible, but that every state needs religion.

*At the same time, the Directorate promoted Theophilanthropy to reduce Catholic influence; but this artificial religion was later banned by Napoléon.
 
I doubt you'd get a similar "large army with two uninterrupted years of training" in an ATL.
Which gets to whether there would be a continuation of the Coalition Wars, or if this new government would reach an accord with the other European powers, including England. Like I said earlier, (assuming peace with Austria is still reached by spring of 1801), the lack of a Haiti campaign might help with reaching an accord with Britain.
 
Napoleon is like a fiction, rather than a real person.

Napoléon is even more an idea than a person. Napoléon himself created the idea of Napoléon the revolutionary. He knew that if history was to remember him positively, this idea had to kill the despot Napoléon. Napoléon the despot had lost his wars, but Napoléon the revolutionary represented invincible ideas. On St. Helena, the bonapartist myth was born. We often think of Napoléon ad a great general and politician, but he was undeniably a master when it came to manipulate public opinion.
 
So it strikes me that Napoleon had five major "acts" to his name OTL in the first five years following his rise to power in late 1799, which tie into the short term effects of having him not brought to power:
  1. Creating the Consulate, Becoming Dictator, then Emperor. Sieyes had his own ideas for the French Constitution, which @G.Washington_Fuckyeah has done a great job covering elsewhere. Bottom line, FWIG -- the Grand Elector isn't as dominating a figure as Napoleon was OTL, even if it's still a lifetime appointment (more or less). I would guess that were France to adopt this government, they'd be unlikely to transition to crowning one of their own as "Emperor".
  2. Ending the War of the Second Coalition, Starting the War of the Third Coalition. OTL, Russia was already out of the war, and Austria negotiated peace February 1801, leaving only Britain. We've talked about the likelihood of TTL's government managing this much; Even if they do, there's another question -- OTL, peace took another year following the defeat of the Allies on the Continent, and it was only another year befire France and Britain were at war again (though it took longer for other allies to join); so if TTL France does do roughly as well against Austria (and I think they can), then everything comes down to how they handle Britain.
  3. Sending the Expedition to Haiti, Losing, Selling Louisiana. Short answer, I think TTL's government is significantly less likely to do this, and has a very good shot of reaching an accolade film with Touissant L'Ouverture. This has some very interesting longer term effects in its own right, not only on Haiti, but abolitionism, the United States, and the rise of the British Navy; plus the above mentioned Anglo-French relations.
  4. Reconciliation with the Papacy.
    The government needs to heal the religious division afflicting France, and therefor a reconciliation with the Pope is essential. But it might be a more democratic reonciliation. The Pope accepts the election of priests and bishops, but clergymen have to be endorsed by the Pope. Also, refractory clergymen are allowed to return and reintegrate the French clergy. This might work, especially if you take into account that on Christmas 1797, the bishop of Imola (who became Pope Pius VII in 1800) gave a homily asserting that democracy and Catholic faith aren't incompatible, but that every state needs religion.
  5. The Civil Code, Rolling back various progressive laws of revolution. We've talked about that here as well.
 
May you explain why? In late 1799, the military situation was in fact improving. Brune had defeated the British and Russians at Castricum on October 6, and the Russian invasion ended at the Battle of Zurich, won by Brune on September 26. Without British and Russian help, Austria had no chance to enter France (as "holding off" suggests). It was now necessary to take back Italy.

Why is it necessary? The French Alps were a perfectly defensible border.




Here, you are confusing two different systems. Sieyès' original proposal didn't mention three consuls. Sieyès imagined that the head of state (the Grand Elector) would appoint two consuls, one for foreign affairs, one for interior affairs. No agreement is needed between both; and if they aren't cooperating, the Grand Elector can dismiss them at any moment.

This makes "Grand Elector" sound very much like a euphemism for "King".
 
Why is it necessary? The French Alps were a perfectly defensible border.

Sure, but to win the war, the French troops had to march on Vienna, if they wanted to secure favorable peace terms.

This makes "Grand Elector" sound very much like a euphemism for "King".

Sieyès indeed considered the Grand Elector to have all advantages of a king without his disadvantages.

You should remember that Sieyès was a monarchist. Not in the common sense of this word; he certainly didn't want to restore the Bourbons, and he was most likely opposed to any other form of kingship in France. But Sieyès considered a single head of state to be most suitable, and that made him, by the standards of the time, a monarchist. Effectively, back then, a republic was associated with an executive council (Directorate). In France at least.
 
This makes "Grand Elector" sound very much like a euphemism for "King".
Sieyès indeed considered the Grand Elector to have all advantages of a king without his disadvantages.
Would you agree that TTL's Grand Elector is unlikely (or less likely) to have himself declared emperor? And if so, does that have any important changes in its own right? Or do Sieyes and company use the Grand Elector position as a transition towards (non-Bourbon) constitutional monarchy?
 
Would you agree that TTL's Grand Elector is unlikely (or less likely) to have himself declared emperor? And if so, does that have any important changes in its own right? Or do Sieyes and company use the Grand Elector position as a transition towards (non-Bourbon) constitutional monarchy?


I was thinking more of the latter - something more akin to an English King of the period rather than a Bourbon one.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
I was thinking more of the latter - something more akin to an English King of the period rather than a Bourbon one.
I understand that this was actually what the British were hoping would happen in France - their implacable opposition to France came from the Terror and then from Napoleon, and they were cautiously willing to consider peace unless lots of people were being killed and/or someone was violating diplomatic norms - so you might well see the Revolutionary wars sort of peter out and a new "constitutional" monarchy in France.

Might even have a chance for the alliance politics of the era to be "Britain + France" v "Habsburgs + Prussia", I think that's a new combination.
 
Would you agree that TTL's Grand Elector is unlikely (or less likely) to have himself declared emperor?

"Declare himself emperor" is a bit tricky. Doing so without approval by other institutions would be outright illegal. It would only be possible through a constitutional amendment, proposed by the Senate, accepted by the people and adopted by the Legislative Body. This was the amendment process proposed by Sieyès. Also, thus procedure was allowed only every ten years, making it complicated to change the constitution.

It isn't hard to imagine that the people would have voted in favor of this proposition. The great majority of the rural population was moderate and wasn't absolutely opposed to a monarchy. Also, plebiscites weren't real expressions of popular will back then. Between 1793 and 1815, six referendums took place in France, all resulting in the adoption of the government's proposition. Plebiscites were more or less ruber-stamps, and opposition appeared mainly through abstention.

The parliament too might have accepted the creation of an imperial magistracy. But would the Senate have proposed it? The Senate is composed of old revolutionaries. Many of them had voted in favor of the death of Louis XVI. IOTL, the Senate was already very reluctant to appoint Napoléon Consul for life. I doubt the Senators would have proclaimed Sieyès, a less charismatic man than Napoléon, emperor.

And does he want it?

Or do Sieyes and company use the Grand Elector position as a transition towards (non-Bourbon) constitutional monarchy?

There were rumors that Sieyès wanted to restore the French monarchy -- this is mainly due to the poor wording of the texts in which he advocated for a single head of state. I already mentioned that he called himself a monarchist for this reason.

Some, especially Sieyès opponents, suggested that Sieyès supported a restoration of French monarchy under the Duke of Brunswick, a known friend of the Enlightenment. This is certainly nothing more than a defamation. In 1792, the Duke of Brunswick had threatened to destroy Paris if the royal family would be harmed. The French hated him. Sieyès, who knew when a situation was hopeless, would never have advocated for such an unpopular measure.

No, I consider Sieyès a republican and I don't think he wanted to transform France into a monarchy. But he wanted to replace the king by a new single head of state, the Grand Elector.

@Mikestone8 @Saphroneth Who do you think might be a candidate then (assuming the former Count of Provemce is right out)?

If you want to exclude the Bourbons, especially Louis XVIII and his reactionary brother Charles X, you still have the Orléans branch. Louis-Philippe's father called himself Louis Égalité, and Louis-Philippe fought at Valmy. He would be the only candidate acceptable to the moderate forces within France.
 
@G.Washington_Fuckyeah So then France remains a republic (or a "republic") for the foreseeable future then; that actually sounds fairly likely. Of course, to play devil's advocate, wasn't one of the arguments in favor of the vesting Napoleon with the new title that it would discourage other European powers from looking to restore the Bourbons? Then again, that could be a moot point TTL, depending on whether there's a War of the Third Coalition, which gets back to how TTL's new government deals with Britain.
... you still have the Orléans branch. Louis-Philippe's father called himself Louis Égalité, and Louis-Philippe fought at Valmy. He would be the only candidate acceptable to the moderate forces within France.
Oh yeah, the Orleanist heir was of age at this time; yeah his father was killed in the Terror, but the moderates in the Senate sure as hell aren't going to hold that against him.
 
The parliament too might have accepted the creation of an imperial magistracy. But would the Senate have proposed it? The Senate is composed of old revolutionaries. Many of them had voted in favor of the death of Louis XVI. IOTL, the Senate was already very reluctant to appoint Napoléon Consul for life. I doubt the Senators would have proclaimed Sieyès, a less charismatic man than Napoléon, emperor.
Of course, what they want may change in the fullness of time. Perhaps in 1800 they are not so interested in formally establishing a new monarchy, but in, say, 1820 or 1830 when the revolutionary generation is starting to see its own mortality and looking towards its future...?
 
There's also the question of how affects the general stability of French politics -- for example, an assassination attempt on Napoleon in December of 1800, eventually discovered to be the work of royalists, was initially used as a pretext for coming down hard on various leftists, based pretty much on the Consul's personal conviction that the plot was carried out by "anarchists"; true, Sieyes and the other Brumaire conspirators were no friends to the Neo-Jacobins, but I have trouble seeing them pulling something like this. On the flip side, Napoleon himself had a great deal of name recognition, which Sieyes' other candidates for the Brumaire "sword" (aside from Moreau) could not match; it could be argued, therefore, that the new government would be treading more carefully to shore up their legitimacy with the people.

Actually, the latter issue brings up something I've touched on a few times now, that of negotiations with Britain -- if the new French government isn't being headed by a super-popular demagogue like Napoleon, they're in a similar boat to Britain in terms of needing to negotiate a peace, which means less likelihood of pushing their luck with Cornwallis. Actually, as I think about this, I'm get the image in my head of Sieyes angling for the Grand Elector position as the government is being set up, only to find that they need someone more popular to shore up their support; and if this happens once Austria is defeated, Moreau (who OTL was one of the only men more popular in France than Napoleon) might consider stepping in to accept (or "accept") the largely ceremonial position to heal the country. (Hell, Sieyes actually preferred using Moreau as his "sword" to the Corsican, but the former general declined, on grounds that he wasn't ready to get too involved in politics... at least at that time.) There's also these changes, noted elsewhere:
More ways that Napoleon not coming to power might help here -- the Italian Republic is now unlikely to have the same head of government as France (even if their President is still Napoleon); and the Batvarian Republic is now less likely to have a reactionary coup in 1801; and negotiations following the tentative peace deal in September 1801 won't have the Bonaparts trying to put the screws on Cornwallis... AAR, less tension on issues of the Lowlands and Italy would mean that the intervention in Switzerland isn't as much of a provocation (which, taken in itself, isn't such a big deal, since it ended with a negotiated settlement).

CONSOLIDATE: For our PoD, what would you think of simply holding Napoleon in Egypt for another two to four weeks (so that he arrives in France late October or early November, instead of early October)? I ask because, according to Charles Esdaile, it was the Corsican's arrival that threw a wrench into Sieyes' negotiations with Moreau to be his coup's "sword"; Isser Woloch (IIRC) said Moreau had demurred, saying that he didn't want to be more involved in politics, but it now strikes me that this might have changed.

If I'm right, then you'd have a scenario where Napoleon arrives in France, looking to be greeted as the nation's savior and brought to power, only to find the establishment has already propped up one in the form of the one man who could rival him in terms of popular support. Thoughts?
 
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CONSOLIDATE: For our PoD, what would you think of simply holding Napoleon in Egypt for another two to four weeks (so that he arrives in France late October or early November, instead of early October)?

There might be some truth in this. Indeed, Moreau was very reluctant about serving as Sieyès' general in a coup d'état, and when he heard that Napoléon had returned to France, he said to Sieyès that Napoléon was much better suited for such a task than he was.

BTW where did you read about Esdaile?
 
@Alcsentre Calanice Quick question -- if Moreau is brought onboard in the new government as France's Grand Elector, in which case I'm guessing Sieyes would take the role as Consul of Interior Affairs, who would be the Consul of the Exterior? (I ask specifically here since you've said elsewhere that Jourbet would be Sieyes' choice, but if he's still dead TTL?)
 
Depending on the PoD, butterflies may have Hoche still available to act as the 'Sword'.

For Consul for External Affairs, the best choice would obviously be Talleyrand, but I am not sure if french politics would allow that at first. Maybe in a second step (possibly after he manages to negociate a peace with UK)?
 
@Alcsentre Calanice Quick question -- if Moreau is brought onboard in the new government as France's Grand Elector, in which case I'm guessing Sieyes would take the role as Consul of Interior Affairs, who would be the Consul of the Exterior? (I ask specifically here since you've said elsewhere that Jourbet would be Sieyes' choice, but if he's still dead TTL?)

As I wrote above, it's quite unrealistic that someone else than Sieyès becomes Grand Elector. The office of Grand Elector, a passive but powerful ruler, is in fact perfect for a man of Sieyès' character. Sieyès wouldn't like to become Consul, since the Consul would have been appointed and dismissed by the Grand Elector, so Sieyès would have been under the constant threat of being sacked if he doesn't comply with Moreau's orders.

As for the position of Consul of the Exterior: Moreau, Joubert... I think that this position was designed for the general that would carry out Sieyès' coup. The Consul of the Exterior had the ministers of foreign affairs, of the army and of the navy under his authority.

For Consul for External Affairs, the best choice would obviously be Talleyrand, but I am not sure if french politics would allow that at first. Maybe in a second step (possibly after he manages to negociate a peace with UK)?

This point isn't really clear, but according to most of my sources, Sieyès and Talleyrand disliked each other. Sieyès correctly assumed that Talleyrand was a man without loyalty, and Talleyrand thought that Sieyès was a misanthrope, who treated humans as pawns. That's why, at first, Sieyès didn't want him to hold any position in his government. And indeed, Talleyrand didn't became Minister of Foreign Affairs immediately after the 18 Brumaire. Instead, Reinhard stayed minister for ten days; but since Reinhard and Sieyès, normally close friends, had some problems in their relationship, Sieyès didn't protest when Napoléon replaced Reinhard with Talleyrand and appointed Reinhard ambassador to Switzerland.

Reinhard was a German diplomat from Württemberg who was French ambassador in Hamburg and Florence before becoming the Directorate's (and, shortly, Napoléon's) Foreign Minister in 1799. He was strongly influenced by German Enlightenment and became Napoléon ambassador to Westphalia in 1807/08, where he stayed until 1812. His career continued under the Restoration and he became member of the Chamber of Peers during the July Monarchy.

That being said, even if Talleyrand was a good diplomat, he wasn't perfect. His major fault was to constantly reject an alliance with Prussia or Russia, while sparing Austria. Austria was an irreconcilable enemy, and still, Talleyrand wanted to appease it, instead of decisively weaken it. He also supported the idea to send an army under Bonparte to Egypt, even if he should have known that the Egyptian campagin was unpromising in the long run.
 
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