Could've the US *actually* won the war in Iraq if it had more ground troops?

Could've the US *actually* won the war in Iraq if it had more ground troops?


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More troops would not change the disasters in diplomacy and administration post-invasion.

More troops would have probably been a prequisite for the successful execution of a more realistic occupation plan but by itself they would not have done the job remotely...
Agreed with both. Rumsfeld's plan to use the fewest number of troops possible proved to be a bust. However that was just one of the many strategic failures of the Iraq War. The US had no real post-invasion plan, didn't understand the situation on the ground (particularly in regards to the Shia-Sunni conflict and the need for Baath Party membership), had few Iraqi politicians on their side with credibility, and really gave up the nation building part of the mission.
 
It is quite possible that more US troops could have helped, but I think that having an actual plan that went into a bit more depth than 'Iraqi's greeting us with open arms after getting rid of Saddam' would have made more of a difference. I'm courting controversy here, but keeping at least the bulk of the Iraqi security forces might have helped reduce the initial anarchy and some sort of South African style Truth and Reconciliation Commission might have been useful for dealing with some of the more minor officials whilst uncovering Baathist crimes.
Perhaps, and I hope I'm being very pessimistic, the best thing for us outside Iraq might have been to ensure we had a tame dictator lined up to replace Saddam. Unfortunately, for Iraqi's all that would change in that case would be the face on the 'Big Brother is watching you' poster.
 
No.
The US Neo Coms ignored the implications of the Sunni-Shia divide and ignored many of implications of the radical Sunni movements.
There is a Portuguese saying that says that you shouldn't get involved in other people lives unless you're planning to stay there.
Iraq was a country with a religious problem, an ethnic problem and zero tradition of democracy.
The chances of invading, dissolving the status quo and getting out with a stable, pro western government in place were close to zero.
I'd rather work in a Sealion works plan than in a Iraq works plan.
 
having enough troops to secure ammo dumps etc, prevent looting of museums and government buildings, establish some sort of presence more or less everywhere early would have established the conditions for a rational reconstruction policy to have a shot at succeeding. Failure to do so meant that even the best possible postwar policy would get off to a shaky start at best. A sound military policy needs a sound occupation/reconstruction policy to succeed and vice-versa. Sadly in Iraq the USA had neither.
 
As some others have said, more troops would help with the short term problems; protecting museums, securing arms, restraining Iraqi soldiers, etc.

But the long term issues remain and these came about through a combination of arrogance, short sightedness, over optimistic assessments and out right lies by the Bush administration. These can not be corrected by more boots on the ground.

Benjamin
 
I think answering this question depends on what US objectives were in going ahead with the war.

If the goal was to prevent Iraq from becoming a cornerstone of a potential regional group of countries that threatened US dominance and/or US allies in the region, then it was pretty successful at doing that. Iraq is unlikely to present such a threat at any time in the near future. So in that sense, the war was a US victory of a kind.
 
I do wonder whether a gentler and less inclusive de-baathification might have kept some competent heads whether they were actually needed, rather than having to find new people to do everything.
 
If the goal was to prevent Iraq from becoming a cornerstone of a potential regional group of countries that threatened US dominance and/or US allies in the region, then it was pretty successful at doing that. Iraq is unlikely to present such a threat at any time in the near future. So in that sense, the war was a US victory of a kind.

Well, that's sort of a 'giraffe repellent' kind of objective. By that I mean, not a lot of giraffes running wild in north America.

Iraq wasn't and wasn't likely to become a cornerstone of a regional group of countries that threatened US dominance or allies in the region. Basically, Iran hated Iraq. The Syrian Baathists loathed the Iraqi Baathists. Saudi Arabia was a hostile monarchy. Turkey cared nothing for Iraq. The Persian Gulf states were indifferent to hostile. That situation had been status quo for decades, even before the Gulf War, and was unlikely to change.

Iraq's Baathis regime as any kind of threat in the near or medium or even long term future was nonexistent.

In terms of ensuring the security of American interests, the war was actually counterproductive.
 
More troops might have gone a long way towards security the country in the aftermath of the invasion. less looting, more secured ammo dumps, patrol more areas where insurgence meet up/ control. It might not have been enough on its own but it would have been a big help.
 
Well, that's sort of a 'giraffe repellent' kind of objective. By that I mean, not a lot of giraffes running wild in north America.

Iraq wasn't and wasn't likely to become a cornerstone of a regional group of countries that threatened US dominance or allies in the region. Basically, Iran hated Iraq. The Syrian Baathists loathed the Iraqi Baathists. Saudi Arabia was a hostile monarchy. Turkey cared nothing for Iraq. The Persian Gulf states were indifferent to hostile. That situation had been status quo for decades, even before the Gulf War, and was unlikely to change.

Iraq's Baathis regime as any kind of threat in the near or medium or even long term future was nonexistent.

In terms of ensuring the security of American interests, the war was actually counterproductive.

I take the point about the lack of allies for the former Iraqi government, definitely. However, imagine how different the balance of power in the middle east would be supposing the emergence of a stable Iraq, one that had regained the amount of control over its own territory that it had in the 70s. There would be a 3 state-wide belt, from Syria to Iraq to Iran, that whatever their differences, would stand in opposition to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the USA. All 3 OTL did (and do, in the case of Syria and Iran) provide support for Palestinian resistance groups, despite (as you say) not particularly liking each other. Certainly an opposition to US policy has brought together many disparate governments in recent years, ranging from Latin America to East Asia.

Even without a large increase in cooperation with its neighbors, a stable Iraq that had control over its oil production - including in the Kurdish north - would have the ability to make things uncomfortable if it chose to sell oil in a currency other than the dollar, given the size of its oil production capabilities.

If I had to guess, I wouldn't say that the elimination of Iraq as a stable state with the potential for regional influence was the original plan of the US government when the invasion was initiated. However, by the time 2006 rolled around, I think that it was plain to see that a stable, democratic, Iraq would end up closer to Iran than anything else. In that situation then, a destabilized Iraq became the next best thing to a loyal US ally.

For me, the most interesting counterfactual here is what an Iraq that remained governed by Saddam Hussein or a similar government would have meant over the next decade or so.
 
The Unfortunate thing is that people tend to view guerrillas as some romanticized force that is invincible and unbeatable. The truth is that in medium to large scale insurgencies (1000+ rebels) the rebels win ~25% of the time (since 1775). Since 1945 the number has risen to 39%, which is still a majority victory for the incumbent power.

Guerrillas are defeatable, but only if they are forced to realize that they cannot prevail on the battlefield. This combined with a willingness by the entrenched government to grant moderate concessions in exchange for peace+rebel disarmament is the most effective way for defeating the guerrillas.

Here are some handy link's I found that serve as good reading on guerillas in general and how to beat them:

Wall Street Journal: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323596204578243702404190338

Rand Corporation: How to defeat insurgencies:

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG965.pdf


Please let me know if you guys find these links to be helpful for this discussion, or interesting:)
 
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