True
Except that coastal traffic along the eastern Chinese coast was about the only way left to get POL from the NEI (by way of Malaya and Indochina, of course) to the Home Islands; and airpower based in the PI could be more effective and more easily sustained than airpower in China.
Best,
China never did live up the the hopes of Allied commanders, in spite of Chennault's at times grand plans. Airlifting every bomb and gallon of gas just made operations more trouble than the damage they could cause.
Admiral King thought that landing at Taiwan would make more sense strategically but I think in this instance Macarthur was right (and I really hate Macarthur). Taiwan would have been Okinawa but worse, and just as close to Japanese bases. The fleet would have faced attack not only from Okinawa and China and Taiwan, but also from Luzon, which would make the air defense situation uglier. While the Philippines kept two US field armies busy for about a year, it was relatively cheap compared to Okinawa in terms of casualties vs forces engaged (on the American side anyway). American losses in the Philippines, including Luzon and Leyte as well as the landings further south, were around 88,000, including around 20,000 dead
At Okinawa, a force half the size of the Philippines Campaign suffered nearly 100,000 casualties (naval casualties were roughly the same). Taiwan would have been certainly worse, and without the benefit of a local population on the US side providing intelligence, flank protection, scouting, and indeed doing some of the killing too. Civilian casualties would have been bad in Taiwan as well, so moving the battle just changes the victims.
Meanwhile the Japanese occupation of the Philippines was harsh and getting worse, and American civilians were dying there..