Could Tony Blair have gotten Britain into the Euro?

Thanks. I’ll admit that was the answer I was looking for.

Are there any particular variables that could swing the referendum towards “join” that you can see?
The ones I outlined, such as a far superior quality of leadership on the 'Yes' side versus the 'No', would be one thing. It is especially important to minimise opposition within the cabinet, so making Brown's influence as small as possible whilst keeping Blair popular is vital, as is keeping relatively popular supporters of the No side, like Portillo perhaps, off the field (perhaps because he is still smarting from a loss to Clarke in the Tory leadership election). I'd also suggest looking at precedents from the 1975 referendum and how that was won. The No side might suffer from some pretty massive divisions, given that it would be housing the likes of Michael Howard, Tony Benn, and the BNP under one roof, and the Yes side could exploit that to their advantage. Bringing in events that will increase solidarity toward Europe and good feeling toward the EU would also help, though I can't think of any specific ones off the top of my head.
 
Circling back around to the referendum idea: even if Blair couldn’t ram it through Parliament, I suspect he could get it to go for putting it to a popular vote.

A referendum passing isn't really plausible because of the reasons I outlined in post #17. The opposition to it was too consistently deep (Something with support in the twenties at the best points is almost, but not quite, genuine fringe issue territory) and Tory voters in particular would have been too broadly ingrained in their attitude on the issue. There's no way on earth I'd say it's capable of passing in a serious discussion of alternate outcomes like this.

In a work of fiction, OTOH, it depends on how many concession to plausibility you're willing to make.

The ones I outlined, such as a far superior quality of leadership on the 'Yes' side versus the 'No', would be one thing. It is especially important to minimise opposition within the cabinet, so making Brown's influence as small as possible whilst keeping Blair popular is vital, as is keeping relatively popular supporters of the No side, like Portillo perhaps, off the field (perhaps because he is still smarting from a loss to Clarke in the Tory leadership election). I'd also suggest looking at precedents from the 1975 referendum and how that was won. The No side might suffer from some pretty massive divisions, given that it would be housing the likes of Michael Howard, Tony Benn, and the BNP under one roof, and the Yes side could exploit that to their advantage. Bringing in events that will increase solidarity toward Europe and good feeling toward the EU would also help, though I can't think of any specific ones off the top of my head.

Tbh this sounds like the observations of someone who didn't actually live through the 2016 referendum, when George Galloway and Nigel Farage just being things were meant to ensure the defeat of 'Leave'. Having the establishment line up behind something is a double-edged sword.

But the 'no' side on the Euro isn't going to be half as populated by the fringes as 'Leave' was, it's going to have pretty much all of the Conservative Party and about 1/3rd of Labour, maybe a bit more, behind it. C'mon - let's not be silly, the BNP isn't going to be anywhere near the official campaign.
 
Tbh this sounds like the observations of someone who didn't actually live through the 2016 referendum, when George Galloway and Nigel Farage just being things were meant to ensure the defeat of 'Leave'. Having the establishment line up behind something is a double-edged sword.

But the 'no' side on the Euro isn't going to be half as populated by the fringes as 'Leave' was, it's going to have pretty much all of the Conservative Party and about 1/3rd of Labour, maybe a bit more, behind it. C'mon - let's not be silly, the BNP isn't going to be anywhere near the official campaign.
Being able to claim the anti-establishment moniker undoubtedly helped Leave in 2016-but that doesn't mean that would always be the case. After all, the same tactic backfired in 1975. The early 2000s were different times to nowadays- people were a lot more content with the status quo- and in the scenario I sketched out, the major parties wouldn't all be discredited in one way or another- in fact you'd have a PM who is historically popular, backed up by a Leader of the Opposition and a Lib Dem leader who are also well liked.

The number of MPs that back a No vote won't matter all that much if the most prominent among them aren't very popular-and if you minimise Labour opposition to it you're basically left with a campaign that would be led by those who are more inclined toward the right of the Tory Party- and besides Portillo, most of them were quite unpopular at this time. It's true that the BNP wouldn't be allowed within a mile of the official No campaign, but that doesn't mean they couldn't have an impact on the debate. The Leave campaigns in both 1975 and 2016 tried to marginalise Powell and Farage, yet both were able to make a not insignificant contribution to the discussion, although the greater populist mood in 2016 meant that it was less of a burden then than in 1975. Then you also had the confrontations between the National Front and left wing Leave activists that happened at meetings during the first campaign.
 
C'mon - let's not be silly, the BNP isn't going to be anywhere near the official campaign.


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Being able to claim the anti-establishment moniker undoubtedly helped Leave in 2016-but that doesn't mean that would always be the case. After all, the same tactic backfired in 1975. The early 2000s were different times to nowadays- people were a lot more content with the status quo- and in the scenario I sketched out, the major parties wouldn't all be discredited in one way or another- in fact you'd have a PM who is historically popular, backed up by a Leader of the Opposition and a Lib Dem leader who are also well liked.

The number of MPs that back a No vote won't matter all that much if the most prominent among them aren't very popular-and if you minimise Labour opposition to it you're basically left with a campaign that would be led by those who are more inclined toward the right of the Tory Party- and besides Portillo, most of them were quite unpopular at this time. It's true that the BNP wouldn't be allowed within a mile of the official No campaign, but that doesn't mean they couldn't have an impact on the debate. The Leave campaigns in both 1975 and 2016 tried to marginalise Powell and Farage, yet both were able to make a not insignificant contribution to the discussion, although the greater populist mood in 2016 meant that it was less of a burden then than in 1975. Then you also had the confrontations between the National Front and left wing Leave activists that happened at meetings during the first campaign.

It's true that there would be less of a pro-outsider mood, this isn't the post-2008 era of populism, and that people would be more willing to trust the 'experts', but that works both ways in a situation when, as I've said, there would be more 'experts' lining up against entry than in 2016, and people would generally feel 'Why do we need to change?' Business would be divided on this.

Tbh I think you're over-stressing how much all the main leaders being pro-entry would have on things, and I suspect there would be too much temptation to do the kind of thing Blair did in 1999 when he shared a stage with Clarke and Hezza - which would be very much a double-edge sword, particularly given that most of the key 'No' people would be old Labour figures. It's not going to play well in Labour's Eurosceptic heartlands. I think it's simplistic to view it as 'prior popularity equals the issue is banked and votes move' - if that was true then Saint Anthony would have had much, much more insulation on Iraq.

I really don't think you're grasping how monumental the 'No' mood would be in the Tories either, it wouldn't just be Michael Howard and John Redwood and IDS, it would be effectively the whole party excluding Ken and his Commons lieutenants, who were a tiny group by the 2000s, and some of the MEPs. Effectively everyone else would be against it, it wouldn't be like 2016. Importantly, though Mrs T would be too far gone in bad health to do anything, she'd signal in a statement her intentions.

The BNP are not synonymous with Powell, or even Farage. They would have no bearing on the debate.
 
Tbh I think you're over-stressing how much all the main leaders being pro-entry would have on things, and I suspect there would be too much temptation to do the kind of thing Blair did in 1999 when he shared a stage with Clarke and Hezza - which would be very much a double-edge sword, particularly given that most of the key 'No' people would be old Labour figures. It's not going to play well in Labour's Eurosceptic heartlands. I think it's simplistic to view it as 'prior popularity equals the issue is banked and votes move' - if that was true then Saint Anthony would have had much, much more insulation on Iraq.
What is often forgotten about Iraq is that although there was broad and fierce resistance to the invasion, opinion polls frequently showed that the public agreed with Blair. It was only when the results of the policy became apparent when people overwhelmingly began to think it was a bad idea. The Euro could well be a similar thing; it might generate huge protest in the country and within his own party, but that is not to say that the silent majority won't side with the PM.
I really don't think you're grasping how monumental the 'No' mood would be in the Tories either, it wouldn't just be Michael Howard and John Redwood and IDS, it would be effectively the whole party excluding Ken and his Commons lieutenants, who were a tiny group by the 2000s, and some of the MEPs. Effectively everyone else would be against it, it wouldn't be like 2016. Importantly, though Mrs T would be too far gone in bad health to do anything, she'd signal in a statement her intentions.
I don't doubt that the Tories would be overwhelmingly opposed, but as I said, the number of MPs who are against doesn't really matter all that much if the campaign doesn't have good leadership. And by this time, the only figures on the left of the party that the public really knew about were Clarke, and maybe Heseltine, who are both strong Europhiles. There weren't really any Cameron or Osborne types who were moderates but also mildly Eurosceptic. So whilst it wouldn't only be the right of the Tory Party who come out against it, practically all the best known Conservative figures who were against it would come from that faction.
The BNP are not synonymous with Powell, or even Farage. They would have no bearing on the debate.
Why not? Putting aside the ideological differences here, what is undeniable is that they were right wingers who prominent Leavers tried to keep well away for fear that their cause could be tainted by what they regarded to be xenophobic attitudes. I'm not sure whether they had the profile at the start of the 2000s that they would have by the end of it, but I'm fairly sure they were publicly regarded as the party for racists and neo-fascists, much like the National Front were in the 1970s, and their activities in 1975 did have at least a small bearing on the debate. I see no reason why a similar thing would not happen with the BNP.
 
What is often forgotten about Iraq is that although there was broad and fierce resistance to the invasion, opinion polls frequently showed that the public agreed with Blair. It was only when the results of the policy became apparent when people overwhelmingly began to think it was a bad idea. The Euro could well be a similar thing; it might generate huge protest in the country and within his own party, but that is not to say that the silent majority won't side with the PM.

Largely incorrect; see my post on Chat for a discussion of this. Though it's a nuanced issue, the public was broadly either opposed or highly sceptical until hostilities commenced. The window where the war had majority public support was actually quite small. Though the opposition deepened over time, it is emphatically not the case that the public were blindly supportive of Blair's position, and then swung. Incidentally, the public attitudes on the issue pre-invasion were in the context of the vast majority of the political class supporting it, and on an issue of national security no less. This has a bearing on this scenario. If the public didn't give a blank cheque on war, they're not going to give it on this.

Talking about 'silent majorities' on this is just wishful thinking; we have a huge amount of polling on the Euro over a sustained period of years when it was a live issue which shows nothing close to that.

I don't doubt that the Tories would be overwhelmingly opposed, but as I said, the number of MPs who are against doesn't really matter all that much if the campaign doesn't have good leadership. And by this time, the only figures on the left of the party that the public really knew about were Clarke, and maybe Heseltine, who are both strong Europhiles. There weren't really any Cameron or Osborne types who were moderates but also mildly Eurosceptic. So whilst it wouldn't only be the right of the Tory Party who come out against it, practically all the best known Conservative figures who were against it would come from that faction.

A referendum at this point in time would have secured the backing of two former Conservative Prime Ministers, John Major, and Margaret Thatcher, as well as endless numbers of former Cabinet ministers, the vast majority of Conservative MPs and office-holders, and many other figures of substance and prominence from the right. The 'No' campaign would very likely have a prominent role for, or possibly even be directed by Dominic Cummings, who ran the Business for Sterling campaign at the time, and would later go on to be the director of Vote Leave. It would have attracted a significant amount of business support. The notion that it would be a fringe, badly-lead campaign by just some nameless MPs stretches credulity.

You seem to be forgetting that a large number of the public are Conservative voters, or former Conservative voters - in a referendum every vote counts, it's not just a question of who can appeal to the centre ground, but to natural party supporters as well; and it's really they, in the case of the Conservatives, who have to be swung to get entry over the line. Ken would have some bearing as leader, but would not 'deliver' Tory voters any more than Cameron did in 2016, especially when set against the support of the rest of the party for 'No'. The support of Conservative voters would have been 'No's' to lose, which is really all 'No' would have to do to win.

However, it would naturally have attracted a lot of Labour support as well, in almost certainly a more encompassing fashion than Leave did in 2016. Some trade unions would probably come out against, as well as former Chancellor Dennis Healey and quite a number of Labour MPs and lords, including obscure backbencher Jeremy Corbyn. An interesting question is whether a Cabinet minister dives in as well - it's not impossible that David Blunkett or Margaret Beckett come out for 'No', even if Blair imposes a whip on the issue for the government.

Why not? Putting aside the ideological differences here, what is undeniable is that they were right wingers who prominent Leavers tried to keep well away for fear that their cause could be tainted by what they regarded to be xenophobic attitudes. I'm not sure whether they had the profile at the start of the 2000s that they would have by the end of it, but I'm fairly sure they were publicly regarded as the party for racists and neo-fascists, much like the National Front were in the 1970s, and their activities in 1975 did have at least a small bearing on the debate. I see no reason why a similar thing would not happen with the BNP.

They were regarded as the party of racists and Neo-Fascists; which is why they would have had no bearing. The 'No' campaign would not be seen within a million miles of them; even in 2016 most mainstream Leavers didn't want anything to do with Leave.eu, and that was a UKIP outfit, who by that point had came third in the popular vote at the last election. In an early 2000s referendum UKIP would be seen as the absolute lunatic fringe of 'No', not the BNP.
 
Talking about 'silent majorities' on this is just wishful thinking; we have a huge amount of polling on the Euro over a sustained period of years when it was a live issue which shows nothing close to that.
I take your point on Iraq. But what i was trying to communicate with the 'silent majority' was not that the single currency had the support of most people at the time- it was that there was a large number of voters who aren't terribly ideological could have been won over in the right circumstances-to some extent this is what happened in 1975, and I can't rule out that it could happen in a potential Euro referendum.
A referendum at this point in time would have secured the backing of two former Conservative Prime Ministers, John Major, and Margaret Thatcher, as well as endless numbers of former Cabinet ministers, the vast majority of Conservative MPs and office-holders, and many other figures of substance and prominence from the right. The 'No' campaign would very likely have a prominent role for, or possibly even be directed by Dominic Cummings, who ran the Business for Sterling campaign at the time, and would later go on to be the director of Vote Leave. It would have attracted a significant amount of business support. The notion that it would be a fringe, badly-lead campaign by just some nameless MPs stretches credulity.

You seem to be forgetting that a large number of the public are Conservative voters, or former Conservative voters - in a referendum every vote counts, it's not just a question of who can appeal to the centre ground, but to natural party supporters as well; and it's really they, in the case of the Conservatives, who have to be swung to get entry over the line. Ken would have some bearing as leader, but would not 'deliver' Tory voters any more than Cameron did in 2016, especially when set against the support of the rest of the party for 'No'. The support of Conservative voters would have been 'No's' to lose, which is really all 'No' would have to do to win.

However, it would naturally have attracted a lot of Labour support as well, in almost certainly a more encompassing fashion than Leave did in 2016. Some trade unions would probably come out against, as well as former Chancellor Dennis Healey and quite a number of Labour MPs and lords, including obscure backbencher Jeremy Corbyn. An interesting question is whether a Cabinet minister dives in as well - it's not impossible that David Blunkett or Margaret Beckett come out for 'No', even if Blair imposes a whip on the issue for the government.
The experience of referendums in recent years tells us that retired politicians generally tend to play second fiddle to current leaders. Most of the Tory former cabinet ministers would be against it- but that on its own won't swing too many votes, because the majority of public aren't aware of who most cabinet ministers are, past or present. Your average voter won't be stopping to ask themselves what John Gummer makes of all of this. The main effect would be too reinforce the feeling that most in the Conservative Party are opposed to it- which would already be created by how the opposition of most MPs. But when you actually get into those politicians the public would be familiar with that would likely be opposed-you get the likes of Thatcher, Major, Hague, Lawson, Lamont, Howard, and maybe people like IDS and Peter Lilley- none of whom were particularly popular at this stage. I agree that they would still likely take most Tory voters with them- but I also think that having Clarke, and others like Heseltine and a significant minority of the parliamentary party (I'd imagine we'd see some MP supporting it out of loyalty to Clarke (though this would be less of a thing than it was for Cameron) would maximise the chance of a decent chunk opting for Yes.

I don't doubt that at least a few cabinet ministers would come out against it, its just a question of limiting it so that those who were known and reasonably well liked by the public-like Blunkett- stay on side, either because the imminent referendum causes them to reluctantly come off the fence, or because of their sense of party loyalty prevents them from coming out against Blair. Healey was getting on a bit, he was well into his eighties by this stage, and in any case, a similar sense of loyalty might put him off playing too big a role in the campaign. Of course, you'd have the likes of Benn and Corbyn in the 'No' camp, but Livingstone was the most prominent figure from that faction at that time, and he was in favour, plus many of those who hold similar views on most other issues within the general electorate would generally be more favourably inclined to Europe than hard left MPs were.
They were regarded as the party of racists and Neo-Fascists; which is why they would have had no bearing. The 'No' campaign would not be seen within a million miles of them; even in 2016 most mainstream Leavers didn't want anything to do with Leave.eu, and that was a UKIP outfit, who by that point had came third in the popular vote at the last election. In an early 2000s referendum UKIP would be seen as the absolute lunatic fringe of 'No', not the BNP.
As I mentioned earlier, the fact that the No campaign won't touch them with a bargepole doesn't mean they won't play a role. Nick Griffin isn't going to be invited to do the debates or anything- but the media still paid some attention to what the BNP had to say in these years-that isn't going to be put on hold for the duration of the referendum. Then there is the question how their activists interact with other No campaigners on the ground. Many journalists would see a lot of potential in these stories-and the BNP would use it as an opportunity to gain publicity and support, so they would do their best to get themselves heard, and it would most likely be an issue that, whilst comparatively minor in the grand scheme of things- naturally attracts attention. So I don't think you can totally rule out them playing any role in the campaign quite so easily.

You have to bear in mind that I am not saying that this scenario represents a sure fire victory for Yes. In fact, I think that, even with all of this, that would be very much unlikely. But I think Yes would stand a small chance of winning-provided practically every possible variable goes their way in the campaign. There have been a number of elections and referendum results which would sound ASB to us if they hadn't actually taken place, given the state of play beforehand- history isn't a matter of the most likely thing always happening. So if someone put this before me as the premise of a TL, I'd be willing to put my doubts to one side and read on.
 
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Perhaps you put the pod further back a few years and have the public like the euro more. Means Blair doesn't need to side with Brown can take him head on.
. What pod that would be I don't know? The EU gives 10 euro note to every eu citizen or something barmy like that

Or the EU offers something for the UK as a carrot to get them to jump in
 
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