No. Not until you prove conclusively that economic feedback can only be obtained through pure price values, something which economists have explicitly acknowledged is not the case. That not only means it is not guesswork, but also makes your entire appeal to it a massive red-herring. Until you understand that, this conversation will continue to go nowhere and your claims will continue to be about as evidence free as young earth creationism.
It's worth noting that even with their own overestimates, the CIA was able to accurately identify a lot of the issues afflicting the Soviet economy from roughly the late-60s onward and by the 1980s they had come to the conclusion that something would have to give. The biggest overestimates (along with the more overblown fears of the USSR economy overtaking the American one) really date from the late-50s, when the Soviet economy managed to make it's biggest growth strides and those strides managed to hide it's defects.
That is true, but they were still grossly overestimating the actual economy at every point. IIRC, one of the big issues (though far from the only one) was that they were measuring the ruble value of a lot of salaries and products, but not what could actually be bought with it because of shortages and rationing. In fairness, Soviet shortages were so random that would have been close to impossible. The difference between certificate and regular rubles also threw things off. Basically, they grossly overestimated what the actual realistic purchasing power of a ruble was.
While I generally agree with your points, this is a bad argument. Of course they didn't build Maginot Lines, but that's because those didn't work and were clearly obsolete in the face of air power and nuclear weapons. The only way to effectively defend in the post-World War II era was to have a powerful military, which is exactly what the Soviets built--and it's exactly what the U.S. and other NATO allies built, too. This argument could be just as easily used to "prove" that the U.S. and its allies were the aggressors. Overall, both countries were motivated by the same mixture of fear and greed that motivates most large empires--fear that they might be invaded, greed that they might have an opportunity to conquer themselves.
I disagree completely. It's a popular misconception that the Maginot Line and fixed fortifications in general didn't work in World War Two, and actual military professionals understood that. The Maginot Line didn't work because the politicians weren't willing to extend it all the way to the North Sea, so the Germans literally just went around it. If they had been forced to attack directly into the teeth of the defensive line, they would have gotten absolutely wrecked. There are many cases in WWII where fixed lines of fortifications were successful...the Mannerheim Line, the German belts across the Italian Peninsula were successful at stalemating the allies until the very end of the war, etc. If Stalin hadn't idiotically dismantled the Molotov Line, there is zero doubt that Barbarossa would have gone very differently. They've also been successful since WWII; the Iraqis were able to successfully use them to block the Iranian efforts to cut off the Shatt al-Arab, the South Koreans have quite rightly built fortified defensive lines in depth across the peninsula, etc.
Like any other tactic, it's subject to the realities of geography and terrain, but if the Soviets had ever seriously worried about an offensive invasion by NATO, they would have at the very least fortified Czechoslovakia, which is quite mountainous and thus excellent for it, as well as the Oder and the areas in front of it. East Germany has a ton of fairly large lakes with swampy ground in between them, which is ideal for fixed defenses. The fact that they never did that speaks volumes about their intentions. If you build a 25,000 tank army with tons of paratrooper and marine divisions, forward deploy all of their logistics in stockpiles close to the border where they might be vulnerable to a surprise attack, and put no resources into defenses, then what you're creating is an offensive weapon, not a defensive one.
I mean, Stalin's industrializations are what allowed the USSR to even get as far as it did - despite the loss of life and unfortunate repression that accompanied it - economically the USSR just wasn't really built to function in a way that would allow it to overtake the USA GDP wise - ideally it would be built to maximize progress towards The Revolution (TM).
Edit: To clarify, what I'm saying is WW2 did set up disadvantages sure, but the USSR was still facing an impossible task - it's a miracle and a testament to the stubbornness of humanity that they even got close to reaching the west.
They never really got close. Also, just to be clear, Russia would have industrialized much quicker and better in every way, including with regards to its military-industrial complex, without Communism. I'm not completely sure that's what you're saying, but a myth one sometimes hears is that the USSR/Russia would have been fucked in WWII if Stalin hadn't beefed up the heavy industry like crazy. That's not true.
I would agree that WW2 had a huge impact on the post-WW2 Soviet economy, but I wouldn't say the entire Soviet economy was doomed as a result of WW2. The only sector that I truly think was doomed post-WW2 was agriculture just because of how truly awful that sector's history was up to that point (and it didn't help that Kruschev, one of the Soviet Union's best hopes for post-WW2 reform, was pretty terrible as far as agriculture goes).
I actually disagree with that, agriculture is one of the few areas of the Soviet economy that might have been savable. What they needed to do was expand the private plots, which IOTL were 3% of the land but provided 25% of the output. Even North Korea has managed to do that IOTL. If they had done it, the USSR might have been able to stay together with 1970s level standards of living, but I don't think that qualifies as a pleasant place.