Could the US have supported Dutch defenses in the East Indies in the years before 12/7/41?

raharris1973

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First off, I will start with the motive and rationale. Weak defenses in the Dutch East Indies (DEI) poses an indirect, but real threat to both the US and British Empire in the Far East.

Weak defenses make the DEI a tempting target for Japan (especially if it gets worried about reliable oil supplies). However, invasion & occupation the DEI provides an additional operational incentive to occupy the sea lines of communication between Japan and the DEI, which go through the Philippines islands (& Malaya, Singapore, Borneo).

There was work being done to strengthen defenses in the US’s Philippine Commonwealth. Complementary work strengthening defenses of the DEI makes a Japanese southern advance through the Philippines less enticing overall because if effective it would mean the Japanese would still face a hard battle a the end of their logistical tail. Strengthened defenses in the DEI would be a helpful supplement to the defenses of the Philippines (and Australia, & Borneo, Malaya & Singapore), even though by the time US concern reached the highest levels, the US had several other competing priorities.

Second part- the method – US arms sales to bolster local air and land defense forces and the Dutch Far Eastern fleet from the late 1930s. With the Dutch still a neutral all the way until May 1940, such sales would not run afoul of any US neutrality laws. Indeed, the with the Dutch as neutrals US arms could be transported there on US ships and funded on flexible credit terms.

Thoughts?
 
My sense is that the notion of collective defense was too weak to get the USA to spend on the Dutch, we did not yet have game theory to illuminate how this might be a very wise play. I think the assumptions are that a RN in Singapore and USN in the Philippines is the sword and shield. This era looks very "every man for himself" and I read how the Dutch were flummoxed in the pursuit of new Cruisers specifically for this theater. Shopping in Germany they got some but not all the answers, they shopped Italy and looked at France, the goods on offer hidden behind secrecy and suspicion, so unless it is outright purchases even these might get the Dutch a mixed bag of stuff. And I am not learned enough on the economies involved but I think part of the answer lies in just how much revenue can be pulled to defend these territories far from home? We know Indonesia is a big economy today, but just how much profit was being generated in the 1940s? Was this worth more than what was spent and would the taxpayers agree?
 
There are some material limits along with the political or mental in MWs post. Industrial mobilization was going about as fast as could be expected given US politics. Congress & industry were refusing to accept any sort of resource allocation authority without the US being at war. Equally important was no actual arms industry existed in 1940. The US had a arms design' industry that was fairly good. It could build prototypes & small test batches, but the factory floors for large scale production was still under construction in 1941. Between building up a training & defense air fleet for the US & assisting the British there was no surplus from the factory output of 1940-41.

Another question is what value the aircraft would have? Another 200 P35 or P36 interceptors flown by rookie Dutch pilots dont look like a big gain. It appears that to really gain the Dutch need to start circa 1938-39 so their expanded aircrew establishment are well trained & the aircraft types are modified to competitive standards.
 
We were having trouble getting Wake's defenses up, I don't see anything being available for the Dutch...
 
What if war production and munitions sales are promoted and favored as a way to stimulate the economy out of the Depression and export weapons abroad to take advantage of the tensions in the 1930s?
 
Have to get around the general anti war sentiment of the US much sooner. The Neutrality Acts severely interfered with arms exports. It took several years for those to be dismantled, the final abrogation not occurring until 1939

Another obstacle was the desire of the Dutch to grow their own industry. Like many nations they turned to imports as a last minute last resort.
 

raharris1973

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Have to get around the general anti war sentiment of the US much sooner.

I don't think that such sentiment ever stopped US exports of small arms entirely.

The Neutrality Acts severely interfered with arms exports. It took several years for those to be dismantled, the final abrogation not occurring until 1939

Wasn't my loophole in the OP good enough to do away with problems related to the Neutrality Act? The Neutrality Act only regulated, to my knowledge, exports of arms to countries at war. Netherlands was not at war until May 1940, by which time the neutrality acts were quite watered down and the US was openly building aircraft for belligerent nations like France. The Chinese deliberately did not declare war on Japan, to avoid neutrality act restrictions, and said restrictions never impeded US exports or loans to China.

To me it seems like that the biggest problems are the lack of pure market incentives for US firms and the Dutch govt to behave in the manner proposed, as Carl remarked here:

Congress & industry were refusing to accept any sort of resource allocation authority without the US being at war.
Another obstacle was the desire of the Dutch to grow their own industry. Like many nations they turned to imports as a last minute last resort.

So, there would need to be considerable creativity by well-placed business men and officials to *contrive* the business plans and policy adjustments that could make such arms assistance economically viable.


What if war production and munitions sales are promoted and favored as a way to stimulate the economy out of the Depression and export weapons abroad to take advantage of the tensions in the 1930s?

This is an interesting point. I've speculated a few times previously on how applying some of the (admittedly anachronistic) aspects of Reagan's "military keynesianism" could have improved the domestic economic outlook and America's ability to defend its own colonial outposts in the Pacific. Likewise arms sales could have been helpful for the economy and helpful for the overall global security situation, this would be an anachronistic importing of aspects of the Nixon Administration's policies towards arms sales (especially towards the 1970s "twin pillars" of stability in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia & Iran) both for global balance of power reasons and to keep US manufacturing lines going during a lengthy period of depressed domestic defense spending.
 
There's also the simple fact that the defense of the Dutch East Indies is a naval problem, and if Japan pushes in enough naval force the US and Britain will likely be unwilling and unable, respectively, to commit the level of force necessary. The US would prefer to stick to its original plan of building up its strength and then grinding through to Japan, while Britain has too many other drains on its naval strength in Europe to really commit any serious force.
 
As others have mentioned, there would have to be more POD in policy and state relationships between countries to allow something like this. Perhaps if more countries started to work on interlocking defense treaties after Japan goes full hog in China. More buildup to try to stop any Japanese incursions into their areas of control.
 
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