Could the US have 'saved' Nationalist China

Was there any possibility of the US declaring war on Japan for attacking China? Inspired by this abortive TL. If Japan is forced to divert attention to America, perhaps the Nationalists would'nt have taken such a mortal blow.

If only there had been a stronger League of Nations, maybe international military action could've been taken against Japan.
 

FDW

Banned
No, really by this time Chiang had proved to everyone important within and outside China that he was a fucking idiot. (Especially take a look at his actions from 1935-1945, during the entire war period regarding the relationship with the CCP)
 
No, really by this time Chiang had proved to everyone important within and outside China that he was a fucking idiot. (Especially take a look at his actions from 1935-1945, during the entire war period regarding the relationship with the CCP)

Admittedly there wasn't much he could do. His power base was stuck in the warlord era, and the Communists weren't exactly helpful with their efforts. It would have been more advantageous if he had crushed the CPC as planned, instead of forming the united front, that way at least he'd only have the Japanese and his subordinates to deal with
 

FDW

Banned
Admittedly there wasn't much he could do. His power base was stuck in the warlord era, and the Communists weren't exactly helpful with their efforts. It would have been more advantageous if he had crushed the CPC as planned, instead of forming the united front, that way at least he'd only have the Japanese and his subordinates to deal with

What's to say the Communists don't pull another long march before Chiang can take them out?
 
What's to say the Communists don't pull another long march before Chiang can take them out?

Before the long march, there were 80,000 CPC members who embarked on the journey. At the end only about 10,000 of the originals made it to Yan'an. They were literally on their last legs and entirely vulnerable in that timeframe. If there had been no Xi'an incident, the CCP would have faded into irrelevance and Mao would in all likelihood have lost his position if not his life.
 
Another possibility: The Chinese don't lose the last of their German trained divisions in Burma in 1942. That was preventable, the fault of the Allies, not the Chinese, and it significantly weakened the Nationalists by eliminating a force they had used as a fire-brigade against the Japanese and by eliminating people they could have used to train newly raised divisions.

Or, you could have Tu Yu-ming's Fifth Army withdraw west towards India (aka what Sun Li-jen's New 38th Division did IOTL) instead of heading into the Kachin Hills, where they lost most of their numbers to jungle disease, starvation, and pursuing Japanese forces. Not sure what impact would it have for later, but the extra manpower available might have made a difference in '42-'43.

Marc A
 
Or, you could have Tu Yu-ming's Fifth Army withdraw west towards India (aka what Sun Li-jen's New 38th Division did IOTL) instead of heading into the Kachin Hills, where they lost most of their numbers to jungle disease, starvation, and pursuing Japanese forces. Not sure what impact would it have for later, but the extra manpower available might have made a difference in '42-'43.

Marc A

The manpower itself might not make much of a difference; China had a lot of that; but the fact that it's manpower that's been trained, supplied, and equipped by the British and Americans is likely to make it leaps and bounds ahead of anything in the field in China at that point.
 
The manpower itself might not make much of a difference; China had a lot of that; but the fact that it's manpower that's been trained, supplied, and equipped by the British and Americans is likely to make it leaps and bounds ahead of anything in the field in China at that point.

Actually, that isn't the issue either. In fact, within the 1st couple of years following the Sino-Japanese War, the US trained more than half a million KMT soldiers, along with lavishly equipping them with WWII surplus weaponry and supplies that would have been used for the invasion of the Japanese home islands. In all, the US would donate nearly 5 billion dollars to the KMT during the Chinese Civil War, so trained manpower wasn't the problem.

The problem was that none of these troops particularly cared for the KMT and defected to the Communists at the 1st opportunity, and then the US later fought against these same troops during the Korean War.

That's why the loss of the German trained divisions in Shanghai and then later in Burma were so dangerous, as they were not only well trained, but also ideologically committed to the idea of a Nationalist China, and when those soldiers were lost, Chaing then had to rely upon peasants and others who had little reason to support what was essentially a giant version of a warlord state.
 
There were several things the US could have done differently that might have changed the outcome of the Chinese Civil War. It essentially comes down to supporting Chiang against all domestic opponents, understanding the true nature of the Chinese Communists, and acknowledging the Soviet help given to the CCP.

1) Not send Joseph Stilwell to be Chiang's Chief of Staff. He turned out to be a disastrous choice. He never developed the senior staff work that he was supposed to do; he bungled Burma badly so that Chiang lost his elite units and the Burma Road was closed; he tried to actively undermine Chiang politically which was just stupid.

2) Devote what supplies was sent directly to the Chinese armies (conentrating on basic supplies for infantry) instead of building up the US Air Force. This didn't happen because Stilwell bungled things so badly. He failed to advocate this position so Chennault won out, and his plans on reforming the Chinese Army was designed to isolate Chiang (not smart).

3) Understand clearly that Mao's gang of criminals are not mere "agrarian reformers", but devoted Marxist revolutionaries who are anti-democracy. This would mean not wasting any time or energy in a fruitless attempt to include them in a coalition government.

4) Understand that the Soviet Union was supporting the Chinese Communists with large stocks of weapons and ammunition. The US was quite clueless about this during the civil war.

5) Push Chiang to make compromise only with the Chinese Democratic League and not with the CCP and let him know we'll support him to the hilt since having China as an ally is better than letting it become an enemy under Mao.

6) Don't push Chiang into sending his soldiers into Manchuria to hold it. Chiang was initially against doing that but eventually came to that decision because George Marshall encouraged him. The US only thought of getting rid of the Soviet Red Army there and didn't realize that the Nationalists would not be able to hold it.

7) Concentrate on effective anti-corruption and economic and political reforms in support of the Chinese government. Chiang always wanted to do so (and actually did on Taiwan), but delayed doing them on the mainland until he was confidant that he could delay with recalcitrant warlords. A policy of supporting Chiang fully in return for these early reforms would have been telling.

Unfortunately, this all goes back to the earliest issue - get rid of Stilwell. Perhaps sending Hugh Drum or Albert Wedemeyer (probably too junior in 1942) instead would have changed a lot.
 
There were several things the US could have done differently that might have changed the outcome of the Chinese Civil War. It essentially comes down to supporting Chiang against all domestic opponents, understanding the true nature of the Chinese Communists, and acknowledging the Soviet help given to the CCP.

1) Not send Joseph Stilwell to be Chiang's Chief of Staff. He turned out to be a disastrous choice. He never developed the senior staff work that he was supposed to do; he bungled Burma badly so that Chiang lost his elite units and the Burma Road was closed; he tried to actively undermine Chiang politically which was just stupid.

2) Devote what supplies was sent directly to the Chinese armies (conentrating on basic supplies for infantry) instead of building up the US Air Force. This didn't happen because Stilwell bungled things so badly. He failed to advocate this position so Chennault won out, and his plans on reforming the Chinese Army was designed to isolate Chiang (not smart).

3) Understand clearly that Mao's gang of criminals are not mere "agrarian reformers", but devoted Marxist revolutionaries who are anti-democracy. This would mean not wasting any time or energy in a fruitless attempt to include them in a coalition government.

4) Understand that the Soviet Union was supporting the Chinese Communists with large stocks of weapons and ammunition. The US was quite clueless about this during the civil war.

5) Push Chiang to make compromise only with the Chinese Democratic League and not with the CCP and let him know we'll support him to the hilt since having China as an ally is better than letting it become an enemy under Mao.

6) Don't push Chiang into sending his soldiers into Manchuria to hold it. Chiang was initially against doing that but eventually came to that decision because George Marshall encouraged him. The US only thought of getting rid of the Soviet Red Army there and didn't realize that the Nationalists would not be able to hold it.

7) Concentrate on effective anti-corruption and economic and political reforms in support of the Chinese government. Chiang always wanted to do so (and actually did on Taiwan), but delayed doing them on the mainland until he was confidant that he could delay with recalcitrant warlords. A policy of supporting Chiang fully in return for these early reforms would have been telling.

Unfortunately, this all goes back to the earliest issue - get rid of Stilwell. Perhaps sending Hugh Drum or Albert Wedemeyer (probably too junior in 1942) instead would have changed a lot.

Pretty much this
 
However wouldn't the requirement for not sending Stillwell essentially be having someone else (and like I said earlier far more wary of communism in general and the Soviet Union specifically) than Roosevelt to be president at that time?
Or failing that at least having someone else than Marshall as chief of staff as he was the one that actually made the recommendation?

Here's a though, could Mac Arthur have done a better job in China perhaps to the point of saving the nationalist government than Stillwell?
 
However wouldn't the requirement for not sending Stillwell essentially be having someone else (and like I said earlier far more wary of communism in general and the Soviet Union specifically) than Roosevelt to be president at that time??Or failing that at least having someone else than Marshall as chief of staff as he was the one that actually made the recommendation?

FDR didn't select Stilwell to be sent to China. Secretary of War Stimson initially asked Hugh Drum to go. Drum was the initial front runner to become US Army Chief of Staff, but FDR picked Marshall. Drum had some reservations because he wanted an actual command and feared that the assignment was only as a military mission. Stimson's words to Drum always indicated that the assignment would be a command, but when Drum talked with Marshall it sounded more like a mission. Drum's attempts to figure out what the assignment actually entailed made it look to Marshall that Drum was not interested, and it was taken away from him even after he said he'd go. Instead it went to Stilwell who didn't want to go anyway, but didn't want to refuse a command.

So if Stimson, Marshall, and Drum communicated better, Drum could very well have been sent. Or if Stilwell simply told Marshall, I'll go, but I'd rather command this Operation Torch plan I've been working on, then yet a third person might have been picked.

Here's a though, could Mac Arthur have done a better job in China perhaps to the point of saving the nationalist government than Stillwell?

MacArthur had a lot of strengths and might have done a better job. Most of Mac's failings as a commander had to do with him neglecting his duties when complacent (Philippines in late 1941, in Japan during peacetime, Korea after Inchon). During actual wartime when focused on the job, he did very well. Mac would certainly have no truck with the Chinese Communists, and he would have had the political skills to deal with Chiang and understand the actual situation in China. He also would have worked much better with his fellow commanders, which Stilwell often couldn't.
 
2) Devote what supplies was sent directly to the Chinese armies (conentrating on basic supplies for infantry) instead of building up the US Air Force. This didn't happen because Stilwell bungled things so badly. He failed to advocate this position so Chennault won out, and his plans on reforming the Chinese Army was designed to isolate Chiang (not smart).

Just want to clarify that Stillwell did advocate building up the Chinese army. I don't want to imply he didn't. However, during a conference in Washington in 1943 when both he and Chennault presented their plans, Stilwell failed to adequately explain his position. He came off very poorly, so much that both FDR and Marshall told Chiang they would remove him if needed, but Chiang foolishly said he felt he could work with Stilwell out of concern for not wanting to cause him to lose "face" and hoping Stilwell would change the way he interacted with him.
 
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