Eh, actually the point of the thread is to just wonder if in a general sense if the Union could have, while it was still fighting the Confederacy, have managed to enforce the Monroe Doctrine at the same time. I'm not sure the Union necessarily has to be able to match European naval power to do that.
I think what we really need to take into consideration is the probability that the US will plough resources into these ships for little or no result.
Lucky the 'Black Fleet' mainly relied on Sail power, as even after the Civil War, the USN ran on Sails for economic reasons.
And yet in
biographies of Perry we find sentences like 'The outward passage to China afforded the officers of Mississippi plenty of sightseeing, thanks to her need for coal' and 'The Commodore... flattered himself that he could have negotiated a new treaty with Thailand; but in 1853, after his first visit to Japan, he could not spare the coal, and now he had no time.' There seems to be some disagreement here.
Why would British commercial Ports deny US Coal and Victuals?
Relations were cordial between US and UK at the time
Because the US insisted, of course.
'In a subsequent conversation with Lord Lyons, Mr Seward said "that France, and, he thought, all the other Powers of Europe, refused to allow privateers to remain for more than twenty-four hours in their ports..." The Orders of January 1862 complied... in this respect with the desire of the American Government. These Orders required every ship-of-war or privateer of either belligerent which should enter British waters to depart within twenty-four hours afterwards, except in case of stress of weather or of her requiring provision, or things necessary for the subsistence of her crew, or repairs. In either of these cases she was to put to sea as soon after the expiration of the twenty-four hours as possible, taking in no supplies beyond what might be necessary for immediate use, and no more coal than would carry her to the nearest port of her own country, or some nearer destination. Nor, after coaling once in British waters, was she to be suffered to coal again within three months unless by special permission.' (Mountague Bernard,
A Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great Britain During the American Civil War, 1870)
Number of guns that are afloat... An important metric for determining where Navies rank, don't you agree?
Only when it suits the US, apparently - in the case of the Kearsarge, the number of guns is deemed irrelevant.
Rating broadside guns and pivot guns being equal, is a mistake
Tell that to the mid-nineteenth century United States navy, which rated Kearsarge as a six-gun sloop.
A pair 11" Dahlgrens with 166 pound shot is a bit more effective than a row of 32 pdrs, and more so when firing shells
I just want to be absolutely clear on this. Are you seriously saying that USS Kearsarge's two 11in Dalhgrens are 'more effective' than the Impératrice Eugénie's broadside? On the assumption that you are, allow me to illustrate exactly what this claim entails for the benefit of those less familiar with the numbers than I happen to be.
For a start, the French navy doesn't use a '32pdr'. Impératrice Eugénie mounts 30 30pdrs and 6 22cm (~9in) shell guns on her upper deck - we'll leave aside her spar deck for the minute, as you did say 'a row' and not the multiple rows which Eugénie actually carried. Per side, that's 15 30pdrs and 3 22cm shell guns (firing shells weighing c.59lb), meaning a throw weight of 627lb (450lb of solid shot and 177lb of shell). By contrast, the pair of 11in Dahlgrens would throw 268lb of shell or 332lb of shot, between 53% and 42% of the French ship's output from only one of her decks. And that's before we get into the quote from the Kearsarge's captain that 'There has not been a day in which it would have been safe to cast loose the pivot guns' - very awkward if you're counting on firing them at anybody.
Of course, the most crucial part of this is that all the numerical jiggery-pokery in the world won't change the fact that Kearsarge was rated a sloop.
