Could the Spanish Republicans have won?

True, but a lot of that internal opposition could have been countered with a more decisive british support.
The British Government were actually pretty sympathetic towards the Nationalists - they even allowed Franco to use the Royal Navy communications centre at Gibraltar. The problem is that if you have a government in Whitehall that fears communism more than fascism, support for the Republicans is not likely to be forthcoming. Even if you have a Labour government that doesn't necessarily make intervention any more likely as Labour was split between Catholics and interventionists.
 
I think the possibility that the "Republicans" might have somehow been unified and moderate enough early on to win over sufficient positive support from Britain and make the French feel more confident in positive support has been explored and rejected adequately enough. The Spanish Republic, such as it was, was obviously not a comfortable liberal nation rudely conquered by alien fascist thugs; it was a nation with a very thin grasp on liberal democracy because a whole lot of Spanish were much more radically inclined than any government in London would have been comfortable supporting. And as someone said above, these people expressing their radically divergent visions of how life in Spain should go is part of what we call "democracy."

So for positive support for the actually existing democracy, which was hardly coherently united, we'd need a radical power interested in seeing radical alternatives to the liberal order of the 1930s evolve such as was happening in Spain.

People want a Bastard? What else was Stalin trying to be?

To be fair--I suppose Stalin probably didn't care much what happened to Spain and his actual interest in aiding the Republicans was to put Soviet hardware and military doctrine to the test, picking up a subservient Spain if he could get it but if not, writing off the Spanish.

So if the question is, "Could the Republicans have won?" with a POD of 1936, I'm afraid it looks unlikely to me.

If we can relax the POD and suppose that a more reasonable Soviet Union, or some kind of Red Russia (such as the one in LordInsane's Central East timeline) or some radical power somewhere existed that could counter the Axis support and organize a unified, or at least coordinated, battle plan with the resources they contribute, that might have done the trick. Upthread at post 10 NothingNow proposed something like that if there had been a union of Latin American left-wing regimes--Mexico, Cuba, Chile say. Obviously they could only have offered a shoestring of help but their presence might have catalyzed more cooperation among the "Republican" factions? But to oppose the hardware and troops the Italian Fascists and Nazis threw into the ring there probably needed to be more substantial help. And the best one could hope from the British government was that it could be persuaded to be truly neutral and not covertly actually aiding Franco as I am grateful someone has already pointed out they did.

A radical Russia would not have been trusted by Britain's Tories nor considered safe allies for the insecure French progressives, but I can see them winning enough respect among the democratic citizens of these parliamentary governments to at least win a stay on active opposition, provided the Russians conducted themselves less cynically than Stalin ordered OTL. A leftist intervention that wanted to win would have had to do better at building alliances and been less concerned with winning hegemony at the cost of ultimate victory. LI's Red Russia of the Central East timeline is not a Bolshevik dictatorship but a somewhat queasy coalition of everyone to the left of the Tsarists, in a much-truncated rump Russia that however did avoid much of the devastation of the Great War and the Civil War OTL--they lost a lot of land but kept the people, and the infrastructure of the core they hung onto, and as a coalition would have more plausibly fielded an expedition that would be committed to supporting all anti-fascist factions provided they were willing to work together for mutual defense.

Now obviously the more broadly based a Red Russia is, and the more successful, the more it is likely to panic reactionary elements in all countries, so it is not clear how ITTL the Russians would be able to get help to Spain. Of course ITTL it is also not clear how reactionary the governments of either Italy or Germany would be nor whether there would be any sort of fascist power to back Franco anywhere. Perhaps that timeline would be a good one to explore a Spanish Civil War where no foreign governments get involved, or at any rate modest, furtive backing of Franco or his analog can be countered by volunteers alone?

A POD where at any rate Stalin is not calling the shots in the Kremlin, or his position is much weaker and he has real diversity in Soviet policymaking to contend with and fields a force with the mission of winning the war rather than a long-shot attempt to rule Spain, might be much later in time than LordInsanes and involve a victorious Entente instead.
 
People want a Bastard? What else was Stalin trying to be?
They not only needed that type of political leadership, but they also needed the services of about 6 talented colonels early in the war. Following the failure of the coup in Madrid and Barcelona, a modest Nationalist column leaves Republican neighborhoods in Seville to "whither on the vine". They then advances through Republican areas all the way to Portuguese border against totally ineffective Republican militia resistance.

Meanwhile, another nationalist column marched from Galicia, though mountaneous terrain and relieved the vastly out numbered Nationalist militia groups holding Olviedo. They then advanced to the French border.

Either column could have been stopped by talented leaders at the colonel level. The Republicans could also have taken Olviedo (isolated pro natioanalist town surrounded by Republican mining areas). Instead, Republican forces, despite their 7-1 advantage, milled about in confusion after a poorly planned "banzai" charge failed.
 
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People want a Bastard? What else was Stalin trying to be?


Stalin wasn't Spanish. He also was only interested in supporting certain factions within the Republic and not the Republic itself.

The Republic did finally get a "bastard", but Juan Negrin arrived too late to make a difference.
 
Hello to everybody! As a newcomer, this is my very first post.:eek:

I think that the quality of this forum is OUTSTANDING and I'd like to participate here as much actively as possible, despite my poor English…

With regards to this thread, I personally think that we could try to determine the different reasons for the defeat of the Spanish Republic (SR). Here you are a small list, maybe you can help me to complete this (or to discuss about…):


  • To disband the Spanish Republican Army during the first days of the military coup, and to replace this by militias. In my opinion, it was a mistake, and the SR required a lot of time to build up from scratch a new Army, maybe too late…
  • The internal “Civil wars” in the SR.: Stalinist Communists against Trotsky’s communists, Communist against Anarchists and socialists, all of them against moderate republicans… and as a “corollary”, the wrong answer to the repeated question: What is the priority, the War or the Revolution?
  • Already stated in the thread, the external support from Germany and Italy vs Russian’ support, linked to the neutrality of France and UK. In general terms, we can say that the GER / ITA support in terms of quality / quantity was better than the RUS one (or not…?).
  • The leader´s strategy: General ROJO, the real SR strategic commander, was always looking for a decisive battle, in accordance with the direct approach theory. FRANCO´s strategy was the opposite, that´s it, the indirect approach. You know who finally won. To learn more: see General Alonso Baquer, Miguel: Guerra Civil Española, APROXIMACIÓN INDIRECTA versus ACCIÓN DIRECTA book.

Thanks for reading this...
 
Also, the nationalist support was applied far more effectively. For example, a certain amount of Soviet advise / material went only to Moscow approved factions. Nationionalist support was applied by a central command.

True.

When one thinks about it, the Republic was self-crippled in so many ways, it is almost amazing that they resisted for almost three years and even managed a few decisive victories.

The Republic was pretty much toast from the start, the Anarchists were the only reason it was a civil war instead of a successful coup, and the Republic's MO seemed to be to dick them over whenever possible.
The Anarchists were seen as a loose cannon with its priorities in the wrong order; and once it was clear that the Soviet Union would be the only country willing to help...

The British Government were actually pretty sympathetic towards the Nationalists - they even allowed Franco to use the Royal Navy communications centre at Gibraltar.
Churchill pretty much said in his memories that he supported the nationalists because the republicans loathed everything about him and his family -of course he didn't have the same qualms about the Soviet Union a few years later. :rolleyes:

The problem is that if you have a government in Whitehall that fears communism more than fascism, support for the Republicans is not likely to be forthcoming. Even if you have a Labour government that doesn't necessarily make intervention any more likely as Labour was split between Catholics and interventionists.

True, but in the beginning of the war the communists were actually quite marginalized (for example, they were the only party in the left outside the government coalition), and the coalition in itself was quite moderate (the PM in July 18 belonged to a small center-left galician nationalist party!).

They not only needed that type of political leadership, but they also needed the services of about 6 talented colonels early in the war.
The Republic had a lot of talented officers such as Vicente Rojo or Enrique Líster; it just lacked the command structure and material resources to make it matter during the early months of the war.
.
  • The leader´s strategy: General ROJO, the real SR strategic commander, was always looking for a decisive battle, in accordance with the direct approach theory. FRANCO´s strategy was the opposite, that´s it, the indirect approach. You know who finally won. To learn more: see General Alonso Baquer, Miguel: Guerra Civil Española, APROXIMACIÓN INDIRECTA versus ACCIÓN DIRECTA book.

Thanks for reading this...

First of all, welcome to the board. :)

Second, and while I broadly agree with the rest of your points, this one is still a matter of debate today. While it is true that Rojo's plans were often much more ambitious than what his resources allowed, Franco made some mistakes that could either be confused as indirect approach, incompetence or (it has been alleged), to gain time to continue repression in the rearguard. He could have conquered defenseless Madrid in the autumn of 1936 but chose to stop in Toledo to free the Alcazar, thus enlarging the war for two extra years, for example.
 
I'm sure this has been debated to death

I have a soft spot in my heart for the Spanish Republic, especially for the Anarchists.
However, even my pinko-tinted lenses can't ignore several basic OTL facts.
What absolutely buggered foreign support from France and GB (and many other liberal democratic countries) was their perception of the Spanish Republic as a wild-eyed revolutionary mob terrorizing the Church, rich landowners, and anyone that dared suggest anything less than 100% collectivization was betraying the Revolution.
Sadly, their perception was Franco's bunch will sort things out to make it profitable again once those nasty Reds are dealt with. Best to stay out of their way... and keep the Republic from confronting them on even terms with the Non-Intervention Committee, et al.
It's laughable considering how bourgeois and social democratic the Republic started out being, but I digress.

By the time that the Popular Front got things a little more settled in 1937-1938, then the perception was that Spain had sold its soul to the Comintern, which considering the extensive role the Soviets played in arming and advising the formation of the Popular Army and Assault Guards, had an unfortunate ring of truth.

To counter those perceptions would require a series of PODs to completely transform the Republic and its image abroad but most importantly, the Spanish Republic had an even bigger counter-current to fight and that was Western reluctance to confront Germany.
France, the UK, and the USA had this image of Germany as an anti-Communist bulwark of little concern to them until 1939. By that point Franco had crushed the Republic.

You'd need somebody in Paris, London and/or Washington getting frisky and resolutely dedicated to making Germany and Italy heel in 1936. If the US decided to make lend-lease available to the Republic in 1937, and do what the Soviets had done, it would've been a tremendous counterweight to Communist influence.

You'd need the Spanish Republicans to make it clear political and economic liberalization would not be a lose-lose proposition for local or foreign investors. With the unions as political participants, they're much more susceptible to bribery and establishing a win-win status quo rather than keep playing the politics of confrontation.
All of this is supposing that the Republic has the time and vision to hammer these things out.

Others have made a point that Rojo kept spoiling for a decisive battle when Franco knew he didn't need to smash the Republicans decisively to win, he could just goad them into expensive campaigns to defend key areas and when the republicans decided to go on the offensive, chew them up enough to where they couldn't do that much to move the line. He maintained the strategic and tactical initiative throughout the war that way. Of course, inheriting most of the mid-level officers and NCO's made it easier for the Nationalists have a more effective army. It also helped that the Nationalists had blank-check support from their fascist allies as far as arms and air support, where the republicans had to go to war with whatever motley assortment of antiques, castoffs, and leftovers for the first year of the war when they could've decisively whipped the Nationalists.
The Republic had to start from scratch and IIRC accepted a devil's bargain of allowing the various political parties' militias to arm themselves from the armories which made coordination even more of a nightmare than usual.
 
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I'm sure this has been debated to death

I have a soft spot in my heart for the Spanish Republic, especially for the Anarchists.
However, even my pinko-tinted lenses can't ignore several basic OTL facts.
What absolutely buggered foreign support from France and GB (and many other liberal democratic countries) was their perception of the Spanish Republic as a wild-eyed revolutionary mob terrorizing the Church, rich landowners, and anyone that dared suggest anything less than 100% collectivization was betraying the Revolution.
Sadly, their perception was Franco's bunch will sort things out to make it profitable again once those nasty Reds are dealt with. Best to stay out of their way... and keep the Republic from confronting them on even terms with the Non-Intervention Committee, et al.
It's laughable considering how bourgeois and social democratic the Republic started out being, but I digress.

By the time that the Popular Front got things a little more settled in 1937-1938, then the perception was that Spain had sold its soul to the Comintern, which considering the extensive role the Soviets played in arming and advising the formation of the Popular Army and Assault Guards, had an unfortunate ring of truth.

To counter those perceptions would require a series of PODs to completely transform the Republic and its image abroad but most importantly, the Spanish Republic had an even bigger counter-current to fight and that was Western reluctance to confront Germany.
France, the UK, and the USA had this image of Germany as an anti-Communist bulwark of little concern to them until 1939. By that point Franco had crushed the Republic.

You'd need somebody in Paris, London and/or Washington getting frisky and resolutely dedicated to making Germany and Italy heel in 1936. If the US decided to make lend-lease available to the Republic in 1937, and do what the Soviets had done, it would've been a tremendous counterweight to Communist influence.

You'd need the Spanish Republicans to make it clear political and economic liberalization would not be a lose-lose proposition for local or foreign investors. With the unions as political participants, they're much more susceptible to bribery and establishing a win-win status quo rather than keep playing the politics of confrontation.
All of this is supposing that the Republic has the time and vision to hammer these things out.
 
There's always the *possibility* that they could. Whether it's *probable* is a different question. I'd imagine one big help would be aid from a USSR interested in fighting the war as opposed to killing Trotskyists. :rolleyes:
 
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