Could the Rhinecrisis lead to a war between France and the German Confederation in the 1840's?

When looking at wikipedia I found this article about the Rhine crisis:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhine_crisis
I have never heard about it before, but maybe people here have heard about it.

Apparently the French government in 1840 it realy wanted the Rhineborder again. This lead to tentions between the German confederation and France and could actualy have turned into a war, but war was avoided when the French government was replaced with a new government, who did not care about it.

Since I know next to nothing about this incident, I was wondering if war could have actualy happened, if history had played out differently and what would have happened if war actualy broke out. Could France have won and created a Rhine border? What would the concequences be for German unification if that happened? What would happen to the French diplomatic status (I can't see the UK, or Belgium and the Netherlands being particularly happy about it)?
 
was wondering if war could have actualy happened, if history had played out differently and what would have happened if war actualy broke out.
That would be the pangermanist rally flag, now France isolated themselve again just 25 year post Napoleon
 
Oh certainly, but without the Rhineland Germany (and Prussia) is a lot weaker and France a lot stronger.
who say they would loss? this is could make all join together even if they don't want and you forgot...Britain will not like france doing this just 25 years remove of napoleon, so they count with a hostile britain at their back
 
Oh certainly, but without the Rhineland Germany (and Prussia) is a lot weaker and France a lot stronger.

Assuming they can win and actually get the Rhineland in the first place.

It's certainly possible, mind you. Mobilization for Prussia will be a lot more difficult as they don't have the extensive rail network yet to transport troops to the front quickly. On the other hand, France will most likely have to face not only Prussia, but various other minor Germans states as well. Austria can't exactly sit it out either, if they want to retain a leading role in the German Confederation. Coordination and cooperation might be difficult on the German side, though. And then there's the other Great Powers who might be averse to renewed French expansionism. Especially the United Kingdom, since French aspirations for the Rhine as the eastern border is kind of contradictory with Belgian neutrality and independence.

Still, assuming they can win a war and conquer the Rhineland, I imagine it will be difficult to hold long-term. However the German confederation develops and whoever leads it, losing the Rhineland will be unacceptable and endeavors of some form to regain it will be unavoidable. OTL the mere threat of the Rhine crisis reinforced German nationalism significantly, so I imagine actually losing territory will have even stronger effects and reactions.

Then there's the revolutions of '48, which I doubt will be butterflied away by France conquering the Rhineland. Once the revolutionary wave hits Europe, things might get ugly in an occupied Rhineland. I think it's unlikely the French can hold on to it for long if that happens. And depending on the course of the revolutions in the rest of the German states, the desire for national unity could even be channeled into supporting nationalist sentiment in the Rhineland.
 
I posted the German war plans a while back:

'In a draft treaty concluded on 28 November 1840… The 1840 order of battle also favoured Austria more than its precursor of 1832, as Prussian negotiators conceded to the Austrians overall command of the Bavarian VII Corps and south German VIII Corps within a southern army on the Upper Rhine. Austria’s only concession was to agree to give the same two corps a measure of tactical autonomy… The south German rulers grudgingly accepted a German federal guarantee of Lombardy-Venetia but rejected the idea of serving under or depending upon the Austrians… [the Austrian general Heinrich von] Hess found that [the Prussian colonel] Radowitz had communicated his own version of the draft treaty of 28 November [to the South German states]… a north German army and a middle Rhine army, each under Prussian leadership, a south German army (including VII and VIII Corps) bolstered by more Prussian troops, and a separate Austrian army, thus giving Prussia control over all German forces except the Austrians. According to the agreement of 28 November, the northern and middle Rhine armies, indeed, were to be led and dominated by Prussians, but the VII and VIII corps were assigned to a single southern army under Austrian command and consisting primarily of Austrian troops... Frederick William IV sent another despatch to Vienna at the end of January 1841, calling for a revision of the November draft treaty to separate the south German VII and VIII Corps from the Austrian army on the Upper Rhine... in effect, to make the actual agreement conform to the false version Radowitz had explicated'

What I find interesting is that the King of Prussia wanted the Duke of Wellington as overall commander-in-chief:

Charles Greville's diary, September 1, 1841: 'It seems clear that the Duke will hold no office. In June he wrote a letter to Peel urging all the reasons why he should not hold office, but expressing his readiness to do anything he might think most serviceable to his Government. Among other reasons he said that a war was not improbable in the unsettled state of European politics, and in the event of its breaking out he should most likely have to take the command of an allied army in Germany, thus exhibiting his own reliance on his moral and physical powers. I did not know (what I heard yesterday) that last year the King of Prussia sent to the Duke, through Lord William Russell, to know if he would take the command of the Forces of the German Confederation in the event of a war with France. He replied that he was the Queen of England's subject, and could take no command without her permission; but if that was obtained, he felt as able as ever, and as willing to command the King's army against France.'

Rory Muir's Life of Wellington: 'A note by Greville’s first editor, Henry Reeve, states that this overture came a little earlier than Greville believed, in January 1841, and Wellington’s reply was dated 30 January 1841. So Wellington’s talk of needing to be free to command the allied armies in Germany in the event of war was neither as far fetched nor unreasonable as it might seem at first sight. (Greville Memoirs (ed Strachey & Fulford) 1 September 1841 vol 4 p 405. Wellington’s reply to Russell is in WP 2/73/178 and 179; Russell’s letter does not seem to be present. It is not quite clear from this reply what exactly the King of Prussia had proposed, but the docket on the copy, written by Wellington’s secretary, summarizes its contents as ‘The Duke ready to take command of the Confederation Armies in case of a War with France’).'

Queen Victoria's journal, 2 January 1841: 'Afterwards I talked with Ld Melbourne & Ld Clarendon, of the Duke of Wellington & his having so gallantly said, that in case of war, he would command the Confederate German Army, which had been offered to him, the other day, by the King of Prussia.'

Presumably this was as an alternative to Archduke Charles. However, if you've got two armies led by Prussia and only one by Austria (or even two Prussian, one South German and one Austrian), I don't see how you could legitimately deny Austria the overall command.

ED: Better details on the deployments, from Miroslav Sedivý's Crisis Among the Great Powers: The Concert of Europe and the Eastern Question.

‘an agreement was signed on 28 November 1840. According to the contract, the two Great Powers were obliged to defend the German Confederation, particularly the Rhineland. Prussia had nine army corps and was prepared to employ them all on the Rhine, and Austria promised to send all her forces which would not be in Italy in the same direction. The operational plan was largely based upon the one prepared in Potsdam. Three federal armies were to be created against France: (1) the army on the lower Rhine consisting of the 3rd, 7th and 8th Prussian and 10th Federal Corps and situated between Trier and Julich and operating either against France or Belgium, (2) the army on the central Rhine comprising the 4th, 5th and 6th Prussian and 9th Federal Corps deployed between Frankfurt and Wurzburg and destined for the defence of the territory between the Saar and Moselle or offensive operations against Metz and Champagne through Lorraine, (3) the army on the upper Rhine consisting of the 7th and 8th Federal Corps assuming a defensive position at the beginning of war and waiting for the arrival of three Austrian federal corps. On the Elbe three more Prussian corps [Guard, 1st and 2nd] were to form a reserve army. The goal of the German armies was to assume an initiative as soon as possible and launch an offensive since it would cause the faster unification of their forces. Since both Powers feared that Belgium would not maintain neutrality and would join France and that the latter would not observe the neutrality of Switzerland, it also was stipulated that Austria would establish an observation army of 30,000 soldiers to protect the federal frontier with Switzerland whereas Prussia would use her army on the lower Rhine against Belgium. They also counted on the Russian reserve army waiting on the Warta river; its deployment would be decided in compliance with the course of operations and merely in the case of need since its use was also regarded in Berlin and Vienna as a necessary evil.

The number of troops was not settled in the agreement but can be compiled from other sources: Prussia’s army was to offer for the three armies on the Rhine 94,200 men, 12,600 horses and 288 cannon, the reserve army on the Elbe would comprise 96,304 men and 13,200 horses. They were to be prepared for battle within six weeks. The Austrian army would increase its forces in Germany gradually and within 18 weeks it would be deployed in full in the number of 150,000 soldiers and 402 cannon, but a considerable part of this number would be prepared for fighting in southern Germany in a shorter period; the Italian army was to be reinforced up to 120,000 men by the troops from Hungary, Carniola and Illyria.’
 
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