Could the Phillipines have been held in 42?

Assuming intelligence puts together Japan's plans by early November 41 and competent leadership could Japan have been beaten there?
 
Assuming intelligence puts together Japan's plans by early November 41 and competent leadership could Japan have been beaten there?

Not really, or at least not barring ungodly good luck, like a freak storm sinking or damaging most of the initial invasion fleet.
 

Driftless

Donor
Not indefinitely.

If you hold to the historic timeline into late 1941, you would still need to change two plausible actions - that should have occured - and the garrison likely holds for much longer, which would have had useful knockons throughout the theater.
1. Move more supplies to Bataan as called for by Plan Orange. That maybe gets the US & Philippine forces another couple of months
2. Get the USAAF off the ground. It's hindsight to be sure, but getting the B-17's to attack Japanese bases on Formosa, would have been more useful than their being shot up on the ground at Clark Field and other airfields on Luzon

To get a longer fight, probably requires a much earlier change of conditions from history.
 
The Japanese could not have been beaten with such a late departure. However, the Americans and Filipinos could have held out much longer and cause the Japanese many more casualties.

If Mac had concentrated his forces to defend Luzon, but make separate commands to prepare for guerrilla defense on the rest of the islands, prepare Bataan for ammunition, food, and medical supplies, then the Japanese timeline would have been severely disrupted. I don't know how long the US could have listed, but holding out another 4-6 months is possible.
 
Not indefinitely.

If you hold to the historic timeline into late 1941, you would still need to change two plausible actions - that should have occured - and the garrison likely holds for much longer, which would have had useful knockons throughout the theater.
1. Move more supplies to Bataan as called for by Plan Orange. That maybe gets the US & Philippine forces another couple of months
2. Get the USAAF off the ground. It's hindsight to be sure, but getting the B-17's to attack Japanese bases on Formosa, would have been more useful than their being shot up on the ground at Clark Field and other airfields on Luzon

To get a longer fight, probably requires a much earlier change of conditions from history.

The Japanese could not have been beaten with such a late departure. However, the Americans and Filipinos could have held out much longer and cause the Japanese many more casualties.

If Mac had concentrated his forces to defend Luzon, but make separate commands to prepare for guerrilla defense on the rest of the islands, prepare Bataan for ammunition, food, and medical supplies, then the Japanese timeline would have been severely disrupted. I don't know how long the US could have listed, but holding out another 4-6 months is possible.
Indeed.

MacArthur sold Congress and FDR on having the Philippines ready to hold against Japan by ... ?spring? of 1942. This would have involved massively upgrading equipment, upgrading the Philippine army, etc.

Whether the Philippines might have held out if the Japanese had given him the time he wanted, no one knows (I doubt it, but it would have been a lot closer).

But, after all, there was a very good reason that Japan attacked when she did. Every day she delayed was a stronger, more prepared US.


Could Bataan have held out for much longer with those extra supplies? Yes. How much longer? Oooo... That's a good question. Blackfox's suggestion seems pretty reasonable.

Could small numbers of US troops working with the Philippine army have conducted guerrilla raids, making Japan's occupation miserable? Yes.

Could the Philippines have held out to the end of '42? very, very hard to do, without a much earlier US war effort.
 
Part of the problem in the PI was the fact that, once the forces had retreated to Bataan/Corregidor, they did not establish a second "southern PI" command. Doing that would have allowed forces in the southern islands to fight rather than Wainwright being legally able to surrender all forces - even the Japanese would have understood Wainwright not having authority to surrender forces other than those Luzon.

Simply following the plan and putting supplies in Bataan (and not fighting so heavily forward), using the time to send off strikes to Formosa as well as dispersing planes rather than leaving everything lines up during the grace period, and then splitting command will help a lot. Doing all this guarantees holding out much longer, and costing the Japanese much more in personnel and equipment. Screwing up the Japanese timeline seriously means things fall apart from then sooner - but I agree that the PI would probably fall eventually. You might see combined US/Filipino holdouts on some of the islands the Japanese don't occupy or visit occasionally, but the main islands will be as OTL eventually though all irregulars could be better and sooner in action.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Beaten? No...

Assuming intelligence puts together Japan's plans by early November 41 and competent leadership could Japan have been beaten there?

Beaten? No...

As it was, the US and Filipino forces held out on Bataan until April and Corregidor until May, which totals five months after the war began; considering the absoulute air and sea supremacy the Japanese enjoyed from late December, it is pretty remarkable. Having said that, once US air and sea power in the PI was destroyed or driven out, the bravery of the ground forces really didn't slow the Japanese offensives down markedly; there's a reason the IJA 48th Division could be withdrawn for the Java campaign.

Although MacArthur's plans for a defense on the beaches and the loss of supplies that could have and should have been moved to Bataan and the harbor island fortifications before the end would have been rational, there is a limit on what can be expected of men in battle - and as significant as Manila Bay is, denying it to the Japanese was not going to win the war.

At some point, one gets to the self-policed prisoner of war camp, akin to the Dardanelles or Salonika in WW I.

With all due credit to the gallantry of the defenders, there's a reasonable case to be made that the men and material deployed into the PI in 1940-41 would have been better used in Hawaii; the AUS units, especially the AAF units and the coast and AA artillery that were deployed to the PI between October, 1940 and December, 1941, would have been especially useful for the defense of Hawaii; same for the fleet boats and submarine tenders, and the Naval Aviation units.

Best,
 
Beaten? No...

As it was, the US and Filipino forces held out on Bataan until April and Corregidor until May, which totals five months after the war began; considering the absoulute air and sea supremacy the Japanese enjoyed from late December, it is pretty remarkable. Having said that, once US air and sea power in the PI was destroyed or driven out, the bravery of the ground forces really didn't slow the Japanese offensives down markedly; there's a reason the IJA 48th Division could be withdrawn for the Java campaign.

Although MacArthur's plans for a defense on the beaches and the loss of supplies that could have and should have been moved to Bataan and the harbor island fortifications before the end would have been rational, there is a limit on what can be expected of men in battle - and as significant as Manila Bay is, denying it to the Japanese was not going to win the war.

At some point, one gets to the self-policed prisoner of war camp, akin to the Dardanelles or Salonika in WW I.

With all due credit to the gallantry of the defenders, there's a reasonable case to be made that the men and material deployed into the PI in 1940-41 would have been better used in Hawaii; the AUS units, especially the AAF units and the coast and AA artillery that were deployed to the PI between October, 1940 and December, 1941, would have been especially useful for the defense of Hawaii; same for the fleet boats and submarine tenders, and the Naval Aviation units.

Best,

Your scenario butterflies US-Japanese war. Or if there is still one would change the timeframe US enters the war. If you withdraw U.S. Troops and assets before the war starts, the Philippines would just declare itself a neutral state and would do everything in its diplomatic power with a Japanese relationship rekindle since 1898. Having said that, There is no need for the japanese to Do Pearl harbor or invade the Philippines.

The scenario would probably be good for the Jews in Europe, since Quezon would have more time to save more Jews from Europe and Philippines would have a significant Jewish population by present day ATL.
 
Last edited:

TFSmith121

Banned
I'm not referring to the entire US garrison, much less the

Your scenario butterflies US-Japanese war. Or if there is still one would change the timeframe US enters the war. If you withdraw U.S. Troops and assets before the war starts, the Philippines would just declare itself a neutral state and would do everything in its diplomatic power with a Japanese relationship rekindle since 1898. Having said that, There is no need for the japanese to Do Pearl harbor or invade the Philippines.

The scenario would probably be good for the Jews in Europe, since Quezon would have more time to save more Jews from Europe and Philippines would have a significant Jewish population by present day ATL.

I'm not referring to the entire US garrison, much less the Philippine Commonwealth forces, circa-Dec. 8, 1941; I am speaking of the reinforcements that went to the Phillipine Department and Asiatic Fleet between 08/41 (beginning of US reinforcement) and 12/41. Specifically, this amounts to some 8,600 AUS personnel (AAF, AGF, ASF), which included the 200th CA Regiment (AA) and the 192nd and 194th Tank battalions, as well as the 35 B-17s of the 19th Bombardment Group and no less than 107 P-40s (Hawaii only had 12 and 138, respectively), as well Boise and 12 addiotional fleet submarines that arrived beginning in October.

That still would have let USAFFE with the US Army's Phillippine Division, the Coast Artillery Command, the 10-12 Phillippine Army "divisions" (brigade strength) once mobilized, and the 4th and 24th groups and Patwing 10, with 54 twin-engine bombers (24 USN, 30 USAAF) and 68 single-engine fighters (USAAF), plus the Asiatic Fleet with two cruisers, 13 destroyers, and 17 submarines - all in all, certainly more than enough to die gallantly.

Neutrality didn't do much for the Thais, as far as the Japanese were concerned.

See:
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-2-1/CMH_Pub_5-2-1.pdf

Best,
 
Neutrality didn't do much for the Thais, as far as the Japanese were concerned.

See:
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-2-1/CMH_Pub_5-2-1.pdf

Best,

In otl, The Thais were not neutral as far I am concerned. The Thais gave mixed signals to the Japanese of where they stood on basing rights or passage and they talked too much with the Allies about security. Not only that, the British encouraged the the Thais to fight the Japanese.

In the ATL, I described you, if the Americans did depart, the closest thing the Philippines would have as a friend if you discount USA would be Japan with little historical relationship with France or Britain or even pressure from Britain to fight the Japanese much like the Thais had to deal with.

However, since our withdrawal of U.S. Troops ideas are not the same, I digress.
 
Top