Could the Phillipines have been held 1941-2

I have to agree with the viewpoints stated here by CalBear and Oldbill. Logistically there is no way for the US to maintain a fighting force in the Philippines after Pearl Harbor. Given the state of training, level of equipment and the outdated strategic viewpoints of the US military in 1941 the Philippines were doomed from the start. It would have to be a very large POD (1939) to start to organize, arm and structure the force in the Philippines to have any different effect than what did happen to them. It was sadly a case of too little, too late for the Philippines.
I don't know about that. MacArthur did manage to convince Congress to try to build up the islands to a defensible level (which he thought could be reached by spring '42). If that process had started 6 months earlier, he should have been able to get up to that level by 7 Dec '41. (Of course, if he had, would the Japanese have attacked earlier?)
I'm sure that MacArthur massively underestimated the Japanese, and probably overestimated his Philippinos, but I could see (with a build up starting 4 months earlier, say), that they could hold out (at least in the mountains) until some time in '43, and with the Japanese bogged down in the Philippines, they don't have the resources for New Guinea or Guadacanal, probably. Moreover, with MacArthur still holding out in the hills, he'd support the Central Pacific offensive by the Navy for his relief, rather than frittering away resources in the SouthWest Pacific.

So, once the Essexes start rolling off the ways, the US heads straight across the Pacific, and saves the Philippine holdouts (OK, both surviving soldiers, perhaps, but still).

Ya. Improbable. And Probably 'some holdout areas' rather than 'The Philippines are held', but still.
 
From the beginning (like 1919/1920) War Plan Orange made the assumption that the PI would fall to Japan before the USA could reinforce them - looking at the sea lanes and where the USA had potential bases (only Guam and Wake west of Hawaii) compared to what Japan had to block US forces moving to the PI this makes sense. Even before WWI TR had made comments about how the PI were "out there" and indefensible. The problem with building up the PI defenses is that before Japan bailed out of the Washington Naval Treaties (yes they had cheated but that was not known) the USA was committed to not building up PI fortifications. The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 gave a 10 year period of transition at which point the PI would be independent. Given the upcoming independence of the PI there was great reluctance for the USA to spend much money (during the Depression) on someplace that would no longer be US territory in the near future. Even sending arms to the new PI military was debated in terms of how much. By the time Japan bailed from treaties, and it became more obvious that things were going to go bad in the Pacific, the USA had lots of catching up to do so this meant resources available to the PI even with the best will were limited.

IMHO a POD for a better outcome in the PI due to an earlier/larger build up means lots of moving pieces have to change. Doing better with a better use of resources (ie: Dougie being smart and better planning) is certainly doable.
 

hipper

Banned
The only way the PI Survive is if the USN had relocated the Pacific fleet to the DEI and it was used to Preserve Java
If that was done then perhaps a contested convoy Route to the PI could exist and a series of Convoys could have been fought through to Reinforce the PI.

it would mean taking risks in the Pacific but if Japan is heavelly engaged i in The DEI then it can't invade port Mosby
 
This depends on PoD.

If Pod is 1941, no amount wanking is going to hold the Philippines.

If PoD is 1935, Philippines can be held but will face two major problems:

1) Allocation of funds of USA and asset delivery on time

2) Allocation of funds of the Philippine government. In otl, the Philippine commonwealth pre 1941 decided to delay buying assets until independence scheduled for 1946.

Yes, it all comes down to funding.

Now, if you based of everything OTL no amount of date start will change this because everything remained OTL including asset, financial, training deliveries remained the same.
 
Assume good US awareness of Pearl Harbor.

Ships with water tight doors close, full alert for anti airdraft guns and US planes meet Japanese (they near edge of their range).

B17 at high level follow returning Japanese aircraft. US carriers given position. Japan loses half of attack force.
 
There's also the fact the Philippine Commonwealth Army was cripplingly short on all manner of equipment (artillery, machine guns, rifles, ect.) in large part due to so much American WW1 surplus being shipped to the British in 1940-41. By late 1941 in particular, I question the wisdom to continue shipping so much equipment to Britain which would only be sent straight into Home Guard armories to rust.
 
It wasn't just equipment either - the training of the PCA was in a dreadful state, IMHO most of the formations would need at least 12 more motnhs to be effective, and even then there is the issue of a lack of seasoned officers and NCOs.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
It wasn't just equipment either - the training of the PCA was in a dreadful state, IMHO most of the formations would need at least 12 more motnhs to be effective, and even then there is the issue of a lack of seasoned officers and NCOs.


A rule of thumb I read for WW2 training. It takes only 6 months to train any one soldier to do any one job. It takes 2 years to get a new battalion to good combat effectiveness. If you start major changes and equipment in mid-1941, you probably have good units by mid-1943. The USA needs to make the decision to defend the PI seriously by early to mid 1939 at the latest, in order to begin serious training in December 1939. And this would require anticipating Hitler would attack Poland. If Hitler loses his nerve in late 1939 or dies in a car wreck, the USA PI funding will look pretty smart.

And you see the problem IOTL. If in June 1940, Congress goes all out funding the PI, then we get legislation in July. Add six months to get the factories making weapons, and we are in December 1940. We have good quality PI divisions just in time for Christmas 1943, which seems like about the time we start putting the Japanese on the retreat on most fronts. It is a sad lesson of war, but you really need to keep most of the troops and supplies needed for the first 2 years of a war in active or reserve status. The USA spent a about a 150 years repeatedly learning this lesson.

You will see me make similar comments mostly on WW1 threads, but the USA need an army at least 3 times bigger in any given year from 1880 to 1942. And the sad thing is that we could have kept much of it in reserve status compared to the Europeans due to having more defensive depth (Oceans).
 
Well most of the weapons could come from WW1 surplus. Agreed that the POD would be best done in 1939. It most likely would not stop the IJA but they could bleed them a lot more and have stocks of armories to aid resisters.
 
The PI need to begin training significant numbers of formation NLT early 1939. Even if they are equipped entirely with WWI surplus - 1903 Springfields, .30 cal water cooled machine guns, 75mm artillery with a sprinkling of BARs & Thompsons this is a pretty fair match on what the Japanese infantry units will have. US units would be stiffeners, and having some tanks (Stuarts and Grants), some US mobile heavy artillery (105 & maybe some 155) and you have a ground force that will put up a stiff fight. Of course you need to avoid the aircraft being caught on the ground and destroyed before the fight begins to provide some protection for the ground troops as well as some offensive capability for ground support.

IMHO the most difficult part of getting these units trained is where do NCOs and officers come from.
 
The only way the PI Survive is if the USN had relocated the Pacific fleet to the DEI and it was used to Preserve Java
If that was done then perhaps a contested convoy Route to the PI could exist and a series of Convoys could have been fought through to Reinforce the PI.

it would mean taking risks in the Pacific but if Japan is heavelly engaged i in The DEI then it can't invade port Mosby

The Dutch were hard pressed to keep their small navy operating out of Java. The US Asiatic fleet fled PI to Java and found it had to spread its ships across ports in Australia as well. It took the USN over six months to prepare Wellington NZ as its main S Pacific base & set up a few forward naval depots in Fiji & New Calidonia area. Then it still had trouble sustaining a portion of the Pacific fleet there.
 

hipper

Banned
The Dutch were hard pressed to keep their small navy operating out of Java. The US Asiatic fleet fled PI to Java and found it had to spread its ships across ports in Australia as well. It took the USN over six months to prepare Wellington NZ as its main S Pacific base & set up a few forward naval depots in Fiji & New Calidonia area. Then it still had trouble sustaining a portion of the Pacific fleet there.

nice docks in Singapore and Ceylon. Just add some US navy supplies and some inter allied cooperation.
 
.... Just add some US navy supplies and some inter allied cooperation.

That was the tough and time consuming part. Building up the material. It took three months to position enough US air force supplies and base/ground personel in Australia & New Guinea to get a single bomber wing into sustained action. Even in May 1942 the USN had severe limits on how many ships it could operate in the S Pacific for more time than a raid. Ammunition and spare parts of all classes were still inadaquate in the S Pacific in late spring. This was first due to the chaos Allied cargo shipping was in, then the distance to the S Pacific. Both Ceylon & Singapore were further away from the US than Wellington.

Wellington had the added advantage that it was not captured by the Japanese in a few short months ; )
 
From San Francisco to Australia at around 12 knots is 30 days, to the PI is maybe 7+ days longer. This is straight steaming no convoy no zig-zag and the most direct (great circle) route. Of course you have to get the cargo to SF (or another west coast port) assuming you have it sitting in a warehouse somewhere. Then load it. This means realistically 2-3 months for supplies that are already in inventory and can be spared to get to the PI, Australia, or Java.
 
In Febuary the Lexington attempted a raid on Raubal. Japanese air reconissance spotted the TF & Adm Brown prudently aborted the raid. He was still caught by a group of 17 twin engine bombers & was lucky to get away with ships unscathed. One of the IJN squadrons attacking was made up of aircrew who had attacked the PoW & Repulse.

A few weeks later combined air groups from both the Lexington and Enterprise struck at a Japanese convoy approaching New Guinea. They managed to sink one cargo ship, damage a couple others, and scatter the rest for a week.

Somehow I cant see the US fleet doing much better if concentrated in Javanese waters.
 

hipper

Banned
That was the tough and time consuming part. Building up the material. It took three months to position enough US air force supplies and base/ground personel in Australia & New Guinea to get a single bomber wing into sustained action. Even in May 1942 the USN had severe limits on how many ships it could operate in the S Pacific for more time than a raid. Ammunition and spare parts of all classes were still inadaquate in the S Pacific in late spring. This was first due to the chaos Allied cargo shipping was in, then the distance to the S Pacific. Both Ceylon & Singapore were further away from the US than Wellington.

Wellington had the added advantage that it was not captured by the Japanese in a few short months ; )

The Question was how to percent the Pi from falling tot the jappanese

To do that you need a secure supply line

To secure the supply line you need to commit the US Pacific fleet to the ABDA forces preferably before the start of the war.

It may not work. But it's the only way worth attempting.

Regards
 
The problem with major elements of the USN being committed to Java/ABDA is that they are working in very restricted waters and will be easily within range of land based aircraft. Japan still has Indochina, and at least some of the OTL landings will succeed allowed Japan more airbases in the area. Surface units without air cover, we know how that ends. Putting US carriers in very restricted waters and subject to air attack from land and carrier aviation will not end well. At this point Japanese naval aircraft are generally better than the US aircraft, and the pilots are more experienced. Sooner or later this will overcome US defenses - and carriers not sunk will have a very long haul to get to where they can be replaced.

Furthermore the supply line to the PI does not go through the ABDA area. Even if you prevent some of the Japanese gains in the DEI you still have the eastern end of the island chain and Borneo in Japanese hand as well as French Indochina. This means the western sea approaches to the PI via the South China Sea are still interdicted. The supply line that matters is the US-Hawaii-PI route.
 

hipper

Banned
The problem with major elements of the USN being committed to Java/ABDA is that they are working in very restricted waters and will be easily within range of land based aircraft. Japan still has Indochina, and at least some of the OTL landings will succeed allowed Japan more airbases in the area. Surface units without air cover, we know how that ends. Putting US carriers in very restricted waters and subject to air attack from land and carrier aviation will not end well. At this point Japanese naval aircraft are generally better than the US aircraft, and the pilots are more experienced. Sooner or later this will overcome US defenses - and carriers not sunk will have a very long haul to get to where they can be replaced.
The start of the
Furthermore the supply line to the PI does not go through the ABDA area. Even if you prevent some of the Japanese gains in the DEI you still have the eastern end of the island chain and Borneo in Japanese hand as well as French Indochina. This means the western sea approaches to the PI via the South China Sea are still interdicted. The supply line that matters is the US-Hawaii-PI route.

At the start of the War the US Hawaii PI route is interdicted. While the Allies controll the sea route to the PI through the Dutch East Indies.

Therefore to keep the PI the American Pacific fleet (plus land based air) should have been in the DEI
 
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