Could the Ottomans really conquer or vassalize italy or a part of it?

The same thing occurred to me, but I think it could go either way: the Ottomans were a lot stronger than the Byzantines, but they'd be fighting a stronger and more united enemy as well. The Byzantines were fighting just the Lombards (and later the Sicilian Normans), but the Ottomans would be fighting the Hapsburgs and most of Italy at the very least. The big wild card is which side France takes: they were the Hapsburgs' main rivals within Europe, and OTL they did align with the Ottomans against the Hapsburgs from time to time, so it's not out of the question that they'd give the Ottomans an opening by keeping the Hapsburgs busy while the Ottomans bite off a chunk of Italy. On the other hand, France had significant claims and ambitions of their own in Italy during this period, so there's a point beyond which the Ottomans wouldn't be able to push without making an enemy of France.

The Franco-Ottoman alliance was started only by Francis I but his (and Ottoman's at that time) strategic idea was the Ottoman attack on the Hapsburg hereditary lands through Hungary: in Italy Francis had his own interests (mostly Milan) and I'm not sure if Suleiman was planning any conquest there. Anyway, the OTL actions were more logical (and secure) for the Ottomans than an adventure like landing in the Southern Italy because on land they could use their forces to a full extent. As far as the earlier time frame is involved, both Charles VIII and Louis XII had been actively pursuing claim to the Kingdom of Naples which would prevent close cooperation with the Ottomans (if they decided to land in Italy).

Of course, as you said, the direct analogies with the Byzantines are simply irrelevant.
 
The best approach would be toward Venice by land - that it wasn't seriously considered tells you how difficult that promised to be.
On the other hand, if successfully done by luck and genius, it would be rather devastating.

This stratagem was consistently failing all the time from the Middle Ages and all the way to certain General Bonaparte (who seemingly had a right combination of both luck and genius). ;)
 
There is a big difference between Rome and Constantinople. It might not be easy for a non catholic to understand, but it’s like the difference between idk, Baghdad and Mecca. Both are obviously important to Christianity, but there are degrees of magnitude. Constantinople for anyone in Europe, was always somewhat on the periphery, and they were considered something of heretics as it was. Not so for Rome. If there was anything that would unite the powers of Europe, it would be Rome falling to the Muslims, especially when there is an especially zealous catholic monarch in both Spain and Austria at this point.

Things change later on, and you can always bring up the French allying with the Turks, but Northern Italy has always been a part of France’s imperial ambitions, and Southern Italy was usually in the sway of Spain. Thats very difference from the Balkans, where they’re really just a counterbalance for the Holy Roman Empire, or considered as such by the French. Probably a big reason why they never did attempt to expand into Italy to be honest.

In 930 CE the Qarmatians destroyed the Kaaba, desecrated the entire city of Mecca, took the bodies of the inhabitants and stuffed them in the wells, and stole the black stone. There was outrage throughout the muslim world and yet no military response. Compare to the first Arab conquest of Jerusalem and the lack of a mass Christian military response. The idea that attacks on holy cities causes religious people to unite as one has very little support.

EDIT: Also the time the Portuguese stole the Buddhas tooth from Sri Lanka and ground it to dust. No military response from other Theravada Buddhist states

It may or may not: we can only speculate. If it was so easy, why would you need Mehmed II or Suleiman to be associated with it? Why almost 19,000 Ottoman troops led by one of their best commanders did not advance beyond Otranto (and raiding of few places along the coast)? It is, supposedly, a well-known fact that by October of 1480 the troops of Gedik Ahmed Pasha started suffering from supply shortages which forced him to evacuate most of his troops to Albania leaving only a small garrison in Otranto. In other words, invasion already stalled while Mehmed was still alive.



Aragon was not "farther away" by a very simple reason: it owned Sicily. Don't know where did you get an idea that supply of its army was easy because it was anything but easy even with the numerous Italian allies. Additional factors: Aragon (helped by Castile) had a powerful navy (the Ottomans mostly had galleys which were good for the raiding but not as supply ships), Cordoba was just one step short of being a military genius (or perhaps he was one), and until 1501 the France and Spain had been allies fighting against the King of Naples. BTW, on the earlier stage of war the French troops stationed in the Kingdom of Naples suffered from terrible food shortages.

Unlike their Christian contemporaries with the armies living mostly off the land, the Ottomans strongly relied upon a well-organized supply train which would be rather difficult to provide and maintain in this specific theater.

According to this academic article , Gedik sent a large portion of his forces to Albania in order to put down a large rebellion that had erupted, not because of supply shortages. The general conclusion of the article is that the invasion of Italy failed because Mehmed had exhausted the Ottoman state with extra intense mobilization during his reign (for example, the siege of Rhodes was simultaneously ongoing during the invasion of Otranto). This allowed large dangerous rebellions to erupt in Albania, cutting off help and caused Mehmeds successor to pull back after the civil war (which also helped the rebels) to concentrate on fixing them and recovering. Nothing there about the inherent impossibility of supplying Italy from OE territory. If the Albanians had been fully pacified before the Italy invasion, I don't see why the Otranto soldiers couldn't have been reinforced.
 
Last edited:
According to this academic article , Gedik sent a large portion of his forces to Albania in order to put down a large rebellion that had erupted, not because of supply shortages. The general conclusion of the article is that the invasion of Italy failed because Mehmed had exhausted the Ottoman state with extra intense mobilization during his reign (for example, the siege of Rhodes was simultaneously ongoing during the invasion of Otranto). This allowed large dangerous rebellions to erupt in Albania, cutting off help and caused Mehmeds successor to pull back after the civil war (which also helped the rebels) to concentrate on fixing them and recovering. Nothing there about the inherent impossibility of supplying Italy from OE territory. If the Albanians had been fully pacified before the Italy invasion, I don't see why the Otranto soldiers couldn't have been reinforced.

The article is not dealing with the issue of a possible Italian campaign and the issue of the supplies is mostly being ignored because author is concentrating on the Albanian factor. However, there is something about the supply lines as well: "As Treptow observed, in spite oftheir localized character, these rebellions threatened the Ottoman positions in Italy by cutting off the supply and communication lines between Istanbul and Vlorδ". What this does say (no matter what were author's intentions) is that the whole adventure was ill-conceived because the rear (Albania) was not secured by the time it started. It also says that the invasion army expected supplies from the Ottoman Empire.

As for the practicality of a whole schema, "The forces of Gedik Ahmed Pasha during the invasion, consisting of maximum 18,000 troops, or these that Gedik was planning to gather in order to extend Ottoman acquisitions in Italy before being recalled by Bayezid II, namely 25,000 troops, were but a sign of the empire’s exhaustion.... it becomes apparent that the Ottoman invasion of Italy was a rather middle-scale or even small-scale operation". Conquest of Italy with these numbers was unrealistic and the reasons why resources of the Ottoman Empire were exhausted are besides the point. BTW, as far as the siege of Rhodes is involved it looks like the Ottoman forces are being evaluated as only being between 10 and 20K; not such a big force to exhaust resources of the whole Empire.
 
The article is not dealing with the issue of a possible Italian campaign and the issue of the supplies is mostly being ignored because author is concentrating on the Albanian factor. However, there is something about the supply lines as well: "As Treptow observed, in spite oftheir localized character, these rebellions threatened the Ottoman positions in Italy by cutting off the supply and communication lines between Istanbul and Vlorδ". What this does say (no matter what were author's intentions) is that the whole adventure was ill-conceived because the rear (Albania) was not secured by the time it started. It also says that the invasion army expected supplies from the Ottoman Empire.

As for the practicality of a whole schema, "The forces of Gedik Ahmed Pasha during the invasion, consisting of maximum 18,000 troops, or these that Gedik was planning to gather in order to extend Ottoman acquisitions in Italy before being recalled by Bayezid II, namely 25,000 troops, were but a sign of the empire’s exhaustion.... it becomes apparent that the Ottoman invasion of Italy was a rather middle-scale or even small-scale operation". Conquest of Italy with these numbers was unrealistic and the reasons why resources of the Ottoman Empire were exhausted are besides the point. BTW, as far as the siege of Rhodes is involved it looks like the Ottoman forces are being evaluated as only being between 10 and 20K; not such a big force to exhaust resources of the whole Empire.

The article itself is not specifically about the Albanian factor. It's about all the factors that led to the invasion of Otranto not progressing. It specifically points out that the Albanian factor is overemphasized and details the other reasons for why the expedition stalled. Why would it ignore supply lines if it didn't ignore the other factors? it seems more likely that the issue of supply was simply minor enough to only merit a minor mention, while the Albanian rebellion was more significant.

The reasons for why the OE was exhausted is important because it has implications for how feasible the OE conquering south Italy is. Having the Albanians be pacified is much easier than granting the Ottomans total naval domination.

Rhodes is a single example used to illustrate a trend.
 
The article itself is not specifically about the Albanian factor. It's about all the factors that led to the invasion of Otranto not progressing. It specifically points out that the Albanian factor is overemphasized and details the other reasons for why the expedition stalled. Why would it ignore supply lines if it didn't ignore the other factors? it seems more likely that the issue of supply was simply minor enough to only merit a minor mention, while the Albanian rebellion was more significant.

It may seems to you that supply issue "was simply minor" but it proved to be quite critical over the centuries of a warfare, especially the modern one when "supplies" meant not only the food but ammunition as well. BTW, there is a clear quote in my post from the article (which you seemingly consider to be an ultimate truth on the subject even if author explicitly mentions other points of view) about supply lines being cut due to the Albanian rebellions forcing return of the main part of the landing troops so you can figure out their (supplies) importance.


The reasons for why the OE was exhausted is important because it has implications for how feasible the OE conquering south Italy is. Having the Albanians be pacified is much easier than granting the Ottomans total naval domination.

Rhodes is a single example used to illustrate a trend.

But we are talking about something close to the OTL not a fancy la-la-land in which all problems are gone, there are no internal or external enemies, food is easily available available on a countryside and gunpowder could be bought in the local shops. We are also talking about the Ottoman army, which, unlike its western counterparts, was putting a great stress on providing a regular supply for its troops.

Anyway, whatever seems to you to be author's point, one thing is clear: in OTL the planned size of the expedition was inadequate for the purpose of conquering Italy and there was no realistic possibility for a much greater army to get engaged on that theater.
 
It may seems to you that supply issue "was simply minor" but it proved to be quite critical over the centuries of a warfare, especially the modern one when "supplies" meant not only the food but ammunition as well. BTW, there is a clear quote in my post from the article (which you seemingly consider to be an ultimate truth on the subject even if author explicitly mentions other points of view) about supply lines being cut due to the Albanian rebellions forcing return of the main part of the landing troops so you can figure out their (supplies) importance.




But we are talking about something close to the OTL not a fancy la-la-land in which all problems are gone, there are no internal or external enemies, food is easily available available on a countryside and gunpowder could be bought in the local shops. We are also talking about the Ottoman army, which, unlike its western counterparts, was putting a great stress on providing a regular supply for its troops.

Anyway, whatever seems to you to be author's point, one thing is clear: in OTL the planned size of the expedition was inadequate for the purpose of conquering Italy and there was no realistic possibility for a much greater army to get engaged on that theater.

Let's look at what you said in your previous posts:

supplying a big army across the Adriatic Sea would be a very complicated task requiring close to an absolute naval domination (which the Ottomans never had).
Unlike their Christian contemporaries with the armies living mostly off the land, the Ottomans strongly relied upon a well-organized supply train which would be rather difficult to provide and maintain in this specific theater.

The idea here is that the Ottomans were inherently unable to supply forces in Italy properly due to a lack of naval power and that this was a primary reason for Ottoman failure. This is quite different to a lack of supply simply being one aspect of of a large rebellion that included threatened communication and obstruction of reinforcements. Naval domination would not have prevented rebellious Albanians from causing the turning point of the invasion-murdering the newly appointed commander Suleyman Pasha.

I dunno what you mean by me considering the article the "ultimate truth". As far as I know we're both laymen and hence our history opinions must be backed up by what expert academics say. If you have academic sources that support your points I'd be happy to read them.

Apparently, "fully pacifying Albania before the expedition" is the same as "a fancy la-la-land in which all problems are gone, there are no internal or external enemies, food is easily available available on a countryside and gunpowder could be bought in the local shops". Okay.

In terms of possibilities, I don't know whether Suleyman Pasha could have successfully suppressed the rebellion but his defeat was a turning point. If he had won, why couldn't reinforcements have been shipped in? The garrison in Otranto clearly thought it was possible and were banking on it.
 
Sicily was ruled by the Muslims (Arabs) between 827 and 1091 which does not qualify as "several centuries" or even as "couple centuries" and by the late XV century it was an ancient history, unlike the Aragonian rule which started in 1282 and was still there. Then, it "could" be a great target but hardly was one because campaign of its conquest would require a naval dominance, which the Ottomans did not have and clear military superiority, which they also hardly had by the late XV.

I agree naval power is probably the key here. He who controls the sea can come and go at will, bringing in vast resources to overwhelm the enemy.

I'm not an expert on the Ottoman navy. The empire's resources were vast and they were still advancing on land until the 1690s. So I suspect there is a theoretical possibility to be had.

The late 1400s doesn't seem as good a time as the 1500s, due to the speed of expansion being too fast. But the time of Muhtesem Yuzyil? Seems feasible.

I've just conquered Sicily with the Ottomans in Empire Total War, so I might be a little biased :)
 
So, any ideas to how make the ottoman navy the mediterranean hegemon? I am now looking for posible escenarios for ottoman sicily and/or malta.
 
Let's look at what you said in your previous posts:

The idea here is that the Ottomans were inherently unable to supply forces in Italy properly due to a lack of naval power and that this was a primary reason for Ottoman failure.

What I said is that (a) providing the regular supplies across the Adriatic would require a naval domination and (b) that the Ottoman army was paying a lot of attention to the regular supply of the troops. The conclusions are yours, not mine.
 
I agree naval power is probably the key here. He who controls the sea can come and go at will, bringing in vast resources to overwhelm the enemy.

I'm not an expert on the Ottoman navy. The empire's resources were vast and they were still advancing on land until the 1690s. So I suspect there is a theoretical possibility to be had.

The main problem with the resources was that they were all over the place: Syria, Rhodes, Albania/Italy, Crimea, problems in Walachia, potential danger of Hungarian attack, etc. The Ottoman empire of that time did not have too many quality troops, especially Janissary (according to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Janissaries, in 1484 their number was 7,841 and remained almost the same till 1540's). So, if they had been used on the numerous theaters, it would be 2 - 3,000 per place, which is not too much, especially taking into an account their tactical limitations: they were good in the sieges (on both sides of equation) but an absence of the pikemen made them vulnerable to the cavalry charges and in most of the famous Ottoman battles on the West they had been fighting defensively behind the earthworks, stockades, etc. Battle of Ankara demonstrated what could happen to them in an absence of a cavalry support. Sipahi were a good cavalry but they were light comparing to the Western cavalry of the XV century and, AFAIK (or judging by their performance in the XVIII century), not well-drilled to fight as an unit. In other words, no substantial (if any) advantage unless present in the big numbers but they were not in an unlimited supply and as I understand there were "specifics" of their deployment like limited time span (due to the need to oversee the field works in their estates). The rest were either troops of the vassal states (like Serbian knights at Ankara or Moldavians and Walachians at 2nd Vienna or the Crimeans) of various quality and sometimes questionable loyalty or the Ottoman irregulars.

As a result, there could be only a limited number of troops dedicated to the Italian front. They could grab some piece of a territory but I would not bet on their ability to maintain a long-term occupation, especially taking into an account that there were both Spanish and French interests in this specific area and that any disruption of a status quo could easily trigger the direct involvement of these powers.

The late 1400s doesn't seem as good a time as the 1500s, due to the speed of expansion being too fast. But the time of Muhtesem Yuzyil? Seems feasible.

I happen to disagree. In 1494 the French involvement into the Italian (specifically Neapolitan) affairs started and soon afterwards you have Spain (and then HRE) involved as well. Of course, combination of the conflicting French, Spanish, Italian and Ottoman interests in Naples is interesting but I have no idea how it could develop except that, most probably, there would be a temporary Christian alliance against the Ottoman followed by the "business as usual" mess. ;)

And as far as Suleiman is involved, IMO the Ottomans already started lagging behind the Western counterparts tactically. Anyway, what Suleiman did in OTL looks like a much more sound strategy because attack on Hungary (and then on Vienna) did not involve the limitations related to a seaborne operation, allowed to deploy much more troops AND made obvious geopolitical sense while landing in Southern Italy was not solving any problems.

I've just conquered Sicily with the Ottomans in Empire Total War, so I might be a little biased :)

In 1837 Tsar Nicholas I decided to commemorate 25th anniversary of the Battle of Borodino. Under his personal command the reenacting troops gained an easy victory over the "French" and Nicholas was foolish enough to say: "here is how the real battle had to be fought!". To which one of his generals (a rare specimen who had a backbone) answered: "Your Majesty, you forgot that in this reenactment the troops and artillery had been shooting blanks and, most important, Napoleon was absent!" Happy future conquests! :winkytongue:
 
Top