Could the Netherlands have been liberate Aug 44

This morning I caught a repeat of the World at War. A British guy was claiming that just after Brussels was taken there was a halt order. He said tht in fact there was more fuel than the people giving the order thought and that at that time the German forces in the Netherlands were very weak.

If a risk had been taken could it have come off?

If so how much differnce does it make? The Nazis would still have been on their side of the Rhine.

On the other hand if it did allow an invasion of Germany itself from the West how much does that change the nature of the relationship with Stalin?
 
Horrocks, in command of XXX Corps, felt that he made the critical error by concentrating on capturing Antwerp, which he achieved taking the port intact, rather than pushing into the Netherlands. He had been earlier ordered by Montgomery to take Antwerp, so the blame needs to be at least shared. Trying to ensure your own supplies rather than gambling on destroying the enemy force was the normal British way of fighting.
 

nbcman

Donor
Capturing Antwerp with its port intact didn't help much since the Allies (mainly Canadians) still had to clear the Scheldt Estuary leading from the North Sea to the port. Based on our knowledge, the Brits would have been better off pushing on in hopes of getting across the Rhine in the Netherlands.
 
Horrocks stopped after taking the bridges he was assigned to, because Monty couldn't take his attention from Berlin. Had he, or 1st Canadian Army, pressed on even a couple of days around 1 Sept (which they had fuel to do, if Ike was willing to immobilize Patton a day or two), they could've cleared the Scheldt Estuary & kept the Germans on the run into November. It's just possible the war might've ended before '45. Simonds, a Canadian (whose forces Monty considered less than competent), saw the need to supply the armies in Europe; Monty didn't. (Ike was too busy playing ref between Monty & Patton to notice.) It's said the amateurs talk about tactics, the professionals, about logistics. This was all about logistics.
 

Larrikin

Banned
To begin with, XXX Corps didn't get to Antwerp until early September, by which time it had driven further, faster than any force in history to that point.

When 11th Armoured got to Antwerp they had enough fuel to do one more job, be it helping the White Army on the docks, driving north to cut off the Beveland Peninsular, driving east to grab the Rhine Bridges, or driving south east to grab Aachen.

Roberts, the OIC, asked up the line for instructions, Horrocks asked Dempsey, Dempsey asked Montgomery, Montgomery tried to ask Eisenhower.

Eisenhower, who had just taken over as Allied Ground Commander from Montgomery, had no plans, and more the point, was effectively incommunicado for the crucial few days. Even when he acted, he didn't act decisively.

As for playing ref between Montgomery and Patton, that particular rivalry was all in Patton's fevered imagination, it was Patton that was disobeying orders, not Montgomery. Montgomery's fights with Eisenhower were about command structure and strategy, Patton was just out for glory.
 
Eisenhower, who had just taken over as Allied Ground Commander from Montgomery, had no plans, and more the point, was effectively incommunicado for the crucial few days. Even when he acted, he didn't act decisively.

Quite. Time and again, Eisenhower was pressed for an answer as to what the first priority was. Repeatedly the answer was effectively 'everything'.

This amounted to clearing the Schledt, advancing on the Rhine, pushing the Germans and slowing so that 12th Army group had the supplies to advance.

As for playing ref between Montgomery and Patton, that particular rivalry was all in Patton's fevered imagination, it was Patton that was disobeying orders, not Montgomery. Montgomery's fights with Eisenhower were about command structure and strategy, Patton was just out for glory.

Was Bradley really so in awe of (or intimidated by) Patton that he couldn't bring him into line? It seems ridiculous to my eyes.
 
I'd say that ending the war still in '44 is over-optimistic. Same goes for liberating the main parts of the Netherlands (the "Randstad") in August '44.

But I find arguments considerung the failed clearing of the Schelde-estuary causing a world of trouble until Spring '45 rather convincing.

If Antwerpen is not only captured, but also useable as a port, could this give a whole new impetus to the operations in the Southern Netherlands? If a Rhine crossing can be achieved there in late 1944, in a better version of Market Garden, then you are in an excellent region to deploy forces for the decisive push. This was the seductive logic behind "Market Garden".

If you are North of the Rhine in the Netherlands AND effectively supplied, you can have a field day. Look at the map. No hassle with the Eifel, Ardennes or other fancy forested hilly regions. No Westwall fortifications.

Instead, flat tank- and air-force friendly terrain to push Eastwards. Go for Münster and Osnabrück and to Bremen. The Weser would be the next obstacle, but while you halt your forces there, you can attack the Ruhr from the North across the Lippe which is a rather minor river. Your tertiary forces can deal with the Central Netherlands, which are cut off from Germany, then.

Thus.....clear-out the Schelde in early September'44, force a Rhine crossing in the Netherlands in late September; advance through Northern Westphalia to the Weser in October. The Netherlands can be liberated during the early winter months, then.
 
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Larrikin

Banned
Was Bradley really so in awe of (or intimidated by) Patton that he couldn't bring him into line? It seems ridiculous to my eyes.

Looks that way, seems Bradley never got over serving under Patton, and didn't ever have the balls to pull him into line. The fact that Bradley was another of the under performing US senior generals (ala Clarke, Patton, Hodges, Stillwell) that the US press lionised and who were less than candid in their post war memoirs tends to get over looked.
 
But I find arguments considerung the failed clearing of the Schelde-estuary causing a world of trouble until Spring '45 rather convincing.

The real tragedy is that, it could have been done so easily. If the first divisions into Antwerp had been ordered to seal off the Beveland peninsula (not a great distance), the Schledt could have been cleared and Antwerp opened very quickly.

I don't have the relevent book on me, but Neillands maintains that the Wehrmacht was not in a position to halt such an advance for long. Sadly, by the time the advance actually occurred, the Germans were ready for them.

Antwerp would have allowed enough supplies to maintain the advances across the front, instead of commanders fighting for resources.
 
Looks that way, seems Bradley never got over serving under Patton, and didn't ever have the balls to pull him into line. The fact that Bradley was another of the under performing US senior generals (ala Clarke, Patton, Hodges, Stillwell) that the US press lionised and who were less than candid in their post war memoirs tends to get over looked.

You'll be getting hate mail... ;)
 
IF Antwerp had been captured a few days earlier and the troops gone to seal of the Beveland peninsula and forces moved north and took most of Holland before September 15 there is changes in the litterature world.

Anne Frank was captured in Amsterdam on September 15.

But you would need someone else that the overrated Monty in command. Apart from El-Alamein he failed ever offensive he made
 

Larrikin

Banned
You'll be getting hate mail... ;)

I am prepared to return fire. I give credit where credit is due, but from my reading over the years the only two American Army commanders I'm prepared to give full credit to are Devers and Eichelberger, with Kruger coming in third.
 

Larrikin

Banned
IF Antwerp had been captured a few days earlier and the troops gone to seal of the Beveland peninsula and forces moved north and took most of Holland before September 15 there is changes in the litterature world.

Anne Frank was captured in Amsterdam on September 15.

But you would need someone else that the overrated Monty in command. Apart from El-Alamein he failed ever offensive he made

Ok, how is 11th Armoured supposed to have gotten to Antwerp a few days earlier? On the 29th of Aug they were just east of the Seine, on the 4th of Sept they were in Antwerp. That's 7 days to cross half of France and all of Belgium. They could have cut off the Beveland Peninsular then, but gone no further.

And as for Montgomery, I'm afraid I'm going to have to ask you to back that one up. List for us his failures.
 
And as for Montgomery, I'm afraid I'm going to have to ask you to back that one up. List for us his failures.
The already mentioned 2d Alamein, failing pursuit of a fleeing enemy. Then Caen. Caen again. And Caen again. (Despite promises of "setting my front on fire".) Then Falaise, which he blamed on the Canadians (who he derided as less than competent, but chose anyhow,:confused: without putting a {putatively better} Brit division alongside them). Of course, had the experienced Canadians from Italy hadn't been getting slaughtered at Ortona to no purpose, they might've been available & succeeded in spite of Monty.
 
The already mentioned 2d Alamein, failing pursuit of a fleeing enemy. Then Caen. Caen again. And Caen again. (Despite promises of "setting my front on fire".) Then Falaise, which he blamed on the Canadians (who he derided as less than competent, but chose anyhow,:confused: without putting a {putatively better} Brit division alongside them). Of course, had the experienced Canadians from Italy hadn't been getting slaughtered at Ortona to no purpose, they might've been available & succeeded in spite of Monty.


How odd, I was under the impression 8th army chased the germans and italians all the way back to Tunisia.....:rolleyes:
Or are you following the popular myth that they could have doine it faster? despite the weather sitaution which hindered the speed of advance, and the little issue of follow-up logistics...

Caen. A failure. Maybe the fact that the British attacks were soaking up 90% of the armour in Normandy was of course an abject failure (odd how the Americans recieve so little flak for taking so long to break out, which WAS the plan....). Every time the British attacked, they dragged in, destroyed and held in place the Germans armoured reserve..obviously this was a complete operation failure...:rolleyes:

Um, the Falaise pocket a failure? Yes, many germans escaped. On foot. With no heavy equipment..... damn, a few more of these failures and who knows what would have hapenned....:p
 
Or are you following the popular myth that they could have doine it faster? despite the weather sitaution which hindered the speed of advance, and the little issue of follow-up logistics...
Remarkable how Monty pays attention to logistics here, but not at Antwerp.:confused:
Caen. A failure. Maybe the fact that the British attacks were soaking up 90% of the armour in Normandy was of course an abject failure (odd how the Americans recieve so little flak for taking so long to break out, which WAS the plan....).
That was Monty's claim postwar. It's not what his three (count 'em, three) plans called for at the time. IIRC, Monty could've had Caen by noon on D-Day....
Um, the Falaise pocket a failure? Yes, many germans escaped.
And should not have. Nor would have, had Monty been just a trifle smarter. Or less dismissive of the Canadians. Or less hypocritical.

BTW, you want the big failure? It's the one I missed last time: Antwerp. Or, rather, not clearing the Scheldt. And then there's Market-Garden, ignoring photographic evidence of no less than two panzer divisions.:eek:
 
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