Could the Nazi invasion of France have failed?

[Carl Schwamberger]

i remember reading that Hitler panicked during invasion at the speed his armies were moving and repeatedly ordered them to stop, but his field officers ignored him and continued until they ran out of gas. What if they had obeyed ? Could that have given France the breathing room to organize a defense. ?

It is correct there were several 'Halt' orders. The first came from Hilter. He was talked out of it by Halder before it was sent.

The second from Hilter again was sent. Guderian got permission from Kliest to continue with a reconissance in force, which Guderian did with half his corps. The other Armored Corps commanders also continued with strong recon forces. The order was canceled the next evening. This one day halt was actually a blessing to the Armored Corps as they had been a continual action for over a week & had well over 50% of their tanks left behind for breakdowns. Several hundred repaired tanks caught up, preventive maintinance was done on all the vehicles, some ammunition and fuel trucks caught up, and the infantry corps closed some of the gap between them & the Armored Corps.

The last order, the infamous 'Dunkirk Halt' order originated with Rundsteadt. The Allied counter attacks at Arras & Montcornet showed the enemy had some sort of offensive capability , & no one knew how much. Hilterm as nervous as ever took Rundsteadts recomendation/request seriously and ordered the halt short of the evacuation sites. Montifiores book on the Dunkirk battle is a good source for the last halt order. Hornes 'To Lose a Battle' or Chapmans 'Why France Fell' have descriptions of all the halt orders & their effects.

I read Liddell-Hart's' History of the Second World War that someone in the French Army wanted to chop some of the trees down in the Ardennes Forest and use them as road blocks. He said that blocking the roads would have slowed down the German advance considerably. However, the French officer was overruled because it would stop a counter attack by the French cavalry, which was brushed aside by the Germans.

This was a single incident. The Belgian 'Ardennes Corps' left road blocks everywhere. Unfortunatly the corps was not strong enough to defend them. By the time the French mechanized cavalry arrived to help the situation was out of hand.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

All the OP is asking for is a failed Fall Gelb, no specifications on how. So, for example, you could make the AdA actually well run by 1940, and have them have respectable sortie rates against the Luftwaffe. In that case, most of Germany's unassailable air advantage goes right out the window.

One of the considerations for the air battle is the French had just stood down a large number of squadrons, to be requipped and retrained with new aircraft. Some of the bomber groups had nearly completed their training & were into combat late May. This stand down and accompanying reorganization meant between 25 & 30 % of the French air force was non operational on 10 May. Even with that disadvantage the French have been credited with inflicting over 500 combat losses on the German air force. Re: Historians like Alfred Price have sorted through German records to come up with accurate numbers. Overall the Germans had over 1000 combat aircraft lost from combat or accident after six weeks, reducing total combat strength from about 2,700 to 1,700. Had the French air force been warned & prepared 10 May, or at least in a better position with the squadron conversions the German aircraft losses would have come sooner & larger.

Alternatively, you could have the Belgians co-operate with the WAllies and integrate themselves into their defensive plans, allowing for troop movements into their territory in September 1939.

This allows the overall front to be shortened by 20%. It allows the French to entrench a solid battle front in the Ardennes, with a back up zone to contain breakthroughs. In the north French, or British mobile corps are right on the Dutch border & there is no way a invading German army can reach and block the critical Dutch bridges before the Allies.

It also encourages the Belgians to mobilize faster. Six divisions formed from third wave reservists were incompletely formed and trained on 10 May. Have those called up in the autum of 1939 with the first two groups & Belgium can present a much more solid defense.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

one year? That's weird, they had 5 months and they know that. The lacked ammo and oil for more. It was a pass/fail game.

The single most critical event is the 2nd rade 55th division at Sedan. You change that or you give them two more days, or you move the French 7th army where it should have been and it's game over for germans: as long as French can hold the river and at least prevent germans for building a bridge, Ardennes are a dead end for them.

Reinforcing the 55th Division, or its parent 10th Corps before the crossing on the 13th can help. The top quality 21st Corps did not arrive until the morning of the 14th & was not ready to counter attack until late afternoon. Bring in the 21st Corps on the 13th & Guderians crossing can be counter attacked on the evening of the 13th or early morning of the 14th.

Another difference would be in the French air attack on the crossing. 140+ bombers struck during 14 May. Had any of them hit either of the pontoon bridges the crossing would have been halved in strength. The bridges used all the material in the corps pioneer train & it would have been another day before one bridge could have been restored. Knocking out both bridge would have limited the crossing to some ferrys & the rubber boats used in the original assault.

Another PoD during the battle was Coraps decision on 14 May to order the 9th Army to retreat to the border fortifications. Four German armored divisions had established three bridgeheads across the Meuse River, against the 9th Army advance guards during the 13th May. Corap became extremely pessimistic on the 14th 7 late in the day ordered a two stage retreat back to France. This reversed the arrival of the main body of his army on the night of the 14th, and eneded plans to counter attack on the 15th. The reverse march threw the 9th Army into chaos, and left a few small holding actions in its wake, vs the sveral corps size counter strikes planned. The well known destruction of the 1 DCR, one of the French armored divisions occured in one of the weak delaying action on the 15th.

Have Corap stick with the plan & there is no roll up of confused disorganized French soldiers on the 15th & 16th May. Instead two corps of Kliests Pz Group must fight their way through a line of fresh infantry divisions backed by two tank divisions and a array of extra artillery. Kliest may still have a break through, but it will come later & at a higher cost.