Could the Kriegsmarine have assembled a battlefleet for the Atlantic ?

[NOMISYRRUC]

Dunno why Admiral Schmundt proposed sending Admiral Hipper into the Mediterranean.

IMHO it's a reflection on how "useful" Hipper was.

It's lack of range and unreliable machinery meant it was of little active use and its passive uses were tying down British cruisers and diverting the RAF from bombing the Rhur. That is until the Invasion of Russia and the Arctic Convoys began. IMHO Admiral Schmundt could have not taken those factors into account early in 1941.

It could also have been because Hipper needed a refit (the unreliable machinery again) and that couldn't be done at Brest. Perhaps he thought that sending her to the Mediterranean wasn't much riskier than returning to Germany via the Denmark Strait. She'd be more useful operating with the Regia Marina in the Central Mediterranean in the unlikely event of not being sunk in the Strait of Gibraltar.

 

[Petr K.]

Off the top of my head 30 of the 90 operational U-boats that Germany had in late 1941 were ordered to the Mediterranean. 20 got through. The other 10 were forced to turn back (which might have been the inspiration for the last third of Das Boot) or sunk making the attempt.

November
U 433 (https://uboat.net/boats/u433.htm), U 95 (https://uboat.net/boats/u95.htm) ...
December
U 208, U 127, U 557, U 131, U 434, U 574, U 451, U 567, U 79, U 75...

Thought they did sink the aircraft carrier Ark Royal and battleship Barham, which IMHO mitigates those losses (and the opportunity cost of sinking more merchant ships in the Battle of the Atlantic) somewhat.

+HMAS Parramatta, HMS Galatea, HMS Salvia...

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

IMHO it's a reflection on how "useful" Hipper was.

It's lack of range and unreliable machinery meant it was of little active use and its passive uses were tying down British cruisers and diverting the RAF from bombing the Rhur. That is until the Invasion of Russia and the Arctic Convoys began. IMHO Admiral Schmundt could have not taken those factors into account early in 1941.

It could also have been because Hipper needed a refit (the unreliable machinery again) and that couldn't be done at Brest. Perhaps he thought that sending her to the Mediterranean wasn't much riskier than returning to Germany via the Denmark Strait. She'd be more useful operating with the Regia Marina in the Central Mediterranean in the unlikely event of not being sunk in the Strait of Gibraltar.

Or @BlackDragon98 is right and it was too much schnapps at dinner.

 

[McPherson]

When your AAA is worse than the RMs... Self-scuttle and deny the enemy razor blades.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Not to mention the RAF squadrons based at Gib.

From the outbreak of World War II until well into 1942 there was only one RAF squadron at Gibraltar. That is No. 202 Squadron.

It was equipped with half-a-dozen Saro London flying boats from December 1937 and did not receive its first Consolidated Catalina until April 1941.

The squadron's 6 Londons were perfectly capable of spotting Hipper so that she can be engaged by Force H and Gibraltar's coast artillery, but they were not capable of damaging a German heavy cruiser, let alone sinking one.

 

[Petr K.]

AIUI Marschall had to send Hipper and the 4 Z-boats to Trondheim to refuel. If that wasn't necessary he probably sinks Glorious and her escort without any of his ships being damaged and then proceeds to sink most of the evacuation convoy. Loosing Courageous and Glorious was a disaster for the Royal Navy. Loosing Ark Royal too would be a catastrophe.

On the evening of June 7, Marschall suspected that the evacuation of Allied forces was taking place. The Germans could therefore head north at 11 p.m. on June 7 and not to turn south. A better exploration of Luftware could change their decision, or Marschall's instinct, or anything else. They did not have to copy their course like in OTL, when they were looking for some significant destination till 1 p.m., with no effect. Only then Marschall sent Hubert Schmudt's ships to Trondheim.

The time to find an evacuation convoy was there. Schmundt headed to Trondheim because it was Hitler's order and Raeder
insisted on the execution of this order.

On 7 June in the afternoon, the German fleet refuelled from the tanker Dithmarschen, the destroyers took fuel from the battleships, in case of emergency they could do it again.

 

[Petr K.]

IOTL Hipper left Germany on 30th November and her encounter with WS-5A was on 24th December.

I know that, I am familiar with these facts. It was about an example of a decisive battle. Except for the attack on WS -5A, there will be no other opportunity to sink two aircraft carrier in a single day + endanger transports full of soldiers. I was talking about little Jutland.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I know that, I am familiar with these facts. It was about an example of a decisive battle. Except for the attack on WS-5A, there will be no other opportunity to sink two aircraft carriers in a single day + endanger transports full of soldiers. I was talking about little Jutland.

The way that you wrote it suggested that the 3 ships left Germany in October so it would have been highly unlikely that they would have encountered WS-5A.

However, I wrote the following in Post 292

IOTL Admiral Scheer started her sortie on 31st October and Admiral Hipper attempted to make one on 24th September.

Therefore, my guess is that Raeder would plan two sorties. First at the end of September with a squadron made up of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Hipper, which would operate in the North Atlantic. Then at the end of October a squadron comprising Lützow (ex-Deutschland) and Scheer would have broken into the North Atlantic and made for the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, but I can't make my mind up whether they would have operated independently or as a pair after they reached the South Atlantic.

However, it's also likely that Hipper would have had the fire that caused the postponement of the OTL Atlantic sortie leaving Scharnhorst and Gneisenau to sail together, which is effectively the OTL Operation Berlin brought forward by 4 months. Hipper would then make a solo sortie at the end of November, which is what she did IOTL.

OTOH Raeder could have waited until Hipper's repairs were completed so that she Scharnhorst and Gneisenau could leave Germany on 30th November and in turn intercept WS-5A on 24th December.

I think that Admiral Marschall would do what Captain Meisel did IOTL. That is he would disengage upon seeing the six destroyers approaching and head for Brest because Hipper was running low on fuel. However, the cruiser Berwick and two troopships that were severely damaged IOTL would probably be sunk ITTL.

The Germans would regard it as victory in the naval war of attrition because none of their ships were damaged and they would have overestimated the damaged done to the convoy and its escort. The British would claim victory by saying that the Germans were driven off and most of the convoy was saved.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Carrying on from Post 308.

I also wrote in Post 292.

I maintain my opinion that the Germans could have completed Bismarck and Tirpitz on time instead of a year late by not building the aircraft carriers and they would have been operational in time for Bismarck to take part in Operation Juno and for both ships to accompany Scharnhorst and Gneisenau on their TTL Atlantic sortie of September 1940. I also think that completing Bismarck and Tirpitz on time would have a knock-on effect on the German heavy cruisers Prinz Eugen, Lützow and Seydlitz. I think Prinz Eugen would have been completed 6 months earlier and been ready to sail with Hipper at the end of November 1940.

So it worked out as three sorties.

1. 24th September 1940 - Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Bismarck and Tirpitz.
2. 31st October 1940 - Scheer and Deutschland (not re-named Lützow ITTL because the heavy cruiser of the same name wasn't sold to the USSR).
3. 30th November 1940 - Hipper and Prinz Eugen

However, Raeder might cancel the September 1940 sortie and wait until Hipper completed her repairs and for Prinz Eugen to become operational. However, that means there is the risk of one of the four capital ships developing a fault that prevents her from taking part in the postponed sortie. Marschall is now engaging WS-5A with 4 capital ships and 2 heavy cruisers instead of 2 capital ships and one heavy cruiser.

He sinks and/or heavily damages several of the troopships before the escort arrives. This time he takes the calculated risk that he can sink the British destroyers before they can torpedo him. Then he sinks the 3 cruisers and the 2 aircraft carriers. Meanwhile, the surviving troopships have scattered. The number that gets away depends upon the amount of time that the escort bought them. The damage done to the German squadron will depend on how successful the destroyer attack is and upon how many aircraft the carriers can launch before they are sunk.

OTOH the Admiralty gives WS-5A a stronger escort of 2 aircraft carriers, 6 cruisers and 12 destroyers. In which case Marschall would still have withdrawn when the escort arrived, but he would have sunk at least 4 troopships and 2 of the escorting cruisers in the process and all of his ships would have been undamaged. Furthermore, the extra 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers would have had to come from somewhere. For example the 3 extra cruisers might have been deducted from the forces looking for Deutschland and Scheer ITTL.

Or the Admiralty might have decided to postpone WS-5A because it couldn't provide a strong enough escort. That's also a victory for the Germans because it slows down the expansion of the British forces in the Middle East.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

According to Naval History Net the six destroyers escorting WS-5A left the convoy on 22nd December. When the convoy encountered the Hipper on the night of 24th/25th December the escort of WS-5A consisted of the cruisers Berwick, Bonaventure and Dunedin and the corvettes Clemantis, Cyclamen, Geranium and Jonquil. However, it also says that the Dunedin was misidentified as a destroyer and Captain Meisel rightly feared a torpedo attack in the poor visibility.

Argus and Furious were being used as aircraft ferries.

The convoy having scattered, the two carriers turned their whole attention to locating and attacking the enemy; unfortunately their resources were minimal and the weather atrocious. The carriers were cluttered with cased aircraft with only three Skua dive bombers in FURIOUS and two Swordfish torpedo aircraft in ARGUS; worse still, FURIOUS had no bombs, only torpedoes, while the ARGUS had bombs but no torpedoes!

https://www.naval-history.net/xAH-WSConvoys03-1940.htm

 

[McPherson]

One short comment...

Without a land based reconnaissance and strike air arm worthy of the name, the KM resources wasted on surface ships for North Atlantic operations were just that, resources wasted. Perhaps the OP should have added what kind of airpower should the KM have logically developed to go with Raeder's and/or Doenitz's idiocies? I mean RIKKO capability. Any takers?

 

[Dilvish]

According to Naval History Net the six destroyers escorting WS-5A left the convoy on 22nd December. When the convoy encountered the Hipper on the night of 24th/25th December the escort of WS-5A consisted of the cruisers Berwick, Bonaventure and Dunedin and the corvettes Clemantis, Cyclamen, Geranium and Jonquil. However, it also says that the Dunedin was misidentified as a destroyer and Captain Meisel rightly feared a torpedo attack in the poor visibility.

Argus and Furious were being used as aircraft ferries.

https://www.naval-history.net/xAH-WSConvoys03-1940.htm

Did I read that right? The carrier with the operable dive bombers had no bombs, while the carrier with the operable torpedo planes had no torpedoes? Well, the Skuas could strafe to support the Swordfish bombing runs. Then the surviving planes could land on the carriers they need to be on?

 

[Zheng He]

One short comment...

Without a land based reconnaissance and strike air arm worthy of the name, the KM resources wasted on surface ships for North Atlantic operations were just that, resources wasted. Perhaps the OP should have added what kind of airpower should the KM have logically developed to go with Raeder's and/or Doenitz's idiocies? I mean RIKKO capability. Any takers?

RIKKOs are great until they encounter enemy fighters. Then they die.

A KM with a strong RIKKO capability will lead to the RN developing means to provide fighter to convoys faster than OTL.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Did I read that right? The carrier with the operable dive bombers had no bombs, while the carrier with the operable torpedo planes had no torpedoes? Well, the Skuas could strafe to support the Swordfish bombing runs. Then the surviving planes could land on the carriers they need to be on?

Yes you did! The Naval History Net article continues.

While frantic efforts were made to clear the respective flight decks to cross deck the Swordfish for arming, the carriers searched in the gloom for the cruiser, fortunately not finding her, while the Skuas were flown off unarmed as reconnaissance aircraft. By the time the Swordfish had been flown over to the FURIOUS, armed and readied to fly off, there was no trace of ADMIRAL HIPPER and a thoroughly alarmed Admiralty ordered the carriers to cease their suicidal search. The only beneficiaries of the affair were the Swordfish aircrew, who were provided with an early Christmas lunch in BOTH carriers prior to their expected sortie!

 

[McPherson]

According to Naval History Net the six destroyers escorting WS-5A left the convoy on 22nd December. When the convoy encountered the Hipper on the night of 24th/25th December the escort of WS-5A consisted of the cruisers Berwick, Bonaventure and Dunedin and the corvettes Clemantis, Cyclamen, Geranium and Jonquil. However, it also says that the Dunedin was misidentified as a destroyer and Captain Meisel rightly feared a torpedo attack in the poor visibility.

Argus and Furious were being used as aircraft ferries.

https://www.naval-history.net/xAH-WSConvoys03-1940.htm

Somewhere in another thread I wrote that the British were incompetent in the use of their flattops in 1939-1940?

For what the Germans needed, the Soryu was probably as worthless as the Ryujo as a sample design.

The Germans should have looked south instead of east. Anyway, if you were not in the aircraft carrier game with wet hulls and lesson learning by 1930, you would not be ready for 1939 aircraft carrier combat. Murphy, the three navies that did have a decade or more aircraft carrier experience were not ready. British and American operations at sea during 1939-1940 were grossly incompetent. The Japanese did not iron their problems out until 1941 and promptly demonstrated in 1942 that they were mostly incompetent in battle. It will not be until 1944 that the British and Americans (mostly) figure it all out.

This is why I look at the Italians and French and go hmm. They jumped into the game late 1939-1940 with full fledged aviation fleet defense ships (Aquila and Joffre planned vessels, respectively.). The French would have mimicked UK practice. The Italians with a universal aircraft carrier scout fighter bomber and a mission statement of fleet air defense against LRMPs and enemy seaborne strike aircraft in their Aquila kind of show the ancestry of aircraft carriers operated by everybody EXCEPT the United States today. THAT is what I find interesting about the Italians. They formulated a theoretical paper doctrine and then built to it, instead of evolving one through practice.

The Soryu was an IJN evolved attack aircraft carrier. It takes an all attack and no defense doctrine and a first strike mindset, that existed in the Japanese and American navies and nowhere else to use that kind of flattop properly. If the Germans built it or something like it and armed it as they planned Graf Zeppelin, it would be used wrong and it would be wasted.

The Furious was being used as an aircraft transport ship, as was Argus. What was wrong with that picture?

Source Here:

WW II aircraft as deck cargo - FineScale Modeler

RIKKOs are great until they encounter enemy fighters. Then they die.

A KM with a strong RIKKO capability will lead to the RN developing means to provide fighter to convoys faster than OTL.

Against a navy (^^^) that is still doing this kind of utter idiocy as late as December 1940 and turns in the sorry performance it did on December 8, 1941 and April Fools Day 1942? I'll take that gamble.

 

[Petr K.]

RIKKOs are great until they encounter enemy fighters. Then they die.

Joachim Helbig - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

While on patrol approximately 100 kilometers (62 mi) south of Crete on 11 May, Ju 88s from I./LG 1 detected four British destroyers, HMS Jervis, Kipling, Jackal and Lively. The first wave of 14 Ju 88s from I./LG 1 attacked the destroyers later that afternoon, sank Lively and crippled Jackal. A second wave failed to find the destroyers, but the third wave of seven Ju 88s, led by Helbig, attacked the destroyers with the setting sun behind them. Helbig's aircraft sank Kipling at 32.39°N 26.19°E while Jackal later had to be scuttled.[26] The attack was successful despite the presence of defending Bristol Beaufighters from No. 272 Squadron RAF.

 

[AdA]

One short comment...

Without a land based reconnaissance and strike air arm worthy of the name, the KM resources wasted on surface ships for North Atlantic operations were just that, resources wasted. Perhaps the OP should have added what kind of airpower should the KM have logically developed to go with Raeder's and/or Doenitz's idiocies? I mean RIKKO capability. Any takers?

I'll just recycle a sugestion I made a few years ago...

Yet another suggestion for a LW long Range MPA. The Me261 was an experimental aircraft intended to carry the Olimpic Torch for the 1940 Tokyo Games in a non stop Berlim Tokyo flight. This would be essentially a spotter plane for U Boote groups and have the speed and range to roam unintercepted over the Atlantic.

Messerschmitt Me 261 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

For a earlier and easier option, a dedicated MPA based on the Bf110 could have been developed along with the original Bf110. OTL the Bf110D-4 was used for that role, but a dedicated version could have been developed that would have the range to be useful when operating from bases in France and the speed to evade most allied fighters used for convoy protection.

 

[AdA]

One short comment...

Without a land based reconnaissance and strike air arm worthy of the name, the KM resources wasted on surface ships for North Atlantic operations were just that, resources wasted. Perhaps the OP should have added what kind of airpower should the KM have logically developed to go with Raeder's and/or Doenitz's idiocies? I mean RIKKO capability. Any takers?

Another option would be to take the looser in the heavy fighter competition, the Fw57, and have FW turn it into a long range high speed MPA.
Since the obvious counter are Hurricanes on CAMs and later Wildcats on escort carriers, it needs to be fast enough to escape from the area while they climb to intercept altittude and needs enough range to be useful operating from bases in France. Being essencially a "spotter" it needs to carry nothing but a big radio and lots of fuel...

 

[BlackDragon98]

Another option would be to take the looser in the heavy fighter competition, the Fw57, and have FW turn it into a long range high speed MPA.
Since the obvious counter are Hurricanes on CAMs and later Wildcats on escort carriers, it needs to be fast enough to escape from the area while they climb to intercept altittude and needs enough range to be useful operating from bases in France. Being essencially a "spotter" it needs to carry nothing but a big radio and lots of fuel...
View attachment 571960

I think you got the wrong plane.
The Fw 57 was way too slow.
Only 251 mph max despite it's 911hp DB 600 engines.

What would have made a perfect long range high speed MPA is the single seat version Fw 187. (the 2 seater version was just plain stupid, a shit idea from the alcohol fueled head of Ernst Udet)
With 671hp Jumo 210G engines it still clocked 326mph max.
Once you add DB 601, this baby could probably clocked 370-380mph max at level flight, not to mention having the same firepower as the Bf 110, 4x 7.92mm MGs and 2x 2cm cannons.
I'd add drop tanks and anti-ship rockets to the Fw 187, making it the German equivalent of the Mosquito.
Rudolf Nebel can be hired to make these anti-ship rockets. The poor guy was ostracized and sidelined because of a cowardly idiot called General Karl Becker.
I've included some images of the Fw 187 below.

 

[AdA]

I think you got the wrong plane.
The Fw 57 was way too slow.
Only 251 mph max despite it's 911hp DB 600 engines.

What would have made a perfect long range high speed MPA is the single seat version Fw 187. (the 2 seater version was just plain stupid, a shit idea from the alcohol fueled head of Ernst Udet)
With 671hp Jumo 210G engines it still clocked 326mph max.
Once you add DB 601, this baby could probably clocked 370-380mph max at level flight, not to mention having the same firepower as the Bf 110, 4x 7.92mm MGs and 2x 2cm cannons.
I'd add drop tanks and anti-ship rockets to the Fw 187, making it the German equivalent of the Mosquito.
Rudolf Nebel can be hired to make these anti-ship rockets. The poor guy was ostracized and sidelined because of a cowardly idiot called General Karl Becker.
I've included some images of the Fw 187 below.
View attachment 571964
View attachment 571965
View attachment 571966

The FW57 was not one of FW best designs, being based in a flawed multi role requirment probably inspired by French concepts, and lost to the Bf110 (that was a real fighter bomber, not a multi role aircraft) fair and square. My idea would be for an extensive redesign that would be a dedicated MPA.
You can't use single seaters for MPA in the pre coumputer era. The job is too boring and needs at least a second pair of eyes.
The reason why I sugested the FW57 was that it could have been developed for the MPA role in 1936 and be deployed in large numbers in 1940. Another option, for the same reason, would have been the Hs124.
What you need in war is weapons that are good enough, soon enough, in enough quantity. Better/later/fewer is not often a winning formula.