Could the Franco-Viet Minh agreements of 1946 last through the end of 1948 ?

Could the Franco-Viet Minh agreements of 1946 last through the end of 1948 ?

  • Yes

    Votes: 9 47.4%
  • No

    Votes: 10 52.6%

  • Total voters
    19

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
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Could the agreements of 1946 have lasted longer and postponed or forestalled the outbreak of full-scale war in French Indochina? Feel free to suppose any of the French officials on the spot in the region are different from those in OTL [so no need to say, "never with D Argenlieu in charge"] but still must be drawn from the pool of available French officials

The text of the agreements is below, taken from an encyclopedic source. Wherever italics appear, they represent my commentary-

The-Vietnam Agreement of March 6th, 1946
The government of the French Republic, represented by M. Sainteny, a delegate from the High Commissioner of France, properly authorized by Admiral D’Argenlieu, High Commissioner of France, in who resides the sovereign powers of the French Republic, on one part;
And the government of Vietnam, represented by its president, Ho Chi Minh and the special delegate pf the Council of Ministers, M. Vu Hang Khanh, on the other part;

The following has been agreed upon:

  • The French government recognizes the Republic of Vietnam as a free state, having its own government, parliament, army and treasury, belonging to the Indo-Chinese Federation and to the French Union.
    Concerning the unification of the three ky (Tonkin, Annam And Cochin-China) , the French government binds itself to carry out the decisions taken by the population through a referendum.
  • The government of Vietnam declares itself ready to accept amicably the French army when, in conformance with international agreements, it relieves Chinese forces. An annex agreed upon and attached to the present preliminary convention will establish the terms according to which the relief operations will be effected.
  • The stipulations formulated above will enter into force immediately. Directly after the exchange of signature, each of the high contracting parties will take all necessary measures to stop hostilities immediately, to keep the military forces in their respective positions and to create the favourable climate necessary to the immediate opening off friendly and frank negotiations.
    These negotiations will bear especially on the diplomatic relations of Vietnam with foreign states; the future status of Indo-China; and French economic and cultural interests in Vietnam.
    Hanoi, Saigon or Paris may be chosen as the location of the conference.
Done at Hanoi, March 6, 1946
Signed: Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh, Vu Hung Khanh


Annex to the Franco-Vietnam Agreement of March 6th, 1946
Between the High Contracting Parties designated in the preliminary convention, the following is agreed upon:
Firstly, the relief forces will be composed of [these forces were to relieve departing Chinese Nationalist forces I believe. Their occupation area was Indochina north of the 16th parallel. South of the 16th parallel, the French were already present in strength, and this annex likely did not apply to or restrict a French troop presence south of the 16th parallel]

  • 10,000 Vietnamese with their Vietnamese cadres, under military control of Vietnam
  • 15,000 French, including the French forces now located in the territories of Vietnam north of the 16th parallel. These elements must be composed solely of French metropolitan origin, except for soldiers guarding Japanese prisoners
These forces, as a whole, will be placed under supreme French command with the assistance of Vietnamese representatives.
The advance, stationing and employment of these forces will be defined during a general staff conference between the representatives of the French and Vietnamese commands, which will be held upon the landing of the French units.
Mixed commissions will be created at all echelons to ensure liaison in a spirit of friendly cooperation between the French and Vietnamese forces.
Secondly, the French elements of the relief forces will be divided in the three categories:

  • Units charged with guarding of Japanese prisoners of war will be repatriated, as soon as their mission is completed, following the evacuation of Japanese prisoners, in any event with a maximum delay of 10 months. [French reinforcements handling the Japanese to depart Vietnam north of the 16th parallel by January 1947]
  • The units charged with ensuring, in cooperation with the Vietnamese Army, the maintenance of public order and security in Vietnamese territory. Each year a fifth of these troops will be relieved by the Vietnamese Army, this relief will thus be effectively completed after five years. [French occupation troops to be relieved by Viet Minh, in annual decrements of 3,000 - for five years- leading to no French occupation troops in Vietnam north of the 16th parallel by March 1951]
  • The units charged with the defense of air and naval bases. The length of the mission entrusted to these units will be defined in the later conferences. [French air and naval base personnel to stay indefinitely pending additional agreements]
Thirdly, in the places where French and Vietnamese forces are stationed, precisely demarcated zones will be assigned to them.

Fourthly, the French government binds itself not to use the Japanese for military purposes.

Done at Hanoi, March 6, 1946
Signed: Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh, Vu Hung Khanh

Franco-Vietnam Modus Vivendi of September 14th, 1946
  • Viet-Nam nationals in France, French nationals in Viet-Nam will enjoy the same freedom of “establishment” as nationals, as well as freedom of opinion, of teaching, of commerce, of circulation, and more generally all democratic liberties.
  • French property and enterprises in Viet-Nam may not be submitted to a stricter regime than that accorded property and enterprises of Viet-Nam nationals, particularly with regard to taxes and labor legislation. This legal equality will be accorded on a reciprocal basis to the property and enterprises of Viet-Nam nationals in the territories of the French Union.
    The status of French property and enterprises in Viet-Nam may only be modified by mutual agreement between the French Republic and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.
    All French property requisitioned by the Government of Viet-Nam, of which persons or enterprises have been deprived by the Viet-Nam authorities, will be returned to their owners or representatives. A mixed commission will be appointed to set the conditions of this restitution.
  • In order to renew cultural relations which France and Viet-Nam are both desirous of developing, French schools of various grades may function freely in Viet-Nam. They will follow official French programs. By special agreement, the necessary buildings will be attributed to these establishments. They will be open to Viet-Nam students.
    Scientific research and the establishment and operation of scientific institutes are free in all the terrorist of Viet-Nam for French nationals. Viet-Nam nationals will enjoy the same privileges in France.
    The Instut Pasteur will be restored in its rights and property. A mixed commission will settle the conditions under which the Ecole Francais d’Extreme Orient will resume its activity.
  • The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam will call upon French nationals by priority each time it requires advisors, technicians or experts. The priority accorded to French nationals will only cease to operate in case of impossibility on the part of France to furnish the requested personnel.
  • As soon as the present problem of monetary harmonisation is solved, a single and identic currency will have legal tender in the territories placed under control of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and in the other territories of Indochina.
    This currency id the Indochinese piastre now issued by the Bank of Indochina pending the creation of an issuing institution.
    The status of the issuing institution will be studied by a mixed commission in which all the members of the Federation will be represented. This commission will also coordinate currency and exchange. The Indochinese piastre is part of the "zone franc."
  • Viet-Nam forms a custom union with the other countries of the Indochinese Federation. Consequently, there will exist no internal customs barriers and the same tariffs will be applied everywhere on entry into and departure from Indochinese territory.
    A coordinating committee for customs and foreign commerce, which may furthermore be the same as the committee for currency and exchange, will study the necessary measures of application and will prepare the customs organization of Indochina.
  • A mixed coordinating commission for communications will study the necessary measures to re-establish and improve communications between Viet-Nam and the other countries of the Indochinese Federation and of the French Union: overland, maritime, and air transportation; postal, telephonic, telegraphic and radio-electric communications.
  • Pending the conclusion by the French Government and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam of a definite agreement regulating the question of diplomatic relations between Viet-Nam and foreign countries, a Franco-Viet-Nam mixed commission will set the measures to be taken to assure consular representation of Viet-Nam in neighboring countries and Viet-Nam relations with foreign consuls.
  • Anxious to assure as soon as possible in Cochin-China and in southern Annam the restoration of public order necessary both to the free development of democratic liberties and to the resumption of commercial transactions and conscious of the happy effect which the cessation on both sides of all acts of hostility and violence might have in this connection, the French Government and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam have decided together on the following measures:
    • All acts of hostility and violence on both sides will cease;
    • Agreements between French and Viet-Nam general staffs will settle the conditions of application and control of measures decided upon together;
    • It is specified that prisoners now held for political reasons will be freed, with the exception of those held for crimes and offenses under common law;
      The same will apply to prisoners taken in the course of (military) operations;
      Viet-Nam guarantees that no action will be taken and no act of violence will be tolerated against any person because of his attachment of loyalty to France; reciprocally the French Government guarantees that no action will be taken and no act of violence tolerated against any person because of his attachment to Viet-Nam;
    • the exercise of democratic liberties defined in Article I will be reciprocally guaranteed;
    • unfriendly propaganda on both sides will cease;
    • the French Government and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam will collaborate to render nationals of ex-enemy countries harmless;
    • a person appointed by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and approved by the French Government will be accredited to the High Commissioner to establish the cooperation necessary to execute this agreement.
  • The Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam agree to seek together the conclusion of special agreements on all questions which may arise, in order to strengthen their friendly relations and prepare the way for a general final treaty. The negotiations will be resumed to this end as soon as possible and at the latest in January 1947.
  • The dispositions of the present modus vivendi, made in duplicate, will go into effect October 30, 1946.
Done at Paris, September 14, 1946

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, The President of the Government,
Signed: Ho Chi Minh

For the Provisional Government of the French Republic The French Minister for Overseas France,
Signed: Marius Moutet
 
It's a bit tough... As I understand it, France had no intention to consider (then) VietNam as an independent state (especially when communist-friendly force was leading). Moreover, the goal of each side was completely opposite: VietNam wanted "full" independence while France wanted VietNam "just as a part of Indochina" [practically French land]

Also a note (I check via Wikipedia Vietnamese, the English version has practically nothing, so take this with a grain of salt), the Fontainebleau Meeting 1946 (Viet Minh vs France, Seine-et-Marne, France, 6 July to mid-September 1946), there was a problem regarding the (now) Southern region of Viet Nam [called Cochinchina at that time]. If there were to be a referendum about the fate of this land as a "state", then the Agreement on March would be "neutralised".

The problem was that by June, Agreement had already been "neutralised" by Georges Thierry d'Argenlieu as he "recognized" a puppet "Autonomous Republic of Cochin-China" [sic, from Wikipedia English]. In the eyes of Vietnamese, it was practically a declaration of war.

--------------

So, if you want the agreement to last until 1948 (or preferably, worked until forever, I hate seeing my homeland wrecked by war again, even in "fantasy"), you'd need someone in "Roosevelt" style (aim to remove the colonial system) and cool-headed figures going along. From my limited knowledge about this time, I see no alternative other than war as in OTL
 

Archibald

Banned
Georges Thierry d'Argenlieu

If that man could be butterflied away, things might be easier. He actively sabotaged the 1946 agreement. Also, in November 1946 he ordered the shelling of Haiphong, that cause hundred of deads and led to the breakout of December 1946, the beginning of the war.
 
If Leclerc stays in Indochina, it is possible to butterfly away the Indochina War. He and Sainteny ( "Comissaire de la République" in Indochina or "Republic's Commissioner": the civil ruler of Indochina) respected Ho-Chi-Minh and the feeling was mutual: the three men were about to make a deal in 1946 but Leclerc's departure and d'Argenlieu's criminal stupidity created the mess which cost 600 000 lives.
 
So, let's assume of some PODs (ranging any where between d'Argenlieu's mistress [just say there is one] needed his "attention" and Leclerc was ordered to be in Indochina to support Sainteny) allows the Agreement on March 1946 to proceed smoothly... Hmm. Things can turn out pretty good for my country.
  • VietNam turned to an independent state, probably akin to India and UK at that time (practically independent despite heavy influence)
  • The communist element/movement is satisfied with the above result and the non- (and anti-) communist force can relief because there is no "takeover" or increase in support for them
  • There is no war (obviously), leading to no Vietnam War.
  • VietNam could be turned into a "neutral" zone of sort. Ho Chi Minh, a nationalist following the communist ideal, would flex his muscle to ease down the tension in the next few early year of the Cold War. The Cold War might still be as chilly, but at least not as deadly
The "real" independence allows VietNam to stand equal with France might take a few more years, but at least, there is no war (and there is no idiot around)
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
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If Leclerc stays in Indochina, it is possible to butterfly away the Indochina War. He and Sainteny ( "Comissaire de la République" in Indochina or "Republic's Commissioner": the civil ruler of Indochina) respected Ho-Chi-Minh and the feeling was mutual: the three men were about to make a deal in 1946 but Leclerc's departure and d'Argenlieu's criminal stupidity created the mess which cost 600 000 lives.

So, I suppose that deal between Leclerc, Sainteny and Ho Chi Minh would look like the accords above.

Both sides would need to struggle mightily to control firebrands on their own side. There will be colons with harder line attitudes trying to appeal over LeClerc's head to be less tolerant of Ho's power [De Gaulle will probably be writing him angry letters against his "appeasement"], and making provocations on the ground.

Ho Chi Minh will face tension in his party over how to administer his controlled zones "progressively". It will be frustrating for the Viet Minh to wait 5 years for French troop withdrawal from the north, and also to hold off on any land reform or curtailment of church rights or property.

If the peaceful status quo however persists until late 1949 however, the French hardliners will see that it is too late to exercise the military option north of the 16th parallel, with the Chinese Communists on the border. At the same time, the military option will gain some more credibility and appeal among some of the Viet Minh.
Cold War polarization globally will probably make holding the ceasefire harder too.

Perhaps the Indochina War starts in late 1949 or 1950 with the French pulling their last troops out of the north but maneuvering to set up a separate state south of the 16th parallel, a "Cochin-china-plus".

It would be interesting for sure, and even if fighting and division results, it will probably be more merciful to the people of that generation on both sides.
 
So, I suppose that deal between Leclerc, Sainteny and Ho Chi Minh would look like the accords above.

Both sides would need to struggle mightily to control firebrands on their own side. There will be colons with harder line attitudes trying to appeal over LeClerc's head to be less tolerant of Ho's power [De Gaulle will probably be writing him angry letters against his "appeasement"], and making provocations on the ground.

Ho Chi Minh will face tension in his party over how to administer his controlled zones "progressively". It will be frustrating for the Viet Minh to wait 5 years for French troop withdrawal from the north, and also to hold off on any land reform or curtailment of church rights or property.

If the peaceful status quo however persists until late 1949 however, the French hardliners will see that it is too late to exercise the military option north of the 16th parallel, with the Chinese Communists on the border. At the same time, the military option will gain some more credibility and appeal among some of the Viet Minh.
Cold War polarization globally will probably make holding the ceasefire harder too.

Perhaps the Indochina War starts in late 1949 or 1950 with the French pulling their last troops out of the north but maneuvering to set up a separate state south of the 16th parallel, a "Cochin-china-plus".

It would be interesting for sure, and even if fighting and division results, it will probably be more merciful to the people of that generation on both sides.
Agreed for the most part except for de Gaulle: the man resigned in January 1946. After the 20th January, he has lost any political power within the government. So the possibility of seeing him trying to pressure Leclerc is unlikely.
 
What possibility is there of North Vietnam going its own way, as Yugoslavia did, still communist but independent of the Soviets and China?
 

raharris1973

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What possibility is there of North Vietnam going its own way, as Yugoslavia did, still communist but independent of the Soviets and China?

Tito had a reason to be against Stalin, stalin was trying to undermine him and it was a case of strike out on his own or wait to be purged. Before 48 Tito was happy to be aligned Stalin.

What particular reason would Ho Chi Minh or his Vietnamese colleagues have to be angry with the USSR ?

It's not like breaking with Stalin would make things easier for Ho with French communist politicians, since they were Moscow loyal.
 

Pangur

Donor
Tito had a reason to be against Stalin, stalin was trying to undermine him and it was a case of strike out on his own or wait to be purged. Before 48 Tito was happy to be aligned Stalin.

What particular reason would Ho Chi Minh or his Vietnamese colleagues have to be angry with the USSR ?

It's not like breaking with Stalin would make things easier for Ho with French communist politicians, since they were Moscow loyal.
As I understand it the Vietnamese were nationalists first, communists second. Consider this, a Vietnamese state thats quite friendly with the west in 1949
 
As I understand it the Vietnamese were nationalists first, communists second. Consider this, a Vietnamese state thats quite friendly with the west in 1949

I think that I read somewhere that Ho Chi Minh was a nationalist, he just considered communism as a tool to an end (independence and freedom for his country, prosperity for his people and such). If the scenario happens, I think Vietnam could become a "better" Switzerland (neutral [enough] in politics and have busy trade with all sides). Machinery and weapons from the Soviet-bloc and money flow from the anti-communism-bloc... Sounds nice enough for me
 

raharris1973

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As I understand it the Vietnamese were nationalists first, communists second. Consider this, a Vietnamese state thats quite friendly with the west in 1949

But why should we assume that all nationalists in Asia would incline to be pro-US and anti-Soviet? In many parts of the world, Nationalists like Nasser, Qadhafi, Chavez, and Sukarno were inclined to be quite anti-USA and friendly to the USSR or PRC

I think that I read somewhere that Ho Chi Minh was a nationalist, he just considered communism as a tool to an end (independence and freedom for his country, prosperity for his people and such).

Some have said the same about Stalin or Mao, although to be totally fair to Ho Chi Minh, I would have to say he was much less committed to programs motivated by ideology alone compared to Stalin or Mao, and he was far more collegial with party colleagues than either of those two. In reading William Duiker's biography of Ho, he comes off as very much content to play the elder statesman with others wielding real power from the end of the French War onward. By the 60s he was more of a symbol than a politician, a Vietnamese Communist equivalent of the Emperor of Japan. He did not exercise a personal tyranny over the collective Vietnamese Communist Party leadership. A telling contrast is how Mao used his power to have recurrent pool parties which he would have pretty women recruited for sex (and he may have spread venereal diseases doing so). Meanwhile, when Ho Chi Minh wrote a letter to Zhou Enlai asking for assistance in meeting somebody from China to be his new wife, other Vietnamese party leaders and Zhou talked it over and decided it would be most convenient just to ignore Ho Chi Minh's request.

If the scenario happens, I think Vietnam could become a "better" Switzerland (neutral [enough] in politics and have busy trade with all sides). Machinery and weapons from the Soviet-bloc and money flow from the anti-communism-bloc... Sounds nice enough for me

A neutral Vietnam would certainly be a more populous, militarily powerful and warmer neutral than Switzerland, although poorer.

Agreed for the most part except for de Gaulle: the man resigned in January 1946. After the 20th January, he has lost any political power within the government. So the possibility of seeing him trying to pressure Leclerc is unlikely.

So between 46 and 58 De Gaulle didn't really have much cachet as a friend Leclerc's or an elder statesman?
 
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Pangur

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In reading
But why should we assume that all nationalists in Asia would incline to be pro-US and anti-Soviet? In many parts of the world, Nationalists like Nasser, Qadhafi, Chavez, and Sukarno were inclined to be quite anti-USA and friendly to the USSR or PRC


/Snip

I am not saying anything the Vietnamese being pro US for the simple reason that I don't know which way they would`swing' . They might be pro US or they may well have stayed out of all of it and were neutral
 
So between 46 and 58 De Gaulle didn't really have much cachet as a friend Leclerc's or an elder statesman?
De Gaulle can have an unofficial influence over Leclerc: after all, he somewhat made his career, at least partially. But De Gaulle, like in Lebanon or Syria in 1943, would like to postpone the independance in order to have a good deal with Ho. The man wanted to give France its "greatness back" but he knew the colonial empire was done: his doctrine was between d'Argenlieu and Leclerc. The 1946 deal, per se, is already a good one. But postponing in order to get a good deal means two years at most: so the "Grand Charles", if he had any power, would give independance in 1947-48, not like d'Argenlieu. Plus the failure in Syria and Lebanon, under his rule, would be a lesson for de Gaulle and he would be more careful about Indochina.
So De Gaulle could write private letters but I think he would only influence Leclerc in order to slightly modify the agreement, nothing more.
 

raharris1973

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If LeClerc remains in charge and the agreement remains in force, what would be the reverberations for internal French politics and French colonial relations between 46 and 51?

Would the concessions to Vietnamese nationalists instead of OTL's French offensive cause more pro-independence agitation in the Maghreb by 48 or 49? Would the completion of French evacuation from northern Vietnam (and possibly more) in 1951 be a signal for revolt in Algeria (which kicked off in OTL after Dien Bien Phu and Geneva)? Would the Algerian revolt happen on OTL's schedule? Or might it come later than 54, with France having arranged a more graceful exit from Vietnam? Whenever an Algerian War starts, would the lack of having gone through an eight year Indochina War, make the French willing to fight in Algeria longer, for 16 years or a dozen instead of 8? If so, this could mean the French not being out of Algeria until the 1970s.
 
If LeClerc remains in charge and the agreement remains in force, what would be the reverberations for internal French politics and French colonial relations between 46 and 51?

Would the concessions to Vietnamese nationalists instead of OTL's French offensive cause more pro-independence agitation in the Maghreb by 48 or 49? Would the completion of French evacuation from northern Vietnam (and possibly more) in 1951 be a signal for revolt in Algeria (which kicked off in OTL after Dien Bien Phu and Geneva)? Would the Algerian revolt happen on OTL's schedule? Or might it come later than 54, with France having arranged a more graceful exit from Vietnam? Whenever an Algerian War starts, would the lack of having gone through an eight year Indochina War, make the French willing to fight in Algeria longer, for 16 years or a dozen instead of 8? If so, this could mean the French not being out of Algeria until the 1970s.
Algeria remains a wild card. In 1946-1947, the independentists are licking their wounds after the repression in 1945: many of them are dead, arrested, executed etc... Plus the FLN only began to gain strength when Nasser decided to help them (weapons, instructors, money etc), and the dude only took power in 1954 ( after the 1952 coup). Dien Bien Phu was a boost to their morale (the french can be beaten), nothing more. Morale don't give SMG's, Egypt does.
In the event of a war in Algeria, France is going to send far more professionnal soldiers and less conscripts ( the Indochina War had cost 90000 soldiers for the French): the french army is going to be in a better shape and the FLN will suffer a lot more.
But we have to know that the French had a very specific point of view about Algeria: it was a part of France. Period. Even Mendes-France and Mitterand believed that. To give up Indochina is one thing. It's far away, to send an army is expensive, the public opinion doesn't care. To give up Algeria is another.
 
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Archibald

Banned
Lot of good point by Jeandebueil. Not much to add except for a point I made in another thread, that is, for the 1954 - 1961 average frenchman, Algeria is part of France as much as Corsica or Brittany. No way it become independant. Conquest of Algeria happened in 1832 (from memory) so that's 130 years, four generations of colonists (there are hundreds of thousands of them, to become the Pieds-Noirs). The OAS, the military coups of 1958 and 1961, plus the attacks against De Gaulle (not only Petit Clamart, there was another atempt) speak by themselves.
And what's more astonishing is the speed at which French opinion forgot Algeria, pieds noirs and harkis after 1962. By 1963-65 algeria was mostly a past relic.
I have to check to see when was OAS disbanded (if it ever was)
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organisation_armée_secrète#Apr.C3.A8s_l.27ind.C3.A9pendance
 
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