Though the Fenian Raid of 1866 into Ridgeway, Ontario was a heroic and futile feat of arms, it was doomed to failure, whatever foolhardy objectives they hoped to achieve.
In an alternative scenario, in which the the North American Fenian leadership could have shown a little more strategic insight, they could have coincided their raiding activity with the restive Metis and other Native American tribes in western Canada. This would have required the North American Fenians to established contacts with these tribes, who may or may not have had their sympathy to willingly cooperate with them.
The first Metis rebellion of 1869 was "difficult" to put down due to sheer logistical reasons alone. Please see the following link:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolseley_expedition
If the Fenians coordinated their raids to coincide with a future a Metis or Native American revolt, enough British and Canadian troops may have been needed to be diverted westward through rough terrain that could have hindered an effective response to either threat from manpower and logistical restraints. This could have enabled the Fenians to hold out long enough to gain operational momentum and self sustainability and build their pocket of resistance, whatever they were trying to achieve...(a second Irish homeland?)
This would have been less likely to succeed once the Canadians managed to build the Canadian Pacific Railway by 1885. This enabled the Canadians to more effectively mobilize against any threat they faced, internally or externally. The second Metis rebellion, or the Northwest Rebellion, which was more serious, was probably successfully controlled due to effective railroad based mobilizations against the hostile tribes (and better weaponry like the Gatling Gun at Batoche Ferry).
In this case, the Fenians could have responded by sabotaging these vulnerable track based supply lines, and slowing down the logistical capability of the British-Candian forces enough so they could not effectively sustain operations in remote areas. The general strategy would be to spread Canadian forces thin between two attritional insurgent forces working indirectly together.
Brian Ghilliotti
In an alternative scenario, in which the the North American Fenian leadership could have shown a little more strategic insight, they could have coincided their raiding activity with the restive Metis and other Native American tribes in western Canada. This would have required the North American Fenians to established contacts with these tribes, who may or may not have had their sympathy to willingly cooperate with them.
The first Metis rebellion of 1869 was "difficult" to put down due to sheer logistical reasons alone. Please see the following link:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolseley_expedition
If the Fenians coordinated their raids to coincide with a future a Metis or Native American revolt, enough British and Canadian troops may have been needed to be diverted westward through rough terrain that could have hindered an effective response to either threat from manpower and logistical restraints. This could have enabled the Fenians to hold out long enough to gain operational momentum and self sustainability and build their pocket of resistance, whatever they were trying to achieve...(a second Irish homeland?)
This would have been less likely to succeed once the Canadians managed to build the Canadian Pacific Railway by 1885. This enabled the Canadians to more effectively mobilize against any threat they faced, internally or externally. The second Metis rebellion, or the Northwest Rebellion, which was more serious, was probably successfully controlled due to effective railroad based mobilizations against the hostile tribes (and better weaponry like the Gatling Gun at Batoche Ferry).
In this case, the Fenians could have responded by sabotaging these vulnerable track based supply lines, and slowing down the logistical capability of the British-Candian forces enough so they could not effectively sustain operations in remote areas. The general strategy would be to spread Canadian forces thin between two attritional insurgent forces working indirectly together.
Brian Ghilliotti