Could the Entente win ww1 earlier?

No there really aren't. The weather problem is the major handicap for a naval expedition, it forced the attacks into a staggered, piecemeal pattern that gave the Ottomans the opportunity to contain each individual phase, and weather patterns aren't usually the kind of PODs that work in the serious fora. De Robeck's expedition just emphasized the pitfalls and the gap between a good concept and the execution of that concept. It's this phrase that I've bolded that tends to be missed in almost all ATLs as the assumption tends to be made that if an idea is good, its execution must also always and forever be, when reality offers almost no cases of this actually happening.
How does the weather affect the forcing of the Dardanelles as occurred the 18th? What stops it from being successful on the 19th, when the Turkish forts are almost completely exhausted in ammo, and new, more advanced, minesweepers (staffed by sailors [from the sunk pre-dreads] more willing to work under fire) brought in? How does the weather change it?

Moreover, by simply removing the shoreline mines placed on the 8th, you basically change the entire outcome of the March 18th attempt at forcing the straits. The losses incurred there wouldn't have happened at all. How does the weather affect that?
 
How does the weather affect the forcing of the Dardanelles as occurred the 18th? What stops it from being successful on the 19th, when the Turkish forts are almost completely exhausted in ammo, and new, more advanced, minesweepers (staffed by sailors [from the sunk pre-dreads] more willing to work under fire) brought in? How does the weather change it?

Moreover, by simply removing the shoreline mines placed on the 8th, you basically change the entire outcome of the March 18th attempt at forcing the straits. The losses incurred there wouldn't have happened at all. How does the weather affect that?

It doesn't affect those actions, it does, however, mean that there had to be repeated attacks on the Straits that were intermittent and sporadic and permitted the placing of such minefields like that to start with. The problem with the British campaign is that it was not a continual pattern of bombardments, it proceeded in fits and starts due to that weather pattern. To butterfly away the Neusret incident is rather difficult given that by this point the campaign has dragged on since 1914 so if any opportunity presents itself the Ottomans *will* take it. To focus on the 1915 naval campaigns without mentioning the 1914 bombardment also creates a difficulty as it means the "solution" is neglecting the problem it needs to solve. As I said, Gallipoli's a Catch-22.
 
I think I read somewhere that one of the problems the British had in the Dardanelles was that the RN's minesweepers weren't powerful enough to advance against the strong current that flows out through the straits leading to them losing so many ships to mines. There was also a suggestion that if they'd adapted destroyers for the sweeping role then they could have cleared the channel. Is this true?
 
The Dardanelles Campaign faced a Catch-22 of an interlocking defensive system the British had no answer to cracking apart. The British could not force the Straits by Sea due to weather, changes in which are for the ASB subforum, nor could they simply conduct an amphibious landing *after* the sea landing, when the British deliberately chose to not do the strategy they'd planned before the war in lieu of two different strategies both of which proved flat failures. This scenario also ignores multiple pressing realities of WWI combat, most egregiously that the Russians in WWI are run by drooling idiots who aren't suited to lead Boy Scout Troops. And I'm not referring to their generals here, as they actually did rather well for themselves, but to the Romanovs.


You missed my main point about the Galipolli campaign, that the French and Royal Navies should not have tried to force the straights independantly of the army. By moving more than a month before the landings they gave the Ottomans time to garison the peninsular had they waited until April 25th the combined forces would have knocked out the forts and occupied the peninsular as before the first attempt the Ottomans had very little apart from the forts in the area.

I see you point about the Russians but with the addition of French and Commonwealth troops and a reliable source of supplies they would be at least as good as the Austro Hungarian troops they were facing in the south, and don't forget the Austro-Hungarians had just as many problems as the Russians. They were a polyglot force fighting for an empire that was teetering on the verge of collapse that was also hampered by inadequate industrial production. Like the Russians their men were poorly equiped and indiferently led by officers who cared more for their possition at court and private benefit than they did for their duty to their men.
 
Esopo & all

I think, ignoring pre-war butterflies a number of possibilities have been mentioned.

a) There have been some suggestions that the German army nearly buckled during its 1914 retreat from the Marne. Even if that didn't happen, which does seem rather unlikely, then some further success regaining the ridge line would have made a big difference in later operations. Or as Xhavnak suggests the BEF or some other factor prevents the occupation of Antwerp. This would both cause a serious, if short termed, shell crisis for Germany but make the allied position markedly stronger.

b) Some failure in the east early on. The Germans nearly panicked at the early Russian moblisation as mentioned by Magnum. Or simply slightly better pre-war planning so the Russians hold a defensive line against Austria and put more pressure on the Germans.

c) A more properly organised Gallipoli, especially if it triggers an avalanche in the Balkans with Greece and Bulgaria brought in on the allied side as well as the Ottomans being driven from the straits.

Those are the main military ones that come to mind in the early part of the war. Once the western front especially had stablised both sides lacked the technology and organisation to make a decisive breakthrough until either attrition or new methods restored movement. After Gallipoli no eastern approach by the western powers were tried apart from the stupid Salonika operation. Coupled with Russian isolation this limited chances of an early decisive victory after that point.

Steve
 
I missed one small point that would improve the benefit of a succesfull Galipolli. Someone anyone shoot Cousin Nicky, his wife and Rasputin.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Inspired by this tread : https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=240747

How can the allies defeat the cp earlier and with lesser casualties/efforts?

Best way is for UK to draft on day 1 in England.

Gallipoli was a mistake. By going after the Ottomans, pressure was reduced Germany which saved A-H. If one has to do an amphibious assault, it should be done in the Adriatic. Take out the weakest link first, A-H. Best option is to use the Gallipoli force fighting back into Belgium.

Russia not sending orders in the clear, and later in easy to break codes, will have a huge impact.

Concessions to Indian Nationalist for more troops (conscription) in India could also be a huge help, but this does come at at a costs from the English perspective.

The first Mesopitanian campaign was hiddeously poorly planned, ran and ended badly with the seige of Kut. Despite being often forgotten it could easily have gone differently and led to a faster fall of the Ottomans.

Apologies for obsurity but the entire local contingent for the War was lost at Kut and it gets to me a bit.

Help yes. But the impact is small unless you are willing to move forces from other theaters, which likely is a net loss. The logistics in Mesopotamia make it a poor choice for the British, once Basra is secured.

German high command panics a bit more and doesn't rescind the order to retreat behind the Vistula in East Prussia. This leads to:
1. Hindenburg staying in retirement
2. No disaster for the Russians at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes

Fast forward to 1916 where, with the Germans and Austro-Hungarians busy with bloody attritional battles on the Western front and the Isonzo respectively, the Russians, in conjunction with a Romanian entry into the war which unbalances CP positions, annihilate a large part of the Austro-Hungarian troops facing them and secure several positions across the Carpathian Mountains and begin pushing into the Pannonian Plains. Emperor Karl sues for peace and from there its only a matter of time.


Plausible or is there something i've missed ?

The local commander Hindenburg replaced was regaining his nerve at the end, so one needs both the original commander to continue to panic, and Hindenburg not to be appointed.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
If as was sometimes suggested the BEF had been based independantly from Antwerp there is a good chance they would have held it and the nitrate stores would not have fallen to the germans and thus their fighting capacity is severely reduced.

Or they could have been trapped and lost. It is a high risk, high reward move. Was the BEF really strong enough to break out of the German investment of its lines? BEF in Antwerp means not BEF slowing the other German Armies, so if the BEF does not breakout fast enough, it hurts the Entente.

How well could the Russians have done early on, especially if they had not broadcast their plans in clear?

The Russians did quite well, they almost broke into the central Hungarian plain anyway, and forced the Germans to pull 3 corp out of the attack on France, and force Germany to do a Russia first strategy in 1915. They would have done better without the codes being in the open, but the Russians deserve credit for saving France in 1914, at least as much as the BEF deserves credit.
 
The Russians had an opportunity to inflict a major defeat on Germany early in the war at Tannenberg/Masurian Lakes. More competent commanders who were not hated rivals could have lead the two Russian armies to victory in East Prussia, and threatened Berlin very early on. Combined with the defeat of Germany at the Marne, and A-H setbacks (also at the hands of the Russians in Galicia) that might have lead to an Entente victory as early as 1914.

Maybe with not much territory changing hands, but with the obstensible Entente war goals of 1914 (preserving Serbian independence) being achieved. As long as the Allies kept their aims modest, the Central Powers could probably agree with a negotiated peace that re-established the status quo antebellum.
 
Best way is for UK to draft on day 1 in England.

Gallipoli was a mistake. By going after the Ottomans, pressure was reduced Germany which saved A-H. If one has to do an amphibious assault, it should be done in the Adriatic. Take out the weakest link first, A-H. Best option is to use the Gallipoli force fighting back into Belgium.


Britain had no need for conscription before 1916. The army couldn't cope with the flood of volunteers. There were shortages of everything from Artillary to boots. Men had to wait months after volunteering before they could report for duty, and faced the scorn of their neighbours who thought them cowards while waiting. Also Britain had no tradition of conscription for the army, and the closest equivelant the navy's press gangs had ended generations earlier.

Putting extra troops into the western front would have been pointless as in 1915 there was no way to break through the German lines and restore movement to the campaign.

To launch an invasion of the Austro Hungarian empire from the Adriatic the entente would first have to bring the A-H Navy to battle and defeat it. The A-H navy though small was perfectly adequate for it's role of defending their coast, and would have been a match for the Ententes Galipolli force, having more Dreadnoughts, plus Pre Dreds, Armoured Cruisers, Destroyers and submarines. While that force exists no landings can take place. Despite Entente Naval superiourity that force remained viable right to the end of the war.

Of the major Central Powers the Ottomans were the weak link not the A-H in the Adriatic.

Galipolli failed not because of it being stategically flawed (which it wasn't) but because of poor planning and a lack of co-ordination between the Naval and Army elements.
 
You missed my main point about the Galipolli campaign, that the French and Royal Navies should not have tried to force the straights independantly of the army. By moving more than a month before the landings they gave the Ottomans time to garison the peninsular had they waited until April 25th the combined forces would have knocked out the forts and occupied the peninsular as before the first attempt the Ottomans had very little apart from the forts in the area.

I see you point about the Russians but with the addition of French and Commonwealth troops and a reliable source of supplies they would be at least as good as the Austro Hungarian troops they were facing in the south, and don't forget the Austro-Hungarians had just as many problems as the Russians. They were a polyglot force fighting for an empire that was teetering on the verge of collapse that was also hampered by inadequate industrial production. Like the Russians their men were poorly equiped and indiferently led by officers who cared more for their possition at court and private benefit than they did for their duty to their men.

And yet Austria-Hungary lasted to 1918 under ol' Karl, Idiot Nicky didn't even make it to three Calendar years.
 
Just have the Haber-Bosch Process take a few more years to perfect. There you go, Germany runs out of munitions in 1915-1916, and the war is over.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Britain had no need for conscription before 1916. The army couldn't cope with the flood of volunteers. There were shortages of everything from Artillary to boots. Men had to wait months after volunteering before they could report for duty, and faced the scorn of their neighbours who thought them cowards while waiting. Also Britain had no tradition of conscription for the army, and the closest equivelant the navy's press gangs had ended generations earlier.

Putting extra troops into the western front would have been pointless as in 1915 there was no way to break through the German lines and restore movement to the campaign.

To launch an invasion of the Austro Hungarian empire from the Adriatic the entente would first have to bring the A-H Navy to battle and defeat it. The A-H navy though small was perfectly adequate for it's role of defending their coast, and would have been a match for the Ententes Galipolli force, having more Dreadnoughts, plus Pre Dreds, Armoured Cruisers, Destroyers and submarines. While that force exists no landings can take place. Despite Entente Naval superiourity that force remained viable right to the end of the war.

Of the major Central Powers the Ottomans were the weak link not the A-H in the Adriatic.

Galipolli failed not because of it being stategically flawed (which it wasn't) but because of poor planning and a lack of co-ordination between the Naval and Army elements.

Yes, the did. First, by drafting the UK avoids shipyard workers, ammo plant workers, coal miners and other critical occupations from joining, and drafts more clerks and lower value workers. This means more production of armaments and a faster growing Army/Navy.

Now I also believe they could have built up their forces faster, but even if I happen to be wrong on this point, a better, more systematic use of manpower helps. The idea of the draft was debated months before it passed, and I have a hard time believing that in the months leading up to the draft, there was no need for extra manpower.

The A-H navy could have been defeated, also Serbia did not fall until late 1915, so the UK could have landed at a friendly port. The same roads that evacuated the Serbs army, can allow British troops into attack Serbia. Attacking Germany in France was the best idea, Adriatic second best, and Gallipoli was a distant third. This has to do with the personalities, Churchill like to take risks and like the big risk/big return bet. He did not have the personality that favored the better, low risk, guaranteed average return option of France.

History proves you wrong on the Ottomans. Germany signed the ToV. A-H fell apart. The Ottomans fought the Entente to a negotiated peace. Logistics is the key. In France, it is easy to supply. A-H would have been more moderate difficulty. The Ottomans required building railroads and infrastructure, and was the hardest option. France and the UK came close to breaking the German lines in 1915. With an extra 16 divisions, they have a good chance of succeeding, and even failure will halt the German drive into Russia months earlier than OTL.

Gallipoli failed because amphibious operations are much harder than attacking in an area that has good ports, good railroads, and flat terrain. Flanders was a much better option.
 
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