Could the Corwin Amendment and CSA President Toombs avert the American Civil War?

Lately, I've been fascinated by the idea of the latest possible aversion of the American Civil War. The last option I can think of (and granted, an unlikely turn of events), is Robert Toombs being chosen as President of the Confederacy rather than Jefferson Davis. Toombs, IOTL the Confederate Secretary of State, was entirely opposed to attacking Fort Sumter:

"Mr. President, at this time it is suicide, murder, and will lose us every friend at the North. You will wantonly strike a hornet's nest which extends from mountain to ocean, and legions now quiet will swarm out and sting us to death. It is unnecessary; it puts us in the wrong; it is fatal."

So, with Toombs' passionate opposition to firing the first shot, would it have been possible for conflict to be put off long enough for the North and South to re-unify, on the condition of the Corwin Amendment being ratified, which would've permanently (from a constitutional perspective) entrenched slavery in the states in which it already existed? Lincoln voiced support for the Corwin Amendment, and could have used it as an out for his 'preservation of the union above all else' stance. Was there any chance of this happening, or were there too many hot-headed secessionists and chances of a borderland shootout by that point to make (semi-)peaceful reunification completely impossible? If so, what about a President Stephen Douglas and Toombs agreeing on the more pro-slavery Crittenden Compromise?
 
It very well could, though not quite in the way I think many would imagine. Secession really was touch and go there for awhile: alot of folks not quite sure what this "Confederacy" meant and how serious their political leaders actually were in pushing their independence in the great game of chicken. At some point, the rebellion is going to have to take some kind of action to confirm their independence: the longer they dally and less decisive they seem in pursuing independence, the louder the Unionists are going to get and the more skittish or passive secessionists are going to err on the side of caution and pull back. This reduces the South's bargaining power every time the don't contest Federal moves and statements that enforce their authority and legitimacy, and probably results in the individual states failing to come together and instead forced into unilateral negotiations for an "annulment" of their temper tantrum.

Corwin is probably the best terms they could get; Critten is unacceptable to the Northern Republicans.
 
The Corwin Amendment was considered totally inadequate by secessionists and could never have served as the basis for peaceful reunion, even assuming such a thing was possible at the time the decision was made to fire on Fort Sumter (which it almost certainly wasn't). If any compromise could have averted secession, it was the Crittenden Compromise, which could never have been accepted by Lincoln. Indeed, it was so pro-southern it can hardly be called a compromise at all. (It guaranteed slavery in all US territories south of the Missouri Compromise line, including those "hereafter acquired"--which could mean anything from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego! Contrast with the Corwin Amendment, which said nothing about the territories, and was perfectly compatible with the Republican platform.) But by the spring of 1861 not even the Crittenden proposal could being the North and South back together.

Toombs, in opposing the attack on Fort Sumter, was not dreaming of peaceful reunion. Rather, his point was basically "we already have achieved independence. A few Yankee troops at Fort Sumter can't menace it--so why unnecessarily attack them? If there has to be a war, let the North initiate it; if they don't and leave us alone, we have our independence, and that's all we want." (After all, plenty of independent countries have foreign bases on them!)
 
Last edited:
At some point, the rebellion is going to have to take some kind of action to confirm their independence:

No! Southerners already had de facto independence. At some point, the North had to do something to challenge it--or else in effect acquiesce in it. That was Toombs' point.
 
An old post of mine:

***

My problem with all scenarios about a war being avoided over Fort Sumter (either by Lincoln abandoning it--which he might well have done if he knew that Pickens had been successfully reinforced--or by the Confederates not attacking it) is this:

Lincoln's next step (once it becomes clear that Seward's hopes of a Unionist reaction in the South leading to voluntary reconstruction are not going to be fulfilled) is probably going to be to collect the revenues offshore. A nation claiming to be independent can allow a foreign nation to have a couple of forts in its territory--plenty of nations after all have allowed US bases on their soil. What it *cannot* allow is to have a foreign nation collect revenues on its imports. As Thomas Clingman of North Carolina said:

"I confess, Mr. President, that I do not know whether or not I understand the views of [Buchanan's] message exactly on some points. There is something said in it about collecting the revenue. I fully agree with the President that there is no power or right in this government to attempt to coerce a State back into the Union; but if the State does secede, and thus becomes a foreign State, it seems to me equally clear that you have no right to collect taxes in it. It is not pretended that we can collect taxes at British or other foreign ports from commerce going in there. If a State of the Union secedes, and becomes a foreign State, it cannot be touched. The most offensive form of coercion which could be adopted would be that of levying tribute. I have no doubt that most of the governments of Europe would release their dependencies from the claim on them for protection and for postal facilities, &e., if they would just pay the government all the money it might think proper to exact. I do not know, sir, whether I am given to understand from the message that there is a purpose to continue the collection of duties in any contingency; but if that be the policy, I have no doubt some collision may occur."

http://books.google.com/books?id=ymUFAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA519

If the revenues are collected "peacefully" this puts the burden back on the South to fire the first shot.
 

JJohnson

Banned
The Corwin Amendment was considered totally inadequate by secessionists and could never have served as the basis for peaceful reunion, even assuming such a thing was possible at the time the decision was made to fire on Foer Sumter (which it almost certainly wasn't). If any compromise could have averted secession, it was the Crittenden Compromise, which could never have been accepted by Lincoln. Indeed, it was so pro-southern it can hardly be called a compromise at all. (It guaranteed slavery in all US territories south of the Missouri Compromise line, including those "hereafter acquired"--which could mean anything from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego! Contrast with the Corwin Amendment, which said nothing about the territories, and was perfectly compatible with the Republican platform.) But by the spring of 1861 not even the Crittenden proposal could being the North and South back together.

Toombs, in opposing the attack on Fort Sumter, was not dreaming of peaceful reunion. Rather, his point was basically "we already have achieved independence. A few Yankee troops at Fort Sumter can't menace it--so why unnecessarily attack them? If there has to be a war, let the North initiate it; if they don't and leave us alone, we have our independence, and that' all we want." (After all, plenty of independent countries have foreign bases on them!)

The Corwin Amendment, supported by Lincoln from what I've read, along with Lincoln's own quotes on slavery in 1861, left me thinking he's more interested in the Union and tariff revenue, while the South is more concerned with independence than slavery. Slavery was more certain under the US than under the CS from the looks of things.

If the CS were to get Toombs as President, does he also send peace envoys to Lincoln to try to negotiate a settlement for US forts in CS territory, like what happened under Davis? And does this CS also consider a Union restocking of forts on their territory an act of war in this timeline (sounds like not)? Does Lincoln also send an envoy to Fort Pickens in Pensacola to restock that in case Fort Sumter isn't fired on? If both forts are restocked and not fired on, I don't think Toombs or any President would try to rejoin the Union. If Lincoln calls for 75,000 troops to put down the rebellion like OTL, that would most certainly drag TN, VA, NC, and AR into the CS, and leave Kentucky neutral again, depending on which side invades it first or otherwise messes with their neutrality. Based on the restock of Sumter and Pickens, it looked more like Lincoln was interested in getting the South to fire first, but if they don't I think he would march troops in at some point to collect tariffs. Then it's a question of whether that would also be an act of war, and what would the UK and France do?

And if Toombs were president would he have been a better president for the Confederates, and not micromanage and second-guess the generals, and would he insist on a defense of all the CS territory, rather than concentrating their forces in two or three theaters?
 
The Corwin Amendment, supported by Lincoln from what I've read, along with Lincoln's own quotes on slavery in 1861, left me thinking he's more interested in the Union and tariff revenue, while the South is more concerned with independence than slavery. Slavery was more certain under the US than under the CS from the looks of things.

I disagree that the South was more interested in independence than slavery. To the secessionists, independence and the security of slavery were inseparable. Indeed, southern secessionists and southern Unionists were both very concerned with slavery. Their main difference was whether slavery was safer in the Union or out of it. But even most Unionists (at least in the Lower South) agreed that to assure the safety of slavery within the Union, the North would have to make concessions that would go well beyond the Corwin Amendment.

To quote an old post of mine:

***
Probably a majority of southern political leaders and voters after Lincoln's election were not absolutely committed to secession. But it would certainly take more than the Corwin Amendment to keep them in the Union. Basically, all that amendment did was to prohibit the federal government from passing a law abolishing slavery in the states. Hardly any southerners thought that *that* was how the Republicans would menace slavery. They were afraid of more indirect methods, which the Corwin Amendment did not address. Nothing in the Corwin Amendment would have prevented Congress from outlawing slavery in the territories while admitting one free state after another, thus reducing the South to a hopeless minority. Nothing in the Amendment would prevent Lincoln from using federal patronage to build up an antislavery party in the South. Nothing in the Amendment would prevent the Post Office from allowing the circulation of "incendiary" materials in the South. Nothing in the Amendment would stop northern defiance of the fugitive slave law--even if Lincoln was sincere in his promise to enforce it. Southern fears of all these things may have been overblown, but they were genuinely felt.

The question is what would southerners who were not "secessionists per se" accept as sufficient reassurances to lead them to stay in the Union. At least in the Lower South, the answer was probably that nothing less than the Crittenden proposals could produce an anti-secessionist majority. But the so-called Crittenden Compromise was so one-sidedly pro-southern (especially in guaranteeing slavery in all territories "hereafter acquired" south of the Missouri Compromise line--which could mean anything from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego) that it is very unlikely that enough Republicans would support it to give it any chance of passage. Indeed, many of them argued quite convincingly that it was not a real compromise at all but simply a surrender to the South. (The only "pro-northern" feature of the Compromise was banning slavery in the territories north of the Missouri Compromise line--where nobody expected slavery to take root, anyway. Oh, yes and the Compromise did call for laws to suppress the African slave trade--but so did the Confederate Constitution!)

https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...-the-american-civil-war.428907/#post-15896406
 
The problem is that an amendment to the Constitution can be undone, hence the end of prohibition as an example. Assuming that slavery was only to continue in states where it currently existed, you still have the probability that slavery in some birder states and D.C. will be abolished by the state - and the South would never expect this states right to go away. Furthermore, every new state admitted would be a free state, and eventually this would mean passage of a repeal amendment would be easy to do. One reason for secession was that the political leaders in the south saw that the only way to remain as they were with slavery as the bedrock of the way of life, was to be a separate nation established on that principle.
 
The problem is that an amendment to the Constitution can be undone, hence the end of prohibition as an example.

Well, the unusual thing about the Corwin Amendment was that it was supposed to be unamendable! But as I wrote in a post here some years ago:

***

To me, it is questionable whether any provision of the Constitution can be unamendable, even if it says it is. The proposed Corwin Amendment stated that "No Amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any state, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State." Yet I doubt that this would prevent a future Congress and state legislatures from repealing the Corwin Amendment itself. And indeed, as Peter Suber points out, "the Corwin amendment did not (explicitly) bar its own repeal." http://legacy.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/psa/app1.htm Suber's *The Paradox of Self-Amendment * is an interesting philosophical study of the problems. http://legacy.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/psa/

https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...onstitutional-amendment.340510/#post-10186178
 
The Supreme Court might have had something to say on the legality of an amendment that prohibits its own repeal (a fine example of self-reference, should anyone care).
 
Well, the unusual thing about the Corwin Amendment was that it was supposed to be unamendable! But as I wrote in a post here some years ago:

***

To me, it is questionable whether any provision of the Constitution can be unamendable, even if it says it is. The proposed Corwin Amendment stated that "No Amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any state, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State." Yet I doubt that this would prevent a future Congress and state legislatures from repealing the Corwin Amendment itself. And indeed, as Peter Suber points out, "the Corwin amendment did not (explicitly) bar its own repeal." http://legacy.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/psa/app1.htm Suber's *The Paradox of Self-Amendment * is an interesting philosophical study of the problems. http://legacy.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/psa/

https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...onstitutional-amendment.340510/#post-10186178


But in practice it could never be repealed, unless the necessary majorities were ready to launch a civil war. It would be obvious to all that such a repeal would be in effect a declaration of war on the South.

Wandering a little off-topic, I've sometimes wondered if this issue could have come up at state level. Had the antislavery people won in 1820, Missouri might have had to adopt a constitution banning slavery, and perhaps also forbidding any repeal of this provision. Had MO, after gaining statehood, then attempted such a repeal, I could imagine a proslavery State Supreme Court declaring that such a provision was unenforceable, and a proslavery SCOTUS going along with it.
 
As far as a state eliminating slavery, the south was caught in a cleft stick here. On one hand, they were very strong in states rights and limiting federal authority. On the other hand they worked federally when other states passed "personal liberty laws" freeing slaves who entered the state and also going strong with the Fugitive Slave Act and Dred Scott. In reality the best the south would expect would be that while a state could ban slavery (as many did between 1800 and the ACW or entered as free states), but a slave brought in to the state would remain "property" and escaped slaves would be considered "stolen" property - that was the actual argument, they had "stolen" themselves from their masters. The "deprivation of property" argument actually had some strength behind it, as it would fall under the sections of the Constitution limiting deprivation of private property without due process and also the "full faith and credit" part of the document. The latter says that one state has to accept legal actions done in another state - an example being if the legal age for marriage in one state is 16, and it is 17 in another a couple married in the first state who moves to the next remains legally married, this also applied to the "quickie divorces" in Nevada back in the day when somebody would move to Nevada just long enough to be resident, get a "no fault" divorce there, and it would be legal back in their "home" state even if the divorce laws were stricter there.
 
Top