Could the Confederates win the war post Fort Sumter?

It's more the other way around I've found. Trade with Great Britain and its colonies controlled something like 60% of the United States trade, while imports to Britain from the US accounted for 16% of exports and 17% of imports. I've got a more detailed source somewhere, but need to track it down in my notes, but that's what I recall off the top of my head. Though I do know that in the historic war scare the European banking houses closed their doors, and until Lincoln got the greenbacks rolling confidence in the government collapsed until roughly February 1862 when the greenbacks proved viable and there was no war.

Similarly, the Union at the height of the war scare in 1861-62 discovered the uncomfortable fact they were facing a shortage of the necessary material to make gunpowder and needed a crash course to try and mitigate the disaster, and if the war scare hadn't ended they would have faced a shortage until 1863 because the British controlled, almost exclusively, the source of nitrates needed to make powder. Iron, lead, and steel were also monopolized by British trade, the iron being singularly important because the Springfield Armory actually couldn't make any weapons without a specific source of iron from Britain according to this article.

The confiscation of British property would be a short term solution resulting in a long term problem from a lack of investment and likely numerous legal challenges, and the British would most likely retaliate in kind while simultaneously driving the American merchant marine to extinction far better than the Confederate Navy could have dreamed of. Meanwhile, every soldier, rifle and cannon sent to guard the coast or attack Canada is one less man fighting the Confederate states who suddenly have open markets to sell their cotton and import weapons and powder, while freeing up their own men for the armies fighting against the North.

All of this is just the economic/strategic problems of British intervention, before a single redcoat sets foot on American soil. When it comes down to the nitty gritty of where the soldiers, cannons and ships will come from you find a series of stark and equally bad choices. The British won't win the war in 1862, but their intervention alone sees the chances of a successful independent South rise from negligible to good odds.

It's why I see some method of foreign intervention as about the only way the Confederate States could plausibly achieve independence.

You do realize that GB is an island that has to import virtually every raw material except coal while even the 19th Century US is a continental-sized Great Power? The US is so big it has to import virtually nothing. If it is a raw material on this planet, outside of tropical plants, it is almost certainly found on US soil somewhere or other. The US doesn't have to import crap to keep its economy going but GB does.

The British were simply a cheaper source for those materials so they were imported. Potassium nitrate is a very common compound, which is why countless tons were produced the world over. If potassium nitrate was remotely rare gunpowder would never have been used, it would be too expensive. Never forget the US is BIG, it has potassium nitrate, it has sulfur, it has charcoal, it has lead and iron. The US had Pittsburg for God's sake. It could produce countless tons of iron.

You expect your property to be seized in war. The US wouldn't seize it merely to pay the bills but to both deny it to GB and to discourage others from waging war against the US. It might discourage British investment in the US for some decades but so what? First short time considerations outweigh long term ones in war and there are other sources of investments including internal investments which outweighed British Investments by a ton. In 1860 the US was already rich being the number 3 industrialized country on the planet heading quickly towards number 2.


I doubt it would slow investment in the US much after the war because it would still be a profitable place to invest AND everyone would expect the US to do just that.That is one of the risks you run when starting a war with someone. Seizing enemy property in war is seen as completely different as compared to doing so with neutral property in peacetime. It would be fought in US courts and the British would almost certainly lose. The US courts are pretty reluctant to involve itself in wartime policy. I have little doubt that the court system would see it as legitimate because GB declared war against the US.

You have to realize the logistical problems with supplying an army in Canada against a country as rich as the US from 3000 miles away. The US is not Zanzibar, it won't take a regiment of Her Majesties Finest to win but a real large army and it will have to be heavily supplied. The US was already a continental sized Great Power that was entirely connected by railroads in all but its frontier land. Canada was a remote colony with a tiny population a tenth the size of the US and a logistical system to match. It isn't India where you can hire tons of peasants to do all the grunt work for you, you have to send people to do that as well.
 
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You're quite right 1862 isn't 1814, (or 1781)!
Britain does not have to worry about France, or anyone else, and can focus all of its resources on North America for the first time. And this time it has a powerful ally on American soil. The North has just lost is largest trading partner and imported source of weapons and war equipment, at Gettysburg 22% of Union Infantry Regiments were armed exclusively with Enfield Rifles, without Foreign Imports the North cannot arm its troops.

All Britain has to do is break the Union Blockade, impose its own on the North and hold Canada. It is perfectly happy to let the Confederate Army do most of the fighting and dying. The Union at a minimum now has to divert thousands of troops to coastal defence and garrisoning the Canadian Border, even if not a single shot is fired by Britain on land. Whereas the Confederacy is freed from having to garrison its ports, can import and export whatever it likes and can divert greater resources to its Field Armies.

Canada is safe until at least April 1862, no one is campaigning in a Canadian Winter and the St Lawrence is impassable, even today the Seaway only opens at the end of March, the river also thaws from the Atlantic end which favours the Naval Power. Historically the Trent Affair was concluded by the end of December 1861, in the event of escalation this gives Britain another 3 months to build up its forces in Canada.
The planned call out of the Canadian Militia was for 100,000 men, and certainly, according to The Times, enough arms were reported to have been shipped to arm such, from a Sedentary Militia of 470,000. The population of Canada in 1861 was 3,174,442, this is no greater a level of mobilisation that either the North or the South.
There have been estimates that Britain could move approximately 68 Infantry Battalions to North America, given the time and available shipping, without compromising its Imperial, or Home, security. One of the functions of the British Militia being to enable this, Militia Battalions routinely deployed overseas to relieve or supplement Imperial Garrisons. They did so during the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny, there is no reason to believe it should not occur now.
Drafts from Militia, and Volunteers, were also often used to reinforce regular battalions going to war. One of the reasons every painting of the Grenadier Guards defeating the French Imperial Guard at Waterloo is historically inaccurate is that many of the "Guardsmen" are not portrayed as still wearing their uniforms of the West Sussex Militia.
With attached Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers and the Military Train, 68 battalions is enough to form 11-12 British Infantry Divisions, in 5-6 Corps, each of about 14,000 men, a not dis-similar number to a Union Army Corps, plus additional Garrison Artillery, Drill Instructors, Staff and Engineers. Or possibly as many as 100,000 men (Its 68 btns out of 148, or 46% of 219,000). Taking Canada from 100-200,000 trained Soldiers, including the Duke of Wellington!;), is not going to be that easy*. Especially when facing a resurgent Confederacy at the same time.

(*Major-General Arthur Wellesley, 2nd Duke of Wellington was one of the officers considered for a Divisional Command in the event of war:winkytongue:)


The US was the fastest growing country in the 19th century and by miles. Between 1814 and 1860 the US grew enormously in geographical, population and economic size. In 1814 it was rich but fairly unpopulated and relatively unindustrialized for a Western country, by 1860 its population was greater than GB and was the 3rd largest economy on the planet and coming up fast. All the important areas were already covered by rail. Canada? Not so much. Logistics is a bitch, particulary if it is thousands of miles long.

How is Canada going to supply 400,000 men long term? They don't need just rifles, but they need shot, food, gunpowder, uniforms, boots, blankets, tents etc. Almost all of which, except food, will have to be supplied by GB. They also need a lot of hands to handle the logistics.All of this is going to be needed to be replaced several times in war. Supplies get lost every time you advance or retreat and you go through shot and ammo quickly. There simply wasn't enough Canadians to handle the supplies of a huge long term army against its next door colossus.
 
Hello,
The OP seems to have been hijacked into a debate on foreign intervention, which was not going to happen. To return to the OP, a CSA victory after Ft Sumter was very unlikely but possible with the right conjunction of events in 1862. Fall of 1862 was the only time the CSA had the initiative on multiple fronts. They lost their chance in the East due to some bad stupid luck and happenstance (apologies to P-M) with Special Orders 191. And lost their opportunity in the west due to a terminal case of Braxton Braggitis. The fall of 1862 was critical because of the imminent Congressional elections. A substantial CSA incursion into PA and a CSA capture of Louisville might have triggered a anti-war backlash and a Democratic majority in the House. Maybe, just maybe. Then if Abe Lincoln could die that fall from say an outbreak of Typhoid Fever in DC, the combination of political defeat and loss of a great leader just might lead to enough of a loss of will to continue the war in the North to accept a negotiated settlement with CSA independence. This is still a long shot and absolutely requires A Lincoln's death from natural causes, but it is possible. After 1862, no way.
 
You do realize that GB is an island that has to import virtually every raw material except coal while even the 19th Century US is a continental-sized Great Power? The US is so big it has to import virtually nothing. If it is a raw material on this planet, outside of tropical plants, it is almost certainly found on US soil somewhere or other. The US doesn't have to import crap to keep its economy going but GB does.

The British were simply a cheaper source for those materials so they were imported. Potassium nitrate is a very common compound, which is why countless tons were produced the world over. If potassium nitrate was remotely rare gunpowder would never have been used, it would be too expensive. Never forget the US is BIG, it has potassium nitrate, it has sulfur, it has charcoal, it has lead and iron. The US had Pittsburg for God's sake. It could produce countless tons of iron.

You expect your property to be seized in war. The US wouldn't seize it merely to pay the bills but to both deny it to GB and to discourage others from waging war against the US. It might discourage British investment in the US for some decades but so what? First short time considerations outweigh long term ones and there are other sources of investments including internal investments which outweighed British Investments by a ton. In 1860 the US was already rich being the number 3 industrialized country on the planet heading quickly towards number 2.


I doubt it would slow investment in the US much after the war because it would still be a profitable place to invest AND everyone would expect the US to do just that.That is one of the risks you run when starting a war with someone. Seizing enemy property in war is seen as completely different as compared to doing so with neutral property in peacetime. It would be fought in US courts and the British would almost certainly lose. The US courts are pretty reluctant to involve itself in wartime policy. I have little doubt that the court system would see it as legitimate because GB declared war against the US.

You have to realize the logistical problems with supplying an army in Canada against a country as rich as the US from 3000 miles away. The US is not Zanzibar, it won't take a regiment of Her Majesties Finest to win but a real large army and it will have to be heavily supplied. The US was already a continental sized Great Power that was entirely connected by railroads in all but its frontier land. Canada was a remote colony with a tiny population a tenth the size of the US and a logistical system to match. It isn't India where you can hire tons of peasants to do all the grunt work for you, you have to send people to do that as well.

I think the articles I posted earlier made clear the problems with this position.

Put simply, in 1861 the United Kingdom, irrespective of the Empire as a whole, had the largest manufacturing base in the entire world, and produced more coal, iron, steel and lead than the entire US. It did not have the manufacturing base necessary to produce the large quantities of steel for full scale war, and even in peace time did not produce enough domestic pig iron to meet its needs, importing 395,000 tons from abroad. Could you make that up? With hundreds of thousands of investment over the course of a few years, sure, not in a time of war for a crash course. The US can't snap its fingers and magic up countless weapons, tons of iron, nitrates, lead, among other items it needed to fight the war historically.

The US is not, and has never been, an autarky. Springfield Armory was entirely dependent on British steel to manufacture rifles, and that's not me saying it, to quote the article:

When the war began, Springfield was in the awkward position of being entirely dependent on English sources for gun iron as well as steel. Abram Hewitt, whose Cooper, Hewitt & Company operated the Trenton Iron Company, bought English iron for the Armory at the Marshall works. In the Fall of 1862, he convinced the Ordnance Department and the Secretary of War that he could make iron of comparable quality if guaranteed a price no less than that paid for English iron. He succeeded in making usable iron only after a visit to Birmingham and much technical difficulty, and by the Fall of 1863 secured all orders for Springfield Armory barrel iron. Within a few months of this contracting coup, the Armory and the Remington Company found deficiencies in the Trenton iron for barrels, but this domestic source continued as Springfield’s sole iron supplier through the war and beyond.

This is precisely one issue the Union would face if it went to war with Britain, and it has nothing to do with that being a 'cheaper' item from abroad. Among countless others which you dismiss by saying the US is 'big', which means zip in practical terms. The US effectively controlled only a fraction of its modern territory, and in the Civil War a third of that was in open rebellion. In return they can, what, cut off a fraction of direct British trade? Against an economy three times its size. Not to mention that the mere rumor of war with England caused the loss of millions in specie from New York banks in under a month which forced the government to suspend numerous payments for nearly three months. The British banks and finances were fine, if the Americans chose to cut themselves off from British investments then that's shooting themselves in the foot for a generation.

You seem to be overestimating the difficulties of supplying an army in Canada, which isn't a remote and desolate corner of the Empire, nor underdeveloped. It has its own rails, canals, roads and telegraphs, with men and material available to do things like be farriers, blacksmiths, drivers, engineers, railroad conductors, carpentry, billeting, ect and a domestic industry to provide for an army in the field. Historically the material for a huge force was sent, and more was available. This along with men, ships, and material which could be imported and transported down the natural highway that was the St. Lawrence River, and provisions had been made for an overland route to supply men and material in the winter.

Fighting both an internal rebellion and the Great Power of the day is not an easy thing, and the Union does not self evidently have the resources to do it.
 
The US was the fastest growing country in the 19th century and by miles. Between 1814 and 1860 the US grew enormously in geographical, population and economic size. In 1814 it was rich but fairly unpopulated and relatively unindustrialized for a Western country, by 1860 its population was greater than GB and was the 3rd largest economy on the planet and coming up fast. All the important areas were already covered by rail. Canada? Not so much. Logistics is a bitch, particulary if it is thousands of miles long.

How is Canada going to supply 400,000 men long term? They don't need just rifles, but they need shot, food, gunpowder, uniforms, boots, blankets, tents etc. Almost all of which, except food, will have to be supplied by GB. They also need a lot of hands to handle the logistics.All of this is going to be needed to be replaced several times in war. Supplies get lost every time you advance or retreat and you go through shot and ammo quickly. There simply wasn't enough Canadians to handle the supplies of a huge long term army against its next door colossus.

The US economy was 3rd by a very considerable margin.

The UK's share of world manufacturing output in 1860 was 19.9 percent; that of France, 7.9 percent; the US, 7.2 percent; Russia, 7 percent, the various German states, 4.9 percent; Austria, 4.2 percent, Italy, 2.5 percent.
(Source is Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Random House, 1987; Vintage Books, 1989)

Its not quite a 3 to 1 advantage, its more like two and three-quarters, but that's still huge. US GDP did not catch up with Britain's until the 1880's (And that's just the UK, not counting the Empire) And Britain's share of the world's wealth was also still increasing, its share had risen to 22.9% of world manufacturing output by 1880, it was hardly in decline, it was also becoming even more powerful.

The Population of the United States in 1860 was 31,443,321.
The Population of Britain in 1861 was 29,070,930, if you factor in the population of Canada, 3,174,442, there is no advantage here.
Especially when one of the key points of the American Civil War was that a Nation was divided. There are 9,103,332 Americans in States that are not actively part of the Union, and hence their contribution too the pool of military age males, manufacturing output and GDP must be removed from any comparison.
The British expect the Confederacy to do most of the fighting and dying against a wounded colossus, its a key point that in any European Intervention no one is facing a UNITED States of America.

And seriously my post said a 100-200,000 man Canadian Garrison not 400,000!?
 
I think the articles I posted earlier made clear the problems with this position.

Put simply, in 1861 the United Kingdom, irrespective of the Empire as a whole, had the largest manufacturing base in the entire world, and produced more coal, iron, steel and lead than the entire US. It did not have the manufacturing base necessary to produce the large quantities of steel for full scale war, and even in peace time did not produce enough domestic pig iron to meet its needs, importing 395,000 tons from abroad. Could you make that up? With hundreds of thousands of investment over the course of a few years, sure, not in a time of war for a crash course. The US can't snap its fingers and magic up countless weapons, tons of iron, nitrates, lead, among other items it needed to fight the war historically.

The US is not, and has never been, an autarky. Springfield Armory was entirely dependent on British steel to manufacture rifles, and that's not me saying it, to quote the article:

When the war began, Springfield was in the awkward position of being entirely dependent on English sources for gun iron as well as steel. Abram Hewitt, whose Cooper, Hewitt & Company operated the Trenton Iron Company, bought English iron for the Armory at the Marshall works. In the Fall of 1862, he convinced the Ordnance Department and the Secretary of War that he could make iron of comparable quality if guaranteed a price no less than that paid for English iron. He succeeded in making usable iron only after a visit to Birmingham and much technical difficulty, and by the Fall of 1863 secured all orders for Springfield Armory barrel iron. Within a few months of this contracting coup, the Armory and the Remington Company found deficiencies in the Trenton iron for barrels, but this domestic source continued as Springfield’s sole iron supplier through the war and beyond.

This is precisely one issue the Union would face if it went to war with Britain, and it has nothing to do with that being a 'cheaper' item from abroad. Among countless others which you dismiss by saying the US is 'big', which means zip in practical terms. The US effectively controlled only a fraction of its modern territory, and in the Civil War a third of that was in open rebellion. In return they can, what, cut off a fraction of direct British trade? Against an economy three times its size. Not to mention that the mere rumor of war with England caused the loss of millions in specie from New York banks in under a month which forced the government to suspend numerous payments for nearly three months. The British banks and finances were fine, if the Americans chose to cut themselves off from British investments then that's shooting themselves in the foot for a generation.

You seem to be overestimating the difficulties of supplying an army in Canada, which isn't a remote and desolate corner of the Empire, nor underdeveloped. It has its own rails, canals, roads and telegraphs, with men and material available to do things like be farriers, blacksmiths, drivers, engineers, railroad conductors, carpentry, billeting, ect and a domestic industry to provide for an army in the field. Historically the material for a huge force was sent, and more was available. This along with men, ships, and material which could be imported and transported down the natural highway that was the St. Lawrence River, and provisions had been made for an overland route to supply men and material in the winter.

Fighting both an internal rebellion and the Great Power of the day is not an easy thing, and the Union does not self evidently have the resources to do it.
This is a good point. The USA of 1862 was proportionally far weaker than that of, say, 1914 (where the idea of America joining the Central Powers probably kept Entente planners up all night even with British-friendly Presidents in office.

The USA can beat the Confederacy, albeit with more difficulty, if the Brits give Johnny Reb preferable trading status. The US cannot beat Johnny Reb and John Bull at the same time, it would be a disaster.
 
The OP seems to have been hijacked into a debate on foreign intervention, which was not going to happen.

I'd quibble with that. I don't mean to hijack the thread with an ad nauseum discussion of British advantages vis a vis the Union, but it's pertinent - I think - to the point I'm attempting to make. Like the Thirteen Colonies in 1776 the Confederate States was dependent on foreign recognition and aid of some sort to survive. Without those, its chances of winning independence, not beating the North, are slim. There were only two powers who might have had the opportunity or interest to intervene in the conflict, Britain and France.

Both had the military might to put some serious muscle on the Union and flip the scales in favor the Confederacy. With that foreign help the Confederacy has important breathing space and help in fighting the Union which would prove invaluable, powder, guns, ships, markets to keep their economy afloat through loans and bonds, ect. Without it, you most likely end up with varying differences from the historical result and a 1/100 chance the Confederacy delivers victory on its own. I'd argue that foreign intervention flips the odds to 50/100 if not 70/100 depending.

This is a good point. The USA of 1862 was proportionally far weaker than that of, say, 1914 (where the idea of America joining the Central Powers probably kept Entente planners up all night even with British-friendly Presidents in office.

The USA can beat the Confederacy, albeit with more difficulty, if the Brits give Johnny Reb preferable trading status. The US cannot beat Johnny Reb and John Bull at the same time, it would be a disaster.

In my experience there's too much assumption that the Union circa 1862 is the same as the US in 1914, it was manifestly not. It was a powerful country in its own backyard, but compared to the powers of Europe, not so much. Lincoln himself knew this, and made the quip 'one war at a time' and we know his cabinet were aware of these difficulties as well. Reports from ranking officers and a Congressional investigation showed pretty conclusively that the Union wasn't in a position to fight a two front war. So they played a very skillful game of diplomacy instead, variously bowing to European pressure, resisting it, and subverting it where they could. Probably the most excellent example is Lincoln's reaction to Napoleon in Mexico, paying lip service to Monroe Doctrine when he can do nothing about it, but then sending 50,000 men to the Rio Grande to 'remind' the French whose backyard they were in when the Civil War was won.

Lincoln was a canny operator surrounded by excellent men, but even they can't shift the weight of empires without the resources to do it.
 
You seem to be overestimating the difficulties of supplying an army in Canada, which isn't a remote and desolate corner of the Empire, nor underdeveloped. It has its own rails, canals, roads and telegraphs, with men and material available to do things like be farriers, blacksmiths, drivers, engineers, railroad conductors, carpentry, billeting, ect and a domestic industry to provide for an army in the field. Historically the material for a huge force was sent, and more was available. This along with men, ships, and material which could be imported and transported down the natural highway that was the St. Lawrence River, and provisions had been made for an overland route to supply men and material in the winter.

And of course, if supporting an army in Canada really were that difficult, this would also work against any US attempts to occupy the place.
 
Supporting an army in Canada from the USA is quite different than supporting one from the UK. There are rail lines from the USA across the Canadian border in the east, the there is a vast US merchant shipping on the Great Lakes. The USA can increase its naval presence on the Great Lakes rapidly, not so for the UK. Within Canada itself the Grand Trunk RR from Montreal to Sarnia was completed in 1860 (this was more or less across from Detroit) - then as now the Canadian rail system was primarily a stones throw from the US border. There was a main line from Portland, Maine to Montreal. There was no rail connection to the Maritimes.

This is not to say it would be easy or sensible for the USA to voluntarily fight the UK at the same time as the CSA. The reality was that almost everything needed for the UK to fight the USA in Canada would need to be imported, with the exception of food, fodder, etc.
 
And of course, if supporting an army in Canada really were that difficult, this would also work against any US attempts to occupy the place.

Not exactly, as others have correctly pointed out. Keeping an army supplied in Canada from the sea is eminently practical as the odds of the Royal Navy losing control of the St. Lawrence are nil, however, unless enough is done to keep the army supplied in winter they are effectively out of communication save via an overland route for nearly 4 months of the year. However, the British did have plans OTL to mitigate this problem.

That said, winter would be a bitch for any side campaigning in Canada, not that it was easy across the US either. Lord knows the British are unlikely to try landing in Maine or New York in the middle of February!

Supporting an army in Canada from the USA is quite different than supporting one from the UK. There are rail lines from the USA across the Canadian border in the east, the there is a vast US merchant shipping on the Great Lakes. The USA can increase its naval presence on the Great Lakes rapidly, not so for the UK. Within Canada itself the Grand Trunk RR from Montreal to Sarnia was completed in 1860 (this was more or less across from Detroit) - then as now the Canadian rail system was primarily a stones throw from the US border. There was a main line from Portland, Maine to Montreal. There was no rail connection to the Maritimes.

This is not to say it would be easy or sensible for the USA to voluntarily fight the UK at the same time as the CSA. The reality was that almost everything needed for the UK to fight the USA in Canada would need to be imported, with the exception of food, fodder, etc.

Interestingly, Congressional investigations in February and April of 1862 concluded that while the superiority in tonnage existed on the Upper Lakes, (Erie, Michigan, Huron, ect) on Lake Ontario it was completely absent, with the Canadians/British being dominant in both fortifications and arms. Worse was the fact that the arsenals for the Lakes had been completely emptied to arm the flotilla's on the Mississippi and for the expansion of the Navy. While the British could drive gunboats up the St. Lawrence or along the canals, the Americans would have to extemporize a fleet from scratch on Lake Ontario as boats could not be passed through from the Upper Lakes to Lake Ontario.

Worse from that perspective is that historically the Canadians and British had at least a semblance of naval infrastructure in existing naval dockyards at Kingston, while volunteer naval brigades were formed from able merchant masters and sailors on the lakes in 1861-62 who could man auxiliary gunboats (including the existing ships Passport, Magnet and Kingston which had been built as ad hoc warships in the previous decade) and the full expectation the British could move ironclad gunboats up the river. Meanwhile American fortifications were in even more shoddy repair than their Canadian counterparts and completely unarmed. Essentially, the American settlements on the St. Lawrence would be at the mercy of the Canadian shore unless immediate action was taken.

While the Americans had plans to counter this, it comes from a much worse 'standing start' position on the British side.

The railroads are both a help, and a hindrance to the invader. While the Americans could use the rails, the defenders would be using them as well, which makes a bit of a even odds scenario. Heck, the British had something of a hair brained scheme to capture Portland and use that.

The points about moving weapons and ammunition over are well made, but so long as the St. Lawrence is open (and even if the sleigh route is open) the British could use their massive superiority in global shipping to move as much as they pleased across the ocean and up the St. Lawrence. Slower than straight from the factory to the front line of course, but the supplies will get there I have no doubt. The Crimean War was fought at similar distances and in a wilderness in comparison!
 
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