Could the Byzantines hold Anatolia in the long run without its interior?

Could the Byzantines have kept Anatolia in the long run with the Turks controlling the desolate interior? The Byzantines had control of the economically rich coastal areas, and even with occasionally mediocre leadership under Manuel the Turkish raids were still held off pretty well.
 
It's not impossible, but as long as the Turks are there they are a dagger consistently chipping away at the heart of the Empire with likely constant raids that would be an awful drain on the Empire's resources. The minute an intelligent and dynamic emperor comes to power and has enough resources at their disposal retaking the Anatolian interior will almost certainly be their first objective. No one likes having a dagger pointed right at their hearts like that.
 
Not impossible, but it would require the Byzantines to some how neutralize or minimize the impact of the Turks, which I'm not sure the Byzantines are capable of accomplishing after a certain point. For further clarification, what time frame are you looking at for the Byzantines?
 
Not impossible, but it would require the Byzantines to some how neutralize or minimize the impact of the Turks, which I'm not sure the Byzantines are capable of accomplishing after a certain point. For further clarification, what time frame are you looking at for the Byzantines?
And if an Emperor manages to Neutralize the Turks in the long term rather than just for a generation or two, why would they not just take the interior? It just makes no sense not to.
 
Technically yes. The Byzantines could hold the coast of Anatolia for a long time without retaking the interior; however, whatever structural factors lead them to fail to retake the interior would also underly structural weakness in the Byzantine Empire.
 
What about if the Turks and the Byzantine form a alliance from some threat and over time it blossoms into a real alliance which stops the constant raids on Byzantine lands
 

Albert.Nik

Banned
A strong Byzantine Empire in the Balkans with making Slavs who were already there as citizens could help. Added to this,butterfly the East West Schism. This would help them take back Anatolia and probably even Levant(crusaders conquered most of it but we're unaffiliated with the Byzantines) and parts of North Africa.
 

Albert.Nik

Banned
What about if the Turks and the Byzantine form a alliance from some threat and over time it blossoms into a real alliance which stops the constant raids on Byzantine lands
Who could invade that time? The lands from where Huns(Turks) and Mongols invaded(the last time anyone say such an invasion) had been already emptied as they all invaded West. So who else could invade in such a way?
 
And if an Emperor manages to Neutralize the Turks in the long term rather than just for a generation or two, why would they not just take the interior? It just makes no sense not to.

Good point, I guess I went right to how to "Make the Byzantines survive to modern times" thinking.
 
The East Romans can hold the coast while Turks remain in the interior. It is like having a Hostile Bulgaria East of the Balkans while the capital is Constantinople. Troublesome but not impossible.

Required:
1. No 4th Crusade
2. No Mongol Invasions (that drove many Turks to Anatolia)
3. Better emperors
 
I think the Byzantines could have done what you're suggesting, but Geopolitics suggests that it couldn't be maintained long term if either party were interested in their own strategic goals.

Romans - Turks are a threat to the core of the Empire, perhaps we should get rid of them
Turks - The Romans have the coast. If we want to make big trade money, we need a coast!

So yes, it is possible for the Byzantines to hold the Anatolian Coast without the interior - but whoever does control the interior needs to be weak, or disinterested in the Anatolian coastline.
 

Vuu

Banned
It's easier to roll downhill than uphill - the Turks would naturally gravitate to the coasts as a result

But on the other hand, the terrain is such that the interior is not the most nice of places and won't be able to support too much people...
 
Could the Byzantines have kept Anatolia in the long run with the Turks controlling the desolate interior? The Byzantines had control of the economically rich coastal areas, and even with occasionally mediocre leadership under Manuel the Turkish raids were still held off pretty well.

I think the best chance to make this work long term is if the capital is in Anatolia. This happened in the time of the Empire of Nicaea, between 1204 and 1261.

Let's say the empire of Nicaea continues to exist for some reason. I think they might survive for centuries, possibly even permanently.

But otherwise, as others have said it's not a sustainable situation for the Byzantine Empire. Sooner or later they must either retake the centre or lose control. It's inevitable.
 
I would honestly have to disagree with what seems to be the consensus here; Anatolia was the literal heartland of the Byzantine Empire. It contained the vast majority of the population (excluding Constantinople) and was essentially the most important portion of the state. The loss of the Balkans to the Bulgarians is not equivalent since the region did not have nearly as much strategic value as Anatolia did. Without it, the Empire is going to decline instantly the moment it runs out of luck or an incompetent ruler takes the throne.
 
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I would honestly have to disagree with what seems to be the consensus here; Anatolia was the literal heartland of the Byzantine Empire. It contained the vast majority of the population (excluding Constantinople) and was essentially the most important portion of the state. The loss of the Balkans to the Bulgarians is not equivalent since the region did not have nearly as much strategic value as Anatolia did. Without it, the Empire is going to decline instantly the moment it runs out of luck or an incompetent ruler takes the throne.
Coastal Anatolia was the truly important part. That's where most of the population and economic activity was, and it was the Laskarid Emperors' position there that allowed it to maintain a large enough army to not only beat the Turks into submission for a time but also wage frequent campaigns against the Latin Empire. It was the Palailogos' neglect of the defense of this region in favor of a constant war of attrition in the Peloponnese of all places that ultimately spelled the end of the Empire's hopes of recovery.

The inland was important strategically of course. Much better to have it than leave that dagger into the single most important part of the Empire, but not having it doesn't necessarily mean that the Empire is doomed. It just means that if the Emperor is smart, the top of his list of priorities aside from defending Constantinople had to be taking back the Anatolian plateau to secure the coast.
 
The East Romans can hold the coast while Turks remain in the interior. It is like having a Hostile Bulgaria East of the Balkans while the capital is Constantinople. Troublesome but not impossible.

Required:
1. No 4th Crusade
2. No Mongol Invasions (that drove many Turks to Anatolia)
3. Better emperors

The third one is really big. The Romans lost a lot of territory in Anatolia between 1180 and 1204. And of course the power struggle between claimants ultimately led to the Crusaders sacking Constantinople.
 
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The third one is really big. The Romans lost a lot of territory in Anatolia between 1180 and 1204. And of course the power struggle between claimants ultimately led to the Crusaders sacking Constantinople.

I blame Manuel I Komnenos. His reign (1143-1180) was largely a magnificent failure in the end.

While the armies and fleets he commanded were vast and impressive, he failed to use them effectively. The wealth at his reach was enormous, yet he did not spend it wisely. His diplomatic efforts were extensive and wide-ranging, yet they brought no lasting benefit to the empire.

His military efforts touched every possible direction, yet he failed in most of his wars/campaigns. Here is a list of the wars/campaigns during his reign:

Anatolia 1140s - failure
Second Crusade 1140s - failure
Italy 1150s - failure
Cilicia 1150s - success
Hungary 1160s - success
Egypt - 1160s failure
Anatolia 1170s - failure

We cannot reasonably expect more than 3 good emperors in a row, and the three Komnenoi (Alexios, John II, Manuel) together ruled from 1081 to 1180. It's inherent in the nature of monarchy that you won't get one good ruler after another and maintain it for more than a century. Sooner or later you'll get a bad emperor.

Manuel's diplomacy, and foreign policy in general, was rather unsuccessful in the end. He could have managed the Second Crusade differently, but instead of putting his whole heart into it and using it as an opportunity to make real gains, he treacherously made a truce with the Turks and did not participate in the campaign. This was a major blunder, in my opinion, and the failure of the crusade did permanent damage to Byzantium's reputation, particularly as the Byzantines were accused of aiding the Turks (which may or may not be true).

His failed war in Italy was extravagantly expensive, wasting vast quantities of gold on a project that completely failed in all its objectives. Given the empire's rapid collapse after 1180, it's only natural to think the gold might have been better spent elsewhere.

His expedition to Cilicia and triumphal entry into Antioch was a success in the 1150s, and he did win a war with Hungary decisively in the 1160s. These victories did add some strength to the imperial army (Hungary became a vassal and had to provide troops) and possibly some wealth and prestige (Antioch became a vassal and also provided troops, and Cilica was added to the empire).

However the invasion of Egypt in the 1160s was another costly failure, and is difficult to justify given that it relied on the unreliable help of reluctant Cruader "allies" who often behaved more like enemies, and that it was prioritised over the situation in Anatolia, which was far more relevant to the empire's interests.

This is of course compounded by the failure in Anatolia in the 1176 campaign against Konya, where Manuel's army was famously defeated at the battle of Myriokephalon. The failure of that campaign really gave the lie to the imperial pretensions of the court in Constantinople. The Sultan of Rum demanded that the emperor demolish two fortresses; Manuel complied with this demand in the case of the one but did not in the case of the other. But the mere fact of failure of this impressive and costly expedition, combined with the emperor taking orders from the upstart Sultan of Konya, was a major humiliation to Byzantine prestige and credibility.

The arrest of all the Venetians in the empire in the 1170s and the confiscation of all their property was another foolish move by Manuel. This alienated one of the most useful allies of the Byzantine Empire, with results that would prove to be disastrous in 1204 when a Venetian fleet arrived in Constantinople and sacked the city, dismantling the empire.

The biggest failure of Manuel is that he failed utterly in Anatolia. His reign was the empire's last chance to retake the interior, and he clearly had the manpower and the money to achieve this. But instead of campaigning effectively to achieve his goals, he allowed the Turks 30 years to build up a unified state (the Danishmends and Seljuks had been two separate, divided and weak domains at the start of his reign). He then compounded that failure by losing at Myriokephalon.

Really, for the empire to have succeeded in this period, it would have been necessary to take Konya and Ankara. Doing so would have secured the Byzantine position in Anatolia, allowing the provinces to prosper. It would also have halted the Turkification and Islamisation of the region. The capture of the Seljuk capital would likely have ended their state, since the Danishmend regions would probably have rebelled and returned to autonomy. In such a case, it would have been a relatively simply matter to mop up the remaining cities of Anatolia and restore the frontier to its ancient defensible position on the Taurus mountains. Even if the empire failed to do this, it would have been facing a greatly weakened enemy, from a position of much improved territorial control. Byzantine Anatolia would have been in a much better position to survive and prosper than OTL.

Instead, Manuel largely squandered the opportunities open to him. It is a pity, because the Byzantine Empire was never again to be in a position where its survival as a great power could have been as readily assured.
 
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