Could the Burma Road have been kept open in 1942?

Hey everyone, while reviewing an old story of mine about an alternate Charles Lindbergh who decided to fly with the AVG in WWII instead of staying put, I came across some of my own notes regarding the future of the story. The idea was to have Lindbergh influence the Burma campaign in such a way that the Japanese advance was stopped short of Rangoon and that the Allies somehow held their ground until the monsoon season in May keeping the Burma road open.

In TTL Lindbergh plays a minor role in convincing the British Commander Thomas Hutton to allow the 17th Indian division to withdraw behind the Sittang River 5 days earlier than OTL (when the 17th's commander initially asked). Thus in TTL the British are able to put together an effective fighting force to take advantage of the favorable terrain and inflict a severe defeat on the Japanese forces in late February 1942. This then buys time for the British to send in reinforcements, and leads to the Chinese holding the strategic city of Toungoo. Despite the arrival of future Japanese reinforcements, the situation becomes a stalemate and the Japanese are not able to make any more significant gains before the advent of monsoon season.

Is the above scenario plausible? If not, what kind of POD would be needed for the Burma Road to be kept open? (The later the better!)

Just how important was cutting the Burma Road to the Japanese? Is it merely a matter of when rather than if the Japanese take it? How would the Indian Ocean Raid proceed if Rangoon was still held by the British? Were there any naval troops that could be used to launch an amphibious assault on Burma?

Any additional thoughts/comments would be welcome.
 
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Art

Monthly Donor
I believe the A. V. G. accidentally

bombed a british formation. I read about the A. V. G., but not in the past 6/7 years. I know the British were outnumbered in aircraft, and had a mixed, colonial army in the area, not trained to fight a modern army, even one as badly equipped as the Imperial Japanese Army. Plus there was little loyalty for the British Empire in Burma. Never discount the effect of that. Not that the Japanese got any more loyalty from the peoples they conquered.
 
Fearless Leader

As Art says there are still a number of problems but with a bit of luck the rough terrain could enable the Japanese to be stopped on the Sittang.

Having Rangoon would make supplying and defending Burma a lot easier but you still have the problem that the Japanese will have sea [and in the early period air] superiority over the region. That would make running convoys into Rangoon difficult and possibly expensive so it could well be that for 42 at least the road is virtually cut as all that Britain can afford to take in are reinforcements and supplies for the defenders.

However from 43 onwards it would enable a much larger flow of supplies to the Chinese and the USAF in China.

Steve
 
The problem is the British never seriously considered defending Burma. They did not imagine the Japanese capable of invading and thus failed to deploy enough forces for Burma's defense. There were also no plans to work with the Chinese forces despite Chiang Kai-shek being eager to send troops into Burma.

It was only when the British were dealt a defeat in Malaysia did Churchill permit Chinese forces to enter Burma, by then the invasion had started and the British had lost all confidence fighting the Japanese in the jungle and the goal was to evacuated to India ASAP. The Chinese troops ended up playing rear guard for a retreat in progress.

The Japanese invasion of Burma was done under great logistical difficulty. It was entirely possible to stop them given the political will to do so. The fundamental problem is the different war aims of the British and Chinese sides. To the Chinese the Burma Road was vital, to the British it was of low priority.
 
The problem is the British never seriously considered defending Burma.

The Japanese invasion of Burma was done under great logistical difficulty. It was entirely possible to stop them given the political will to do so. The fundamental problem is the different war aims of the British and Chinese sides. To the Chinese the Burma Road was vital, to the British it was of low priority.

Very true, as Churchill himself and others greatly disliked General Chaing Kai-shek (radio shows in Britain called him "General Cash My Check"). That Chaing wanted to nationalize British property, especially the enclaves, was part of that.

In 1943, after almost breaking into India, Britain allowed US special operations in the Shan states, to considerable success. With a 1940 agreement of the US as an intermediary (remember, the Flying Tigers formed at this period), we could see what you are suggesting with realtive ease. Guarentees not offered in OTL, like a separate Shan/Karen/Mon separate state with outlet to the sea allong the Saleen River (not much navigatitable, but still) would have very cheaply offered them something to fight for.

In OTL, with sparks before, Burmese ethnics were seen as a trouble bound to cause serious disruption.

As it was, in OTL of 1943-45, no guarentees were offered and yet they still gave help to the non British Americans. As stated, the British were none to popular, and Bill Slim was an OK guy, but in his early campaign made some big enough errors. A salient entrenched group of these Kingdoms would be tough for the Japanese to beat and provide a cushion to stop the advance south of the Burma road.
 
Getting the whole 17th Indian Division (16, 46, & 48 Brigades) intact to the Sittang Bridge earlier and giving them time to build defensive positions along the river certainly helps.

33rd and 55th IJA Division tactics would be to move parallel to the river looking for a weak point to force a crossing at.

Things that would have helped.

- Earlier arrival of 7th UK Armored Brigade (coming from Middle East). They did good service north of Rangoon at the Battle of Pegu after the IJA was already over the Sittang. If the 17th Indian can form a line, the 7th brigade (mostly light tanks) could make a very effective mobile reserve/response team.

- Earlier arrival of 63rd Indian Brigade (coming from Middle East). More troops could help extend a Sittang River line. Even with a 17th wholely across the river, they'd be beat up and tired.

- 1st Burma Division gets involved. They were in theater somewhere, but I am unclear what they were doing before the IJA crossed the Sittang.

- As another poster stated, earlier involvement by the Chinese Expeditionary Force. Advance units of CEF Division arriving three weeks sooner might have really helped. Some of their units were very effective, Sun Li-Jen's 38th Division in particular.

- Diverting the 6th or 7th Australian Division to Rangoon. ASB probably, as the Australian government was scared and did refuse such a request. The 6th got stuck by orders in Ceylon during this time frame. Not just diverting them, but getting them there in time to help would be the key. If the IJA gets initially stopped on the Sittang by the forces identified above. Then the IJA has to recover and build up before launching another effort over the river. Maybe that would give enough time for the Aussies to arrive, march, and man/extend defenses along the river.
 
I can see at least one potential knock-on: Operation Matterhorn is drastically altered, & supplying B-29 bases in ROC becomes (somewhat...) more credible, so the first B-29 attacks against Japan are both sooner & slightly more effective. This offers the additional option of beginning aerial minelaying against Japan sooner.
 
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