War in the East options
Guys
While I think joe-chamberlain is ignoring a lot of points and needs to learn that you don't win people over by insulting them I would agree on some of the points raised over the effects of the Nazis adopting a different attitude to the local population in the SU [Soviet Union]. Lets see about some of the points:
a) Food - From what I have read about the SU there were two main factors in Soviet agriculture. The Collective farms and the small private plots allowed to farmers. The former had vast areas of the best land and access to considerable amounts of mechanical equipment and fertiliser. Despite that the private plots, for their size, were far more productive.
Collectivisation was deeply unpopular in the SU, not just amongst those murdered as kulaks but the bulk of the rest of the population as well. I think the Nazis did consider dissolving them and restoring private plots but decided this would reduce production. This may seem likely given the advantage of centralisation but I suspect that doing it, along with allowing the peasants to sell much of their surplus would have considerably increased production. What it would definitely have done would have been winning over a lot of people in the occupied area, reducing if not wiping out partisan activity in their rear and making any later Soviet re-occupation markedly more difficult. Furthermore, as rumours of it spread it would have weakened the rest of the SU, to some degree or another. [Thinking that while some might subtly favour further German advances possibly even more importantly a paranoid Communist state would be very concerned about such fears].
b) Hitler being persuaded to agree to such a programme. I think while unlikely its not impossible. After all he made the initial deal with Stalin in 39 when it was in his interest. If the case was put that this would enable the building up of forces which would be largely under German control and could be spent in bitter fighting against the Red Army, saving German soldiers. As a number of people have said raw infantry is highly dependent on support services, logistics, artillery, air support etc, which would also be controlled by the Germans. Also by splitting the various factions, having Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian etc you could do some divide and rule. Again this would not only supply extra troops but also pose a serious threat to the Soviet state by presenting an alternative option that would seem favourably to many in the SU.
c) Supplying such troops. This would be a problem, although better treated populations will provide more resources in anything but the shorter term. This applies not just to agriculture but also industry, both conscripted labour in Germany and controlled production inside the occupied SU. However a number of the troops would have relatively limited needs. Any used for anti-partisan forces would not be needing much equipment. Urban fighting would require more but longer range air and artillery could be supplied by German units while FR [Free Russian] units provide the fairly lightly equipped pbi. [Poor bloody infantry].
Even poorly equipped troops would be better than nothing especially since, as the Wiki entry showed they would fight ferociously to avoid falling into Soviet hands. Even more so if they have reasonably prosperous [by Soviet] homes and family to protect. [Any former Soviet 'citizen' who has lived in relative comfort will know what fate faces them if the Red army moves west again.
Furthermore there are automatic gains. For instance partisan activity would be much reduced as to apply Mao the fish would be denied water. This would free up German troops and avoid a lot of destruction of war materials and disruption of supplies.
d) That the POD, 1/1/42 is too late for such a policy as the Germans have already alienated the population. True to a degree. However they were an invading army, which inevitably is likely to lead to some excesses. Furthermore in a lot of cases they passed through so quickly that relatively little impact on the local population other than removing the Soviet state. Also the population had long lived under one of the most brutal regimes in world history. As such if the Germans make a clear change in policy and make efforts to stick to it - [clear orders to their soldiers and making well published examples of a few who disobey] - they will at the very least greatly reduce the hostility of the population and the resistance they will face. More likely they will win over a lot of the population, who will have faced little brutality in the early days and can put down any such reports as bad apples or Soviet propaganda. Don't forget, Vlasov's own defection didn't occur until the failure of the Soviet offensive in Spring 42, when he was alienated by the disregard of the Soviet system for the lives of the troops of the Red army.
I'm not saying that such a policy would definitely win the eastern front for the Germans. However at the very least it was by far the best chance for winning in the east after the initial dash in 42 failed. In terms of mobilising millions of people, not necessarily as troops but as more productive elements of the German war machine than enemies driven by despair into opposition. Also in the implied threat to the Soviet state that such measures would pose to its control of areas still under its control. At the very least, when the Red Army drove west again it would have to fight every inch of the way not just against the Germans but also the vast majority of the local population. In itself a problem and also it would making stripping the newly regained lands of men to feed into the Red Army more difficult. More likely some formations could have been available by mid-42 say, to form defensive formations in some areas and possibly also expendable assault formations for urban fighting, given the prestige of liberating key cities from the Soviet yoke. The SU was also under heavy pressure in 42 with shortages of just about everything and its losses could have been increased such as to reduce/break either its strength for later counter-offensives or its will and self belief to continue the war. [Seeing Hitler agreeing to even a favorable neotgiated peace is highly unlikely but possibly by 43/44 you could see both sides so worn down that some settlement is possible, which would drastically alter the war in the west.
Steve