Could the Axis win the war from 1942 onwards?

You don't seem to be listening to what people above are telling you. The Russian National Army wasn't small for a want of recruits but because there simply wasn't enough guns and butter to equip such a force in more than a token way.

Equipping them means stripping supplies sorely needed to keep the OTL German army going. Trading reasonably adept German divisions for swathes of badly equipped and badly fed cannon-fodder is not a war-winning strategy.

Besides it is far too late. Reasonable treatment of Slavs would likely be a war winning solution in 1941 but it is too late to try in 1942. The Germans spent at least 6 months raping and pillaging Russia and that would not be forgotten just because of better treatment and it would likely be seen as a sign of weakness.
 
Why would I listen to people who are either wrong or openly lying?

You have spouted half informed suggestions all day and you have ignored most of the, perfectly reasonable, comments made.

You have not bothered to gather any new data to support your case, and wikipedia, whilst acceptable within limits, is hardly a useful source on matters of contention.

I am intrigued by what you think people are "openly lying" about. In fact, I am intrigued by what openly lying it, it would seem a contradition in terms.

A contradiction like the same trucks, artillery and food going to both Germans and Slavs.
 
"poorly equiped and ill-trained cannon-fodder."

What like the Soviet infantry then.
In case you are too daft to realise it, you'll be suprised to be informed that the was actually a considrable degree of variability as far as the quality of Russian infantry went. Sure, at the start of the war many soviet units were little more than cannon-fodder. Also it's true that later in the war the sovs did have certain penal units designated for cannon-fodder... but equally so there were elite guards divisions aw well.

edit: Besides, you're talking about expanding an only semi-effective force of 250K by around an order of magnitude... which would see troops with combat experiance rather heavily diluted, and thus, the overall effecitveness reduced.

Besides, we're talking about a plan that was proposed by a small minority of the Nazi party and in reality ended up quickly shot down... it isn't exactly a probable outcome in anything short of a 3rd-Reich-Wank scenario.
 
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In case you are too daft to realise it, you'll be suprised to be informed that the was actually a considrable degree of variability as far as the quality of Russian infantry went. Sure, at the start of the war many soviet units were little more than cannon-fodder. Also it's true that later in the war the sovs did have certain penal units designated for cannon-fodder... but equally so there were elite guards divisions aw well.

edit: Besides, you're talking about expanding an only semi-effective force of 250K by around an order of magnitude... which would see troops with combat experiance rather heavily diluted, and thus, the overall effecitveness reduced.

Besides, we're talking about a plan that was proposed by a small minority of the Nazi party and in reality ended up quickly shot down... it isn't exactly a probable outcome in anything short of a 3rd-Reich-Wank scenario.

Would you like me to post various sources of Soviet infantry still being effective without training?
 
The war was winnable for the Axis before 1942, but nearly impossible for them to win during or after 1942.
 

CalBear

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What could the combined Axis powers do different from 1942 onwards to win the war?

Germany - Military coup. Kill the Nazi leadership. Might be able to hold onto a rump Germany under German control.

Italy - As above, then turn on the Germans (somewhat like OTL, but sooner)

Japan - Surrender immediately, turn over Military dictatorship to West for trial.

That is as close as a win that the Axis can get in 1942 or later.

They could lose faster, but win? Not a chance on earth.
 

CalBear

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The Italian navy with aircraft assistance will help secure Malta in early 1942.
This will help supply problems in North Africa greatly.
2 extra Panzer divisions would secure Suez.
Would close the Suez canal and mean only a one front war against the Torch landings.
The main hope is the recruitment of a huge Slavic infantry force to take on the Soviets which could be achieved.
Many Nazis advocated this strategy ive suggested in the East.
Including leading Nazi theorist and ideology Alfred Rosenberg.
Following these plans, when Wehrmacht forces invaded Soviet-controlled territory, they immediately implemented the first of the proposed Reichskomissariats of Ostland and Ukraine, under the leadership of Hinrich Lohse and Erich Koch respectively. The organization of these administrative territories led to conflict between Rosenberg and the SS over the treatment of Slavs under German occupation. Rosenberg was appalled at the displacement, enslavement, and sometimes genocide of non-Jews in occupied Eastern countries. As Nazi Germany's chief racial theorist, Rosenberg considered Slavs, though lesser than Germans, to be Aryan. Rosenberg often complained to Hitler and Himmler about the treatment of non-Jewish occupied peoples.
If Rosenberg had got it way the German army could have been boosted by several million slavic infantry men which would have come in very useful.

Well, let's see -

The Italian fleet & airforce would (and was) be crushed by the RN, especially by 1942, when the U.S. was able to put elements of the Atlantic Fleet on patrols that freed up increasing amounts of the RN. I would point out that the U.S. was able to operate TWO carrier task forces in the Med in early 1942 (one centered on Wasp, the other on Ranger) for the purpose of ferrying aircraft to Malta. Those carriers also could have provided direct air strikes against any Italian surface unit encountered during these ferrying missions.

The Axis put rather a lot of effort into eliminating Malta IOTL. They failed.

The Axis lacked the additional logistical lift to move 600+ tanks to North Africa. Any attempt to do so would be doomed to failure even without Allied resistance. With the resistance that would have occured, the Heer would have lost at least a Panzer divsion's worth of equipment as it sank to the bottom of the Med.

Closing the Suez is about as improbable as The Marine Mammal that must not be named.

Hitler was in charge of the Reich, not Rosenberg. HITLER (aka the Dictator with the Secret Police & SS) was utterly commited to the eradication of the Jews in Europe and irreversibly committed to the enslavement of the Slavs. Even if Hitler had, in 1942, suddenly changed his mind regarding the Russian population (which would effectively required a total personality transplant) the die had already been cast. Too many bodies had been piled up.

There was no more chance of "several million" slavic recruits in the Heer than there was of a million Jews wearing Lightning Flashes. The only way this could happen is if a platoon of ASB shock troops entered the picture.

BTW: I am well aware (based on earlier posts, far more than some posters here) of the "Cossak Army" and other formations built out of hiwi troops. They were not, and would never have been, decisive. They were, at best, useful in attacking partisan forces.
 
War in the East options

Guys

While I think joe-chamberlain is ignoring a lot of points and needs to learn that you don't win people over by insulting them I would agree on some of the points raised over the effects of the Nazis adopting a different attitude to the local population in the SU [Soviet Union]. Lets see about some of the points:

a) Food - From what I have read about the SU there were two main factors in Soviet agriculture. The Collective farms and the small private plots allowed to farmers. The former had vast areas of the best land and access to considerable amounts of mechanical equipment and fertiliser. Despite that the private plots, for their size, were far more productive.

Collectivisation was deeply unpopular in the SU, not just amongst those murdered as kulaks but the bulk of the rest of the population as well. I think the Nazis did consider dissolving them and restoring private plots but decided this would reduce production. This may seem likely given the advantage of centralisation but I suspect that doing it, along with allowing the peasants to sell much of their surplus would have considerably increased production. What it would definitely have done would have been winning over a lot of people in the occupied area, reducing if not wiping out partisan activity in their rear and making any later Soviet re-occupation markedly more difficult. Furthermore, as rumours of it spread it would have weakened the rest of the SU, to some degree or another. [Thinking that while some might subtly favour further German advances possibly even more importantly a paranoid Communist state would be very concerned about such fears].

b) Hitler being persuaded to agree to such a programme. I think while unlikely its not impossible. After all he made the initial deal with Stalin in 39 when it was in his interest. If the case was put that this would enable the building up of forces which would be largely under German control and could be spent in bitter fighting against the Red Army, saving German soldiers. As a number of people have said raw infantry is highly dependent on support services, logistics, artillery, air support etc, which would also be controlled by the Germans. Also by splitting the various factions, having Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian etc you could do some divide and rule. Again this would not only supply extra troops but also pose a serious threat to the Soviet state by presenting an alternative option that would seem favourably to many in the SU.

c) Supplying such troops. This would be a problem, although better treated populations will provide more resources in anything but the shorter term. This applies not just to agriculture but also industry, both conscripted labour in Germany and controlled production inside the occupied SU. However a number of the troops would have relatively limited needs. Any used for anti-partisan forces would not be needing much equipment. Urban fighting would require more but longer range air and artillery could be supplied by German units while FR [Free Russian] units provide the fairly lightly equipped pbi. [Poor bloody infantry].

Even poorly equipped troops would be better than nothing especially since, as the Wiki entry showed they would fight ferociously to avoid falling into Soviet hands. Even more so if they have reasonably prosperous [by Soviet] homes and family to protect. [Any former Soviet 'citizen' who has lived in relative comfort will know what fate faces them if the Red army moves west again.

Furthermore there are automatic gains. For instance partisan activity would be much reduced as to apply Mao the fish would be denied water. This would free up German troops and avoid a lot of destruction of war materials and disruption of supplies.

d) That the POD, 1/1/42 is too late for such a policy as the Germans have already alienated the population. True to a degree. However they were an invading army, which inevitably is likely to lead to some excesses. Furthermore in a lot of cases they passed through so quickly that relatively little impact on the local population other than removing the Soviet state. Also the population had long lived under one of the most brutal regimes in world history. As such if the Germans make a clear change in policy and make efforts to stick to it - [clear orders to their soldiers and making well published examples of a few who disobey] - they will at the very least greatly reduce the hostility of the population and the resistance they will face. More likely they will win over a lot of the population, who will have faced little brutality in the early days and can put down any such reports as bad apples or Soviet propaganda. Don't forget, Vlasov's own defection didn't occur until the failure of the Soviet offensive in Spring 42, when he was alienated by the disregard of the Soviet system for the lives of the troops of the Red army.

I'm not saying that such a policy would definitely win the eastern front for the Germans. However at the very least it was by far the best chance for winning in the east after the initial dash in 42 failed. In terms of mobilising millions of people, not necessarily as troops but as more productive elements of the German war machine than enemies driven by despair into opposition. Also in the implied threat to the Soviet state that such measures would pose to its control of areas still under its control. At the very least, when the Red Army drove west again it would have to fight every inch of the way not just against the Germans but also the vast majority of the local population. In itself a problem and also it would making stripping the newly regained lands of men to feed into the Red Army more difficult. More likely some formations could have been available by mid-42 say, to form defensive formations in some areas and possibly also expendable assault formations for urban fighting, given the prestige of liberating key cities from the Soviet yoke. The SU was also under heavy pressure in 42 with shortages of just about everything and its losses could have been increased such as to reduce/break either its strength for later counter-offensives or its will and self belief to continue the war. [Seeing Hitler agreeing to even a favorable neotgiated peace is highly unlikely but possibly by 43/44 you could see both sides so worn down that some settlement is possible, which would drastically alter the war in the west.

Steve
 
By 1942 the Axis could do very little differently to affect a victory. There was nothing that they could do different on the Eastern front, which was the key front in 1942. They were heading into Stalingrad, which would ultimately prove to be the turning point and the beginning of the collapse of the Eastern front.

Of course, the easiest thing to do would be to prevent the Allied landings, but even if that were the case, the Germans could still not overcome the Soviet superiority in man and equipment on the Eastern front.
 

CalBear

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Guys

While I think joe-chamberlain is ignoring a lot of points and needs to learn that you don't win people over by insulting them I would agree on some of the points raised over the effects of the Nazis adopting a different attitude to the local population in the SU [Soviet Union]. Lets see about some of the points:

a) Food - From what I have read about the SU there were two main factors in Soviet agriculture. The Collective farms and the small private plots allowed to farmers. The former had vast areas of the best land and access to considerable amounts of mechanical equipment and fertiliser. Despite that the private plots, for their size, were far more productive.

Collectivisation was deeply unpopular in the SU, not just amongst those murdered as kulaks but the bulk of the rest of the population as well. I think the Nazis did consider dissolving them and restoring private plots but decided this would reduce production. This may seem likely given the advantage of centralisation but I suspect that doing it, along with allowing the peasants to sell much of their surplus would have considerably increased production. What it would definitely have done would have been winning over a lot of people in the occupied area, reducing if not wiping out partisan activity in their rear and making any later Soviet re-occupation markedly more difficult. Furthermore, as rumours of it spread it would have weakened the rest of the SU, to some degree or another. [Thinking that while some might subtly favour further German advances possibly even more importantly a paranoid Communist state would be very concerned about such fears].

b) Hitler being persuaded to agree to such a programme. I think while unlikely its not impossible. After all he made the initial deal with Stalin in 39 when it was in his interest. If the case was put that this would enable the building up of forces which would be largely under German control and could be spent in bitter fighting against the Red Army, saving German soldiers. As a number of people have said raw infantry is highly dependent on support services, logistics, artillery, air support etc, which would also be controlled by the Germans. Also by splitting the various factions, having Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian etc you could do some divide and rule. Again this would not only supply extra troops but also pose a serious threat to the Soviet state by presenting an alternative option that would seem favourably to many in the SU.

c) Supplying such troops. This would be a problem, although better treated populations will provide more resources in anything but the shorter term. This applies not just to agriculture but also industry, both conscripted labour in Germany and controlled production inside the occupied SU. However a number of the troops would have relatively limited needs. Any used for anti-partisan forces would not be needing much equipment. Urban fighting would require more but longer range air and artillery could be supplied by German units while FR [Free Russian] units provide the fairly lightly equipped pbi. [Poor bloody infantry].

Even poorly equipped troops would be better than nothing especially since, as the Wiki entry showed they would fight ferociously to avoid falling into Soviet hands. Even more so if they have reasonably prosperous [by Soviet] homes and family to protect. [Any former Soviet 'citizen' who has lived in relative comfort will know what fate faces them if the Red army moves west again.

Furthermore there are automatic gains. For instance partisan activity would be much reduced as to apply Mao the fish would be denied water. This would free up German troops and avoid a lot of destruction of war materials and disruption of supplies.

d) That the POD, 1/1/42 is too late for such a policy as the Germans have already alienated the population. True to a degree. However they were an invading army, which inevitably is likely to lead to some excesses. Furthermore in a lot of cases they passed through so quickly that relatively little impact on the local population other than removing the Soviet state. Also the population had long lived under one of the most brutal regimes in world history. As such if the Germans make a clear change in policy and make efforts to stick to it - [clear orders to their soldiers and making well published examples of a few who disobey] - they will at the very least greatly reduce the hostility of the population and the resistance they will face. More likely they will win over a lot of the population, who will have faced little brutality in the early days and can put down any such reports as bad apples or Soviet propaganda. Don't forget, Vlasov's own defection didn't occur until the failure of the Soviet offensive in Spring 42, when he was alienated by the disregard of the Soviet system for the lives of the troops of the Red army.

I'm not saying that such a policy would definitely win the eastern front for the Germans. However at the very least it was by far the best chance for winning in the east after the initial dash in 42 failed. In terms of mobilising millions of people, not necessarily as troops but as more productive elements of the German war machine than enemies driven by despair into opposition. Also in the implied threat to the Soviet state that such measures would pose to its control of areas still under its control. At the very least, when the Red Army drove west again it would have to fight every inch of the way not just against the Germans but also the vast majority of the local population. In itself a problem and also it would making stripping the newly regained lands of men to feed into the Red Army more difficult. More likely some formations could have been available by mid-42 say, to form defensive formations in some areas and possibly also expendable assault formations for urban fighting, given the prestige of liberating key cities from the Soviet yoke. The SU was also under heavy pressure in 42 with shortages of just about everything and its losses could have been increased such as to reduce/break either its strength for later counter-offensives or its will and self belief to continue the war. [Seeing Hitler agreeing to even a favorable neotgiated peace is highly unlikely but possibly by 43/44 you could see both sides so worn down that some settlement is possible, which would drastically alter the war in the west.

Steve


The main problem here is that the excesses involving the German occupation went WAY beyond the normal "occupation" issues. Normal occupation issues are some looting (mainly by REMFs), some abuse of the civilain population, particularly the random rape, and excessive force against resistance (e.g. the U.S. in Western Europe in '44/45). Spitting babies on bayonets, bashing toddlers' heads in on brick walls, machine gunning noteworthy fractions of the local population, and leaving PoWs exposed to the elements without food or water and shooting them more or less at random to relieve boredom. This was all BEFORE the Germans started kicking farmers and villagers out into the snow to freeze and starve in the Russian winter.

Six months of that was sufficient to convince the population of the Ukraine and Belorussia that communism was better than the grave (especially after the Germans kept the collectivization rules in effect).
 
The main problem here is that the excesses involving the German occupation went WAY beyond the normal "occupation" issues. Normal occupation issues are some looting (mainly by REMFs), some abuse of the civilain population, particularly the random rape, and excessive force against resistance (e.g. the U.S. in Western Europe in '44/45). Spitting babies on bayonets, bashing toddlers' heads in on brick walls, machine gunning noteworthy fractions of the local population, and leaving PoWs exposed to the elements without food or water and shooting them more or less at random to relieve boredom. This was all BEFORE the Germans started kicking farmers and villagers out into the snow to freeze and starve in the Russian winter.

Six months of that was sufficient to convince the population of the Ukraine and Belorussia that communism was better than the grave (especially after the Germans kept the collectivization rules in effect).

Collectivization is a brilliant method of controlling food - at the cost of how much is produced. It can, controversially, be called a Stalinist success story - Soviet Russia did not lost control of its food supply the way the Tsarists did.

This is the whole essence of the German occupation - to seize control of food and resources, a process which is symbiotic with the brutality.

Every calorie left in the occupied USSR is one sent to fuel coal mining and armaments production in Germany.
 

CalBear

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Collectivization is a brilliant method of controlling food - at the cost of how much is produced. It can, controversially, be called a Stalinist success story - Soviet Russia did not lost control of its food supply the way the Tsarists did.

This is the whole essence of the German occupation - to seize control of food and resources, a process which is symbiotic with the brutality.

Every calorie left in the occupied USSR is one sent to fuel coal mining and armaments production in Germany.

I suppose you can call it a success, assuming you ignore the fact that it is directly responsible for at least 11,500,000 deaths (actual deaths are probably 2X that figure) by starvation and that it created a circumstance that made the largest grain producing region in Europe a net importer of grain for most of the 2nd half of the 20th Century.

I completely agree that the collectiviztion method was the best way to sweat the maximum food production out of the surviving rural population with minimal oversight. It was also, comfortably, the best way to ensure that the populous, who had, in many cases, welcomed the Heer as liberators would find the German occupation intolerable.
 
The main problem here is that the excesses involving the German occupation went WAY beyond the normal "occupation" issues. Normal occupation issues are some looting (mainly by REMFs), some abuse of the civilain population, particularly the random rape, and excessive force against resistance (e.g. the U.S. in Western Europe in '44/45). Spitting babies on bayonets, bashing toddlers' heads in on brick walls, machine gunning noteworthy fractions of the local population, and leaving PoWs exposed to the elements without food or water and shooting them more or less at random to relieve boredom. This was all BEFORE the Germans started kicking farmers and villagers out into the snow to freeze and starve in the Russian winter.

Six months of that was sufficient to convince the population of the Ukraine and Belorussia that communism was better than the grave (especially after the Germans kept the collectivization rules in effect).

Calbear

I agree that a lot of the activities of the Germans went way beyond that of normal armies fighting in the west or earlier conflicts. By the end of the war virtually all Soviet citizens were bitterly hostile to the Nazis. [That didn't mean they necessarily liked the Soviets either.

However historically many former Soviet citizens did help the Germans in various ways, long after this point. Furthermore the point I'm arguing here is that the German leadership are persuaded to adopt a different approach. One factor in this would be the removal of the collectivization policy. Another would be openly opposing such brutal treatment and making a few examples of the guilty. [scapegoats if you prefer]

Steve
 
Collectivization is a brilliant method of controlling food - at the cost of how much is produced. It can, controversially, be called a Stalinist success story - Soviet Russia did not lost control of its food supply the way the Tsarists did.

This is the whole essence of the German occupation - to seize control of food and resources, a process which is symbiotic with the brutality.

Every calorie left in the occupied USSR is one sent to fuel coal mining and armaments production in Germany.

Wozza

Not clear whether your agreeing with me or the opposite case. The embolden words suggests you agree with me but not sure that is the case. Also in the last paragraph I suspect you meant 'left' rather than 'sent'?

Steve
 
Calbear

I agree that a lot of the activities of the Germans went way beyond that of normal armies fighting in the west or earlier conflicts. By the end of the war virtually all Soviet citizens were bitterly hostile to the Nazis. [That didn't mean they necessarily liked the Soviets either.

However historically many former Soviet citizens did help the Germans in various ways, long after this point. Furthermore the point I'm arguing here is that the German leadership are persuaded to adopt a different approach. One factor in this would be the removal of the collectivization policy. Another would be openly opposing such brutal treatment and making a few examples of the guilty. [scapegoats if you prefer]

Steve

I might be mistaken, but I think Hitler ordered that the collectivized farms remain such, despite some effort to dismantle them among operatives in the field.
 
Would you like me to post various sources of Soviet infantry still being effective without training?
WTF? I never claimed soviet troops were effective without any training (unlike the implicit assumption derived from your insistance that the Nazis playing nice with the slavs somehow accounting for several million combat effective troops). I meerly pointed out that, contry to your delusions, not all soviet infantry was mere untrained, poorly armed cannon fodder.
 
The best way for the Germans to win in the east is to make it a Anti-Stalinist crusade and treat the USSR as a potential source of troops and taxes. Use harsh measurements against Stalinists but more normal measurements with the rest. Break up the collectives and start selling Soviet factories to German corporations. Levy fairly heavy taxes but make sure that the people have enough left to survive. Basically all the Germans have to do is to be better then Stalin. That is not a high hurdle.
 
I might be mistaken, but I think Hitler ordered that the collectivized farms remain such, despite some effort to dismantle them among operatives in the field.

Wendell

The order probably came from Hitler, one way or another. I made reference to it in my earlier post when I looked at the idea. However in this proposal the Germans are making an effort to win support and undermine the SU, which could led to them taking the opposite root.

Steve
 
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