Could the Americans have won the ARW without French and Spanish support?

The reason for the war for the west was the arming of Indian tribes by the British. Dealing with those tribes was a major war aim and successfully completed.

The US could kill the Indians at leisure.

In fact hey had had been doing so without British intervention for some time.

Spin the War of 1812 justification wheel, again.
 

Jasen777

Donor
The US could kill the Indians at leisure.

In fact hey had had been doing so without British intervention for some time.

Spin the War of 1812 justification wheel, again.

It was the west's justification - they wanted to declare war on a foreign power who was arming their local enemies. This may or may not have been a proper motivation, but that is beside the point. The fact is that it was the justification for a segment of the country and a key reason why the south and west dragged the country into a war the northeast didn't really want.

And as a major war aim it helps to make the case for the war as a draw. As if a return to status quo ante bellum against the main enemy and victories against minor ones does not normally constitute at least that :rolleyes:
 
A. Washington would, no doubt, have fought to the bitter end. How many men would have fought with him, and what they would have used as weapons, is a different, and more important question. It is noteworthy that the state of arms and munitions in the Colonies was so poor that Franklin seriously proposed that the Colonial Army look into deploying LONGBOW :eek: formations. As early as 1776 90% of Continental powder was french in origin

Well the men that were with him in 1776 and still with him in 1781 will probably stay with him until the end(despite not being paid). As far as gun powder I know early on the Continentals captured quite a lot from British convoys, raids in addition to thath received from France, Americans were also beginning to manufacture their own.

B. One battle does not make a war. The number of decisive victories by the Continental forces can be listed with little effort: Saratoga, Trenton, Princeton, Kings Mountain, Cowpens (Yorktown was a combined American/French ground force defeating a British force cut off from relief by a French naval force). Not the most awe-inspiring set of victories.

The Vietnamese didn't win a single battle and yet won the war. I remember reading about a conversation Gen. Clinton was having with I believe Knyphausen, from what I recall Knyphausen suggested that all Washington had to do was keep losing battles until you[General Clinton]ran out of men.

The Philadelphia campaign was a sideshow to the Hudson-Champlain strategy so whether the British walk to New York sail to New York or stick it out in Philadelphia(better for Washington if they do this)the strategy of dividing the colonies on aforementioned corridor had already failed(ala Saratoga).


Less undecided

D. How did you measure "will"? 1778? Von Steuben didn't even start training the Continentals until spring of '78.

Will to continue fighting which they were right up to 1783 and probably beyond if need be.

E. Philadelphia was America's SoG. The British held it, at their leisure, after defeating Washington decisively in the field. Washington then retreated to winter quarters, where, DESPITE millions in French & Spanish air, a QUARTER of his army starved to death. Now, let's imagine Valley Forge without the aid (and weapons/powder/shot) provided by France & Spain. The British were forced to withdraw by the introduction of a large French naval force into the region, until then the British had effectively cut the colonies in half.

No they held New York at their leisure, Philadelphia wasn't so easy. And I was referring to direct French and/or Spanish intervention.

F. The Southern War was brutal beyond any other part of the ARW thanks to the fact that it was almost completely neighbor vs. neighbor. The British were able to capitalize on this, taking the major cities and towns at will. Had the de Grasse not won at Virginia Capes, the Southern Strategy might just have worked. Guerilla warfare in the 1780's is more of a concept than a fact. It could irritate the British; it would NEVER have defeated them. If low intensity warfare had been decisive in the era, the French would have won their wars in North America. They didn't.

Negative, after the Battle of Guilford's Courthouse the southern campaign was effectively abandoned. Cornwallis moved into Virginia in a last ditch attempt to destroy southern resistence. Had De Grasse lost the battle of the capes Cornwallis would've been transported to New York with his army.

The United States exists because Washington understood something that may have gotten past you. His ONLY job was to keep an army in the field, fighting as rarely as necessary and only when odds (or sinking morale) forced it. Victory was to be found in Parliament, not in the field, in London shopping districts, not by taking ground. The best modern example is Giap in Viet Nam.

Exactly, see now your coming around. Its not up to Washongton to win the war, just not too lose it.
 
And as a major war aim it helps to make the case for the war as a draw. As if a return to status quo ante bellum against the main enemy and victories against minor ones does not normally constitute at least that :rolleyes:

Not when you could have just continued attacking the smaller one anyway.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Negative, after the Battle of Guilford's Courthouse the southern campaign was effectively abandoned. Cornwallis moved into Virginia in a last ditch attempt to destroy southern resistence. Had De Grasse lost the battle of the capes Cornwallis would've been transported to New York with his army.

The southern campaign was complete, there was now no coherent Congressional force in the south. The movement was towards Washington. In fact Washington was walking into a trap, but DeGrasse kind of screwed the British plan up.

Oh, and the Allies lost plenty of battles in Vietnam, the US just had a habit of withdrawing their forces if things were going wrong to avoid handing a propaganda victory to the enemy.
 
The southern campaign was complete, there was now no coherent Congressional force in the south. The movement was towards Washington. In fact Washington was walking into a trap, but DeGrasse kind of screwed the British plan up.

I thought Cornwallis went into Virginia to try and cut the supply lines to Nathanael Greene's Army
 
The southern campaign was complete, there was now no coherent Congressional force in the south. The movement was towards Washington. In fact Washington was walking into a trap, but DeGrasse kind of screwed the British plan up.

Greene's army was still there, though somewhat shrunken. Cornwallis' victory at Guilford Courthouse was not a pyrrhic one, pushing the Americans off the field after heavy casualties but failing to destroy them. By moving north into Virginia, he was tacitly admitting that his efforts to destroy the American army further south had failed.
 
The southern campaign was complete, there was now no coherent Congressional force in the south. The movement was towards Washington. In fact Washington was walking into a trap, but DeGrasse kind of screwed the British plan up.

No the British plan was to evacuate Cornwallis from Yorktown then sail to New York. After the battle of Guilford's Court House Cornwallis gave up trying to destroy the southern army. His advance into Virginia was to destroy rebel opposition there by putting everything he could to the torch. These tactics only stiffened rebel resistance and the combination of lack of supplies with being in hostile territory forced Cornwallis to Yorktown where he could be supplied by the RN.

Oh, and the Allies lost plenty of battles in Vietnam, the US just had a habit of withdrawing their forces if things were going wrong to avoid handing a propaganda victory to the enemy.
Name the battles then. The US strategy was that of attrition, when the VC or NVA popped up the Army and Marines went to work hoping to annihilate them. The French got clobbered but the US was undefeated on the battlefield in Vietnam. Tet was a decisive Allied victory in strictly military terms, as was the Easter offensive in 1972, and finally the siege of Khe Sanh.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
No the British plan was to evacuate Cornwallis from Yorktown then sail to New York. After the battle of Guilford's Court House Cornwallis gave up trying to destroy the southern army. His advance into Virginia was to destroy rebel opposition there by putting everything he could to the torch. These tactics only stiffened rebel resistance and the combination of lack of supplies with being in hostile territory forced Cornwallis to Yorktown where he could be supplied by the RN.

Errr, no. Greene was smashed, and Cornwallis had withdrawn to refit, given his huge sicklist (1/3rd of his army).

The torching was mainly carried out by Congressionals, Virginia was so solidly pro-Crown the Continental army could get more than 200 recruits from Virginia by that time (200 men was the number required for a unit to be designated a Regiment, smaller units were designated as Battalions instead, and Virginia's contribution was the 1st Virginia Battalion).

Name the battles then. The US strategy was that of attrition, when the VC or NVA popped up the Army and Marines went to work hoping to annihilate them. The French got clobbered but the US was undefeated on the battlefield in Vietnam. Tet was a decisive Allied victory in strictly military terms, as was the Easter offensive in 1972, and finally the siege of Khe Sanh.

Only because the US had a habit of withdrawing before destruction, so as to to avoid handing propaganda victories to the Communists. For every three casualties the allies inflicted, the communists inflicted two back, not a glowing recommendation for airpower (in fact, airpower probably decreased allied fighting power, but that's another debate).
 
There is no reason to believe that without French military support that the Americans could have continued to avoid battle with the larger British forces and keep most of the Colonies nominally free, as well as continue to conduct the guerilla war they were fighting in the South to prevent the British from ever getting a stranglehold on the continent. Of course, America had been very lucky throughout the war, and a mistroke anywhere along the line, before or after 1781 in an alternate timeline, could lead to the destruction of Washington's army or an equally dark alternative.
On the other hand, if we are talking about a complete lack of support from France, as in they not even selling or loaning war materials or contributing any way to the effort, then America could not have conducted a war. But this scenario is a lot more difficult to imagine without some other deviation in history which made the French not hate the English in the late 18th Century.

.....

Lots to say about this one, heh.
The lack of French diplomatic support might be the most vital detriment to the American war effort. The post-Saratoga recognition of the Colonies as independent by the French was a huge morale boost to the Revolution and swelled the ranks to the large number reported earlier in this forum.
 
Belated correction -

Greene's army was still there, though somewhat shrunken. Cornwallis' victory at Guilford Courthouse was not a pyrrhic one, pushing the Americans off the field after heavy casualties but failing to destroy them. By moving north into Virginia, he was tacitly admitting that his efforts to destroy the American army further south had failed.

Sorry, I meant to say that Cornwallis' victory at Guilford Courthouse WAS a pyrrhic victory.

Of course, without French ships and troops, the Americans could not have bottled Cornwallis up, and Cornwallis' refurbished and reinforced army could instead have moved back down to North Carolina in an attempt to finish off Greene's remaining forces.

One other factor, though, is that if France did not ally itself with the American colonies, support for the war in Britain would have probably been lower. There was a distinct lack of enthusiasm for fighting the Americans in many of the more "Whiggish" portions of British society. In OTL, France joining the war actually solidified support for the war effort in Britain, now that Britain faced its traditional enemy and even a threat (however remote) of direct invasion.

A war without French support could easily create enormous pressure for compromise on both sides, as the rebels could not support a strong war effort on their own for years, while much of the British public would get more and more sick of a war where the British armies usually won the big battles but still had trouble controlling large portions of the countryside.
 
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