Could the Allies have invaded France in 1943?

Links for info on the Mulberry harbors.

http://www.combinedops.com/Mulberry Harbours.htm
A general history. It does have some inaccuracies. The statement that " ..Mulberry A was never used again..." after the June storm is flat out wrong. One floating roadway and its pier head/s were restored and in use the week after the storm. That was part of the material sent to the Mulberry B at the end of June. anoterh sentence in that paragraph "..Such was their success that on occasions they exceeded the impressive performance achieved at Mulberry B." is a bit misleading, hyperbole if you will. The careful reader will spot some contradictions in the text as well. Still it is a good overview even if one has to be careful quoting from it.

Thanks for that. Some interesting ideas but as you say a bit scattered on info and also unclear on dates. It mentioned initial thoughts before meeting the Americans at Quebec but the Quebec Conference [presuming that's what they mean] wasn't until Aug 43 according to Wiki. That's far too late for initial thoughts on the project even for a 44 invasion. Therefore I'm assuming that the incident occurred at an earlier point some time in 42.


Some bits in here:

http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/comnaveu/comnaveu_index.htm



Background material, shows how the logistics situation fell apart and how it was partially restored. Rupppenthal addresses specific questions here & as complete as this account is it still leaves out 2/3 the critical items. ie: it only addresses US Army logistics, nothing on the Brits.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Logistics2/USA-E-Logistics2-3.html
Possibly, apart from the bias because its a US report, it only really discussed the US problems because the still functioning Mulberry B was meeting British needs?
 

There's also an article on that site covering Canadian operations in northwest Europe; I've been mainly reading it out of curiosity, but it might have something on logistics.

There's also this piece: Victory in the West, Volume 1: Battle of Normandy, Ellis, L.F.. It's about the British portion of the campaign, and almost certainly has logistics included. But it's not available online, unfortunately.
 
Have that last one, the Brit admin history. Not yet read it a second time. I read digital text a lot slower, painfully slower in fact, need to have a hard copy printed.

It mentioned initial thoughts before meeting the Americans at Quebec but the Quebec Conference [presuming that's what they mean] wasn't until Aug 43 according to Wiki. That's far too late for initial thoughts on the project even for a 44 invasion. Therefore I'm assuming that the incident occurred at an earlier point some time in 42.

Yes, probably a 1942 confrence, Quadrant perhaps?

Re: Ruppenthal
Possibly, apart from the bias because its a US report, it only really discussed the US problems because the still functioning Mulberry B was meeting British needs?

No. It was written for the US Army History, the Green Books. Those were constructed as a historical refrence for future officers education, not as general histories. Hence the lack of discussion the British activity. Other folks misfortunes were addressed in other venues. Also it covers much much more than the Mulberrys. Overall the Brits were suffering from similar, tho not identical logistics problems as the Yanks. Which is understandable since the logisitics plans and execution of the two army groups were intertwined from the start.
 
Did a quick count out out of Stauntons OB of the US Army and find 69 Army divisions activated by January 1943. of those at least 37 had been activated long enough to run through a complete 'activation' work up and training cycle of 18 months. This includes five armored divisions formed before November 1941 Add two USMC divisions to that total. Also there were some 54 Separate infantry regiments listed, of which about a quarter would be readilly available in January 1943.

Of that eight divisions, including two Marine divisions were committed to the Pacific theatre by January 1943
 
Yeah, I've been following that one since it started. Did not have anything to contribute. My shelf is thin on Brit/Commonwealth logistics. Maybe I'll be able to correct that in the next few years :)
 
Overall the Brits were suffering from similar, tho not identical logistics problems as the Yanks. Which is understandable since the logisitics plans and execution of the two army groups were intertwined from the start.

Working my way through Ruppenthal on PDF so slow going.

While the British had similar issues, it does not appear that they had similar problems, as from the end of the pursuit phase they were able to continue fighting effectively through the autumn clearing ports and much of Holland. 12th Army Group on the other hand managed to get themselves so unbalanced that they were nearly in the same place inFebruary as in September.

Given Eisenhower's and Bradley's positions in 1953, I imagine that franker criticism of some of the decisions made was unlikely but it seems as if many of the key decisions eg accelerating landing of divisions, ports, allocation of supplies, movement of divisions were made without proper understanding of the logistical position; similarly on availability of ammunition, replacements, winter clothing arguments with Washibgton were made too late. The overall tone seems to be the service forces did they best they could but nobody was taking logistics seriously enough.
 
Yeah, I've been following that one since it started. Did not have anything to contribute. My shelf is thin on Brit/Commonwealth logistics. Maybe I'll be able to correct that in the next few years :)
Already posting in that thread. :)

It does show how what looks like a throwaway remark in an official document can be over-interpreted.
Yeah, whilst not a forum member I've followed a few threads where Internet searches have sent me over there and recognised a number of other online handles from elsewhere. It's funny how small this end of the Internet, defence related what ifs and World War II, can be sometimes with a fairly incestuous poster group, often finding the same people cross-posting on a small number of forums and sites. :)
 
Working my way through Ruppenthal on PDF so slow going.

While the British had similar issues, it does not appear that they had similar problems, as from the end of the pursuit phase they were able to continue fighting effectively through the autumn clearing ports and much of Holland. 12th Army Group on the other hand managed to get themselves so unbalanced that they were nearly in the same place inFebruary as in September.

Given Eisenhower's and Bradley's positions in 1953, I imagine that franker criticism of some of the decisions made was unlikely ..... The overall tone seems to be the service forces did they best they could but nobody was taking logistics seriously enough.

When reading Ruppenthal and all the others it is best to keep refering back to the expectations for the advance into France and the supply delivery schedules. Particularly the delivery of transportation equipment, and to a lesser extent the expectations for port availability. The capture of key transportations centers like Antwerp, Liege, Nancy, or Dijon occurred barely 100 days after 6th June. One half or less the expectation and what had been planned for in transportation delivery. When the Allied advance, of all three army groups, halted in September the logistics staff were staring at a rail and automotive road system that they where wholly unprepared to fill with rolling stock. The necessary locomotives and rail cars were sitting in the UK and mostly in the US and the logistics command was struggling with 30 to 60 day lead times to effect changes in altering shipping schedules and getting the rolling stock to Europe. Emergency measures like removing a few extra locomotives from the UK railways threatened disruption to that over taxed system.

The complaints about British logistics problems took a different form than the US criticism. They did suffer from the same twin problems of lack of supply transport and capturing few ready ports. The result was having to slow or halt some units so other could still be fueled, and a wholly inadaquate supply of artillery ammunition.
 
When the Allied advance, of all three army groups, halted in September the logistics staff were staring at a rail and automotive road system that they where wholly unprepared to fill with rolling stock. The necessary locomotives and rail cars were sitting in the UK and mostly in the US and the logistics command was struggling with 30 to 60 day lead times to effect changes in altering shipping schedules and getting the rolling stock to Europe. Emergency measures like removing a few extra locomotives from the UK railways threatened disruption to that over taxed system.

.

I do recall reading about the very enthusiastic shooting up of engines and rolling stock by ground troops.
 
Most of the damage was done by the British 2d Tactical AF & the US 9th AF. Those two were directed to isolate the Normandy battlefield, and their final campaign from march 1944 caused severe damage to the Franco/Belgian railways. The Germans of course evacuated all they could. When the dust settled the French railroads were non functional, with dozens of key bridges down, repair shops in rubble, switch yards repeatedly bombed, skilled labor trapped in Germany or dead & maimed. The Allies had expected this, but did not think the armies would advanced much beyond Paris or the Somme by the end of October. When 21 Army Group entered Antwerp after 4 September they had covered over 90 days of expected advance in less than two weeks. They were not expected to be there until January or late November at the earliest. The material to rebuild the railroads was still moslty sitting in the storage depots in the US & UK, awaiting its scheduled shipping dates.

Accelerating the shipment of the railroad material meant something else had to be set back. Artillery ammunition? Allied Armies in the offence required over 300 tons per day per division HQ to keep all the guns firing . Replacement vehicles and spare parts? At the end of August the repair depots across France & Belgium were filling up with wrecks and broken transport. Port operations material was essential and could not be cut, the French population lacked and food reserve and was already threatened with severe shortages. The Allied Tactical air forces had to displace forward from Britain to eastern France/Belgium. Otherwise they would be out of effective range.

I dont think I have seen anyone claim Monty of Ike should have been anticipating the German armies would collapse in just two months and be routed back to the west wall in a few short weeks after that. Even with our hindsight what happened in Normandy during July and early August seems extraordinary.
 
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