I agree, more air and sea resources could also make a greater contribution to attriting Japanese forces.
Could the Allies have held Rabaul?
- Thread starter Spencersj345.346
- Start date
I agree, more air and sea resources could also make a greater contribution to attriting Japanese forces.
Sure of that? Thus far you have displayed your ignorance pitifully. The Second AIF was not going to come home before the Japanese attacked. There as no need for it to do so. It arrived in April 1942, four months after the Japanese entered the war. If you want a different POD where the 2nd AIF does come home earlier you'll have to state that clearly. You have failed to do so. You would need a very good reason and Menzies (the then PM) didn't have one.
For God's sake you have no idea. I don't need to state the PODs. I'm just saying that there would be plausible ones that would make it possible that the forces on Rabaul could have been stronger. If you have this attitude that the history is written and couldn't possibly have been any different - even though it obviously could - then you're on the wrong site. I mean every post you make is about showing off Year 12-level knowledge. Is that your deal?
Militia units were available for New Guinea. Several actually served there. Military units were limited, at the start of WWII to "Australia and her territories". New Guinea was a territory. 39 Battalion, a Militia Battalion served at Kokoda.
I have superior knowledge than Year 12 . You fail to even demonstrate that IMO. I hold Masters in Military History from the Australian Defence Force Academy. History can be different but it needs good reasons as to why it might be different other than simply saying, "a different POD".
McPherson
Banned
I have looked at it. There are political and logistical problems. The political problem is the Americans. The logistical problem is also the Americans. Seed next remark.
From the naval geography and the means available... (Maybe a brigade strength garrison.), the troops have to be Australian. I do not see from where they come. I could handwave and suggest that either from returning Australian forces coming from North Africa, or from Volunteer forces in Country training for future inter-Empire overseas deployment... but that means the Singapore deployments and the Malay Settlements stationing does not happen pre-Pearl Harbor, or at least not as much as it did RTL.
And then there are the three problems of sea-lift, infrastructure construction and AIR DEFENSE.
And that brings us to politics and the Americans.
Australia is a partner nation inside the British imperial system. Whatever else one might want to do about Rabaul (and Port Moresby), one has to clear things in Canberra, London and Washington and not necessarily in that order.
The London PoV and the RN point of view is the Singapore Bastion Defense. Stop the Japanese north of the Malay Barrier. Rabaul and Moresby are backwaters.
The Australian point of view is colored by the British view. Stop the Japanese as far north as possible. They buy into the Singapore Bastion Defense.
The Americans are the ones at the ABC-1, ABC-2, and the ABD conference who warn the British, that Germany First and USN power projection forward into the northern arctic and eastern Atlantic, means British plans to use PACFLT and their own notional Force Z to nutcracker the IJN in the South China Sea in a reprise of the Mediterranean Strategy the RN uses against the Italians is logistically impossible. The bases distribution , airpower tools, sea lift and naval geography favors the Japanese. The USN view is that the Malay Settlements and the Philippine Islands are goners and that rational naval planning has to think about fighting in Indonesia. But even they do not see that the Japanese will get as far as New Guinea. Like the British, they underestimate the Japanese and they do not recognize the criticality of Darwin, Moresby or Rabaul. They are just as screwed up as the British.
With that background, the allies are slow during the ABDA phase of the fighting to getting forces forward to backstopping secondary positions, like Rabaul. They have less than three weeks to build in an airfield, land that brigade, mine the approaches and provision the garrison to stand a siege until relief forces can arrive.
IF, and it is a big if, the Australian government had looked at the situation with unreasonable almost ASB level foresight and gotten it in the defense ministry heads that Darwin, Moresby and Rabaul should be developed for defense reasons, and this would have to be done before 1937, they would build the Alice Springs to Darwin railroad, built an RAN base in Darwin harbor, improved Port Moresby as a forward outpost and turned Rabaul into the same. They would have built air bases at all three locations and made it policy that Australian territorials garrison these forward outposts. But they did and do not until the crisis is upon Canberra and after 7 December, it turns out that the UK, to whom Canberra looked for their defense arrangements, are through FOREVER in the Pacific.
And that is when the Americans become a political problem and his name is MacArthur.
He is a non-problem as far as January 1942 is concerned, except that Washington, for political reasons, is shoving troops, supplies, and airpower forward to try to at least stabilize the southern Philippine Islands instead of stabilize upon Australia as they SHOULD have done.
Were there enough Americans on the way to handle Rabaul with Australian help? Was there enough sealift, and airpower?
a. there was a brigade (engineers and national guardsmen.).
b. enough lift to get them to Rabaul, since they floated all the way to Australian to where they had been diverted.
c. enough fighters to at least stand up a local air defense? Not sure. The types and numbers seem to have not worked in the fighting when deployed to Java.
d. was there enough time to build a defendable base at Rabaul and Moresby before the Japanese arrived on 23 January 1942? No. The Australians could pick one and do it, but not both. They chose Moresby. They were belatedly correct, it turns out.
So... was Rabaul defendable with the means to hand? Depends on time asked, amount of foreknowledge and solving the politics. As late as 1939? Maybe... After 7 December 1941? Very unlikely. Just not enough time.
Yes, we know that. And do you know what your comment here does? It backs up the contention that more forces could have been sent to Rabaul with a plausible POD or two.
I do not believe you.
Irrespective, let's go back a step, it would be entirely plausible for the Australian government to have had, for example, the 6th Division return after the campaign in Syria given it had been overseas by then for more than 18 months and fought in several campaigns. Bring it home for rebuilding. Just because it didn't happen doesn't mean the leaders of the time might not have come to a different position.
Well said. A stronger Rabaul garrison would need to have been significantly stronger to have prevailed and that does just raise questions about how the Japanese would have acted instead, and also what would have been the opportunity cost someone - likely Australia - would have had to pay to have a stronger garrison there.
Any reinforcements in terms of Ground forces and airpower would have to come from the British Commonwealth during 1941 - the USA has not yet got into its military rearmament 'stride' in 1941 - nor has its military industry really kicked in at this point either.
'The Empire' in terms of air and ground forces is focused upon:-
Garrisoning the UK
Fighting the Italians and Germans in North and East Africa.
Getting involved in supporting the Greeks
Holding down the middle East
Building up airpower in Malta
Fighting Vichy France in various locations to ensure geographical advantages are retained by the Allies and not gifted to the Axis
From the Summer of 1941 sending everything it can spare to the Russians (and quite rightly so)
The only 2 places I can see additional air and ground forces being freed up from is:
The UK Garrison - IIRC about 28 divisions in the UK - 10 of them are fully trained - my suggestion is sending 3 inf and 2 Armor divisions + 1 Canadian Division (if politics allow) to the ME freeing up Australian, New Zealand and Indian Divisions to move East as well as RAF Fighter command releasing 2 wings of Spitfires to serve in the DAF and re-equipping all local RAF forces with Spitfire V and SAAF squadrons with Hurricanes - freeing up RAAF squadrons and all available P40s to reinforce the Far East.
Not getting involved in supporting the Greeks - between that and Sonnenblume it cost about 1.5 Divisions of manpower and over 5 in heavy equipment (MT, field kitchens engineering workshops etc) - forces not diverted to Greece and then Crete might butterfly or seriously contain Rommel's attack altogether?
In addition to stripping HK down to a trip wire force obliging the Japanese to actually use force to invade - by my reckoning it gives the Malaya and the Barrier Islands about 6 more Divisions along with 2 Brigades and several hundred more aircraft (at least one P40 Wing and the existing Wing re-equipped with P40) - transporting the units from teh UK and then following on with the Australian, New Zealand and Indian forces all out there in time might be a big ask but I think it could be done
I still don't think its enough!
However if they can hold on till mid 42, prevent the fall of Malaya through a forward Kra Isthmus defence (Op Matador) with quality Aussie troops, this butterflies the subsequent Burma Ops - the Road stays open allowing for equipment to keep flowing into China via Rangoon and we might see some of the 9 Chinese Divisions plus the 18th Indian Division able to reinforce the Battle in 'Thailand'.
The Knock on effects is that the Chinese are better equipped during 42 into 43 with the road still open which causes the Japanese over all problems, I suspect that forces allocated to the Philippines might instead be rerouted to Thailand meaning that the Philippines campaign bogs down.
The Japanese forces and resources used in the barrier location battles are instead absorbed in the ongoing Thailand and Philippine campaigns.
We know that the Japanese were able to conduct those battles on a pretty tight timetable and what might be called shoe string logistics and a longer more attritional series of campaigns into 1942 might very snap it.
So Reboul (along with Timor and Ambon) holds simply by never being invaded in the first place.
So @McPherson and @Cryhavoc101 when do you think the latest POD to hold both Rabaul and Port Moresby is? I'd say probably around August of 41 but that's my opinion
I think its best 'held' at the Kra Isthmus and if that is not possible then not at all and fall right back
McPherson
Banned
I do not necessarily disagree with any of that conjecture. I just do not see the politics working out in time.
You would have to replace Percival, Lewis Heath, Beckwith Smith, Bennett, that imbecile Popham, Layton, that imbecile Phillips, retire Pound, and put in someone else besides Sir Shenton Whitelegge Thomas to run the Settlements.
On the American side, retire MacArthur, replace the whole Philippine Department army staff, shoot Brereton for the good of the Republic, jail Withers, promote Hart and tell him to get everyone out of there as best he can. At Pearl Harbor hang on to Richardson before 7 December. Failing that, retire Pye and Ghormley on medicals, court martial Short and Kimmel and get Nimitz out there faster if possible.
What @CryHavoc wrote with the stipulation that the Australian government not be as confused as it was during the first 6 months of the Pacific war. John Curtin really had a muddle inherited from Menzies, which is why I think August 1941 might have been politically infeasible. The dangers were well known and some steps (Moresby and the Coastwatchers) were taken, but MURPHY not starting the Darwin road was a huge mistake, and so was letting the MacArthur/Blamey feud start up, once those two "geniuses" smelled each other. That is on the Americans, too, so do not think I am Blamey Bashing.
I agree that the Australians made the correct decision in reinforcing Port Moresby. Rabaul, however important the Imperial Japanese considered it to be, was not as important to the defense of Australia as Port Moresby was. Where to get troops to reinforce the Australian garrison at Rabual? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C_Force#Into_Hong_Kong
C Force. The underequipped, poorly trained Canadian troops thrown away at Hong Kong. If they had been sent to Rabaul it probably would have fallen anyway but not as quickly. And the Australian and Canadian survivors would have gone into the hills to attempt escape. Dangerous but better then facing almost 4 years a prisoner of the Imperial Japanese.
POD? Weather and/or engineering problems delay the departure of the Canadian troopships from Vancouver long enough that the Pacific War begins while they are enroute.
They wouldn't still attempt to sail to a rapidly deteriorating situation at Hong Kong. Though most likely they would have been diverted to Singapore. Or possibly Sydney?
If Sydney then where are they used? Port Moresby if they're lucky or Lae or Rabual if unlucky. Would still be better then what the Canadian troops experienced at Hong Kong.
C Force. The underequipped, poorly trained Canadian troops thrown away at Hong Kong. If they had been sent to Rabaul it probably would have fallen anyway but not as quickly. And the Australian and Canadian survivors would have gone into the hills to attempt escape. Dangerous but better then facing almost 4 years a prisoner of the Imperial Japanese.
POD? Weather and/or engineering problems delay the departure of the Canadian troopships from Vancouver long enough that the Pacific War begins while they are enroute.
They wouldn't still attempt to sail to a rapidly deteriorating situation at Hong Kong. Though most likely they would have been diverted to Singapore. Or possibly Sydney?
If Sydney then where are they used? Port Moresby if they're lucky or Lae or Rabual if unlucky. Would still be better then what the Canadian troops experienced at Hong Kong.
Last edited:
Hopefully with the increase in Australian forces Blamey would become overall commander and with his veteren Divisions and experienced staff officers be more than happy to do a Matador.
And let Percival do what he is good at - hunting down insurgents and the like.
As for air commander - Stuffy (Dowding) was being side-lined in 41 despite having saved the UK and by extension the civilised world by his excellently run Battle of Britain- have him head to the far east and use his technical brilliance to build an air defence network for the region and by living up to his nick name 'stuffy' and upset all of the idiots out there who needed upsetting and by doing so not be in Washington upsetting the Cousins.
McPherson
Banned
What was wrong with William Dobbie for Malaya? He reminds me of Wilson Brown; an old guy who knew his business to a fare thee well for the specific situation he was in around 1939. Dobbie may have been a bad fit for Malta later in 1942, but he seems to have known Malayan terrain and weather effects quite well. Right person , right place instead of wrong person wrong place. He would have needed Dowding to handle the air-end, because his Malta record on that side of the business was almost as bad as Popham turned out to be in Eastern Command.
Percival might be good at insurgent hunting, I cannot say. From my anti-colonialist point of view he had the wrong mindset to inspire his colonial levy troops. He was no Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck, who no matter what his own personal beliefs, could get warrior efforts out of his men. As to Operation Matador, that is knocking south Thailand out and denying the Japanese unopposed landing sites north of the northern Kra peninsula RAF bases, one has to get rid of Brooke-Popham. Shooting him for the good of the Empire seems unjustified and extreme since he actually pushed the idea, before he suddenly chickened out at the last moment, but that waste of a staff officer was as defective to the British cause as Louis Brereton was for the Americans. You might have to throw him out of a plane accidentally on purpose.
Shrug. Some officers are just no damn good by any moral or professional metric you apply. MOO. YMMV and probably should.
Addenda; one question; how come did General Henry Pownall escape the fallout from the catastrophes in which he played a significant deleterious role in Singapore, ABDA and the failed Sri Lanka defense? He was not all that good, either, ya' know? (See citation for Dad's Army; a bit of the all wrong for the job mentality, there.). Layton, too. How did these people skate, through? At least MacArthur and Blamey, for all their problems and squabbles, turned in solid work from August 1942 on.
Last edited:
Concerning Force C, they could always wind up in the Philippines. That is where some of the Canadian vehicles, including Bren carriers, wound up. That is a different story though, and one that doesn't show up here.
If Force C does get sent to Rabaul instead, could we also jigger events to have some of the Pensacola convoy being diverted to Rabaul? 1BigRich makes good points about holding onto Rabaul, how do you keep the garrison supplied? Could an Allied-held Rabaul wind up something of a reverse Guadalcanal for the Allies?
Churchill seems to have vacillated on Hong Kong.
Back in January, 1941 he wrote to General Ismay, refusing to reinforce Hong Kong and stating that he wished '...we had fewer troops there, but to move any would be noticeable and dangerous...' (Chapter X, volume 3 of his WW2 memoirs) He also concedes that later on he allowed himself '...to be drawn from this position, and that two Canadian battalions were sent as reinforcement...'
I get the impression that he was torn between presenting the illusion of a strong front to Imperial Japan in the hope that that would deter them from attacking anywhere new, and the knowledge that if Imperial Japan did attack then anything in Hong Kong was probably going to be overrun.
Last edited:
William Dobbie - was a very old officer in 1941 and I think he was pretty good in Malta - the Locals apparently appreciated his religious 'bent'
He might have been good for Malaya but he like Percival knew what was required - Percival was his COS in 1936 and wrote an appreciation of what would be required to defend Malaya from a Japanese invasion after they both came to the conclusion that the entire peninsular needed defending not just the Singapore Island (I personally think that this knowledge crushed Percival as he knew what was required and he also knew he had far far less than what was required in late 41).
General Pownall - I don't know a hell of a lot about him TBH - seems to be a high level staff officer - lets face it OTL Malaya and ABDA were doomed enterprises - he seemed to be heavily involved in high level staff work throughout the war - something not quantifiable.
As for Layton - blaming him for Ceylon is very unfair - he was made CIC of Ceylon a month before the attack and having been shocked at the shambles he found made immediate efforts to improve the place. Sadly time was against him with the Japanese attacking a month later. I'll give him a pass
It was noted that 'His' air defence network was very poor during the attacks. However the question I would ask is that with an RAF Fighter wing established on the Island why was it left to a Navy Admiral to stand it up? Surely the RAF are the SMEs here - chaps hailing from RAF Fighter command should be setting up ADN's where ever they go as a matter of course - that being their reason for existing! That it had not been done before he arrived speaks volumes. That they were all on the ground when the attackers were flying overhead - speaks louder.
McPherson
Banned
I think he was made the fall-guy for the RAF ground establishment failure to perform during the two critical Bowery runs when air reinforcement was squandered by a lack of preparation to receive and secure the flown off planes as they came in.
Shrug. The man on the spot has to use what he has and do the best he can. Take WATCHTOWER. Ghormley was going insane and he had medical issues, but SAVO, Eastern Solomons and TURNER are all on him. He was unfit to lead. Halsey, who was a worse planner and administrator and battle manager than Ghormley and knew very little about the overall stakes at hazard, screws up Rennell Island and Santa Cruz, but he hurrahs the troops. They hang on and they win. Leadership is the difference. Some people have it and get their people to perform in spite of massive screwups and bad situations and some don't. Percival was not one of those who could hurrah the troops.
I've looked at him briefly. He was an alibi man (military advisor) for Churchill for that famous six volume series the PM did on WWII to "set the record straight" before the historians really got after him... I smelled a rat. Further investigation shows him, Pownall, to be in close proximity to several British disasters from 1942 onward AFTER El Alamein, when the British are normally doing very well, including that questionable period when he worked with Louis Mountbatten in India.
Shove him out of the same plane with Brooke Popham, and Brereton.
Layton was Eastern Command (China Station) long before Phillips showed up. It was part of his job to know how badly Sri Lanka was set up, since that was his planned fallback position if the Singapore Bastion Defense failed. Plus his lackluster performance during ABDA while he ran Tnjong Priok (convoys) infuriated the Americans for some reason as I read their records. Whether that American opinion was justified along with the stuff that happened at Sri Lanka or at Singapore is one of those many YMMV situations and should. To me he was no Andrew Cunningham or Bruce Frazier or even a Harold Somerville. The RN had far better admirals available for such a combat posting at that critical time than he.
The RAF is where I can get into deep trouble with a lot of British patriots; because I frankly really hate some of those incompetent RAF bastards.^1 Those guys at the top career knifed Dowding. Bunch of political apple polishers did that. Whatever else one might say about HAP Arnold: as being of only "average ability" compared to Marshall and King; too fixated on Douhet; not imaginative enough to embrace new technology or allied methods that worked; friend of Brereton, (Who he protected long past the fire the bastard date on Brereton's non-performance record.); he did not backstab people, play career politics or grossly and incompetently mismanage an air force like some people did.
^1
AIR VICE MARSHAL TRAFFORD LEIGH-MALLORY. Commander in Chief 12 Group Fighter Command.
A well educated man, having graduated with honours at Cambridge University in the subject of history, Leigh-Mallory was to become the controversial leader and Commander-in-Chief of 12 Group protecting and being responsible for the fighter coverage of Central England. He was a soldier during World War One and saw considerable action during that period, but towards the end of the war was transferred to become a commander of an aerial reconnaissance squadron.
In 1937, he had visions of becoming the commander of 11 Group a position that he wanted and a position that many expected him to get, but Hugh Dowding gave the prestigious position to Keith Park and assigning Leigh-Mallory to 12 Group, a decision that Leigh- Mallory resented and throughout the Battle of Britain period considerable bitterness was shown between the three.
One of Leigh-Mallory's squadron commanders was Douglas Bader, 'tin legs' as he became known, and both Bader and Leigh-Mallory were firm believers of the 'Big Wing' where fighters could attack in large formations, in fact the 'Big Wing' theory was developed by Bader, but Dowding was not in favour if this, believing that too many aircraft would take too long to disperse and large formations of fighters would get in each others way. But it was not until towards the end of the battle where Dowding agreed, and the 'Big Wing' theory was
responsible for many of the enemy aircraft shot down over London. Dowding would remember this when 12 Group was called upon to assist and protect the northern fighter bases of 11 Group, Leigh-Mallory employed the 'Big Wing' theory and it proved to be a failure.
By the time that all of 12 Groups aircraft had got off the ground, it was too late by the time that they had arrived to assist 11 Group and the Luftwaffe had sustained considerable damage to the northern bases. After the Battle of Britain, Leigh-Mallory seemed to follow Keith Park around, always taking over where Park had left off. Following Park leaving 12 Group, Leigh-Mallory took over, he had got the position he wanted after all. When Dowding resigned in 1942, Leigh-Mallory accepted the post of Head of Fighter Command. In 1943 he became Commander-in Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force controlling the air cover required for the invasion of France in Operation Overlord. After the invasion of France in November 1944 he was appointed C-in-C of South-East Asia, but unfortunately he was killed in a plane crash on his way to take up this position.
What has this got to do with Rabaul? A lot of these people will remain to make decisions that must affect any ATL discussion about defending Rabaul post fall of Singapore and into the ABDA segment of the war, and so discussing Layton, and Pownall and MacArthur and Brooke Popham, for four examples, is entirely fair game as to speculate how they help or hinder the cause upstream.
McP.
Last edited: