Could Soviet Union Defeat Japan?

Could Soviet Union Defeat Japan?

  • Yes

    Votes: 111 83.5%
  • No

    Votes: 22 16.5%

  • Total voters
    133
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By WW II the difficulty with the IJA, compared to the Western forces, was both structural and, much more importantly, tactical. IJA formations tended to be "light" on heavy weapons, especially guns over 90mm (the standard IJA divisional TOE had no guns over 90mm, while the Soviet TOE had 44, the Heer had 54, the U.S. 66). The IJA tended to have larger number of light mortars, no medium/heavy mortars (81-122mm), a much smaller number of AT guns (22, while the Soviets had 54, and the Soviet guns were, based on WW II performance, superior in performance, with other major Western combatants having roughly the same number of AT as the Red Army).

The most striking difference between the various divisional TOE comes in various motor vehicles. Red Army formations were assigned over 600, Heer formations almost 1,200, U.S. and UK formations well over 2,000, with the IJA division allocated no more than 200. Unsurprisingly, the IJA organization had, by far, the largest number of horses, at nearly 2,300, a figure that was double that of either the Red Army or the Heer (U.S./UK formations had no horses as part of the standard infantry TOE). Logistically the IJA simply couldn't support the sort of supply requirements that a modernized force, with a combined arms tactical structure required.

It is worth noting that these figures are also for IJA formations that were much larger in personnel than their Western counterpart, with roughly 20,000 men in a division compared to 14-17,000 for the other forces (these are 1941 figures, except the U.S. which is 1942). The problem rapidly multiplies at the Corps, "Army" "Army Group"/"Front" levels as non IJA formations begin to acquire attached "specialist" units from Corps Artillery to Armored Brigades, with the IJA falling ever further behind the curve as the "Western" infantry divisions become meat-grinders as their overall personnel approached the IJA total figure.

There is a very interesting discussion to be had on the "why?" regarding the differences of the IJA. I personally subscribe to the "no major land battles in WW I Europe" theory which more or less states that the IJA, being spared the bloodbaths that marked the mechanized death of the Trenches, was never forced to face the reality that Elan and courage were not enough. This being the case their commanders were still in "1915" mode, albeit with a better appreciation of air power.
yes, but the terrain they'd be fighting in favored light infantry. The Japanese knew there resources were limited and that they'd beed to spend to creates a great Fleet or Army and as an island nation, their Navy took precedence. In one area the Japanese truly prved themselvex superior IMO and it's an importance in Jungle Warfare is sgnificant. It's in the ability of their soldiers to endure privation. That was by design. The Japanese always tried to make up for their weakness in size and technology by amlifying their strengths. Typical training for a Japanese soldier included cold endurance marches and heat endurance marches carrying full packs, without sleep. If they lagged behind they were beaten. I think it's a little to simple to say Japan never Westerners on even terms (it's absolutely false), although I would agree that they were technologically inferior and while their soldiers were incredibly brave, their tactics were rigid. I think it was the British historian, Max Hastings that called the Japanese soldier a "First rate soldier in a Third rate army". I think it's apropriate, but the qualities of their NCO's and enlisted men often made up for the cfude tactics of their officers and they did have some genuinely brilliant ones (Yamashita was a great general by any standard and Masanobu Tsuji was an excellent logistician, regardless of his unsavoury... "eating habits").
 
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Anyone voting Yes want to give their reasoning for total Soviet victory?

there are assumptions required for my believing the Soviets can win...

They cannot spare the forces necessary unless Germany is bogged down in the West (presumes a better Anglo-French showing in 1940... maybe the original plan is used and the Germans find that meeting force on force takes a lot longer and is a lot costlier and thus France holds out an extra year to 18 months)

OR

Someone actually manages to kill Hitler (almost happened in November 1939 but Gesler failed) and the new leadership gets cold feet and thus the phony war extends longer

IF so, then Stalin is free to act if he wishes. This also requires no Japanese-Soviet neutrality agreement in 1939 (post Japanese humiliation in Mongolia)

The Soviets will have a hard time at first, and indeed a Winter War type series of debacles is likely, but within a year the Soviets have sufficient mass and operational skills as well as some good to excellent generals, as well as having advantages in artillery and armor to push into Manchuria and eventually North China and Korea (my guess, W + 24 to 30 months)

Once the Kwangtung Army is destroyed, and the entire Japanese position in China is facing collapse, the Japanese Army will lose their political power and other factions, including the Navy, will force them into reality.

A Japan that has lost its Mainland Asian Empire and with the Army soundly defeated as a political force meets the definition of defeated. It also butterflies out any possibility of attempts to seize the Southern Resource Area.

If the Japanese are still at war with the Americans and British, things go bad even more quickly. The Army will have no troops to spare, not even the 11 divisions it used in the Japanese seizure of Southeast Asia and European/American colonies, and if they have committed them, the Army has no reserves to throw into the maw of the fighting in Manchuria.

The risky part is what happens to the Soviets when the Germans finish dealing with the West... assuming they do.

Which is why I believe that only Hitler dead or Germany defeated (or both) makes this an option for the Soviets to consider. That or the Anglo-Americans already being at war with Japan and the Germans in a non threatening posture

Japan could embarrass the Soviet Union and even seize some territory, but the Germans potentially could bring down Stalin. So Stalin rightly saw them as the greater threat.
 
By WW II the difficulty with the IJA, compared to the Western forces, was both structural and, much more importantly, tactical. IJA formations tended to be "light" on heavy weapons, especially guns over 90mm (the standard IJA divisional TOE had no guns over 90mm, while the Soviet TOE had 44, the Heer had 54, the U.S. 66). The IJA tended to have larger number of light mortars, no medium/heavy mortars (81-122mm), a much smaller number of AT guns (22, while the Soviets had 54, and the Soviet guns were, based on WW II performance, superior in performance, with other major Western combatants having roughly the same number of AT as the Red Army).

The most striking difference between the various divisional TOE comes in various motor vehicles. Red Army formations were assigned over 600, Heer formations almost 1,200, U.S. and UK formations well over 2,000, with the IJA division allocated no more than 200. Unsurprisingly, the IJA organization had, by far, the largest number of horses, at nearly 2,300, a figure that was double that of either the Red Army or the Heer (U.S./UK formations had no horses as part of the standard infantry TOE). Logistically the IJA simply couldn't support the sort of supply requirements that a modernized force, with a combined arms tactical structure required.

It is worth noting that these figures are also for IJA formations that were much larger in personnel than their Western counterpart, with roughly 20,000 men in a division compared to 14-17,000 for the other forces (these are 1941 figures, except the U.S. which is 1942). The problem rapidly multiplies at the Corps, "Army" "Army Group"/"Front" levels as non IJA formations begin to acquire attached "specialist" units from Corps Artillery to Armored Brigades, with the IJA falling ever further behind the curve as the "Western" infantry divisions become meat-grinders as their overall personnel approached the IJA total figure.

There is a very interesting discussion to be had on the "why?" regarding the differences of the IJA. I personally subscribe to the "no major land battles in WW I Europe" theory which more or less states that the IJA, being spared the bloodbaths that marked the mechanized death of the Trenches, was never forced to face the reality that Elan and courage were not enough. This being the case their commanders were still in "1915" mode, albeit with a better appreciation of air power.
Yes, but the terrain they'd be fighting in favored light infantry. The Japanese knew their resources were limited and that they could either have a great Fleet or a great Army. As an island nation, their Navy took precedence. In one area the Japanese truly proved themselvex superior IMO and it's of paramount importance in Jungle Warfare. It's in the ability of their soldiers to endure privation. That was by design. The Japanese always tried to make up for their weakness in size and technology by amlifying their strength or perceived strength. In this case, it was of the "natural" toughness of the Japanese.
 
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IJA get destroyed. No ifs, ands, or buts about it.

Light infantry formations against combined arms units is a non starter.

I will once again repeat one of the things that thesis arguments tend to ignore. The IJA's last defeat of a fully equipped and supplied "Western/European" ground force was in 1905. The IJA never defeated, or even stalemated a "Western" force that was not both surprised and cut off from reinforcement/in a reduced state of supply throughout WW II. In every major engagement after the initial wave of surprise attacks against colonial forces, ranging from the Indian frontier, across small Pacific islands, to large land mass islands, to the plains of Manchuria the IJA wound up with its collective ass kicked up between the collective shoulder-blades.

The WW II IJA NEVER figured out how to fight against near-peer forces. It was great at massacres of poorly equipped and led formations in China and had the whole pillage bit down pat, but fighting peer divisional sized formations? Not so much.

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Are we really going to have to struggle through another painstaking deconstruction of this tired meme again?

The Japanese Army, like any of the World War era that wasn't the US Army and by extension that of Great Britain, had its share of material shortcomings but was far from a walking anachronism as some "historians" would like to inform the casual reader. They, like Germany, made the most of a limited industrial base and by the early 1940s represented one of the most formidable fighting forces on the face of the planet. There was a reason we ended up nuking them. Twice.
 
Defeat Japan...yes. Total defeat...no. I think it will be a negotiated peace with LOTS of destruction, death, and possible use of WMD.
 
The USSR's air force was in no way configured for that kind of strategic bombing. It was the handmaiden of the Red Army in much the same way the Luftwaffe was the handmaiden of the Heer. It did have a few dozen strategic bombers IIRC, but that was it. The air forces of the IJA and IJN would have been formidable if they hadn't been ground down first by by the USN and USAAF.

Soviets had a strategic bombing force, ADD, which was gutted by Barbarossa. It was primarily equipped with DB-3/IL-4 and in smaller numbers with Pe-8 bombers, all of which had adequate range to hit all of mainland Japan from Soviet bases. By 1939 some 1500 DB-3's were manufactured, I don't know what a few dozen is.

Especially if and when Korea is conquered. Japanese air defences were weak and Soviets are probably bound to discover effects of firebombing on Japanese cities.

Soviets also had a powerful naval aviation which was qutted by Lufwaffe, would be gut by IJN/IJA but would get better all the time. It's capabilities included aerial mining already in late 1930's which would be very effective against Japanese maritime traffic, as demonstrated by Operation Starvation.

Finally, against Japan there was also the very ineffective Soviet submarine force, but they would be acting against IJN, not Germany and Finland in very difficult Gulf of Finland.
 
Soviets had a strategic bombing force, ADD, which was gutted by Barbarossa. It was primarily equipped with DB-3/IL-4 and in smaller numbers with Pe-8 bombers, all of which had adequate range to hit all of mainland Japan from Soviet bases. By 1939 some 1500 DB-3's were manufactured, I don't know what a few dozen is.

Since when are twin engined bombers classified as strategic bombers?

Especially if and when Korea is conquered. Japanese air defences were weak and Soviets are probably bound to discover effects of firebombing on Japanese cities.

Soviets also had a powerful naval aviation which was qutted by Lufwaffe, would be gut by IJN/IJA but would get better all the time. It's capabilities included aerial mining already in late 1930's which would be very effective against Japanese maritime traffic, as demonstrated by Operation Starvation.

Finally, against Japan there was also the very ineffective Soviet submarine force, but they would be acting against IJN, not Germany and Finland in very difficult Gulf of Finland.

Japanese air and maritime defences were weak enough to be destroyed by the USAAF and USN, which took four years to accomplish that task. Unfortunately for the USSR, it only had a fraction of the technological and manufacturing power of the US, and since events in Europe are specified by the OP to stay as close as possible to OTL... Barbarossa is probably still going to happen anyway. That means the USSR has slightly less than two years to do what took the much stronger US four. So while strategic bombing and blockade by the USSR against Japan might do some modest amount of damage to the economy of the Japanese Home Islands, their being able to force Japan into unconditional surrender or collapse is just not going to happen.
 
Assuming a 1939 scenario, as this is when the biggest pre-WW2 Soviet-Japanese confrontation happened, and also because it's when the IJA had roughly reached the extent of its pre-1944 advances in China proper.

Red Army wins in Manchuria if it puts a respectable army with armor and air support to the field, and with Zhukov or someone of similar thinking to him in charge.

The Russians bash through Manchuria, which is mostly steppe territory and therefore good tank country. The local population, being Chinese and in 1939 not even organized into Manchurian militia divisions, is unlikely to be of use to the Japanese defenders at all.

Soviet Union therefore has a foolproof victory in front of it and conquers Manchuria within 1-3 months, depending on how badly the effects of the Great Purge weigh in. A potentially significant side effect of this is that the Germans will see that Russia can do blitzkrieg and perhaps be somewhat less optimistic about their chances in Barbarossa.

The Changbaishan/Korean part of the campaign favors the Japanese, but only in a tactical sense. Korea is full of mountains and is far smaller than Manchuria, making the Soviets' mobility advantage less devastating. Nevertheless, Japan has far less manpower, resources, and a marked inferiority in equipment versus the Red Army, so whether they hold part of Korea (the northern half is a lost cause due to the inertia and size of Soviet forces) is a match between the brilliance of individual IJA officers and the various challenges the Red Army faces.

At this point we run into two considerations, i.e. what the IJA decides to do with its forces in China and what specific war goals the Soviets have in mind.

Quite possibly the Soviets, being ever-cautious, may decide to leave Korea in Japanese hands in order to give the Japanese just a little breathing room and also to avoid having to fight a long campaign in the mountains. After all, they have Hitler on their European front.

The IJA in 1939 has got hundreds of thousands of men and large amounts of military equipment tied up in China. Their entire motivation for the so-called "China Incident" is to stave off Chinese national unification, a goal which in turn serves the objective of maintaining the Manchurian colony state.

In this scenario, with Manchuria being threatened, the IJA is going to want to withdraw forces from China proper. The question is how much. Will they leave garrisons as a tripwire for the Chinese army? Or simply hold onto some coastal areas? Will they try to re-invade Manchuria from the south via the Great Wall?

My guess is that the Japanese will slowly withdraw troops, and eventually pull out entirely except for Shanghai, Hainan island, and some other areas at the coast. They may try to send armies to support Manchuria, but it is unlikely that the redeployment will occur in time to influence the outcome of that campaign at all. The IJA's best bet, then, would be to move its available troops to defend Korea.

Come 1940 and a rather awkward Korean War has happened a decade before it did in OTL. The difference is that there is not as much of the ideological struggle that existed IOTL, and that the Soviets don't really care that much about Korea. Contrast this with the state of desperation that the Japanese are likely being whipped into and suddenly we see that despite the Soviets' material ability to win both Manchuria and Korea, Stalin probably just doesn't have the interest.

The Red Army thus kicks the IJA back to the Yalu and turns back to look at Germany.
 
I voted yes in the sense that the Red Army could overrun Manchuria and maybe at least part of Korea. It would make an interesting change in the 3-way standoff in China between the KMT, CCP, and IJA. How it resolves depends on whether Japan loses part of Korea.

If it loses Manchuria but not Korea, I believe the Navy's Fleet Faction would still press for war with the U.S., and barring help from the Asaki Suzuki Bureau will still get its ass whooped in the Pacific. If Korea is lost as well the Japanese will give priority to getting that back.
 
I don't disagree. Japan loses hard against the Soviet Union. They were smashed in their 30s border wars and they were smashed in '45. However, Japan beat Europeans on land several times, The fact that it didn't happen between the Russo-Japanese War and WW2 isn't because they couldn't, it's because they weren't at war with Europeans.

The European forces they defeated on land in WW II were second-rate colonial garrisons, and even then the Japanese victories were closer than they appeared. The Philippines campaign, against colonial troops isolated from any support, bogged down so badly that the commander was sacked. By the end of the Malaya campaign, the Japanese forces were nearly out of supply. The victories in Burma in 1942 and 1943 look better, but the Japanese were facing second-line formations with inadequate training and equipment.
 
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