yes, but the terrain they'd be fighting in favored light infantry. The Japanese knew there resources were limited and that they'd beed to spend to creates a great Fleet or Army and as an island nation, their Navy took precedence. In one area the Japanese truly prved themselvex superior IMO and it's an importance in Jungle Warfare is sgnificant. It's in the ability of their soldiers to endure privation. That was by design. The Japanese always tried to make up for their weakness in size and technology by amlifying their strengths. Typical training for a Japanese soldier included cold endurance marches and heat endurance marches carrying full packs, without sleep. If they lagged behind they were beaten. I think it's a little to simple to say Japan never Westerners on even terms (it's absolutely false), although I would agree that they were technologically inferior and while their soldiers were incredibly brave, their tactics were rigid. I think it was the British historian, Max Hastings that called the Japanese soldier a "First rate soldier in a Third rate army". I think it's apropriate, but the qualities of their NCO's and enlisted men often made up for the cfude tactics of their officers and they did have some genuinely brilliant ones (Yamashita was a great general by any standard and Masanobu Tsuji was an excellent logistician, regardless of his unsavoury... "eating habits").By WW II the difficulty with the IJA, compared to the Western forces, was both structural and, much more importantly, tactical. IJA formations tended to be "light" on heavy weapons, especially guns over 90mm (the standard IJA divisional TOE had no guns over 90mm, while the Soviet TOE had 44, the Heer had 54, the U.S. 66). The IJA tended to have larger number of light mortars, no medium/heavy mortars (81-122mm), a much smaller number of AT guns (22, while the Soviets had 54, and the Soviet guns were, based on WW II performance, superior in performance, with other major Western combatants having roughly the same number of AT as the Red Army).
The most striking difference between the various divisional TOE comes in various motor vehicles. Red Army formations were assigned over 600, Heer formations almost 1,200, U.S. and UK formations well over 2,000, with the IJA division allocated no more than 200. Unsurprisingly, the IJA organization had, by far, the largest number of horses, at nearly 2,300, a figure that was double that of either the Red Army or the Heer (U.S./UK formations had no horses as part of the standard infantry TOE). Logistically the IJA simply couldn't support the sort of supply requirements that a modernized force, with a combined arms tactical structure required.
It is worth noting that these figures are also for IJA formations that were much larger in personnel than their Western counterpart, with roughly 20,000 men in a division compared to 14-17,000 for the other forces (these are 1941 figures, except the U.S. which is 1942). The problem rapidly multiplies at the Corps, "Army" "Army Group"/"Front" levels as non IJA formations begin to acquire attached "specialist" units from Corps Artillery to Armored Brigades, with the IJA falling ever further behind the curve as the "Western" infantry divisions become meat-grinders as their overall personnel approached the IJA total figure.
There is a very interesting discussion to be had on the "why?" regarding the differences of the IJA. I personally subscribe to the "no major land battles in WW I Europe" theory which more or less states that the IJA, being spared the bloodbaths that marked the mechanized death of the Trenches, was never forced to face the reality that Elan and courage were not enough. This being the case their commanders were still in "1915" mode, albeit with a better appreciation of air power.
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