Could Post-Almohad Morocco Prevent a Successful Christian Reconquista?

As the question suggests, could Morocco, or at least Morocco after the Almohads no longer ruled Morocco, could have kept the Emirate of Granada from falling to the Catholic forces of Castile-Leon, Aragon and/or Portugal?
 
Meaning the Maranid dynasty. Although the Maranids, in support of Grenada, initially were dominant both on land and sea in battle with the Castilians during the 12th and early 13th centuries, all bets are off after losing the Battle of Rio Salado in 1340 to a combined Portuguese-Castilian army.
The Christian forces were generally more united then Marinid-local forces and the formers strength relative to the Marinids was growing ever stronger.
Prognosis: even if they had won at Rio Salado and established a beachhead in Spain, the Marinids and the local Muslims would probably slowly have been ground down.
 
What could be done, if anything could be done to actually keep the Muslims from being ultimately ground down under the heel of Castile and Aragon?
 
It could have been done, but not easily.

Arabo-Andalusian (even if the Emirate of Grenade was heavily "Maghrebized") elites and more generally population was quite hostile to North African takeovers. Eventually it may be why establishing the Nasrid Emirate was preferred : a buffer zone between Maghrib and Spain that both could pressure for tributes.

The really important political unstability of Grenada is another huge obstacle : at some point succession looked like a musical chair contest, whom success depended mostly on raids made on Christian Spain and lack of crushing defeat when it came to real war. Enough to said the balance of power didn't helped.

Eventually it depends less on what Merinids or any other dynasty could do, but how much Castille and Aragon can be prevented to simply conquer Grenada : civil wars helped greatly to Nasrid surival, but it couldn't last forever.

Having an actual Maghrebi naval tradition safe for raiding would be an interesting change from the half-rationalising disinterest that existed IOTL (it was said, for example, that sailing was good enough for Christians but not fitting for an Arab), would it be only to maintain direct contacts with Grenada and prevent a too easy Christian conquest.

Eventually, only a stable and strong Morrocean dynasty able to hold its ground against other Arabo-Berber tribes, Ottomans and Christians may have a chance.
 

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Meaning the Maranid dynasty. Although the Maranids, in support of Grenada, initially were dominant both on land and sea in battle with the Castilians during the 12th and early 13th centuries, all bets are off after losing the Battle of Rio Salado in 1340 to a combined Portuguese-Castilian army.
The Christian forces were generally more united then Marinid-local forces and the formers strength relative to the Marinids was growing ever stronger.
Prognosis: even if they had won at Rio Salado and established a beachhead in Spain, the Marinids and the local Muslims would probably slowly have been ground down.
This always raises the question of whether an alternate political system could have developed to ensure greater stability in the region, something less tribal in nature and prone to infighting. The Marinids were apparently very commerce oriented, maybe they can use their wealth to bribe and integrate far off tribes and settle nomads in cities and easy to control areas?

However, you do cripple the Christian forces for a good while if you have them lose the Battle of Rio Salado. Castile was already bankrupt and heavily in debt, Aragon found this war useless and didn't like this in the first place and having lost a fleet twice would have infuriated the Papacy enough to stop funding the kingdom. Portugal was a bit unstable at the time so the loss of prestige to King Alfonso could have done some serious damage back home; might prompt some revolts at the worst. A decisive victory would bring Castile and Portugal to the bargaining table as Aragon and the Papacy leave the coalition in anger, having wasted their time.

A victory would by the Muslims at least a few decades.

Now, following the victory, the Marinids essentially control Gibraltar and the Nasrid Emirate allowing to further interventions in Europe. And with said breathing space, the Emir continues his campaigns against the Hafsids with less of a hassle, probably taking Tripoli and Tunis earlier and successfully integrating Ifriqiya for a time. Territory like that would give them quite the manpower when the next round starts.

If the right cards are played I could see the Moroccans taking Algarve and southern Alentejo from Portugal (which was still heavily Jewish and Mozarabic at the time, not to mention very wealthy) and everything up to Seville in Castile and giving it to the Nasrids to increase the buffer.

But this really depends on change in the Marinids. They need to be more naval focused, more stable and stronger.
 
Ig would be an interesting change from the half-rationalising disinterest that existed IOTL (it was said, for example, that sailing was good enough for Christians but not fitting for an Arab), would it be only to maintain direct contacts with Grenada and prevent a too easy Christian conquest.


Huh. How'd they end up becoming Barbary pirates, then?
 
Huh. How'd they end up becoming Barbary pirates, then?

First, you'd notice I precised "safe for raiding" (without talking about the maritime fishing tradition in Maghrib). "Decentralized" naval raids (as in lead, financed by individuals, in a word privateers) are a wholly different thing than a more important navy, organized by and for political intent (such as using them strategically),

The last was clearly less important to the point of unexistance : Marinids were the exemple of a north african continental power.

Now, if you allow me, your question doesn't make a great deal of sense : we were talking of post-Almohad Morroco, meaning from the XIIIth century, when Barbary Pirates (as in the mix of north Africa, European, and Ottoman models and cultures) exist only really since the late XVth, and not in Morroco.

It would be as asking why medieval Scotland wasn't a naval power when they end up becoming the British Royal Navy, huh?
It's confusing two entities (Barbary Coast/Morroco), two different centuries, state navy and piracy navy, that probably shouldn't.

Not that North Africa didn't knew piracy before 1480's of course : but it was more from modern Tunisia than Merinid Morocco that had a different setting.
"In Morroco, since the marinid decline to the end of XVth century, naval activity never were more than sporadic privateer raids on Spain or other countries, and freeing of Muslims or Moriscos from Spain".

As for the relationship between Arabs and specifically Maghribian Arabo-Berbers and the sea, it could be compared to the relationship Romans had, maybe more violent. Before the XIIth century, and at the relative exception of Byzantines (when the latter were threatened), Arabo-Islamic entities never had real competitors, no need for a real political focus on naval matters (for instance, Balearic Islands, while technically relevant from Cordoba, were basically a Mediterranean Tortuga obeying to themselves first).

It was temperated by the naval tradition of the people they conquered (Syrians, Africans, Greeks), but never made it in the cultural or political matters : before the Ottomans, I can't really think of a achieved Arabo-Islamic thalassocracy.
I think that the Christian hegemon since the XIVth century (Catalan privateers efficiently replacing former Islamic piracy in West and Eastern mediterranea) probably helped to strengthen these feelings by rationalizing the loss of maritime dominance ("Meh, we never wanted it in first place").

Before the Ottoman arrival, that was decisive into making North African coast (at the exception of Morroco, that wasn't in their sphere of influence) the famed Barbary Coast, partially by opposing two maritime powers (Spain and Ottomans) in real naval confrontation (no longer half-pirate/Half-merchant fleet, but two political entities forming war fleets at this only end) in order to forbid as much as possible the presence of each other in western Mediterranean basin, partially to cover the economical needs of the Turks (by slave hunting, as Arabs did up to the Xth century, or Catalans up to the XVth).

You did have organized piracy in Morroco as well, but not before the fall of Marinids and the establishment of Saadi (educated in Turkish courts) that had actual maritime projects (as in, settling in the Americas). Entities as Salé Republic didn't existed before (and represented a foreign and distinct body inside Morroco anyway).

I hope it seems less confuse, now?
 
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