Could McClellan have won the Civil War?

So, some quick calculations. A Liberty ship troop transport can carry about 500 troops at about 28 tons per soldier. Assuming 10,000 men per division, 20 divisions would require 5.6 million tons of shipping.

So since Japan had 6.5 million tons of shipping in 1941, :eek: 67th Tigers is right that it could ship 20 divisions to the West Coast.:eek:

If Japan had that much shipping in the 20s. Assuming those troops don't need heavy weapons or vehicles. Or food/fuel/ammunition. Or landing boats, since those troops will be disembarking into a friendly port. Or air support/engineers/any other assorted personel an army needs besides actual combat troops. And those ships don't need more shipping to carry enough fuel for this long, long voyage. And the Japanese economy and the Navy can still operate while splitting the remaining 900,000 tons. And if assuming all that remaining shipping goes to the Navy, the Navy would be capable of conducting operations near the West Coast when it could barely do the same near Hawaii OTL with twice as much. Which of course wouldn't be a problem, since that big convoy of troop transports doesn't have anything to fear from the USN.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
So, some quick calculations. A Liberty ship troop transport can carry about 500 troops at about 28 tons per soldier. Assuming 10,000 men per division, 20 divisions would require 5.6 million tons of shipping.

That's tiny, typical WW2 troopers carried 5-10,000 each, some of the largest carried 15,000.
 
That's tiny, typical WW2 troopers carried 5-10,000 each, some of the largest carried 15,000.

1) The only ships that could carry that many were monsters like the QE and QM and their somewhat smaller sisters, ie big ocean liners, of which Japan didn't have any, and which were purpose designed from the beginning to carry large numbers of people.

2) I'm talking about wartime troop movement, which means weapons, limited ammunition/food/fuel, and organic transport and artillery. The big passenger liners can't carry that, and would need additional freighters to carry the equipment for their troops. The ~500 troops and associated equipment and supplies were what the Liberty ships were carrying during the Normandy landings, so if anything, it's being generous, what with the ships just needing to move across the English Channel.

3) Sure, you could halve the amount of shipping you need if you convert more cargo holds to troop bays, but then you'll be landing troops with just their rifles and what they can carry with them.
 
Last edited:

67th Tigers

Banned
1) The only ships that could carry that many were monsters like the QE and QM and their somewhat smaller sisters, ie big ocean liners, of which Japan didn't have any, and which were purpose designed from the beginning to carry large numbers of people.

The Japanese had the 3rd largest liner fleet in the world.

2) I'm talking about wartime troop movement, which means weapons, limited ammunition/food/fuel, and organic transport and artillery. The big passenger liners can't carry that, and would need additional freighters to carry the equipment for their troops. The ~500 troops and associated equipment and supplies were what the Liberty ships were carrying during the Normandy landings, so if anything, it's being generous, what with the ships just needing to move across the English Channel.

Japan used 9 transports for two complete divisions with munitions in 1944. 20 divisions is on the order of 100 transports, which is a very significant chunk of shipping to be sure (1-2m GRT). Moreover, it doesn't have to be a single lift. Allowing for loading and unloading a ship can carry a load a month from Japan to America.

Japanese ability to carry out long distance multi-divisional opposed landings is unquestionable, since they actually did it. All that is questionable is could they afford to divert sufficient tonnage, which is not a question that will be answered here.
 
The Japanese had the 3rd largest liner fleet in the world.

Some dates and tonnage might be more useful than a simple claim that could be just a lie. And in any case, the vastly larger combined British/American liner/freighter fleets took over a year to move 40 divisions to Britain, a shorter route, and between friendly ports, rather than an insanely long route, with no port at all to land in.

Japan used 9 transports for two complete divisions with munitions in 1944. 20 divisions is on the order of 100 transports, which is a very significant chunk of shipping to be sure (1-2m GRT). Moreover, it doesn't have to be a single lift. Allowing for loading and unloading a ship can carry a load a month from Japan to America.

Funny, since that would be the entire tonnage available to the Army at the beginning of WWII, even using an estimate from a relatively short range voyage carrying understrength light infantry divisions and no need for landing boats. And to try to underplay this, you are now suggesting landing the 20 divisions at the rate of a few per month.

Japanese ability to carry out long distance multi-divisional opposed landings is unquestionable, since they actually did it. All that is questionable is could they afford to divert sufficient tonnage, which is not a question that will be answered here.

1) Japan carried out landings at 1/3 the distance at the most, and never involving more than 3 divisions, and never all 3 divisions at the same time either.

2) Whether they could afford to divert sufficient tonnage is easily answered, since even by your estimates, it would take 1/3 of their total tonnage just to carry the troops. (in 1941) It would take another third just to keep the navy fleet running near the West Coast, and by a very generous estimate at that. (unless you are suggesting the invasion convoy go without escort) For that matter, unless you are devoting yet more tonnage to refueling the invasion convoy, they won't even be able to make it back to Japan without capturing (multiple) ports with fueling facilities intact, and this still doesn't account for any of the tonnage needed to keep the army supplied.
 
When was McClellan actually defeated? He certainly achieved less than perfection in most battles but who does? I do not remember the destruction of his army by Lee's superior numbers in the Seven Days, nor Lee's investment of Washington in November 1862.....

So for you, it only counts as a defeat if an army was destroyed or the enemy capitol is besieged? That's a rather...unique...definitiion. Based on your definition, McDowell was not defeated at Bull Run, Rosecrans was not defeated at Chicamauaga, and Burnside was not defeated at Fredericksburg. Based on your definition, McClellan never defeated anyone in his entire military career.
 
Col. Thomas Livermore, Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America 1861-1865, New York, 1901

Unlike you, Mr. Livermore doesn't count CSA troops in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia as standing between McClellan and Richmond.

Livermore's actual numbers for the Seven Days Battles are listed on p, 84 of the work.

His estimates for total troops engaged are:
Army of the Potomac 83,345
Army of Northern Virgina 86,748

Livermore still gives the CSA a slight edge in manpower, but unlike you he doesn't claim the Army of Northern Virginia had 110,000 troops.
 
Japan used 9 transports for two complete divisions with munitions in 1944. 20 divisions is on the order of 100 transports, which is a very significant chunk of shipping to be sure (1-2m GRT). Moreover, it doesn't have to be a single lift. Allowing for loading and unloading a ship can carry a load a month from Japan to America.

Japanese ability to carry out long distance multi-divisional opposed landings is unquestionable, since they actually did it. All that is questionable is could they afford to divert sufficient tonnage, which is not a question that will be answered here.

Not really; at least, not in the same sense of a US West Coast landing. Y'see, historical Japanese landings in the PI and Malaysia and DEI were generally within range of friendly air cover and just as importantly within easy range (ie, a few days or a week at most) of major naval bases. Other landings, such as WI, f'r instance, were relatively small potato affairs, although Wake Island is an interesting example, in that the initial Japanese landing attempt was rebuffed by an understrength Marine battalion, a squadron of F4Fs, and some coastal artillery, and it took significant air power (ie, a carrier division), although with additional fleet support, to gain a landing.

Of course, the US West Coast would NOT be within easy range of ANY Japanese fleet base, and the Japanese weren't exactly experts in terms of long range UNREP operations. In fact, no one really was until the USN in 1943-1944. In other words, what happens when the Japanese fleet providing cover runs out of fuel? I understand that,given you are talking about the 1920s, air power is somewhat less important, except in the sense that what air power was available would be almost exclusively American (remind me how many fleet carriers the Japanese had at that time, and what their air complements were?).

Then there's the small matter of a 6000 mile supply chain, which would be incredibly vulnerable to submarine interdiction, and would have exactly 0 margin for error. A 20 division landing on the US West Coast by Japan? Come on. Even if it could get there - and I think it's been adequately shown that this was quite unlikely - how do you keep it supplied? Reinforced? Evacuate casualties? Etc? It's just impossible.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
So for you, it only counts as a defeat if an army was destroyed or the enemy capitol is besieged? That's a rather...unique...definitiion. Based on your definition, McDowell was not defeated at Bull Run, Rosecrans was not defeated at Chicamauaga, and Burnside was not defeated at Fredericksburg. Based on your definition, McClellan never defeated anyone in his entire military career.

Strawman.

It's about achieving your objectives. In all the McClellan vs Lee engagements (bar perhaps Shephardstown) it was McClellan that achieved his and Lee that was frustrated.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Unlike you, Mr. Livermore doesn't count CSA troops in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia as standing between McClellan and Richmond.

Livermore's actual numbers for the Seven Days Battles are listed on p, 84 of the work.

His estimates for total troops engaged are:
Army of the Potomac 83,345
Army of Northern Virgina 86,748

Livermore still gives the CSA a slight edge in manpower, but unlike you he doesn't claim the Army of Northern Virginia had 110,000 troops.

No, he did that earlier. In fact they had a PFD strength of 112,200:

Joseph Harsh said:
In his memoirs, Joseph Johnston referred to Lee’s forces on June 26 as “the largest Confederate army that ever fought.” He estimated Lee’s reinforcements as follows: 15,000 from North Carolina, 22,000 from South Carolina and Georgia and 16,000 from Jackson, for a total of 53,000. When combined with the 73,000 Johnston had on May 31, this would have given Lee 126,000 men. Johnston later admitted his figures were too high. For example, he counted Lawton twice (with Jackson and with Georgia); he included forces that did not arrive until July and August; and he overestimated Holmes by 150%.

Johnston’s claims affronted that plank of the “Lost Cause” myth that insisted the Confederates had always been heavily outnumbered, and his figures were emphatically rejected by Charles Marshal, Jubal Early, Jefferson Davies, the Reverend J. William Jones, and Walter Taylor, who insisted Lee had 80,000 men or fewer. These defenders of Confederate meagreness indulged in a bad habit of mixing apples and oranges.” They used the figure for their own “effectives”, a stripped down statistic, whilst employing “present for duty” figures for the enemy. Their 80,000 may be fairly effective for Lee’s combat effectives, but then it should be compared to the approximately 70,000 McClellan had in the same category.

The total of 112,220 present for duty for the Army of Northern Virginia…. Breaks down as follows:

Attacking Column North of the Chickahominy

Army of Northern Virginia
Longstreet: 14,291
A.P. Hill: 16,411
D.H. Hill: 12,318
Stuart: 2,109
Total: 45,129

Army of the Valley
Jackson: 9,604
Ewell: 6,353
Whiting: 5,537
Cavalry: 605
Total: 22,099

Confederate defensive forces south of the Chickahominy:
McLaws: 4,915
D.R. Jones: 4,503
Magruder: 5,671
Huger: 6,160
Holmes: 9,018
Reserve artillery: 1,680
Cavalry: 2,000
Richmond defenses: 9,136
Petersburg defenses: 1,909
Total: 44,992
 
Strawman.

No, it's just applying your standards for what counts as a defeat to everyone, not just making a special definition for McClellan. Of course, when that isn't working, you're now trying to change the definition.

Strawman.
It's about achieving your objectives. In all the McClellan vs Lee engagements (bar perhaps Shephardstown) it was McClellan that achieved his and Lee that was frustrated.[/QUOTE]

So your saying McClellan's goal in the Peninsula campaign was to be forced to retreat after accomplishing nothing and delay the end of the war by two years? :rolleyes:
 
Last edited:

67th Tigers

Banned
So your saying McClellan's goal in the Peninsula campaign was to be forced to retreat after accomplishing nothing and delay the end of the war by two years? :rolleyes:

McClellan already knew his position was untenable before the Seven Days. He simply didn't have the troops (i.e. 1st Corps) to cover the required frontage in order to secure his lines of communication despite Lincoln's disengeneous promsies to the contrary. Even before he learned of Lee's turning movement on his communications he was planning to shift his base of operations onto the James.

When Lee struck, McClellan executed the shift, achieving his objectives (keeping the Army of the Potomac intact and shifting to a secure base) whilst denying Lee his (cut the Federal line of communication and destroy McClellan's army).

Both Lee and McClellan were under no illusion that McClellan had won, and Lee thought it was just a matter of time before McClellan was reinforced and advanced up the James River line to Petersburg (which indeed was McClellan's concept of operations). His despatching of Jackson north was to try and prevent McClellan from being reinforced. It worked better than Lee's wildest dream; in response to a raid the Federal government withdrew an army sitting on the jugular of the enemy.

Lee was clear in later years that against any other commander he believed he would have destroyed the Army of the Potomac.
 
Top