Could McClellan have won the Civil War?

Union General George McClellan seems to be somewhat controversial around these parts. Some seems to think he was a coward who could have ended the war years earlier; and some have blamed politicians for undermining his campaigns (ensuring he wasn't successful).

Was McClellan really at fault, or did other factor hamper McClellan from winning the U.S. Civil War in 1862 or so?
 
McClellan could have won or significantly shortened the war by throwing in his reserves at the Battle of Antietam so that the Army of Northern Virginia could be destroyed. He could have at least, prevented the defeated Army of Northern Virginia from escaping across the Potomac.
 
McClellan could have won or significantly shortened the war by throwing in his reserves at the Battle of Antietam so that the Army of Northern Virginia could be destroyed. He could have at least, prevented the defeated Army of Northern Virginia from escaping across the Potomac.

I agree. Antietam was already a major Union victory; it wiped out about 20% of the ANV in one day. Even then, the ANV only escaped because a unit stumbled into the battle relatively late (Jackson, I think, coming back from Harper's Ferry). But McClellan didn't push. If he had really asserted his position, he could've mauled the ANV far worse than he actually did. Even after Antietam, with the ANV a mauled force, McClellan just sat back and didn't do anything. He he moved, he could've gone deep into Virginia. The potential for an early end to the civil war was definitely there, if McClellan used the opportunity he was given.

Politicians are far from the reason he performed poorly. In fact, he was relieved from his position for not doing much.
 
McClellan had the initiative to transfer the Army to the James but he did not have the initiative to immediately advance upon Richmond. Instead he waited, thinking that he was outnumbered.

The war maybe wouldn't have ended in 1862 if the Peninsular campaign was a success, but it would have definately been a big nail in the Confederate's coffin.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
I agree. Antietam was already a major Union victory; it wiped out about 20% of the ANV in one day. Even then, the ANV only escaped because a unit stumbled into the battle relatively late (Jackson, I think, coming back from Harper's Ferry).

AP Hill's Division with 5 brigades (Thomas's Georgia Brigade was left at Harper's Ferry to parole the PW's). Lee sent 3 in against 9th Corps, and left the other two back in reserve (they were not engaged on the day).

McClellan did push hard, but finally stopped when he was down to his last reserve (Sumner, commanding the Right Wing countermanded McClellan's order for Franklin's 6th Corps to attack, and on arriving McClellan sided with Sumner); by that point only 10 of his brigades were coherent fighting units (5 of which were 6th Corps), and he was highly vulnerable to a counterattack, which in fact Lee did launch but it fizzled when JEB Stuart ballsed it up.

But McClellan didn't push. If he had really asserted his position, he could've mauled the ANV far worse than he actually did. Even after Antietam, with the ANV a mauled force, McClellan just sat back and didn't do anything. He he moved, he could've gone deep into Virginia. The potential for an early end to the civil war was definitely there, if McClellan used the opportunity he was given.

Never read up on the operations after Antietam? McClellan indeed did (after resupplying and defeating the vanguard of Lee's attempt to reenter Maryland) break off contact, made a very impressive movement into Virginia and succeeded on getting between Lee and Richmond, whilst being continually stripped of troops and, madly, the entire staff of 5th Corps recalled to Washington by the JCCW. In the process he was not blocking Lee's route to Washington (which had a garrison larger than McClellan's Army at this point) and so he had to go.

Politicians are far from the reason he performed poorly. In fact, he was relieved from his position for not doing much.

He was relieved for relying on "Strategy". Burnside's repeated futile assaults at Fredericksburg were exactly how the JCCW believed the war should be fought.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
McClellan had the initiative to transfer the Army to the James but he did not have the initiative to immediately advance upon Richmond. Instead he waited, thinking that he was outnumbered.

The war maybe wouldn't have ended in 1862 if the Peninsular campaign was a success, but it would have definately been a big nail in the Confederate's coffin.

Of course, he actually was outnumbered (see Harsh; Confederate Tide Rising). McClellan was expressly ordered by Lincoln not to resume the offensive until reinforced. (See Reed; Combined Operations in the Civil War)
 

67th Tigers

Banned
McClellan could have won or significantly shortened the war by throwing in his reserves at the Battle of Antietam so that the Army of Northern Virginia could be destroyed. He could have at least, prevented the defeated Army of Northern Virginia from escaping across the Potomac.

I should point out the state of McClellan's Army:

1st Corps: Only Hofmann's brigade of maybe 500 bayonets is intact, since it is detached off as a flank guard. The rest of the Corps is a confused mess and isn't reformed as a fighting unit for another 3 days.

2nd and 12th Corps: Have disintegrated utterly.

5th Corps: Sykes' regular division of 2,000 bayonets is intact but is the only force joining Sumner's right wing and Burnside's left wing. Morell's division of maybe 4,500 bayonets has left a single brigade to guard and support the artillery, whilst the remain two brigades have shored up 2nd Corps position, relieving them on the firing line.

6th Corps: Irwin's brigade is wrecked. Hancock's and Brookes' brigades have relieved elements of 2nd Corps in place. Slocum's division of maybe 3,000 bayonets is formed in an attack column and was the force meant to go forward until Sumner stopped them.

9th Corps: Of the 4 divisions each of about 2,000 bayonets, Rodman's is utterly destroyed (as bad as much of 2nd Corps), while the remaining three have all suffered heavily. Only Ferrero's brigade is really capable of further offensive action.

So McClellan's dispositions, N-S are:

1 Brigade screening the whole of the shattered 1st Corps.

A line of 6 brigades stretching from the right to the centre, with a small division of 3 brigades formed as an assault force.

1 Brigade holding onto the heights over Burnside bridge, whilst the rest of 9th Corps is shattered.

1 Brigade behind the Antietam as a final reserve.

McClellan could have thrown Slocum in with his 3,000 bayonets. Of course, Lee had 2,000 fresh bayonets to throw back at them, in addition to the forces they'd hit.....
 
Never read up on the operations after Antietam? McClellan indeed did (after resupplying and defeating the vanguard of Lee's attempt to reenter Maryland) break off contact, made a very impressive movement into Virginia and succeeded on getting between Lee and Richmond, whilst being continually stripped of troops and, madly, the entire staff of 5th Corps recalled to Washington by the JCCW. In the process he was not blocking Lee's route to Washington (which had a garrison larger than McClellan's Army at this point) and so he had to go.

AFAIK, the Army of the Potomac didn't really do much. I actually wasn't aware of any post-Antietam battles of that season. I looked it up, and discovered exactly on battle, Shepherdstown. Basically, he sent a single corp over (the relatively undamaged Vth) to do what damage it could against a moderately well defended Confederate position. What happened was then a tactically small-scale disaster (could've been a lot worse, of course, but the Confederates were too demoralized and damaged at this point to really take advantage of the battle). The loss of the battle is not really McClellan's fault outside of perhaps not reconnoitering and planning a bit better (although I think even this is just a case of hindsight being 20/20), it's the fault of various ranked subordinates.

Wherever the fault of Shepherdstown lay, the resulting clusterfuck is entirely McClellan's. There was a relatively weak and demoralized Confederate force blocking a potential beachhead from Porter. So, what did McClellan do? He sat there. He didn't try finding another spot to make a beach head (probably the smartest move, depending on the geography) so he could engage Hill and Jackson safely. He didn't try sending additional artillery over to help force the Confederates to keep their head down.

He sat there. Absolutely convinced that the ANV was still massive and ready for round two, he sat there, doing nothing, until finally he was relieved.

That's not really the way a good general should fight.

He was relieved for relying on "Strategy". Burnside's repeated futile assaults at Fredericksburg were exactly how the JCCW believed the war should be fought.

A balance needs to be struck between defense and offense. I agree that Burnside was, for lack of a better word... retarded. And I certainly understand to some extent where McClellan was coming from. The Army of the Potomac was damaged pretty badly. But it was still in a superior position. It had the ability to recover faster, had far fewer casualties, a few divisions that had minimal damage... After a short period of time, he should've been reorganized and (relatively refreshed). The AotP wouldn't have been anything like it was pre-Antietam, but it would've still been an organized force more than capable of taking on the crippled AoNV.
 
Naw, McClellan was just too cautious. He seemed to want to attack with a 3:1 advantage.

Yes. That's a good idea when assaulting a heavy fortification. When fighting on even terrain, and when being aggressive would provide an advantage, and when you have a 2:1 advantage... Well, then it's much better to attack, attack, attack.

He consistently overestimated the Confederate army, which turned into a self fulfilling prophecy. He expected them to have far more soldiers than they did, so he was afraid to commit his own soldiers. He expected them to invade Maryland, so he was afraid to attack while Virginia was vulnerable. Having better reconnaissance would've helped fix that problem.

One of the reasons Lee did so well was because he was an aggressive commander with a strategic view. Granted, that became a liability at some points, but just sitting back and letting a moderately skilled enemy commander do pretty much whatever he wants... Probably a bad idea.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Yes. That's a good idea when assaulting a heavy fortification. When fighting on even terrain, and when being aggressive would provide an advantage, and when you have a 2:1 advantage... Well, then it's much better to attack, attack, attack.

When did McClellan ever have a 2:1 advantage in the open country? The best he got was maybe 3:2 (but probably closer to 5:4) with the enemy occupying the Dominating Ground and Key Terrain at Antietam.

He consistently overestimated the Confederate army, which turned into a self fulfilling prophecy. He expected them to have far more soldiers than they did, so he was afraid to commit his own soldiers. He expected them to invade Maryland, so he was afraid to attack while Virginia was vulnerable. Having better reconnaissance would've helped fix that problem.
Hardly. McClellan's actual estimates of Confederate strength were fairly accurate. Halleck's on the other hand were extremely high, and it's usually Halleck's figures that are attributed to McClellan. However, McClellan did himself no favours by consistantly reporting "Aggregate Present", a figure much higher than "Effective Strength". The distinction was lost on Washington, and has been lost on a generation of writers.

AFAIK, the Army of the Potomac didn't really do much. I actually wasn't aware of any post-Antietam battles of that season. I looked it up, and discovered exactly on battle, Shepherdstown. Basically, he sent a single corp over (the relatively undamaged Vth) to do what damage it could against a moderately well defended Confederate position. What happened was then a tactically small-scale disaster (could've been a lot worse, of course, but the Confederates were too demoralized and damaged at this point to really take advantage of the battle). The loss of the battle is not really McClellan's fault outside of perhaps not reconnoitering and planning a bit better (although I think even this is just a case of hindsight being 20/20), it's the fault of various ranked subordinates.

Wherever the fault of Shepherdstown lay, the resulting clusterfuck is entirely McClellan's. There was a relatively weak and demoralized Confederate force blocking a potential beachhead from Porter. So, what did McClellan do? He sat there. He didn't try finding another spot to make a beach head (probably the smartest move, depending on the geography) so he could engage Hill and Jackson safely. He didn't try sending additional artillery over to help force the Confederates to keep their head down.

He sat there. Absolutely convinced that the ANV was still massive and ready for round two, he sat there, doing nothing, until finally he was relieved.

That's not really the way a good general should fight.
As far as you know that might be, it's not right though.

Shephardstown was part of the Battle that began when McClellan tried forcing the mountain passes at South Mountain and ended about a week after Shephardstown with Stuart's cavalry being defeated by Pleasonton's in their attempt to recross the Potomac.

However, Shephardstown itself was fought well apart from the green regiment that failed to withdraw. What followed was the race for the mountain gaps which McClellan won, putting his army in supply on good ground where Lee would be forced to attack him funnelled through Snickers and Ashby Gaps, and then Lincoln fired McClellan and directed Burnside to shift to Fredericksburg instead.... A superb example of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.
 
The problem with McClellan is that he was not suited for leading an aggressive campaign against the enemy. General to create a well trained army? McClellan was the man. Need a man to lead the troops against and invading enemy to defend your lands? Go to McClellan. McClellan was a great general, offensive campaigns just weren't his specialty.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
The problem with McClellan is that he was not suited for leading an aggressive campaign against the enemy. General to create a well trained army? McClellan was the man. Need a man to lead the troops against and invading enemy to defend your lands? Go to McClellan. McClellan was a great general, offensive campaigns just weren't his specialty.

Which is why he commanded four offensive campaigns and humbugged Lee in every one....
 
Which is why he commanded four offensive campaigns and humbugged Lee in every one....

I said that offensive campaigns weren't McClellan's specialty. No where did I say that he was a poor offensive commander. It's just that while McClellan was competent, there were better Union Generals for conducting offensive campaigns. I'll take a competent general over a poor one, but a great general over a competent one.
 
Copperhead?

Mclellan could have made significant gains by pushing onwards at Fairoaks or Antietam he allowed defeat to be taken from the jaws of victory. Was he a coward? Probably not in the physical sense but he showed a fear of taking risks and accepting responsibility for failure. Burnside took risks and was ultimately fired for it but he also got results.

There is another aspect of Mclellan, heis heart was no fully in the job as shown by his standing against Lincoln on a compromise platform as a Democrat, he had sympathies with the Confederacy. I suggest he was a Copperhead rather than a coward
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Mclellan could have made significant gains by pushing onwards at Fairoaks or Antietam he allowed defeat to be taken from the jaws of victory. Was he a coward? Probably not in the physical sense but he showed a fear of taking risks and accepting responsibility for failure. Burnside took risks and was ultimately fired for it but he also got results.

A physical coward? The man breveted twice for bravery in Mexico (and refusing a third brevet), one for leading a "Forlorn Hope"? Hardly

At Fair Oaks and at Antietam pursuit of the broken Confederate Army was hardly possible. At Fair Oaks the ANV retired back into their heavy entrenchments, at Antietam they put the Potomac River between themselves at McClellan. Neither offers an opportunity to enter the exploitation phase.

I do wonder at a defence of Burnside, the man who kow-towed to Lincoln's wishes even though he knew they were wrong and could do no good....

There is another aspect of Mclellan, heis heart was no fully in the job as shown by his standing against Lincoln on a compromise platform as a Democrat, he had sympathies with the Confederacy. I suggest he was a Copperhead rather than a coward

No, he was a War Democrat. He believed in winning as soon as possible and restoring the Union without emancipating the slaves. His primary opponents on the JCCW were radical Republicans who wanted to prolong the war long enough to abolish slavery. In 1864 his Presidental platform was clear, continue the war and restore the Union, compromising with the South if necessary.
 

cbrunish

Banned
I do wonder at a defence of Burnside, the man who kow-towed to Lincoln's wishes even though he knew they were wrong and could do no good....

The Constitution of the United States clearly gives the President the power of Commander in Chief of the armed forces. McClellan was both insubodinate and weak. No President would have kept him.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
The Constitution of the United States clearly gives the President the power of Commander in Chief of the armed forces. McClellan was both insubodinate and weak. No President would have kept him.

Insubordinate, never. Even "the snub" is apparently a post facto invention.

Weak? I assume you mean morally, in which case no. McClellan was morally strong. Burnside was morally weak, yes, but not McClellan. Had he been weaker, a toadying politician rather than the consumate professional, he'd have had a much longer career.
 

Commissar

Banned
I do wonder at a defence of Burnside, the man who kow-towed to Lincoln's wishes even though he knew they were wrong and could do no good...

Let me defend Burnside then. Knoxville Campaign, without Lincoln breathing down his neck, or treacherous superiors changing his plans at the last minute and leaving him holding the bag as at The Crater, he showed what he was capable of.

He forced 2,000 confederates to surrender at the Cumberland Gap by swinging around them 40 miles to the South through rough terrain marching his men 30 miles a day, took Knoxville unopposed and forced the Confederates to surrender. Burnside also conveniently lost frantic requests from D.C. to send reinforcements to Rosecrans and focused on just maintaining his supply lines which were very fragile.

He won two battles, one at Blountsville and another at Blue Springs, thus securing the Union's hold on Eastern Tennessee.

When the shit hit the fan after Chicamauga, Burnside remained calm and sent a 5,000 strong force to draw Longstreet's attention and keep him focused on Knoxville instead of Chattanooga.

At Campbell's Station, Burnside made a forced march to deploy first and succeeded and defeat Longstreet enabling him to redeploy to Knoxville's defenses.

The Final play in this act was the Battle of Fort Sanders and Burnside authored the most lopsided defeat to a Confederate Force. 13 Union causalities to 813 Confederates.

I don't know about you, but maybe it was the fact Burnside switched to a Corncob Pipe when he went West instead of smoking Cigars, but that campaign showed genius.
 

cbrunish

Banned
Insubordinate, never. Even "the snub" is apparently a post facto invention.

Weak? I assume you mean morally, in which case no. McClellan was morally strong. Burnside was morally weak, yes, but not McClellan. Had he been weaker, a toadying politician rather than the consumate professional, he'd have had a much longer career.

"McClellan further damaged his reputation by his insulting insubordination to his commander-in-chief. He privately referred to Lincoln, whom he had known before the war as a lawyer for the Illinois Central, as "nothing more than a well-meaning baboon", a "gorilla", and "ever unworthy of ... his high position."[37] On November 13, he snubbed the president, visiting at McClellan's house, by making him wait for 30 minutes, only to be told that the general had gone to bed and could not see him." Wikipedia


I retired from the US military and this would be considered insubordination!!!!! In the USA, the military is subordinate to the Civilian elected government. I'm not sure where you're from (I'm guessing the UK).
 
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