Could Market Garden have been successful?

Capture every bridge on schedule and the highway still stops them cold. These were Waffen SS who weren't going to scare and scatter. Even if XXX Corps to Arnhem, they can't cross the river in any force to make the operation strategically successful. At best, its an enormous expenditure of resources for nothing more than closing up than closing up to more of the Rhine and liberating the SW Netherlands.

Read "It Never Snows in September" by Robert Kershaw. Actually the majority of the troops weren't SS, and even those that were, were often poorly trained and recently called to the ranks (the SS divisions had been destroyed and were being rebuilt). By that stage of the war the Germans were absolutely scraping the bottom of the barrel for manpower, so they threw into the Arnhem battle men with no training, "stomach" battalions, men from coastal batteries, just anybody who could be found. They had the same problem with equipment, so although a company of Tiger II's were used, so was a Panzer III which the found somewhere. This book goes a long way to explaining why the paratroopers were able to hold out as long as they did - some of the best troops in the British army fighting magnificently but often against poorly equipped raw recruits or second rate units.

The Germans couldn't understand why the British tanks stopped moving for the night when the road in front of them was open. There are so many what-ifs with this operation, surely it could have succeeded. What if the entire plan hadn't been revealed when a glider carrying all the details of the plan was discovered by the Germans? What if the radios had been tested in non-desert conditions? What if a landing closer to the final bridge had been tried? What if the advance to the bridge had been done in a different way - after all, one end of it was taken. What if the weather had been better. What if the Poles had arrived earlier. What if a an understrength panzer division wasn't there or its presence had been noted and allowed for (assuming the operation still went ahead). What if the arrangement of troops had been different, so that the Americans got the last bridge or lead the land attack. What if the last bridge had been captured but not one of the ones in between?
 
What if the arrangement of troops had been different, so that the Americans got the last bridge or lead the land attack. What if the last bridge had been captured but not one of the ones in between?

The Americans were not in position to launch the landward attack, but given American love for gizmos:rolleyes: I imagine the radios would work. That said, IDK if such poor LZs would still be picked. IMO the operation still fails, with presumably the 82nd US Airborne being destroyed rather than a lightly harmed 1st British Airbourne, which would likely be bumping the 101st US Airborne to Nijmegen.

This is important from a political perspective for the rest of WWII, as a doubt that Monty gets much of a hearing from Ike about his Grand Ideas. And if Monty still holds that infamous press conference about the Battle of the Bulge, He. Will. Be. Gone. Not cashiered, just "switching" with Alexander. Even Alanbrooke's steadfast protection for Monty will have its limits ITTL. Alanbrooke liked Monty and didn't like Alexander. Ike liked Alexander and didn't like Monty.
 
What if an SAS troop had been assigned to XXX for Market Garden? While SAS jeeps can't fight tanks they could act as a recon force. They could slip through back roads and most important they could have reached poles at Driel
Faster.
 
A Bridge too Far is really an apt name for this operation. And the funny thing is people blame Montgomery for being conservative and overly cautious and one time he does a bold operation he is also criticized for it.

The operation could have worked. That it didn't have just been poor luck. Disregarding intelligence, wishful thinking and a badly chosen route to relieve the paratroops combined with an underestimation of the enemy resistance led to comparative failure. It was not an unmitigated disaster, but it was a setback that dashed all hopes of ending the war in 1944.
 
What if a an understrength panzer division wasn't there or its presence had been noted and allowed for (assuming the operation still went ahead). What if the arrangement of troops had been different, so that the Americans got the last bridge or lead the land attack. What if the last bridge had been captured but not one of the ones in between?
The rest of this post is top notch, but the German tanks were noticed by intelligence. I don't have the book to hand, but I'm pretty sure there's a decent account in Bill Buckingham's Arnhem, 1944. Intelligence knew of the German presence in Arnhem (thanks to PR flights, I think). I think they might have even identified the unit. A Major Urquhart - no relation to CO 1st Airborne - was so insistent on bringing this awkward fact up when sending memos to Browning that he was threatened with being forcibly placed on sick leave. Admittedly, the second part of your phrase is true, they weren't allowed for. I don't think Browning even told 1st Airborne that the two divisions of SS were even there.
 
The rest of this post is top notch, but the German tanks were noticed by intelligence. I don't have the book to hand, but I'm pretty sure there's a decent account in Bill Buckingham's Arnhem, 1944. Intelligence knew of the German presence in Arnhem (thanks to PR flights, I think). I think they might have even identified the unit. A Major Urquhart - no relation to CO 1st Airborne - was so insistent on bringing this awkward fact up when sending memos to Browning that he was threatened with being forcibly placed on sick leave. Admittedly, the second part of your phrase is true, they weren't allowed for. I don't think Browning even told 1st Airborne that the two divisions of SS were even there.

Was Browning as clueless IRL as he was depicted in A Bridge Too Far?
 
Was Browning as clueless IRL as he was depicted in A Bridge Too Far?
Buckingham is pretty scathing of him, certainly. Most of the other stuff I've read isn't much kinder. The best most say of him is that he was a General well suited to fighting battles in the corridors of Whitehall. To be fair to him, such a general was needed when the British Airborne forces were being set up, as they were sometimes treated as the army's very own ginger step-child (see FAA, or Coastal Command for further details). His decision to go in with the 82nd at Groesbeek was a dreadful one. If not, those thirty odd gliders can land the rest of 2nd South Staffs on the first day. Buckingham's theory is that Browning felt he had to do a combat jump to prove he was just as much an Airborne man as Ridgeway, his most obvious replacement. Indeed, after one aborted operation, Browning threatened resignation. Brereton's response was to send Ridgeway a message, telling him to be on standby for promotion. Oh, and the way Browning treated the Poles, both before and after M-G, was very shoddy.

Query, were the SS forces there by planning or luck. Might German forces have been weaker?
I believe it was luck. They'd been pulled back for rest, refit and redeploy. In fact, one of the divisions (9th, I think) even refused orders to remove some of the equipment that should be taken off before the tanks were put on the trains. Turned out to be just one more nail in the coffin of the operation.

I really need to find my copy of Buckingham again.
 
Last edited:
Buckingham is pretty scathing of him, certainly. Most of the other stuff I've read isn't much kinder. The best most say of him is that he was a General well suited to fighting battles in the corridors of Whitehall. To be fair to him, such a general was needed when the British Airborne forces were being set up, as they were sometimes treated as the army's very own ginger step-child (see FAA, or Coastal Command for further details). His decision to go in with the 82nd at Groesbeek was a dreadful one. If not, those thirty odd gliders can land the rest of 2nd South Staffs on the first day. Buckingham's theory is that Browning felt he had to do a combat jump to prove he was just as much an Airborne man as Ridgeway, his most obvious replacement. Indeed, after one aborted operation, Browning threatened resignation. Brereton's response was to send Ridgeway a message, telling him to be on standby for promotion. Oh, and the way Browning treated the Poles, both before and after M-G, was very shoddy.


I believe it was luck. They'd been pulled back for rest, refit and redeploy. In fact, one of the divisions (9th, I think) even refused orders to remove some of the equipment that should be taken off before the tanks were put on the trains. Turned out to be just one more nail in the coffin of the operation.

I really need to find my copy of Buckingham again.

I think that's a particularly unfair on 'Boy' Browning the Airborne forces probably would not have been what they were without his leadership from inception to Market Garden.

As for the HQ going in with the first wave - I agree - pointless.

He would have been unable to exert any control and all 3 Divisions + Sub units would have.

However as to his motives my personal opinion was that he was not the type of officer to send others into harms way and not go himself - also it was believed at the time that the whole thing would be a walk over at pretty much every level! Grab the Bridges - hand off to XXX Corps (who roll up the West Wall) - fly in 52nd Low land to Arnhem - everyone home by Christmas.
 
Indeed, after one aborted operation, Browning threatened resignation. Brereton's response was to send Ridgeway a message, telling him to be on standby for promotion.

The cancelled operation was Linnet II, which was probably the worst idea for an airborne plan ever (including Giant II).

On 3rd September it was proposed by Brereton to be carried out on the 4th without consulting:
I Airborne Corps who would carry it out and had no maps of the proposed drop area
12th Army Group in whose area the drop was to be carried out
21st Army Group who still thought that FAAA was dedicated to them

It is not really surprising that Browning tendered his resignation.
 
also it was believed at the time that the whole thing would be a walk over at pretty much every level! Grab the Bridges - hand off to XXX Corps (who roll up the West Wall) - fly in 52nd Low land to Arnhem - everyone home by Christmas.

Indeed, there is a touch of force preservation in the US landing plans - they were thinking ahead to operations to cross the Rhine with 12th Army Group.
 
I think that's a particularly unfair on 'Boy' Browning the Airborne forces probably would not have been what they were without his leadership from inception to Market Garden.
I posted in something of a rush, and probably didn't explain things as well as I could have, but you're right on this point. Without Browning, there likely is no 1st Airborne Division, and certainly not a 6th Airborne too. There might be three or four brigades, at a push, but they probably wouldn't have the backing to operate as a division, even if they have the troops. The Whitehall battle I mentioned had to be fought. Airborne forces were way down the pecking order, yet the constant pressure to Do Something with what had been provided was ever present, even if the stuff provided was totally inadequate for the task at hand.
However as to his motives my personal opinion was that he was not the type of officer to send others into harms way and not go himself - also it was believed at the time that the whole thing would be a walk over at pretty much every level! Grab the Bridges - hand off to XXX Corps (who roll up the West Wall) - fly in 52nd Low land to Arnhem - everyone home by Christmas.
That's a more sympathetic interpretation than Buckingham, but, looking at the mindset of the time, probably a more accurate one. The point about complacency is also very important. I can't help thinking that the lack of German resistance on a line behind the Seine left the allies seriously overconfident. It took Arnhem and the Bulge to shift that.
The cancelled operation was Linnet II, which was probably the worst idea for an airborne plan ever (including Giant II).

On 3rd September it was proposed by Brereton to be carried out on the 4th without consulting:
I Airborne Corps who would carry it out and had no maps of the proposed drop area
12th Army Group in whose area the drop was to be carried out
21st Army Group who still thought that FAAA was dedicated to them

It is not really surprising that Browning tendered his resignation.
Ah. I'd forgotten the details. I can't blame him either. Even for a command that's getting very complacent, even demob happy, that's horrifying.
 
Could it have been successful as in the WAllies successfully establish a bridgehead over the Rhine? With only minor modifications to the plan and more urgency in it's execution, sure it would.

Would it have achieved a bridgehead large and stable enough to support a rapid southeastward turn into the Ruhr thereby ending the war by Christmas, which is what Montgomery said it would? Nope.
 
My general impression of Market Garden is that it seems like the planning and preparation for it was a bit rushed, if it had been put back a week or so then I think it would of had a much better chance of success. One example is VIII Corps under O'Connor and XII Corp under Richie were meant to advance up roughly parallel roads to the main thrust east and west of it respectively, but they were short of time to re-deploy to their start positions and get organised before the operation started. Extra time would potentially allow them to get into position, rearm and refit and therefore be able to provide better flank protection to the main force. You would also hope that the extra time might help to bring the problems with the radios to light but that's certainly not guaranteed. The supposed intelligence warning about the Groesbeek Heights might also have been sorted out allowing the Nijmegen bridge to be captured straight away so that XXX Corps don't have to waste time helping capture it later on.


Query, were the SS forces there by planning or luck. Might German forces have been weaker?
IIRC they were there by luck, they were pretty understrength so were pulled out of the line to rest and refit at Arnhem. One of the two divisions that made up II SS Panzer Corps, 9th SS Panzer Division or 10th SS Panzer Division I forget which, was actually planned to transfer back to Germany only a few days after the start date of Operation Market Garden. If the operation had started slightly later like I suggested it could have halved the opposition that they would have to face at Arnhem from the SS.
 
Carl

Agree with your conclusion, but I believe you are wrong on the "40 divisions "/"full blooded thrust" details.

IIRC the 40 divisions date back to August with Montgomery suggesting a thrust by 1st Canadian, 2nd British and 1st US armies to cross the Seine, breach the next defensive line on the Somme, capture the V-1 sites at the Pas de Calais, take Brussels and its airfields and breach the Westwall at Aachen. This was quickly overtaken by events.

The 'full-blooded thrust' was in a letter to Eisenhower prior to the planning for market-garden suggesting that the target of Allied operations was Berlin. SHAEF seems to have interprtated this as Montgomery intending to launch an offensive aimed at Berlin, but it seems to me more like a reminder on Maintenance of the Aim.

When Market- Garden was launched, the strategic success would be an Allied Corps across the Rhine, cutting off German forces in the Netherlands and Western Belgium, and opening the way for a concentrated Allied thrust up either bank of the Rhine, negating the Westwall defences.

At the scale of the overall campaign in the west I'd call that a operational success. Detaching the Dutch urban zones won't damage Germany's war fighting ability much, & would complicate Allied transportation if they must feed Rotterdam & the others. Conversely having fourth divisions, or thirty across the Rhine & into Germany creates all sorts of consequences of Stratigic weight.
 
My general impression of Market Garden is that it seems like the planning and preparation for it was a bit rushed, if it had been put back a week or so then I think it would of had a much better chance of success. One example is VIII Corps under O'Connor and XII Corp under Richie were meant to advance up roughly parallel roads to the main thrust east and west of it respectively, but they were short of time to re-deploy to their start positions and get organised before the operation started. Extra time would potentially allow them to get into position, rearm and refit and therefore be able to provide better flank protection to the main force. You would also hope that the extra time might help to bring the problems with the radios to light but that's certainly not guaranteed. The supposed intelligence warning about the Groesbeek Heights might also have been sorted out allowing the Nijmegen bridge to be captured straight away so that XXX Corps don't have to waste time helping capture it later on.



IIRC they were there by luck, they were pretty understrength so were pulled out of the line to rest and refit at Arnhem. One of the two divisions that made up II SS Panzer Corps, 9th SS Panzer Division or 10th SS Panzer Division I forget which, was actually planned to transfer back to Germany only a few days after the start date of Operation Market Garden. If the operation had started slightly later like I suggested it could have halved the opposition that they would have to face at Arnhem from the SS.

Would this not cause the Germans to say: "Screw it, blow all the bridges short of Arnhem NOW and we'll hold here"?
 
Would this not cause the Germans to say: "Screw it, blow all the bridges short of Arnhem NOW and we'll hold here"?

The Germans could have also blown up the dike near Arnhem earlier and then the allies would have to deal with crossing the Waal and the flooded island to get to the Rhine.
 
Top